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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSUMER RIGHTS
The identification of the consumer as a discrete party, entitled to specific
legal rights, is a product of the latter half of the twentieth century. Looking
back on the last four decades, one can now clearly detect a trend for special
legislation protecting the interests of consumers. These resonate with the values
expounded by President Kennedy, who famously in his 15 March 1962
declaration to the United States Congress said: "Consumers by definition,
include us all ... They are the largest economic group, affecting and affected by
almost every public and private economic decision. Yet they are the only
important group ... whose views are often not heard." He declared four basic
consumer rights: the right to safety, the right to be informed, the right to
choose, and the right to be heard. Significantly for our present theme, the right
to redress was not mentioned, but as we shall see this has become an important
aspect of consumer law and policy and is one of four additional rights
developed by Consumers International.' States in developed economies were
relatively quick to start granting rights based on Kennedy's declaration to their
consumers, and most now have fairly comprehensive consumer laws.
Developing countries continue to catch up under the influence of the United
Nations Guidelines on Consumer Protection.2
However, in recent times the legislatures of the First World have become
more reluctant to regulate consumer issues. In part, this may be a form of
paralysis, because the consumer problems of today are no longer of the
manageable order that yesterday's politicians were able to gain plaudits for
addressing in a way that produced obvious improvements. Also, whether it was
the impact of consumer laws, competitive forces, developments in technology,
or other factors, one can certainly say that the quality of cars, white goods, and
to some extent the practices of creditors, have improved over the last few
decades. A more daunting set of tasks face today's politicians if they wish to
claim to be able to use law to control the types of risks3 facing the modem
consumer -witness the issues concerning BSE, GM foods, and the threat to state
regulation posed by trading on the internet.
1. The others are the rights to satisfaction of basic needs, to education, and to a healthy
environment.
2. GA. Res. 39, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 106th mtg., U.N. Doc. (1985); See Guidelines for
Consumer Protection, Department of International Economic Affairs, U.N., N.Y. (1986).
3. See generally ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY, (1992).
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Even in the traditional arena for consumer law, i.e. the sale of consumer
durables, governments are less keen to regulate. This is partly because, on the
whole most developed countries have fairly strong consumer laws, and there is
a preference for self-regulatory solutions to new problems. This reflects the
feeling that there is little sense in adopting laws if they do not actually lead to
traders changing their behavior and wronged consumers being able to have
access to justice. There is certainly an appreciation that rather than piling up
consumer laws, it is important to make those we already have work better.
Of course one way of enforcing consumer laws is through public
enforcement. This is especially appropriate with respect to safety issues, where
the supervision of the marketplace cannot safely be left to individual initiative.
Equally, financial services are so vital for individuals and often involve sums
so large that the state clearly has a role in supervising the market. At the other
end of the spectrum, state involvement might be desirable to deal with small
economic losses which might not justify individual litigation, and also for
matters of taste where the state might feel it should be involved and individuals
may again not be sufficiently motivated to act themselves. The function of the
state as protector of the consumer is, however, another inquiry, for we are
concerned in this essay with how consumers as individuals can invoke the law
to voice their concerns, obtain redress, and help ensure the development of
higher trading standards. Our discussion of public authorities will therefore be
limited to their role in assisting consumers to utilize the law. This essay is
concerned with assessing the comparative efficacy of different modes of
consumer redress within disparate regulatory cultures.
II. WAVES OF ACCESS To JUSTICE
A good starting point for the legal analysis of consumer access to justice
issues must still be the seminal work of Prof. Mauro Capelletti.4 This influential
work has proven to be fertile ground for many subsequent commentators, but
we believe there is still merit in reconsidering his theories in the present political
and regulatory climate. This is not least because we shall go on to show that,
in addition to the three waves in the access to justice movement which Capelletti
discerned, two subsequent regulatory and globalization waves can be detected,
and we will argue for an extension of his analysis in the form of a further
integrative wave. Capelletti's first wave concerned economic matters (i.e.
providing citizens with the legal means to seek justice, i.e. legal aid). The
second wave was organizational (i.e. extending standing to bodies that could act
4. See generally MAURO CAPELLETTI & B. GARTH, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1976); MAURO
CAPELLETTI, ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE, (1981); See also Mauro Capelletti, Alternative
Dispute Resolution Processes within the Framework of the Worldwide Access to Justice Movement, 56 MOD.
L. REV. 282 (1993).
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on behalf of diffuse interests and developing class actions). The third wave was
procedural (i.e. developing ADR). It is interesting to reflect on these three
waves with the benefit of hindsight.
Reading the literature of the late seventies and early eighties on how to
make legal services available to the public,5 one is struck by the optimistic tone
struck by legal radicals. At that time the UK, for instance, had a relatively large
legal aid budget and a flourishing Law Centre movement. With hindsight this
optimism was misplaced. Today in the UK, it would be unrealistic to suggest
that the public purse should finance increased lawyers to fight for the
vulnerable. Although there is the possibility of some legal provision being
given to consumers through the Community Legal Service6 and grants to bodies
like the Citizen's Advice Bureaux do continue, nevertheless the move is to
restrict legal aid and to privatize the delivery of legal services through the use
of contingent fees. A similar pattern is replicated in other countries.
However, the second and third waves remain strong. The organizational
changes have indeed strengthened the role of bodies such as consumer
organizations and public authorities in representing the consumer collective
interest. This can be rationalized as reflecting the law's recognition that
litigation has increased in significance as a means of protecting consumers as
compared to direct regulation. A very practical manifestation of this is the EC's
Consumer Injunctions Directive.' Moreover, class action procedures have
spread throughout the common law world and are being discussed in many civil
law countries, and even introduced in a few.8 In some rare instances in common
law countries, public bodies are even allowed to support individual litigation.9
In civil law countries with the partie civile procedure, the prosecutors assist
consumers to compensation by bringing criminal actions which can lead to
compensation.
The procedural wave favoring ADR has of course continued apace. There
has always been a certain ambiguity as to the motives for adopting ADR. Some
view it as a sensible and affordable way of dealing with relatively minor
consumer problems. Others champion it as a means to provide a higher form
of justice than that which is served up by the adversarial court process.'" For
5. See e.g., M. Zander, The First Wave, in ACCESSTOJUSTICEANDTHE WELFARE STATE(1981).
6. Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22 (Eng.); See at http://www.justask.org.uk (last visited Aug. 29,
2002).
7. Council Directive 98/27, art. 2, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51.
8. Such as Quebec, and to some extent, France.
9. For instance, this is possible for product liability actions in Australia, see the Australian
Consumer and Competition Commission - role and functions, at
http://www.accc.gov.au/pubs/Publications/Corporate/ACCCRoleFuncti.pdf (last visited October 12, 2002).
10. CAPELLETTI, supra note 4, (referring to it as "co-existential justice").
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others it is seen as merely providing second class justice for the poor." Some
recent moves, such as the introduction of compulsory arbitration for small
claims in Germany, are clearly primarily motivated by a desire for cost
reduction.'" Indeed one can detect a certain managerial edge to the
administration of many ADR schemes, yet instances can still be discovered
where ADR is advocated as a better form of justice more suited to the needs of
consumers.
Thus some of the same issues continue to be the same as when Capelletti
defined his three waves, albeit that the contours of debate have evolved over
time. If one were seeking to identify new waves, one might select the
regulatory function of redress actions and cross-border or globalization
dimension.
Litigation has always had a regulatory function. The nineteenth century
German scholar Rudolf von Ihering found it unsatisfactory that individuals
should decide whether to institute litigation on the basis of a personal cost-
benefit analysis, because they had a duty to take into account the public interest
in demonstrating the effectiveness of the law and deterring potential law
breakers.' 3 The changes in organizational structure have helped emphasize the
role litigation plays in developing standards. The motivation behind injunctions
brought by state agencies and/or consumer organizations is primarily to promote
better trading practices. Class actions often have, as one dimension, the desire
to ensure that wrongs are exposed and that remedial action is taken. This
learning process 4 function of litigation has also become evident in some ADR
schemes. For instance, an important function of private sector Ombudsmen
schemes is to provide guidance to industry through published decisions or
annual reports. Even arbitration Schemes are aware that they have to provide
some means of commenting on the poor practices they come across. It is
perhaps only in the small claims courts, where the cases are too minor to be
reported and there is no supervisory structure, that the need to learn the lessons
of disputes is not being appreciated.
The globalization of consumer disputes is becoming more than a mere
theoretical problem. This is a factor of increased international travel and trade. 5
It is most prominent in the EC, which as the world's most integrated free trade
zone, has encouraged consumers to shop across borders and has taken
11. RICHARD ABEL, THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, (1992).
12. See § 15a EGZPO (Gesetz betreffend die Einfifhrung der Zivilprozebordnung).
13. Dr. Rudolf von Ihering, Der Kampf Um's Recht, (1889) quoted in H. Ktz, PUBLIC INTEREST
LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY in Capelletti (1981) op cit.
14. K.N. Llewellyn, The Normative, The Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method,
49 YALE L.J. 1355 (1940).
15. The events of September 11 th may lead to some reduction in travel in the short term at least, but
trade will remain increasingly international.
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responsibility for making it easier for consumers to obtain redress, should things
go wrong. 6 However, this is now a global phenomenon, given the increasing
pervasiveness of Internet trading. This causes problems for regulatory
authorities' 7 and also individuals who want to seek redress from overseas. The
Internet challenges conventional rules on how law should control businesses.
Even if one wanted to hold on to the belief that the traditional court based forms
of redress were adequate to deal with consumer problems, this cannot be a
realistic response to the Internet. Formal court procedures cannot be the right
way to resolve disputes for small amounts between parties on the opposite side
of the globe. The only practical solution is some sort of virtual ADR court.
This forces one to confront the economics of litigation, but in fact it only
confirms and reinforces the existing trend.
We shall conclude with a request for a sixth integrative wave to be
generated in the future, which involves bringing the ordinary courts and the
ADR schemes into sync. We see a strange phenomenon occurring. The
collective dimension is being recognized in the court system (collective
injunctions and class actions), yet the focus of consumer litigation is being
shifted to ADR mechanisms in which these collective instruments rarely exist.
Equally, some ADR mechanisms are taking their function of raising trade
standards extremely seriously and are adopting innovative techniques, yet the
traditional courts continue to rely upon publicity of decisions, which is not
really meaningful for small consumer claims. Thus, we want there to be a sixth
wave of integration of innovations between the courts and ADR institutions.
1I. ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A COMPARATIVE VENTURE
There are many examples of good practice in the consumer redress field.
However, we will caution that, whilst one should accept that consumer redress
mechanisms will be - and indeed we will argue ought to be - different from
ordinary court procedures, one should not accept that these differences ought to
be an excuse for simply providing a poorer version of what already exists.
Consumer problems need unique solutions. Our intention is not to map out a
common model for consumer redress institutions which each country should
follow. The exact mix (for inevitably there will be a mix) of redress systems
will vary from country to country, depending upon national traditions and legal
cultures, and will inevitably build upon what already exists. However, we
believe a comparative survey will provide some interesting models and reveal
some important lessons. We also hope that we can provide some guiding
principles of universal value against which national systems can be judged. The
16. See infra pp. 51-53.
17. Allan Fels, The Global Enforcement Challenge: Enforcement of Consumer Protection Laws
in a Global Marketplace, (Aug. 1997) (discussion paper).
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most fundamental being that one should welcome the uniqueness of redress
schemes set up to address consumer problems, and not simply judge them by
how closely they replicate the ordinary courts. In fact, we suggest that the
potential of new alternatives may not be fully delivered, and problems can
result, if they are simply modeled and judged against existing court based
redress schemes.
It is with regard to redress schemes dealing with relatively small individual
disputes that most work has been undertaken to develop criteria against which
they should be judged. We shall review this, but we also seek to paint a broader
canvas of consumers' use of litigation. It is harder to put forward universal
principles to cover all types of consumer litigation. For instance, different
criteria will apply depending on whether the claim is a one-off individual
dispute or raises broader collective consumer concerns; equally the ability of the
consumer to obtain legal representation will be relevant in some but not all
types of dispute.
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSUMER DISPUTES
At a fundamental level, it is possible to suggest certain special
characteristics of consumer litigation which explain why we think it calls for an
entirely different and novel approach, rather than simply a slimmed down
version of traditional models of justice. Consumers often have small claims,
although the total harm caused by a particular problem to the consumer
collective can be great. Even small claims can have a significant impact on
consumer welfare. This is especially so for the disadvantaged, who ironically
are less likely to seek redress. Moreover, consumer problems are likely to be
a greater irritant to consumer lives than their mere economic consequences
might suggest, because of the distress and wasted time the problems generate.
What to lawyers looks like an economic problem, often translates to the
consumer as a social problem.
Consumers come in all shapes and sizes and few will have the resources
to employ lawyers to deal with their consumer problems, and many will be
intimidated by approaching traders or third party dispute resolution procedures.
One only has to look at the low levels of literacy even in developed western
societies to see how the prospect of writing a formal complaint, yet alone being
enmeshed in legal proceedings, might be a forbidding prospect for many.
Others will simply not find it worthwhile to expend energy on relatively small
claims.
Thus, consumer claims often represent individual losses, but need
collective procedures often involving third parties representing them, to find a
remedy. Advocating such procedures can be quite a tricky argument to win.
The need for such mechanisms is obvious in contexts like the environment,
2002]
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where there can be no obvious human victim. In contrast, in the consumer
context, the jibe can be made that if the victim does not think the claim merits
action, then there is no real 'mischief' to be remedied. However, it is hoped that
the reader can see that whilst it may be a sensible decision for individuals not
to take such cases, this may mask real consumer detriment. It has been
suggested that many individuals who bring cases have to possess "super-spite" 8
to do so. Nevertheless, society would benefit from wrongs being rectified and
trading standards being improved and this requires some mechanisms for
consumer grievances to be voiced.
Consumer disputes can be categorized into four categories. Variables
might include whether the claim is specific to an individual or if it affects the
consumer collective, and whether it is for a large or small amount.' 9 Where
claims involve large individual claims, the consumer aspect of the claim is
perhaps less significant. Such claims raise the same familiar issues, such as
funding and the courts' ability to influence behavior, that are pervasive
throughout the law.20 For this reason we will not spend more time on the
problems facing consumers with large claims where they are of an individual
nature. We will dwell longer on the issues surrounding large claims, which
represent a collective problem. This is both because they raise specific concerns
of organization and funding and also because we wish to reflect on the ability
of such actions to promote the collective interest. The law in this area is making
some hesitant steps at improvement. This allows us to contrast the position with
how poorly the law facilitates collective claims where the amounts at stake are
small for individuals, even if collectively they are large. However, our focus
will first be on the main practical problem which consumers pose for the legal
system. Namely, how to manage the numerous small individual disputes
consumers have.
V. INDIVIDUAL SMALL CLAIMS
Two main approaches have been adopted to manage disparate consumer
disputes often involving small amounts. Under one approach, the dispute is
characterized according to the type of consumer product or service involved,
and a separate dispute mechanism provided which appropriately matches the
dispute characteristics in some sense. This approach has been followed in a
number of the countries which we studied, where particular grievance remedial
processes are provided for disputes in connection with specific and discrete
18. Arthur Allen Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite- The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE
L.J. 1,21 (1970).
19. Leaving to one side the debate is about what is a small claim.
20. It should be noted however, that some of the Ombudsmen schemes for instance, can award quite
considerable sums, although most operate a ceiling on the awards that are binding on firms.
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products. So we see for example, an arbitration scheme set up to deal with
complaints about vehicles,2 a complaints board to deal with insurance
disputes, 22 and ombudsmen to deal with specific sector disputes.23 Commonly,
this is a privatized form of justice. This approach carries the advantage that
most such schemes abide by standards of fairness,24 and provide a decision
maker who has expertise and specialist knowledge. However, since in many
instances the imperative for the setting up of such mechanisms (and indeed the
finance) has come from the product or service providers, there may be a trade-
off between this managerialist approach and the kind of guarantees of
independence and impartiality which are taken for granted in the traditional
adjudicative setting.
The other approach is to provide a special state-funded mechanism, and to
invest it with the particular characteristics, which are regarded as suitable for
'small' consumer disputes of any nature. Most commonly, this mechanism will
be a variant or adaptation of the normal court hearing (although the state-funded
Scandinavian Consumer Complaints Boards are an exception providing an
informal mode of resolution). Here, the advantages of specialism may not
pertain (although there are some exceptions, notably the Consumer Credit
Tribunals in some Australian jurisdictions and the specialist boards that work
within the Scandinavia Consumer Complaints Board structure) and while the
independence of the adjudicator is unlikely to be put in question, other concerns
may arise as to the suitability of the forum given many of their origins in court-
based formal proceedings.
The advantages of court based schemes are that they have the authority of
law, are independent, and can hand down binding decisions. These are also the
roots of some of the disadvantages of using courts as a means of consumer
protection. Judicial processes have to maintain a degree of formalism that can
be off-putting to consumers. The judges may have limited knowledge of
consumer law and even less appreciation that consumer problems may call for
solutions which stretch traditional legal concepts. Also, each court decision is
21. G. Howells & R. James, Litigation in the Consumer Interest, Report for the Nuffield Foundation
and paper presentation to the Annual Conference of the Society of Pubic Teachers of Law, (Sept. 1999)
(discussing the Canadian Motor Vehicle Arbitration Plan (CAMVAP)).
22. Id. (discussing Norwegian Bureau for Insurance Disputes Forsikringsklagekontoret
Arsbereming).
23. Id. (discussing the example of the banking ombudsmen in Australia, Canada, the UK, and New
Zealand); See RHODA JAMES, PRIVATE OMBUDSMEN AND PUBLIC LAW, (1997) (for a discussion on the banking
ombudsmen in Australia, Canada, the UK, and New Zealand, and for other private ombudsmen in the UK);
R. James & P. Morris, The New Financial Ombudsmen Service in the UK- Has the Second Generation Got
it Right?, Paper presented to the 8th International Consumer Law Conference in New Zealand (Apr. 9-1I,
2001).
24. In most instances, they also provide for awards which are binding, or binding de facto, on the
business.
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seen as unique, and there is normally no attempt to obtain an overview of
consumer issues in order to tackle systemic problems. Of course some legal
systems have done their best to eliminate these problems. New Zealand, is one
such example, where the disputes tribunals are quite distinct from traditional
courts.2 5
One point requires emphasis, since it must colour any conclusions about
how well individual redress mechanisms work. Whatever form they take, small
claims court or ADR system, consumer redress mechanisms are still unlikely to
serve the interests of the most disadvantaged. As one commentator in the
United Kingdom has said after studying the small claims courts there "for the
most part, small claims hearings involve well-to-do people suing other well-to-
do people., 26 This mirrors research findings from the US and Canada.27 ADR
procedures have a similar record.28 However accessible and effective they may,
they are still operating in a context where the balance is skewed against those
who can least bear the loss caused by a faulty product or service, and who may
be least able to negotiate successfully with a company.
In setting out to examine mechanisms for individual consumer redress it
is immediately clear that here is an area where Capelletti's third procedural
wave is particularly evident, in form at least. But the whole range of consumer
redress problems are not usually covered by such procedures, and one should
note a broad distinction between disputes concerning the financial services
sector, where ADR schemes are quite numerous, and general consumer disputes
about goods and services where there continues to be a need to rely on court
based solutions, albeit that court procedures have often been modified to
accommodate small claims.
Different forms of ADR have been taken up in different countries. In
some, notably Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK, the private
ombudsman has proved to be a popular consumer remedy with business,
government, and broadly with consumer interests. There is evidence of its
success in providing an easy-to-use and free process for the individual
25. See discussion in Geraint Howells, Rhoda James & Peter Spiller, Making the Alternative
Appropriate: ADRfor Consumer, 7 N.Z. BUS. L. Q. 204 (2001).
26. J. BALDWIN, SMALL CLAIMS IN THE COUNTY COURTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES: THE BARGAIN
BASEMENT OF CIVIL JUSTICE, (1997).
27. JOHN CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETNOGRAPHY OF
LEGAL DISCLOSURE, (1990); Seana C. McGuire & Roderick A. MacDonald, Small Claims Court Cant, 34
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 3,509 (1996).
28. John Birds & Cosmo Graham, Complaints Against Insurance Companies, I CONSUMER L.J. 92
(1993) (explaining that private ombudsmen have been found to be accessed largely by male, middle class
professionals); Rhoda James & Mary Seneviratne, Offering Views in Both Directions: A Survey of Member
Agencies and Complainants on Their Views of the Ombudsman for Corporate Estate Agents Schemes,
Sheffield Law Faculty (1996).
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consumer.29 (Typically, they are able to decide disputes taking into account the
relevant law, industry codes of practice, and considerations of what is fair and
reasonable and make awards of up to a financial limit, which in the UK is
£100,000, which are binding on the companies in the scheme.)
Despite its popularity as a consumer grievance mechanism in many
countries, the spread of this type of private ombudsman has not been universal.
In the US, which is notable for the rapid proliferation of ombudspersons, the
office has been largely confined to the governmental or public agency sphere,
with some limited individual corporate instances.3° The idea of an ombudsman
to cover a particular industry or corporate sector has not taken hold as it has in
other countries. Whether this results from a different regulatory climate or the
availability of other, preferred consumer remedies is unclear, but it provides
emphasis for the point that it would be impractical to prescribe universal
solutions.
Where the idea has taken hold, it has to be said that private ombudsmen are
largely concentrated in financial services. The structural features of industries
in those sectors have meant that the early provision of an external complaints
mechanism was a feasible voluntary response to threats of statutory
intervention. The absence of ombudsmen in the retail sector is striking and
may, incidentally, go some way to explaining research findings in the UK that
ombudsmen played a minimal role in consumer disputes.3'
In most countries there are. some consumer sectors, outside financial
services, which operate codes of practice including the provision of a low cost
arbitration schemes. One problem with these schemes is their often low
visibility to the public eye, and also their perceived lack of independence.
Consumers are concerned not so much about the independence of the arbitrator,
but rather about attempts to force them to mediate claims. Moves are afoot to
improve these schemes,32 but as a general rule, it is true to say that globally
outside the financial service sector, there are few examples of effective industry
ADR schemes.
29. The spread continues. See, Government to Appoint Banking Ombudsman, DAWN (London), June
19, 2001, at I (discussing Pakistan's Finance Minister's announcement of his intention to appoint a banking
ombudsman).
30. See Donald C. Rowat, The Parliamentary Ombudsman: Should the Scandinavian Scheme Be
Transplanted?, 28 INT'L REV. ADMIN. SC. 399 (1962); WALTER GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN:
GOVERNMENTAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, (1966); Larry B. Hill, Institutionalization, the Ombudsman, and
Bureaucracy, 68 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1075, 1077 (1974); Shirley A. Wiegand, A Just and Lasting Peace:
Supplanting Mediation with the Ombuds Model, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 95 (1996); See also
Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombudsman Offices, 2000, A.B.A. Section of
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice.
31. HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW, (1999).
32. See Statement of Principles of the National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee of the
American Arbitration Association: Consumer Due Process Protocol, (May 1998).
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The kind of criteria against which to judge mechanisms for individual
consumer redress are well known, and there is a general consensus in the
literature33 about the kind of points which need to be met, certainly for a non-
court based resolution scheme. The benchmarks recently adopted by the
Australian Government34 are broadly representative of this consensus
identifying considerations of accessibility, independence, fairness,
accountability, efficiency and effectiveness. The European Commission, too,
has been looking at consumer redress and has produced a Recommendation on
the principles applicable to bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of
consumer disputes. 5 These are the principles of independence, transparency, the
adversarial principle, and principles of effectiveness, legality, liberty, and
representation. Both the benchmarks and principles bear detailed examination.
Although they cover much the same ground, there are some interesting
differences that serve to illustrate some of the difficulties faced in trying to
devise an all-purpose model for consumer redress. They also highlight areas of
deficiency. Since, for us, they seem to encompass the kind of considerations
which must be integral to an effective consumer redress mechanism, in this
article we shall use them to test all the consumer redress schemes we have
examined in our comparative survey, whether or not those schemes are court-
based or ADR institutions, and regardless of whether the criteria would be
formally applicable in their national setting.
The Australian benchmarks seem well suited to an ombudsman type of
remedy. The EC principles have inevitably been fashioned to cover the
multiplicity of forms of redress which currently exist within the EU, and one
can detect in places the influence of the court-based, formal approach favored
in civil law countries. Clearly some formal protection is required. The question
is as to where the balance should be struck between, on the one hand, imposing
the kind of formal protections for the consumer which have their origins in a
judicialized forum, and on the other, accepting that for out-of-court procedures
to function as a cheap and accessible remedy then some formal procedural
requirements must be relaxed.
VI. INDEPENDENCE
Independence is probably the most crucial characteristic. It is also one
which is easier to demonstrate the closer the mechanism is to a judicial model.
33. See, e.g., John Birds & Cosmo Graham, Complaints Mechanisms in the Financial Services
Industry, I CIV. JUST. Q 313 (1988).
34. J. Chris Ellison, Minister for Customs and Consumer Affairs, Benchmarks for Industry-Based
Customer Dispute Resolution (1997).
35. Commission Recommendation 98/257 on the Principles Applicable to the Bodies Responsible
for Out-of-Court Settlement of Consumer Disputes, 1998 O.J. (L 115) 31.
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Both the benchmark and the EC principles require that institutional
arrangements should be in place to guarantee the independence of the decision-
making body and thus the impartiality of the decisions. The benchmark requires
that the members of the scheme (i.e. the companies), should have no role in the
decision making process and the administration of the scheme. Both require
that the arrangements made as to the appointment of the decision maker should
be such as to ensure independence from the companies, and the principle
requires that where a decision is taken by an individual, this independence is to
be guaranteed by a range of measures including the requirement that the
appointment of that individual should be for a period of time sufficient to ensure
independence, and that the individual should not be liable to be relieved of his
duties without just cause
The principle also requires that the person appointed should not have
worked for the professional association or one of its members within three years
of the appointment, if that professional association is concerned in the
appointment or remuneration of the decision maker; but it does not impose any
limits on where a post holder might go after holding such an appointment. This
might, however, be at least as significant an issue.
These are all criteria which are met by small claims courts. As to
arbitration, there is usually no serious question about lack of formal
independence of arbitrators, but concerns arise where they are habitually
appointed by an industry and may give the appearance of, at the least,
familiarity with the company representatives. This is the familiar problem of
the advantages of repeat players.
Lack of independence from the industry which funds the private
ombudsman has been one long standing criticism. However, the criticism
usually relates to the institutional arrangements rather than any suggestion of
lack of impartiality on the part of the individuals who hold the office. That said,
there has been some evidence of individual ombudsmen having to withstand
covert industry pressure.36 The private ombudsman has its origins in the United
Kingdom, and the solution devised there to keep the companies at arms length
from the ombudsman and his decision making was a tri-partite structure which
placed an ombudsman council (chaired by an independent person of high repute
and with a majority of independent members) between the ombudsman and the
company which funded the scheme. This was the model adopted first by the
insurance industry in the United Kingdom when they introduced the first such
ombudsman in 1981, and it is a format that has been largely exported to
Australia, NZ, and Canada. Concerns have still been voiced however about the
36. See Howells & James, supra note 21, for an example of a former Australian Banking
Ombudsman and a former UK Insurance Ombudsman; P.E. Morris & J.A. Hamilton, The Insurance
Ombudsman and the PIA Ombudsman: A Critical Comparison, 47 N. Ir. LEGAL Q. 119 (1996).
2002]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
influence of the industry,37 and there have also been concerns where the
ombudsman company had the final power of approval and reappointment withS 38
the result that some schemes have moved to fixed term appointments. In the
United Kingdom, many of these concerns will only be of historic interest, since
the new Financial Ombudsman Service is about to take over the work of eight
existing ombudsman schemes in the financial services sector. As a statutory
scheme, this now represents a reverse in the privatization trend, looking, as it
does, rather like a nationalization of a previously self-regulatory mechanism.
39
Similar plans have been put forward in Canada to introduce one ombudsman in
the financial services sector.4n
The EC principle of independence further requires that any individual who
is the decision maker must possess the abilities, experience and competence,
'particularly in the field of law', required to carry out this function. Most
arbitrators, ombudsmen and judges in small claims courts are lawyers, although
there are notable exceptions, especially for example, in the New Zealand
Disputes Tribunals where only ten percent are lawyers.4 ' Some ombudsmen, the
current Canadian Banking Ombudsman, for example, and some in the United
Kingdom 42 are drawn from other professional backgrounds. In our view this
does not seem to detract from their effectiveness. Indeed, since these
ombudsmen are generally required to make rulings in the light of what is fair
and reasonable there may well be advantages in a non-lawyer examining
established practices with a fresh eye, free from any preconceptions. But as it
is, most of the existing ombudsmen are lawyers further confirming the view that
37. See Howells & James, supra note 21, at 31, for an example of where Democracy watch have
argued that subsequent appointments to independent directorships of the Canadian Banking Ombudsman Inc.
are inevitably tainted because the original appointees (who made subsequent appointments) were selected by
the industry.
38. Id.
39. James & Morris, supra note 23.
40. See Report of the Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Financial Services Sector, Change
Challenge Opportunity, (1998) (explaining that the relevant legislation finally received the royal assent in June
2001. More recently, it was announced in December 2001, that the five major financial services industries
in Canada- banks, life and health insurers, property and casualty insurers, investment dealers, and the mutual
fund industry- have agreed to the creation, on a self-regulatory basis, of a National Financial Services
OmbudService (NFSO), which will provide a central contact point for consumers where they can be referred
to. the relevant industry redress mechanisms, some of which are yet to be put in place. It is understood that
the new redress mechanisms are likely to be modeled on the existing Canadian Banking Ombudsman
organization, which will itself form part of NFSO. The NFSO is to come into operation in July 2002, CANADA
NEWS WIRE, Dec. 20, 2001, and an interview by the authors with Mike Lauber, (Jan. 8, 2002).
41. PETER SPILLER, THE DISPUTES TRIBUNALS OF NEW ZEALAND, (1997).
42. See for example, the current and previous Estates Agents Ombudsman, and the Legal Services
Ombudsman. In the case of the latter, the relevant legislation prescribes that the post-holder who oversees
complaints against lawyers may not be a lawyer.
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the alternative dispute resolution "industry" has been colonized by the legal
profession.43
VII. ACCESSIBILITY
Accessibility, especially in terms of cheapness and ease of use are crucial
elements and most ADR systems would claim these as strengths. The
accessibility benchmark also requires that the redress scheme be well
publicized, that there should be appropriate assistance for disadvantaged
complainants and that a complainant should be able to make contact with the
scheme orally, even though the complaint must ultimately be reduced to writing.
For the benchmark, industry-based schemes should be free of charge and legal
representation should be avoided except in exceptional circumstances. It also
suggests that conciliation, mediation and negotiation should be used to attempt
to settle complaints and that a legalistic and adversarial approach be
discouraged. It is here that there is evidence, perhaps of a cultural difference
between the Australian benchmarks and the EC principles, the latter favoring
a more adjudicative model. On the one hand, the EC's principle of effectiveness
requires that the consumer should have access without being obliged to use a
legal representative, that the procedure should either be free or of moderate cost,
that only a short period should elapse between the referral of a matter and the
decision, and that the competent body should have an active role. On the other,
the principle of representation requires that the redress procedure should not
deprive the parties of the right to be represented or assisted by a third party at
any stage of the procedure. The adversarial principle requires that the procedure
followed should allow all the parties concerned to present their viewpoint before
the competent body and to hear the arguments and facts put forward by the other
party, and any experts' statements. But this tilt towards formality is mitigated
to some extent by the preamble to the Recommendation, which states that while
the interests of the parties can only be safeguarded if the procedure allows them
to express their viewpoint before the decision maker and to know the facts and
arguments presented by the other side, this does not necessarily necessitate oral
hearings of the parties.
Nevertheless, there seems to be an underlying tension between the
perception that procedural rights must always be available and the need to
provide an out-of-court remedy which is informal and easy for the consumer to
use. For instance, the benchmark emphasis on conciliation may not lead to
substantive justice for the consumer given the inequalities that exist and which
can be exploited in negotiations.
43. MICHAEL PALMER & SIMON ROBERTS, DISPUTE PROCESSES: ADR AND THE PRIMARY FORMS
OF DECISION MAKING, (1998).
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Most ADR systems score well on accessibility. The state-funded
Scandinavian Complaints Boards, for example, are easy to use, comparatively
cheap to invoke, and the large numbers of new complaints received each year
are testimony to their popularity. However, most are slow, taking on average
a year to reach a final decision. This seems to be largely a function of lack of
resources." One of the strengths of private ombudsman schemes, too, has been
their comparative accessibility. Individuals can make a complaint without the
help of a lawyer or other third party and without a charge or fee. That is not to
say that they have achieved as wide a coverage as they might, and those few
studies45 which have gathered socio-economic data on complainants tend to
suggest that complainants are more usually drawn from the middle-classes.
The paper-only procedure adopted by most ombudsmen seems to make it
easy and cheap for certain sections of the population to use. The challenge is
to find an approach which allows a wider constituency to use the ombudsman
procedure to resolve consumer disputes, and this is something which most
ombudsmen try to address with help lines and staff specifically allocated to the
giving of advice and assistance. Some are happy to try to resolve complaints
over the phone, to obviate the necessity for form filling, and some of the smaller
schemes are able to organize visits to complainants.46
An issue which goes to accessibility and which has not yet been
satisfactorily addressed is the relationship between ombudsmen and the internal
complaints procedures within companies. Ombudsmen are designed to form the
top rung of an informal complaints ladder, with 'exhaustion' of the internal
procedure a prerequisite for access to the ombudsman, and the integrity of the
bottom rungs is of considerable importance to the consumer. Publicity for the
remedy is essential. Certainly in the United Kingdom there was evidence that
companies were not always wholehearted in their commitment to publicizing
either their own internal complaints process or the ombudsman.47 We suspect
that deficiencies may often result from a disparity of knowledge and
commitment between those in management and those at the counter. We also
suspect that it is not a problem specific to the United Kingdom. Certainly there
is anecdotal evidence to support this. In our survey work, one of the authors
made a spot check on an ATM and Investor Advice Centre close to the head
44. Klaus Viitanen, The Scandinavian Public Complaints Boards: The Aims, Present Situation and
the Future, ICONSUMER L.J. 118 (1996).
45. James & Seneviratne, supra note 28.
46. See Howells & James, supra note 21, for a discussion on the Canadian Banking Ombudsman.
47. C. Graham, M. Seneviratne & R. James, Publicising the Bank and Building Societies
Ombudsman Schemes, 3 CONSUMER POL'Y REV. 85 (1993); R. James, C. Graham & M. Seneviratne, Building
Societies, Customer Complaints, and the Ombudsman, 23 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 214 (1994) (explaining that
it is something which will be largely remedied under the new FOS regime where the new industry regulator,
the Financial Services Authority, has responsibility for monitoring compliance with publicity rules).
[Vol. 9:1
Howells & James
office of one particular Canadian bank immediately after having met the internal
'bank ombudsman'. This spot check revealed that there were no leaflets on how
to complain on view, or available on request, despite confident assertions made
earlier by the bank ombudsman that they were on display at every outlet,
however small.48
One reason for the importance of effective internal complaints procedures
is that they may form a barrier for the consumer to surmount rather than
providing the opportunity to have their complaint resolved at the earliest
opportunity. The desire to address the issue quickly lies behind much of the
argument for conciliation, and there is a trend for ombudsmen and many other
ADR systems to lay stress on initial conciliation. The President of the state-
funded Consumer Complaints Board in Norway, for example, believes that
consumers would benefit if the conciliation function of the Consumer Council
were strengthened, not least because of the time it takes the Board to deal with
cases. Two of the private complaints boards in Norway, for example, those for
banking and finance and for insurance also operate a form of conciliation.
Ombudsmen, too, are increasingly placing an emphasis on conciliation rather
than formal resolution of complaints and the head of the new Financial
Ombudsman Service in the United Kingdom has said he would like to see his
scheme operate a system where only a small minority of cases actually reach the
more formal stages of investigation and decision.49 Whether this emphasis is
really to the consumer's benefit or whether it is driven by managerial
considerations is not clear although we harbor a suspicion. It is a moot point if
consumers benefit most from resolution at an early stage when they may be
encouraged to compromise, or from having their claim examined and
determined by an independent adjudicator.
Conciliation is not the sole preserve of the ADR sector. Small claims
systems commonly provide for a variety of outcomes, including both agreed
settlements and decisions. In France, pre-trial conciliation allows one party to
bring the other before the court for an attempt at conciliation where a settlement
is believed to be possible.5° In British Columbia, the new small claims court
programme of 1991 introduced mandatory settlement conferences for disputed
claims.5 In New Zealand, referees are required to assess whether the matter is
appropriate for a settlement, and if so, to facilitate that process, but failing that
to give a decision in the same forum. 52 There is perhaps a distinction to be
drawn between systems which introduce such a mechanism to improve dispute
48. Howells & James, supra note 21.
49. W. Merricks, Presentation to the Biennial Conference of the British and Irish Ombudsman
Association, (May. 2001).
50. Howells & James, supra note 21.
51. Id. at 28.
52. Disputes Tribunals Act, 1988 (N.Z.)
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resolution outcomes and those which see mediation as a short cut to reducing
costs on the legal system. The German law permitting states to demand
arbitration in small claims cases perhaps falls into the latter category.
Arbitration, although possibly more accessible than the courts, where for
instance the fees are kept down by subsidies from trade associations, still
involves a degree of formality which may be off-putting to the consumer and
usually continues to involve costs for the consumer. In some instances the costs
may be prohibitively high in comparison with the amount at stake. 3
The hope was that small claims courts and tribunals would be accessible
and thus bring justice closer to the ordinary person but there is disquieting
evidence, in jurisdictions such as Canada, New Zealand and the UK, that a large
proportion of consumer disputes are initiated by traders rather than consumers -
what Ramsay has described as "the deformation of small claims courts into
collection agencies., 54 There is also evidence that the applicants tend to be
disproportionately male professionals or self employed and well educated.55
In the US, consumers may choose to take their claim to the small claims
courts which have a highly simplified procedure. There is no need for
representation and indeed in some states there is a prohibition on the use of
lawyers in these courts. The procedure is informal albeit it was originally based
on an adjudicative model, although some courts are now adopting modes of
ADR. Consumer cases would also commonly go to the Municipal Courts
(sometimes known as Magistrates Courts) which have a limited jurisdiction and
are staffed by a full-time judge - appointed or elected, depending on the
particular circumstances in the State. Formal court procedure is adopted, but
these courts also offer non-binding arbitration which can be voluntary or
mandatory, before getting to court, depending on the way the court operates.
It is this procedure which normally applies to consumer cases, normally up to
a limit of $15,000-$20,000, and the individual pays a filing fee of $100.
Interestingly, this type of consumer arbitration is non-binding, because when the
courts adopted the procedure they could not, under the Constitution, deny trial
rights. The arbitration procedure has the advantage of speed, as the hearing
would normally be held within a few months and the procedure would be
streamlined and less formal than an ordinary court. Lawyers can be hired for
a small fee and the consumer is not at risk of having to pay the other side's fees.
53. Richard M. Alderman, Mandatory Arbitration in the United States: The Destruction of
Consumer Rights, Presentation at the Eighth International Consumer Law Conference (Apr. 2001).
54. I. Ramsay, Consumer Access to Justice, Plenary Address at the Eighth International Consumer
Law Conference (Apr. 2001).
55. Howells & James, supra note 21; Seana C. McGuire & Roderick A. Macdonald, Judicial Scripts
in the Dramaturgy of the Small Claims Court, 11 CAN. J.L. & SOC'Y 63 (1996); Spiller, supra note 41;




In these court processes, however, there is still the perception that the business
'repeat player' will be at an advantage in comparison with the unrepresented
individual consumer. The point probably is that a way needs to be found to
provide low-cost legal advice and representation rather than to ban it. Early
neutral evaluation is used in other courts, for instance in some District Courts,
but while there might be potential for its use in consumer redress it seems at
present not to be used much in that setting.
It is recognized that most parties who attend a small claims process expect
and prefer it simply to hand down a decision, and that this reality needs to be
respected by the presiding officer.56 It is also recognized that there are practical
constraints on the extent to which there can be true mediation in the small
claims forum, bearing in mind time constraints, the fact that the
respondent/defendant attends involuntarily, and the role of the presiding officer
as an authority figure.57 Indeed it is unlikely that in small claims the ideal will
be achieved of the mediator and the decision-maker being different people.
Nevertheless, it is suggested that it is important for small claims process to
allow the flexibility to allow disputes to be settled where this is appropriate.
Although it should be recognized that many consumers may feel pressurized
into agreeing a settlement which deprives them of the full value of their claim,
nevertheless the parties' underlying needs may best be met through settlements
which they have fashioned and are committed to implementing. There is also
the hope that the experience of the consumer and the trader in resolving their
dispute will have a remedial and educative effect, not least in heightening the
sensitivity of the trader to the consumer's needs.
Cost is an issue with small claims courts and this varies amongst
jurisdictions. France, for example, has the admirable principle that the legal
system is a free service provided by the state (although since 1991 a tax has
been imposed on legal acts).58 New Zealand for many years operated on the
basis of low filing fees, but in 1998 an increased scale of fees from $30 to $200
has proved a deterrent to certain claimants, 59 and in the UK where the Civil
Procedure Rules do allow for a small claims track, there is discretion for the
judge as to whether this may be invoked and the court fees and allocation fee
(payable if a defense is entered) may prove a barrier to the consumer. These
fees remain fairly high even for small claims because of the political decision
that court fees must cover the cost of running the judicial infrastructure. This
56. E. Clark, A STUDY, THE TASMANIAN SMALL CLAIMS COURT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY, (1992);
Spiller, supra note 41, at 98.
57. Id. at 90, 91.
58. Howells & James, supra note 21, at 7.
59. Disputes Tribunals Rule 5.
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is in contrast to the position in Ireland where the issuing fee is in the region of
£6.
The scale of cost is also determined by the involvement allowed for
lawyers. In jurisdictions such as Quebec and New Zealand, lawyers are
excluded from representing clients on either side, and in recognition of this
there is only limited scope in New Zealand for the award of costs in relation to
the proceedings. 60 Even in jurisdictions where lawyers are allowed there are
usually bars on recovery of lawyers' costs unless one party has behaved
unreasonably.
Again on accessibility, a concern arises as to the nature of the proceedings
and the degree of formality imposed by the judge. The involvement of lawyers
as representatives would seem on the face of it to engender an unhelpful
legalistic approach which is inimical to the aims of informality which may be
reinforced by the physical setting and the court building. However, the issue
may not be clear cut since there is some interesting evidence in Canada (other
than in Quebec) where some poverty groups have argued that the small claims
courts were intimidating for their clients and that reforms such as the
introduction of full time inquisitorial judges and duty counsel would make the
system more effective for the poor. The nature of the procedure has been
addressed in a number of jurisdictions, but with varying success. In France,
where consumer disputes are heard in the court system, albeit with simplified
procedures, research indicates that these courts are not particularly friendly to
individual consumers with small claims. Other jurisdictions provide for small
claims courts as distinct parts of the court system. In Quebec, small claims
court judges are regular, full-time judges of the Civil Division of the Court who
hear cases in the small claims court one day every other week.6' In New
Zealand, the Disputes Tribunals function as a division of the District Court and
claims are heard on court premises.62 Yet other jurisdictions, such as New South
Wales, have adopted specialist consumer claims tribunals.63 Indeed some
Australian states have separate tribunals to deal with credit disputes. There is
some evidence that small claims judges find the handling of disputes an
unpleasant aspect of their work. Clark noted that part-time small claims judges
had difficulty switching to this role from their normal duties and that in
Tasmania satisfaction was greater where one judge specialized in this type of
work.64 In Canada, it was found that work in the small claims court was not
popular with the judiciary and was seen as a demotion. Judges in these courts
60. Disputes Tribunals Act, 38, 43, 1988 (N.Z.)
61. Disputes Tribunals Act, 27, 1988 (N.Z.)
62. Disputes Tribunals Act, 4, 1988 (N.Z.); Spiller, supra note 41, at 10.
63. Howells & James, supra note 21, at 44.
64. CLARK, supra note 56.
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were found not to be particularly good at recognizing the issues being presented
by individuals, and there was a mismatch between the perception of the problem
on the part of the individual and the way in which the legal system, even at
small claims court level, characterized it.
65
A recurrent feature of forums designed for small claims is that there is a
large measure of flexibility in the procedures used, to respond to the needs of
the parties and their situation. In Quebec, small claims judges are authorized to
use the procedure which seems most appropriate.66 In New Zealand, referees
who preside in the Disputes Tribunals may adopt such procedure as is best
suited to the ends of justice and may receive any relevant evidence even if not
legally admissible in a court of law.67 This informality enhances the important
role played by the personality of the adjudicator. The situation in New Zealand
is striking, as the vast majority of referees are not legally trained. Baldwin
noted in the UK that the atmosphere of small claims courts varied markedly
even within the same building depending on the character of the judge.68 Could
these individual idiosyncrasies be altered by better training?
Plaintiffs who make it as far as a small claims hearing have had to
overcome a number of obstacles and the strong temptation must often have been
to drop the claim somewhere along the line. Those who get to the small claims
court represent the tip of the iceberg. Baldwin, in his research in the United
Kingdom, found that in talking to small claims litigants many had found it an
uphill struggle to pursue the action as far as the county court. He believes it is
not enough to provide improved facilities or to expand the scope of informal
procedures or to encourage judges to become pro-active: the greater problem
is to persuade people confronting serious legal difficulties to make use of the
courts and other legal processes. Public awareness of small claims procedures
and alternative methods of resolving disputes is very low, and public attitudes
to the courts in general remain resistant. For large sections of the population,
the courts are seen as uninviting, even forbidding institutions to be visited only
in extreme circumstances. They are places to which they are 'taken'; not
somewhere they use to settle disputes, or have their grievances resolved.
In Canada, McGuire and Macdonald's conclusion has been that:
the use of the court is often correlated with those socio-demographic
variables associated with social power and that structural modifications to
processes of civil litigation designed to enhance access to justice do not
significantly alter the character of any court's plaintiff pool. Whatever may be
the benefits of creating systems of small claims courts, the empirical evidence
65. Ramsay, supra note 54.
66. Id. at 227.
67. Disputes Tribunals Act, 40, 44, 1988 (N.Z.)
68. BALDWIN, supra note 26.
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suggests that greater accessibility of official institutions of dispute resolution is
not one of them.69
That point, so powerfully made, should give one pause for thought.
VIII. FAIRNESS
The next benchmark, fairness, entails that the scheme produces decisions
which are fair and seen to be fair by observing the principles of procedural
fairness, by making decisions on the information before it, and by having
specific criteria upon which its decisions are based. Decisions should be based
on what is fair and reasonable, taking into account good industry practice,
relevant industry codes and the law. Procedurally, due process or natural justice
requirements should be observed. An obligation to provide information should
be placed on scheme members, subject to certain limitations. These
requirements seem to have been written with the private ombudsman in mind.
One issue, however, is the extent to which consumers are satisfied by the normal
paper-only ombudsman procedure. It is a moot point whether having a paper-
based scheme is to the consumer's advantage. Whilst it certainly removes the
intimidation of the 'day in court', it may be that some consumers are less able
to articulate their views on paper than orally. There is also some evidence that
consumers place a high value on 'being heard' whether in person or on the
telephone and that an important element in their satisfaction with the system is
the feeling that their complaint has been understood and been recognized in
some sense by an independent person.7" Adoption of a more personal approach
as a general rule would result in massively increased costs, which might result
in a charge having to be made to the consumer, and it would also have
implications for the speed and informality of procedures, which are currently
part of the ombudsman hallmark.
As to the courts, in New Zealand, there is an important emphasis on the
procedures of natural justice in that there are grounds for appeal where
proceedings have been conducted unfairly and this unfairness has prejudicially
affected the outcome.7 Furthermore, there is review to the High Court on the
basis of breach of natural justice.72 While the number of appeals is low and the
number of successful appeals lower still, and judicial review is rare, the
presence of these safeguards acts as an important incentive to referees to pursue
fair procedures.77
69. McGuire & MacDonald, supra note 27.
70. See Birds & Graham, supra note 28, for research into the views of complainants who had used
the estate agent's scheme in the UK; See also James & Seneviratne, supra note 28.
71. Disputes Tribunals Act, 50, 1988 (N.Z.)
72. Spiller, supra note 41, at 137.
73. Id. at 136-137.
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Clark is, however, troubled as to whether the right balance has been struck
in Australia concerning informality of proceedings and deviations from the rules
of evidence, limitation on rights of appeal etc. He notes Pound's view that there
is a "continual movement in legal history back and forth between wide
discretion and strict detailed rule, between justice without law, as it were, and
justice according to law' 74 and clearly sees small claims and ADR procedures
as being at the very end of the discretionary spectrum. He points out that many
of the legal rules which are being pushed aside in the name of seeking justice
were in fact introduced to ensure justice was delivered. His motivation for
raising this concern about informality is his finding that people cared most about
being given a fair opportunity to present their case and that too much emphasis
should not therefore be placed on fast and cheap justice. However, one can
agree with Clark that it is important that participants see the process as fair and
permitting them the chance to present their cases fully, without resorting to
technical legal institutions to achieve these goals. Again, much will depend
upon enhancing the training for judges and court staff and developing better
information to users. If small claims procedures become too complex there is
a danger of killing the goose that lays the golden egg.
In New Zealand referees are directed to decide in terms of the substantial
merits and justice. They are not bound by strict legal technicalities and forms,
and may disregard contractual terms which appear harsh or unconscionable.75
Indeed in Hertz NZ Ltd. v. Disputes Tribunal,76 a decision was upheld even
though the court admitted the appellant was not and could not be liable at law.
There is, then, a strong emphasis on common-sense justice rather than legalistic
outcomes. However, referees are required to have regard to the law, and it is a
ground of appeal that a referee did not have regard to the provision of an
enactment brought to the attention of the referee at the hearing.77
Similar rules are found in Australian small claims courts. In Queensland
and New South Wales, for instance there is provision that the final order must
be "fair and equitable", thus giving the judge leeway to deviate from the strict
letter of the law.78 Nevertheless, their impact has not been as great as in New
Zealand, because the decisions have continued to be made by lawyers.79 Indeed
it would be an impossible burden to require lay referees to make decisions
according to the law.
One of the interesting issues is whether New Zealand adopts this approach
on the pragmatic basis that within the time and cost limitations of the New
74. Clark, supra note 56.
75. Disputes Tribunals Act, 18-19, 1988 (N.Z.)
76. 8 P.R.N.Z. 145 (1994).
77. Disputes Tribunals Act, 18, 50, 1988 (N.Z.)
78. Howells & James, supra note 21, at 46.
79. Spiller, supra note 41.
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Zealand system it is not possible to deliver perfect justice.8" Alternatively was
the system recognizing that laws could be imperfect and that the tribunals would
be able to deliver better justice if they looked at the substantial merits of the
case? There are some hints of the latter approach, for example when a time limit
is ignored which would operate against a meritorious party. On the whole,
however, the impression gained is that justice according to the law is an ideal
which has to be departed from on cost grounds. Indeed one of the fears of some
commentators8' is the suspicion that this power could be used against
consumers. There is a difference between the use of a flexible power of this sort
to deliver substantive justice when wielded by an ombudsman within a structure
which requires him to justify his use of the power, and the placing of a similar
power in the hands of a referee. In the final analysis, however, the result of the
New Zealand approach may be simply to make explicit what happens in most
small claims courts, for Baldwin's research indicates that many District Judges
in the United Kingdom are happy to depart from the law to achieve a just result
despite being formally bound by the law. Nevertheless one might be cautious
about the extent to which one is willing to accept adjudication according to
substantive justice rather than law. Given the background and training of the
modem referees one can expect them to make a good effort to reach fair
decisions, which do not treat consumers unfairly. To the extent that there are
injustices, one can be reasonably sanguine if the alternative is simply a legal
system which prevents small disputes being heard at all. However of course this
position is less defensible the higher the monetary amount involved.
The EC principle of legality goes further than the benchmark and is
concerned to reinforce the need to preserve strict legal protection which may
look strange to those in countries with well developed ADR systems. It
stipulates that the consumer must not be deprived of the protection of the
mandatory provisions of the law of the state in whose territory the dispute
resolution body is established nor should the consumer be deprived of the
protection afforded by the mandatory provisions applying under the law of the
Member State in which he is normally resident. The first point is covered in
most ombudsman systems where the consumer is free to reject the decision and
go to court instead. Arbitration is usually binding on both parties, however.
The second point, seems to present practical problems. Is it realistic to expect
national ADR systems to have specialist knowledge of legal systems within
other Member States or, perhaps, globally? And indeed, if the consumer is given
the choice to use an informal out of court procedure with its attendant benefits,
80. Kate Tokeley, Disputes Tribunals: Should the Monetary Limits Have Been Increased?, 5 N.Z.




is it not a reasonable trade-off that any legal rights available in their own
country are relinquished?
IX. ACCOUNTABILITY
The benchmark on accountability requires that the redress scheme should
publicly account for its operations by publishing its determinations and
information about complaints and highlighting any systemic industry problems.
This includes the provision of anonymous written reports of determinations to
scheme members and interested bodies both to provide guidance and to
demonstrate consistency and fairness in decision-making. There should also be
an annual report providing, inter alia, a statistical breakdown of complaints,
representative case studies, and highlighting systemic problems. Much of this
is mirrored in the EC principle of transparency.
Ombudsmen and complaints boards broadly meet these requirements,
although arbitration procedures usually do not. A drawback of many ADR
systems stems from the private nature of the process which enables companies
to settle disputes without public acknowledgement of their failings. While the
state funded Scandinavian Complaints Boards do make full details publicly
available, in private schemes case reports are normally on an anonymised basis,
and this includes those private complaints boards in Scandinavia as well as the
private ombudsmen.82 There is an exception. In the Canadian Banking
Ombudsman scheme there are quite stringent reporting requirements where the
ombudsman is required to report quarterly on the number of cases where he has
made a recommendation, and cases where the bank has followed his
recommendation. These figures identify the banks concerned and are made
public. This goes a long way further than reporting requirements in other
jurisdictions where ombudsmen commonly simply report anonymised case
reports. (In one private scheme in the UK, the Building Societies Ombudsman,
the naming of a building society and details of an ombudsman award against it
was available as an option to any society that was disinclined to abide by the
ombudsman's decision. In the event, only two societies took the option during
the scheme's existence). Ombudsmen have generally been assiduous to identify
common problems in their Annual Reports that have gone some way towards
raising public awareness (if only amongst consumer groups and academics) of
the systemic problems which affect consumers.
82. See for example, the Norwegian Bureau for Insurance Disputes and the Complaints Board for
Consumers in Banking and Finance Matters in Norway.
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X. EFFICIENCY
The efficiency benchmark,83 which requires that schemes should keep track
of complaints, ensure they are dealt with by the appropriate process or forum
and should regularly review their own performance is now broadly met by
ombudsman schemes which have become increasingly aware of the need to
ensure a speedy and stream-lined process and one which they can defend under
scrutiny from outside observers. There should also be a system for tracking
complaints, notifying the parties of progress, and provision for regular
monitoring. How well arbitration and small claims courts match these
requirements is unclear although case management is assuming greater
importance if only on financial grounds.
XI. EFFECTIVENESS
Finally, the effectiveness benchmark's measure is that the scheme should
have appropriate and comprehensive terms of reference and periodic
independent reviews of its performance. This is closely linked to the efficiency
benchmark but with the former focusing on the operation of the scheme the
effectiveness benchmark measures the capacity of the scheme to deliver justice.
Schemes should therefore be broad enough to cover the majority of customer
complaints, up to monetary limits which are consistent with customer
transactions in that industry.
Determinations must be binding on members and members must be
encouraged to abide by the rules of the scheme. As regards most of the
Scandinavian Complaints Boards where the awards were not enforceable, there
was a poor rate of compliance with recommendations, in some cases only 50%,
in others only 30-40 %. Bad publicity or the encouragement of consumers to
take legal action in the court if a recommendation has not been complied with
have not proved particularly successful sanctions.84 The Norwegian Consumer
Complaints Board whose decisions are enforceable if the parties do not request
that the matter goes to court within four weeks is able to give assistance to the
consumer to obtain enforcement if this proves necessary. While only a minority
of cases go on to court there had been in 1999 a rash of cases going to court
involving disputes about professional services.85
83. There is no direct equivalent EC principle on these matters although the principle of
transparency covers similar points.
84. Viitanen, supra note 44.
85. This Board received comparatively few complaints. In 1999 it received 256 in total; as to the
category of complaints, those about cars constituted the largest total in number (45), of complaints about
services those relating to building work topped the list at 18 with electrical work next at 12.
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Private ombudsman schemes have a good record on compliance, in most
instances the company settles on the ombudsman's recommendation without a
formal award having to be made and awards have been invariably followed.
This is true in both voluntary and statutory schemes. For the new Financial
Ombudsman Service, statute provides for enforcement of the awards in the
86
county court at the instance of the consumer.
It is interesting that the EC principle of liberty goes further on the issue of
binding awards and requires that the decision taken by the body concerned may
be binding on the parties only if they were informed of its binding nature in
advance and specifically accepted that. Further, the consumer's recourse to the
out-of-court procedure must not be the result of a commitment prior to the
materialization of the dispute, where such commitment has the effect of
depriving the consumer of her right to bring an action before the courts for the
settlement of the dispute. The importance of this provision is sharpened when
one considers the situation in the US where the courts have largely upheld
mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion even in circumstances
where the consumer was given wholly inadequate notice.87 Indeed, it has been
argued that pre-dispute mandatory arbitration, as employed in the US, is
designed to preclude effective redress by consumers and substantially reduce or
eliminate the beneficial effects of favorable judicial precedent and legislation.88
For the consumer in the US, arbitration has significant defects: it is often not
as prompt or inexpensive as the small claims courts, the informal rules often
favor the company as the repeat player and mandatory arbitration precludes the
consumer's freedom to choose to litigate as a class action.89
In countries where the ombudsman remedy pertains, the consumer is free
to go to court at any time up until acceptance of the ombudsman's
determination. Nevertheless, the point has been well made elsewhere that,
given the practical realities, recourse to the courts may only be a theoretical
alternative. 90
86. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, 3, c. 8, s. 229, sched. 17.
87. Richard M. Alderman, Mandatory Arbitration in the United States: The Destruction of
Consumer Rights, Presentation at the Eighth International Consumer Law Conference, (Apr. 2001).
88. Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality
of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation
of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997); Alderman, supra note 86; Mary Dee
Pridgen, Gateway to Justice: Arbitration Imposed on U.S. consumers by Adhesion Contracts, Presentation
at the Eighth International Consumer Law Conference, (Apr. 2001); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print
to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997
Wis. L. REV. 33 (1997).
89. Alderman, supra note 86; Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets The Class
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000).
90. Philip Rawlings & Chris Willet, Ombudsman Schemes in the United Kingdom's Financial
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It is usually implicit in an arbitration process that both parties agree to be
bound by the arbitrator's decision and this certainly pertains in the UK,
Netherlands, Spain and Portugal for example. Although agreements in EC
countries are subject to provisions arising from the EC Directive on Unfair
Terms in Consumer Contracts. 9'
As to small claims courts and tribunals, it would seem to be essential that
the outcome of the small claims process be binding and effective, subject to the
earlier discussion above about conciliation. There is little point in either
consumer or trader initiating and pursuing a process which has inevitable
financial and emotional cost and which ends with an outcome that makes no
difference. Unfortunately, even obtaining a judgment is not the end of the
matter. The reality is that many judgments debtors do not voluntarily comply
with court orders, and law enforcement officers are unable to exact fulfillment
of the order (because of the party's lack of means, disappearance or
bankruptcy). The experience of many litigants in obtaining remedies which are
not complied with, and which sometimes can never be enforced, has caused
some observers to question the value of the small claims system.9"
Small claims systems commonly provide for enforcement of outcomes of
the process, either because the small claims system is part of the court process
or because there is provision for registration of the outcome for purposes of
enforcement. In New Zealand, orders for the payment of money or the delivery
of property automatically become orders of the District Court and are
enforceable through the court process.93 In Victoria, there is a "funds in trust"
model, whereby if a consumer disputes payment of an account the money must
be paid by the consumer into a trust account until the order is decided.94
It is recognized that the enforceability of court orders is an issue not only
for the small claims process: throughout the court process, there is the
experience of successful litigants being unable to translate their orders into
tangible benefit. Nevertheless, it is submitted that it is essential that the orders
of small claims forums be given the maximum support possible by the state if
citizens are to have faith in their justice system.
Under the effectiveness benchmark, schemes should also be designed to
pick up systemic problems, and here it may be important, ironically, that the
dispute 'goes the distance' so that a record is kept of the type of issues involved.
Most complaints boards and ombudsmen claim some success in influencing
good practice, particularly those which are industry specific. In some settings,
Sector: The Insurance Ombudsman, the Banking Ombudsman, and the Building Societies Ombudsman, 17
J. CONSUMER POL'Y 307 (1994).
91. Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L95) 29.
92. Howells & James, supra note 21, at 47, 56.
93. Disputes Tribunals Act, 45, 1988 (N.Z.)
94. Howells & James, supra note 21, at 47.
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the Norwegian complaints boards for example, decisions of these ADR bodies
are taken into account by the courts in comparable cases so that there is the
potential, at least, for benefit to the collective consumer interest by the
influencing of judicial precedent. Ombudsmen have had some influence in
identifying systemic problems within an industry although their effectiveness
here has been tempered by the willingness or otherwise of an industry to accept
the strictures of the ombudsman. In many instances, changes in practice have
seemed rather slow moving to the onlooker, and changes to policy infrequent.
Some ombudsmen have regularly been consulted about industry codes of
practice; it may well be time to give them increased powers in this area.
XII. SUMMARY
Forms of redress for the individual consumer dispute have the potential at
least to provide an adequate mode of resolution, but they have yet to meet their
promise. Small claims courts or tribunals have yet to become truly accessible
to the more vulnerable consumer, and there is a debate as to whether or not
access to (free) legal assistance is a benefit or not. Certainly Capelletti's first
wave of economic assistance is not very apparent for consumers litigating small
claims (this applies a fortiori in the ADR sector). Moreover, while decisions
may be authoritative, in some jurisdictions at least the consumer can be left high
and dry if enforcement of judgment is problematic. Again, the role and
commitment of the adjudicator is crucial; where the judge is a reluctant one then
the consumer is unlikely to get the "best" justice.
Arbitration, while less formal than the courts, seems to us to have
considerable disadvantages for the consumer. The consumer is likely to incur
considerable costs through the arbitration fee, and costs for any expert witnesses
etc. While arbitrators are drawn from independent panels, there will be an
advantage to the company as repeat player both structurally and informally and
the consumer usually has to agree to be bound by the arbitrator's decision.
Here, developments in the US towards mandatory binding arbitration are of
particular concern.
Consumer Complaints Boards and Ombudsmen are assuming considerable
importance in terms of the number of consumer complaints with which they
deal, and the implicit acceptance in many jurisdictions that they are not
alternative forms of resolution for particular disputes, but the only form of
dispute resolution for all but the most unusual consumer who has the time,
money, and willingness to take the long road through the ordinary court system.
They provide a helpful remedy which is free, accessible, informal, and, in the
case of ombudsmen, they are able to make considerable financial awards where
appropriate (where awards are not formally binding, recommendations have
usually become de facto binding). The consumer can reject the award and go
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to the courts. But there have been doubts about the perceived independence of
the ombudsman in some of the industry sponsored schemes and the remedy is
not always as speedy as the informality of the processes would promise. Most
are able to depart from the law and codes of practice to take decisions based on
what is fair and reasonable; this allows them to do justice in the individual case
unencumbered by strict precedent but with the consequence of potential
unpredictability for future consumers and companies in dispute.
Capelletti's third procedural wave is therefore evidenced in some strength
in particular areas of consumer redress but even so, and even where the forms
of ADR are apparently strong, close examination reveals inadequacies which
have yet to redress the structural imbalance between the parties. More needs to
be done to subject the modes of dispute resolution to scrutiny and to effect
change.
There is too, another concern. The issue of individualized justice, as
against such rule of law considerations as certainty and consistency, has a
further dimension. The general consumer interest is better served if conclusions
can be drawn from individual decisions. It is desirable that decisions form more
than mere guidance to the industry concerned and have in some measure the
value of precedent. Can this be achieved in a system which rightly values
speed, accessibility, and probably the desire to resolve disputes at the earliest
level? ADR is commonly a private form of justice; while it may be successful
for the individual consumer, its essential characteristics seem by their very
nature to rule out the wider role of creating beneficial precedent for future
consumers. Some forms of ADR, notably ombudsmen, are making brave
attempts to draw attention to system weaknesses and to bring about change.
However, there are factors preventing the regulatory wave taking hold with ease
in ADR and small claims jurisdictions.
The increased use of mediation, or conciliation, to try to reach a conclusion
may be of benefit to the individual consumer but there is insufficient evidence
at present to make a judgment about it and it takes consumer redress even
further from the public gaze. Justice behind closed doors can only have a
minimal effect on corporate policy and behavior.
The crucial next step is to take action against systemic problems and to find
a way of addressing the collective consumer interest. This is where our call for
a sixth integrative wave to allow a cross-fertilization between the courts and
ADR institutions has importance. The court's power to make decisions public,
and the impetus which comes from the ability of some ADR systems to draw
attention to corporate practices and policies which are detrimental to consumers
could, if brought together, make a significant impact for all consumers,
including those who do not even get as far as seeking redress. One way of
achieving this might be to open small claims courts and ADR procedures up to
the type of collective procedures seen in main stream litigation i.e. class actions,
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injunction procedures etc. These collective procedures will be considered next
before the cross-border dimension is focused on. However, it should also be
noted that small claims and ADR schemes will also increasingly have to
consider how they can handle cross-border disputes or be honest in admitting
that they are not suitable for them and encouraging appropriate alternatives to
be developed.
XIII. COLLECTIVE CLAIMS
The use of collective actions is a good example of Cappelletti's second
wave of organizational changes. There is a trend both towards making it easier
to bring civil actions through procedures analogous to class action procedures
and the development of public law style controls permitting government bodies
and consumer organizations to seek injunctions. To some extent collective
actions also link to the economic trend Cappelletti noted as they can be a
mechanism for making access to justice more affordable. It also fits into the
regulatory wave we noted for this type of litigation often has a broader political
concern to protect the public interest (even where cases are framed as the
protection of private rights). They can also be a mechanism for making cross-
border litigation viable and thus feeds into the globalization wave. Such
mechanisms need to be adapted to the new consumer litigation climate by
incorporating them into the new ADR procedures, for otherwise one could have
the situation where the legal system had developed the means to represent the
consumer collective interest at the very time these sorts of claims were being
litigated outside the court system.
This section covers both the collective litigation of individual claims for
damages and the use of actions to settle points of dispute in a prospective
manner. One of the problems in this area is to categorise the many different
types of collective action available. It is possible, for instance, to distinguish
between regimes where the litigation in theory remains under the control of
private parties (which we label private interest collective litigation) and where
some third party takes control such as a public body or NGO like a consumer
organization (public interest collective litigation). At the heart of many of the
debates in this area is the question of whether there is a collective consumer
interest over and above the sum of the individual claims. We think there
certainly is, at least to the extent of ensuring the law can regulate market failures
where individuals may not have adequate incentives to act against wrongdoing.
It is possible to see the large-scale personal injury problem as falling into
the private interest collective action model and other consumer claims falling
into the public interest category. The private interest collective action procedure
could then be seen as having less of a political dimension. Instead, it could be
viewed as a means of permitting access to the courts to those whose interest
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would not otherwise be represented and as a means of increasing efficiency by
reducing costs and helping the courts manage a workload which otherwise
might threaten to overwhelm the court system. However, the position is not so
black and white. Some large-scale personal injury cases certainly have a
political agenda. The tobacco litigation in the US is one such example. The
Agent Orange case is another good example where the litigation involved more
than the sum of its individual parts, for in addition to compensation many of the
claimants sought to shame the Government for the way they had treated
Vietnam veterans.95 On the other hand, there are some examples of public
bodies and consumer groups being able to assist individuals recover damages.96
Nevertheless, private action collective actions for large amounts, such as
large-scale personal injury (and to some extent financial service) claims, often
raise quite different issues from the public interest collective action which is the
focus of our concern. The debate concerning private interest collective actions
often concerns the question of whether claimants grouping together to press
claims for large amounts of money is an unfair threat to defendants. The
debates tend to center around whether individual assessments of causation and
damages dominate the common issues to such an extent that it is pointless to
bring a collective action. Defendants have argued that the system is wrong to
force them to expend a lot of resources defending generic issues without testing
the underlying strength of the particular cases at hand.97
However, if, what is being considered in a collective action is a point of
principle removed for the issue of compensation, then one might overcome
these objections. We shall see that there is a modern trend to grant standing
(especially within the EC) to consumer groups and public bodies charged with
protecting consumers to seek injunctions in cases involving matters such as
unfair terms, advertising and trade practices. Indeed, this use of the class action
as a form of legislative adjudication is more in keeping with the historical
origins of the representative action in common law as a way of defining the
rules that governed feudal relations.98 For some, the modern notion of the class
action for damages sits uneasily in a legal system which requires that
individuals satisfy all elements of their claim.99 Although such objections seem
to be aimed at the personal injury class action, similar sentiments seem to
underpin those who argue that the line should be drawn at collective injunctions
to protect the consumer interest and that damages should not be available in
such cases. However, we believe a case can be made out for damages to be
95. PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1987).
96. See The Australian Consumer and Competition Commission, supra note 9.
97. See CRISTOPHER HODGES, MULTI-PARTY ACTIONS, (2001).
98. Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 6 (1977).
99. H.P. Glenn, The Dilemna of Class Action Reform, 6 Oxford J. LEGAL STUD. 262 (1986).
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recovered in collective actions involving small scale but widely disseminated
consumer detriment in order to ensure there is no unjust enrichment (although
the manner of distributing the compensation may involve innovative techniques
rather than simply paying sums over to individuals). Thus a role remains for
private interest collective action procedures in protecting the consumer interest.
The problem is not so evident where large amounts are at stake, as in these cases
consumers can often obtain legal assistance under contingency or conditional
fee arrangements. The challenge is to find ways where consumers who have
suffered small amounts of detriment individually, can group together to make
litigation a viable option. Indeed this underlines our central argument that
consumer litigation needs more than modification of existing principles, it needs
new principles structured to respond to the needs of consumers.
XIV. PRIVATE INTEREST COLLECTIVE ACTION PROCEDURES
Defining a private interest collective action procedure is a difficult task.
There are at least three models for how the courts can handle claims brought be
large numbers of consumers - the test case approach, the representative action
and a dedicated class or group action procedure.
XV. TEST CASES
The traditional way would be for lawyers to bring test cases and for claims
to be settled in the wake of the test cases. The problem with such an approach
for claimants is that it does not permit them to benefit fully from the advantages
that should be available if many consumers have similar claims. These include
economies of scale; sharing of legal and expert costs and potential liability for
the other sides' costs (at least in a system where the loser pays rule applies);
demonstrating the full impact of the defendant's conduct and novel
opportunities for fashioning appropriate remedies. From the defendant's
perspective it does not produce the desired finality to such claims as new claims
can be lodged so long as they fall within limitation periods. The courts also do
not have the necessary control over such actions so as to reduce the impact of
such mass claims on the machinery of justice.
XVI. REPRESENTATIVE ACTION
Where claims are similar a representative action has traditionally been
possible in some common law systems. In England such actions had initially
been thwarted by the rule that they were not available for damage claims as each
case was considered to be unique. In England, this particular restriction has
now been overcome and indeed even before the development of a group
litigation order there was a greater willingness to adapt procedures to group
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litigation."0 The strictures of the procedure meant it never really functioned
well, however, in some common law countries like Canada. In Australia the
representative action has also proven to be less malleable, despite some good
intentions. For instance, the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Carnie v.
Esanda Finance Corp., a case involving a challenge to interest charged, had
first rejected attempts to use a representative action as each credit transaction
was viewed as discrete and not a series of transactions.10' The High Court of
Australia took a more liberal approach admitting the approach in principle,10 2
but when the matter was remitted back to Mr. Justice Young, his order requiring
the parties to give notice to all other parties made the action impracticable. 103
Such a course of action may have been necessary for the defendants had adopted
the divisive tactic of only seeking interest against those who were a party to the
proceedings, but this only underlines the need for a more sophisticated
procedure than the representative action.
The approach in Victoria was to introduce a new representative action on
a statutory basis.'04 However, the judiciary remained resistant. In Marino v.
Esanda Ltd., 5 they interpreted the rules restrictively in the face of the clear
legislative intent and held a representative action was not appropriate as the
borrowers had separate contracts.
In 1986 a new representative action was introduced by ss 34-35 of the
Supreme Court Act. This was essentially an opt-in scheme available where
three of more persons have the right to the same or essentially the same relief
and some common question of law or fact would arise irrespective of whether
the claims arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions. Again the
judges were not sympathetic. In Bellotti v. Zentahope Pty Ltd., they criticized
the brevity of the rule describing it as "an attempt to break a butterfly upon a
wheel: the gear is ill-fitted to the task, raising more problems than it can
conveniently bear, yet offering greater torment than the subject deserves"' 6 and
suggested there were so many ambiguities that virtually no case could be
brought under it and that joinder provisions were a better way forward. The
analogy with joinder provisions is perhaps appropriate to some extent under an
opt-in procedure and the opt-out nature of most class action procedures serves
100. Horrocks v. Ford Motor Co., TIMES (London), Feb. 15, 1990; See generally Howells & James,
supra note 21; H. Koch & A. Willingmann, GROSSSCHADEN: RECHTLICHE UND ALTERNATIVE
REGULIERUNGSSTRATEGIAN IM IN-UND AUSLAND- COMPLEX DAMAGES, (1998).
101. 29 N.S.W.L.R. 382 (1992).
102. Carnie v. Esanda Finance Corp., 127 A.L.R.76 (1995).
103. (1996) ASC 56-336.
104. S. 62(IC).
105. 1986 V.R. 735.
106. 1992 BC9203164 3474 at 19.
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to distinguish them from representative actions. Although there is no clear
borderline between the two types of private interest collective action procedures.
The criticism of the brevity of the rules touches on a sensitive issue.
Detailed rules undoubtedly promote certainty, which is an element which is
highly sought after in most legal systems. On the other hand, it also reduces
flexibility. We shall see in the next section the contrast between the United
States class action and the United Kingdom group litigation order. The United
States class action has strict criteria, but relatively established pathways once
the gateway is opened. By contrast the United Kingdom system has laxer entry
criteria, but then leaves the judge with a great deal of discretion as to how far
and for what aspects of the litigation he departs from the model adopted for
individual redress.
XVII. CLASS ACTIONS
The class action is a prime example of Cappelletti' s second organizational
wave, where the legal system adapted to the changes needs by developing new
organizational structures. The United States class action procedure found in
rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and mirrored in each United
States state, is the most famous example. However, similar models have also
been developed in Canada in Ontario, British Columbia °7 and even the civil law
jurisdiction of Quebec. 108 Australia also has an effective class action procedure
at the federal level as well as a less well functioning scheme in South Australia
with reform being discussed in other states. The United Kingdom now has the
Group Litigation Order (GLO) procedure.'0 9 Civil law countries have generally
been more conservative in their procedural reform, but we have seen that
Quebec has a class action procedure and France has some mechanisms which
seek the same results, but in a French way through using consumer associations
as the bodies responsible for developing group actions.
Traditionally, following the United States model, class actions have
required certification. This can be a very important stage in litigation for the
viability of the claim may depend upon whether the court accepts to hear them
as class actions. There are, however, some recent trends to make certification
less crucial. The Australian Federal procedure for instance has no certification
stage and the making of a GLO in the United Kingdom is less like an all or
nothing step. Nevertheless most systems have some requirements before such
a process is permitted.
107. J. Prestage & G. McKee, 'Class Actions in the Common Law Provinces of Canada' in Multi-
Party Actions, C. Hodges (ed.).
108. See an Act Respecting the Class Action, Chapter R-2.1.
109. R. Civ. P. 19(11), 48; See generally M. MILDRED, GROUP ACTIONS IN THE LAW OF PRODUCT
LIABILITY, (2000).
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Some systems specify a minimum number of parties. The United States
requires the class be so numerous as to make joinder impracticable, whilst the
Australian Federal procedure requires seven. In Ontario and British Columbia,
two suffice to form a class. The United Kingdom's GLO is silent on this issue.
In practice this is not as crucial as the test for determining whether a class action
is desirable.
The United States has three criteria for class actions to cover different
situations. Where damages are being claimed, the issue is usually framed as
whether "the questions of law or fact common to the class as a whole
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and that the
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy."" ° In other jurisdictions the test is less strict.
In Ontario and British Columbia for instance, the claims must raise common
(but not necessarily identical issues) and be the preferable procedure for
resolving the common issues, not necessarily all the issues. In the Australian
Federal procedure, the claim must simply arise out of the same, similar or
related circumstances and there must be a common question of law or fact
arising with respect to all the claims. The United Kingdom's GLO is the most
flexible as it is simply a form of case management and can apply to claims
which give rise to common or related issues of fact or law.
In the United States, there have been some high profile cases where rule
23 (b)(3) has been used for mass tort cases, such as the recent tobacco case of
Engle,"' where a state wide class action against tobacco companies resulted in
a $144 billion award of punitive damages. Indeed, in an asbestos case,
certification was upheld as it was seen to be the best way to conclude litigation,
for the court said "there may be cases in which class resolution of one issue or
a small group of them will so advance the litigation that they may be fairly said
to predominate." ' 12 But the majority view is that "The ill-advised deployment
of the class action technique imposes a relatively cumbersome format on largely
personal disputes, while achieving very little, if any, gain in efficiency and
economy."'"13 Also, the flexible remedy regime which is a hallmark of the
United States system is more suited to smaller consumer claims where aggregate
damages make more sense than in litigation involving significant individual
damages.
The United States use of class actions to remedy mass small scale
consumer abuses is worth dwelling on for one characteristic of the collective
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
111. This award was made in Dade County on July 14, 2000.
112. In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996 (3rd Cir. 1986).
113. Pasternak v. The Upjohn Co., 92 CV 5987, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21078 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); see
also Amchem Prod. Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
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action elsewhere is that in its private interest version it has predominantly been
used for personal injury litigation, rather than this type of mass small scale
consumer problem. One sentiment driving the Americans is undoubtedly the
notion of access to justice. This was eloquently expressed by Judge Weinstein
who thought: "this matter touches on the credibility of our judicial system.
Either we are committed to make reasonable efforts to provide a forum for the
adjudication of disputes involving our citizens - including.. .consumers who
overpay for products because of anti-trust violations.. -or we are not."' 14 Part
of the explanation for the importance of this form of legal action in the United
States is revealed in the next quote which well illustrates the role of the class
action in the United States as not merely a means to provide individual justice
but also as a method of controlling business behavior in the absence of public
forms of control:
to consumerists, the consumer class action is an inviting procedural
device to cope with frauds causing small damages to large groups.
The slight loss to the individual, when aggregates in the coffers of the
wrongdoer, results in gains which are both handsome and tempting.
The alternatives to the class action - private suits or government
actions - have so often been found wanting in controlling consumer
frauds that not even the ardent critics of class actions seriously
contend that they are truly effective. The consumer class action,
when brought by those who have no other avenue of legal redress,
provides restitution to the injured, and deterrence of the wrongdoer.' '
In other systems a similar function may be played by public law
enforcement or action by consumer organizations. The distinguishing
characteristic of the United States approach is that it can deliver damages to
individuals and fully recover from businesses the profits they made. There is
a marked reluctance in other systems to provide compensation based on such
mass small-scale widely disbursed damage claims. There is also less incentive
for lawyers to become involved, for unlike in the United States, there is rarely
the functional equivalents of contingent fees and special statutory provisions
concerning recovery of attorney fees in consumer protection statutes. However,
a criticism of these consumer class actions in the United States is that very few
consumers actually recover meaningful compensation. The criticism is that in
return for say a discount voucher as compensation, lawyers often settle the cases
114. Excerpt from a Symposium before the Judicial Conference of the Fifth Circuit, quoted in a
National Consumer Law Centre Publication (1973) FED. R. Civ. P. 58, 299, 305.
115. Jonathan Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and
the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 3 (1974).
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on terms where the amount of lawyer's fees recovered from the defendant is the
prime bargaining issue.
The United States National Consumer Law Center has advised lawyers to
consider bringing class actions under Rule 23(b)(2), as this usually removes the
need for notice until the central liability issues have been settled. This
authorizes a class action where "The party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole." However, as this again involves no damages
flowing to the injured parties the outcome for most consumers may not be too
different under the United States procedure than under other systems depending
more upon public enforcement.
A significant differentiating feature is whether class action procedures are
of the opt-in or opt-out variety. Closely connected to this is the issue of notice,
which is clearly most crucial in an opt-out system which has the capacity to bind
individuals, although they may never have taken part in the proceedings.
Equally the steps required to give notice are crucial for if they are too onerous
they may make the case impractical to run. Most class action procedures are
differentiated from representative actions by being opt-out in nature. The
United Kingdom GLO is different in this respect for it only covers claims that
have been entered on to the group register i.e. it is an opt-in scheme.
Under most schemes the judge is given wide discretion as to the
appropriate form of notice. Ontario has the innovative feature that notification
costs can be funded through the Class Proceedings Fund (see below). For a
personal injury claim, the preference for a representative action style opt-in
procedure or a class action opt-out procedure is finely balanced. Given the
amounts at stake it may be thought unfair to place the conduct of someone's
claim in the hands of a third party without their express permission. By
contrast, where small claims are involved individuals are likely to suffer little
by having the action taken on their behalf and indeed the only likely alternative
is that the case does not get litigated at all. As the point of principle is decided
by an independent arbiter, the consumer can only win by the proper
development of the law and any possible compensation going either to him
directly or cy-presed to activities that benefit him indirectly as a consumer.
Funding for class actions in the United States is uncomplicated. Lawyers
work on contingent fees and there is usually no liability for the other party's
costs, even if the case is lost. That is not to say that the level of such fees
should not be a proper topic for debate, taking as they do usually one third of
the damages. We have already noted the criticism that in many consumer class
actions only the lawyers gain much financially. In most countries funding is
more problematic. Indeed, funding is the most problematic aspect of collective
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litigation. 1 6 Although class actions are normally more cost effective than
individual actions, they can still be expensive to run. There is a general drift
towards contingent fees, although a reluctance to replicate completely the
United States' system. In the United Kingdom for instance, successful lawyers
can obtain an uplift of up to 100 percent of their normal fee and in Ontario there
is a non-percentage contingent fee based on the lawyer's hourly rate, number of
hours worked and a multiplier.
The more serious problem however is to deal with the liability to the other
party for their costs if the case is unsuccessful in full or in part. In the
Australian Federal and Ontario procedure the representative is personally liable
(although he may have an agreement with those he represents regarding cost
sharing), whereas the United Kingdom approach is for the costs to be borne by
all parties represented. This rule was problematic when confirmed by the
courts. 17 It disturbed the practice of selecting legally aided plaintiffs against
whom costs were not awarded as representatives in test cases.
The idea of waiving the loser pays rule fees is appropriate in class actions.
This is especially so as far as low value consumer claims are concerned, for one
can readily understand why few individuals would find it beneficial to risk costs
liability for small individual personal gain.
Ontario has adopted a novel approach to address this issue. Not only is the
representative not to be liable in test cases where a novel point of law is raised
or where a matter of public interest was involved; but also where a plaintiff has
received assistance from the Class Proceedings Fund then the Fund will be
liable rather than the representative. For this reason, funding from the Fund can
be crucial despite the fact that it only covers disbursements and not lawyer's
fees." 8 In Quebec, a government agency (the Fonds) provides assistance for
both disbursements and lawyer's fees, and the problem of the other sides' costs
is now covered by a rule that the claim is treated as one for a modest amount for
which only moderate costs are recoverable.
In Hong Kong, a loan from the state lottery was used to establish a scheme
which meets the legal expenses of litigants in return for a percentage of
damages. It seems clear that if class actions are to work, at least outside the
realm of personal injury litigation, then novel forms of funding and liability for
costs need to be addressed. This is another example of how consumer litigation
challenges the legal system to find novel solutions.
116. Klaus Viitanen, The Crisis of the Welfare State, Privitisation and Consumers' Access to Justice,
in FROM DISSONANCE TO SENSE: WELFARE STRTE EXPECTATIONS, PRIVITIZATION AND PRIVATE LAW (1999).
117. Allocating Liabilities in Opren action, Davies v. Eli Lilly and Co., TIMES (London), May 11,
1987.
118. Ontario Law Commission: Report on Class Actions (1982) (explaining that the commission had
proposed that the loser pays rule not apply in class actions)
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Where class actions are simply used as an efficient means for processing
individual claims then individual assessment of damages may be appropriate.
However, even in personal injury cases there are examples of class actions
giving rise to novel solutions which better reflect the collective dimension of the
problem. The provision in the Agent Orange settlement providing for part of
the damages to be used to improve Veteran healthcare is one example. In small-
scale consumer claims, it may sometimes be possible to award individualized
compensation. For instance, if a utility charges an unlawful amount it could be
ordered to reimburse that amount to all its customers. It may be more difficult
to see how a taxi company that overcharged its customers could trace them to
effect repayment. However, this novel problem was overcome in the New York
class action case of Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., " 9 where the cab drivers were
ordered to undercharge for a period so that the unlawful profits were returned
to the customers. Of course this was rough and ready in the sense that not all
customers would be compensated to the same degree, depending on their cab
hiring habits during the two periods, but unjust enrichment was avoided and
some form of compensation received by those who used New York cabs
regularly. Any more exact distribution of damages would have been
impractical. Most class action procedures make provision for the award of
aggregate damages so long as some sound basis for that assessment can be
discerned. The United Kingdom is out of line in this respect, but even here
settlements can have cy-pres characteristics. For instance, Rover paid £lM for
car research to the Consumers' Association to compensate for breach of
competition laws.' 2° Once again consumer disputes require reconsideration of
existing principles.
The payment of damages to consumer associations in appropriate cases
might be a way forward for overcoming the problem of providing incentives for
them to bring small consumer claims. As Olsen well demonstrates, there is
every reason why individuals will not follow Ihering' s call to invoke the law in
the general interest.' 21 The United States' solution is to provide this incentive
to private lawyers through the lure of attractive fees. In China, the peasant
Wang Hai is using the laws on exemplary damage for counterfeiting as the basis
for a nice income generation scheme based on uncovering counterfeit goods.1
22
However, in many cultures there seem something distasteful about leaving
recovery to such private enterprise initiatives. This is not to say that the role of
individual litigation in developing good standards should be underestimated.
119. See 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (Cal. 1967).
120. David Nicholson-Lord, Rover 'Pays' Im Pounds Compensation, THE INDEPENDENT (London),
Nov. 17, 1993, at 2.
121. M. OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, (1965).
122. M. lp, "An Update on the 'Wang Hai' Phenomenon" (2000) 8 Consumer Law Journal 71.
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Indeed, one sometimes wonders whether the energies put into obtaining
standing and lobbying for new procedures by consumer organizations might not
be more effectively spent in litigating test cases. However, such a strategy
requires resources, often from the public purse, which are increasingly scarce.
XVIII. LEGAL AID
Public funding of lawyers is on the retreat. The one time fairly extensive
United Kingdom legal aid system is now in decline with lawyers being looked
to take cases on a conditional fee basis under which they can claim a success fee
of up to 100 percent if they win depending upon the risk involved. To some
extent, we do not regret some aspects of the decline of Cappellti's first
economic wave for in many respects lawyers rather than litigants or society
seemed to be the main beneficiaries of legal aid. One of the main stimulants for
reform in the United Kingdom was the benzodiazepine cases where £33 M of
public money was spent on a product liability action that never got to court.
However, there is a tendency to throw the baby out with the bath water, and
public funding needs to be more available than it is for high-risk cases that are
unsuitable for conditional fees. Also, there is a need for a more developed
system of legal advice to consumers than exists in most countries.
One interesting model is the New South Wales Legal Aid Commission,
which although with a far smaller budget that their counterparts in the United
Kingdom, seems to have achieved some notable successes by retaining in house
lawyers to work on cases in areas prioritized by the Commission." 3 This shows
that Capelletti' s economic wave still has some life left in it although the funding
of consumer litigation from the public purse may need to be rethought.
Indeed it is noticeable that in Australia there is a lot of case law (at least in
contrast to the United Kingdom) on consumer credit. This seems to be due to
the activity of specialist law centers for financial service funded out of cy-pres
type settlements where creditors have failed to comply with disclosure
requirements and, as a result, agreed to pay money into a financial counseling
trust fund. This is interesting and could be the possible basis for a holy cycle,
whereby such cy-pres arrangements provide an incentive for consumer
organizations to bring actions to protect the consumer interest and then use the
profits to bring further actions and thereby effectively police the market at the
expense of the market.
XIX. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
One alternative to private initiative class actions is the use of public
authorities. The faith in public authorities to regulate the market place varies
123. Ben Slade, Not Enough Lawyers, 36 LAW &SOC'Y J. 58 (1998).
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from culture to culture. It is probably at its highest in Scandinavia where the
Consumer Ombudsmen play an important role, and at its lowest in the United
States where citizens distrust the power of Government to control powerful
business interests, 124 and in developing countries where resources are too scarce
to permit effective enforcement. However, public authorities are likely to place
less emphasis on providing individuals with compensation than with efforts to
protect the general public interest. It is true that in some countries criminal
prosecutions can be an important means of providing consumers with the means
to compensation. For instance, in France the action civile allows the criminal
courts to award compensation to those injured by the breach of the law. Similar
rules allowed the victims of the Colza cooking oil affair in Spain to recover. In
other countries, especially in S. America, the Attorney Generals help consumers
recover damages as well as police the criminal laws. The United Kingdom
courts do have powers to award compensation in such situations under s. 35 of
the Power of Criminal Courts Act 1973, but these powers are rarely utilized to
their full extent and more generally public authorities do not see it as their
function to expend resources in providing compensation.
The Australian Consumer and Competition Commission has a novel power
to intervene in assisting product liability victims. This has been little used as
private practice lawyers are quick to take up the most likely cases and there is
no provision for similar powers where they are most needed, in claims of
modest value.
XX. PUBLIC INTEREST COLLECTIVE LITIGATION
As public bodies become involved in the litigation of claims on behalf of
individuals, we see that the line between public and private interest litigation is
not distinct. We will however now turn our attention to ways in which such
bodies act with the predominant purpose of improving consumer welfare
generally, rather than recovering damages for consumers.
XXI. CONSUMER ORGANIZATIONS
Particularly in France and Germany, consumer organizations have a
tradition of using litigation to promote the consumer interest. However,
especially in Germany consumer organizations (Verbrauceher Zentrale125 in
each Land and a central Verbraucher Schutz Verein) should not be viewed in the
same light as the organic grassroots organizations that exist in most of the
common law world. They are part of the corporatist state structure being funded
124. Even there, there is some good work being done by bodies such as the Federal Trade
Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the State Attorney Generals.
125. Not all are equally active in using their powers.
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by the state and perform an important structural role in market surveillance. In
Germany the consumer organizations main. powers have traditionally been to
challenge unfair trade practices under the Law Against Unfair Competition
1965, and in more recent times unfair contract terms under the Law on Standard
Contract Terms 1976, as amended. The consumer organizations typically
negotiate with traders and obtain their agreement to desist in the practice or
failing that seek injunctions. If these are breached, fines are payable but these
go to the court. It has from time to time been proposed that consumer groups
be allowed to recover damages, but this has not come to fruition.
126
In France, the consumer organizations have also had this market
surveillance role, but whilst some powers merely provide for injunctive relief
(for example in 1988 they were given the power to challenge unfair terms)'27 the
majority also permit consumer organizations to become involved in claims for
damages. French consumer organizations were first given the right to bring
actions in the collective interest by art. 46 of the Royer Law of 27 December
1973. 128 A decision of the Court de Cassation in 1985 made it clear that this
only applied where there was an action civile in the strict sense i.e. there must
have been a breach of the criminal law. The offence must have harmed, directly
or indirectly, the collective interest of consumers. This is an interesting
principle for the consumer organizations are seen as representing the collective
consumer interest. This has been described by Calais-Auloy and Steinmetz as
being half-way between the individual interest of consumers and the general
interest of citizens. The former can be protected by the individuals
themselves, the latter by the minist~re public. By contrast consumer groups are
best placed to protect the collective consumer interest. Consumer groups can
seek injunctions, damages or publicity for the judgment at the defendant's
expense.
XXII. DAMAGES FOR COLLECTIVE HARM
The nature of damages for harm to the collective interest are difficult to
discern with certainty. Calais-Auloy and Steinmetz suggests it is to compensate
the consumer organizations for their efforts. However, they also comment that
they might be viewed as private fines and this fits best with the belief they form
part of a deterrence strategy. 3 ° They note that often the judges fail to confront
the issue and only award a symbolic franc. However the consumer
126. R. Tur, Litigation and the Consumer Interest: The Class Action and Beyond, 2 LEGAL STUD.
135, 165-166 (1982).
127. See C. CON. art. 421-6 (Fr.)
128. Id. (now the Consumer Code).
129. J. CALAIS-AULOY & F. STEINMETZ, DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION, (1996).
130. S. CARVAL, LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE DANS SA FONCTION DE PEINE PRIVEE, (1995).
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organization, Que Choisir in their booklet, 20 ans d'action civile, cite a decision
of the Court of Appeal of Paris of 11 December 1995 which states that there
should be full compensation and not merely a symbolic amount. How should
this be calculated? One approach might be for it to cover damages that cannot
be compensated to individuals for practical/logistical reasons. A more
satisfying theoretical justification might be one based on the harm to consumer
confidence in the market caused by misleading advertising or the sale of
dangerous products. Thus, whilst France has introduced the interesting concept
of damage to the collective consumer interest as something distinct from the
accumulation of individual claims, the implications of this new principle have
yet to be worked out. This goes beyond our view of the collective interest being
to recover damages that otherwise would not have been recovered by individual
proceedings. It is an interesting concept which can perhaps be invoked when
the amount of individual damages is difficult to assess. It might be possible to
argue that poor business practices actually cause more than the sum of
individual losses because of the impact on market confidence in general. Thus,
harm for the collective interest is closely linked to a fine. Payment to a
consumer organization, in addition to individual losses, may provide the
incentive for consumer organizations to bring such cases, but we suspect there
will be strong resistance to such an approach where full compensation is also
awarded. It is more likely that awards to consumer organizations will be more
easily accepted if they are viewed as part of the compensatory package.
XXI. CONSUMER GROUPS AND INDIVIDUAL LITIGATION
Consumer groups in France can also become a party to individual
litigation, 3' but this power is severely limited and adds little to the consumer's
groups power simply to assist consumers. As actual harm is required, it cannot
be used as a mechanism to prevent harm occurring in the first place. Such
instances show how blurred the distinction between public and private interest
collective litigation can be.
The French Consumer Law Reform Commission had proposed a class
action procedure based on the N. American model, but having the French
characteristic that the action would have been brought by a consumer
organization. 132 The organization would have been able to bring an action on
the question of liability in principle without even informing the consumers they
claimed to represent. Once the decision was handed down publicity would be
given to it, and consumers could decide whether to benefit from the decision or
take their own action. In fact, the French legislator adopted a half-way house
131. C. CON. art. 421-7 (Fr.)
132. COMMISSION DE REFONTE: PROPOSITION POUR UN CODE DE LA CONSUMMATION, (1990)
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in its Neietz law of 18 January 1992, which was supplemented by a decree of
11 December 1992.' The right of action arises where several identified
individual consumers suffer harm from the same cause as the result of the act
of the same trader. Thus, it provides a mechanism for them to represent the sum
of individual interests, rather than simply the collective interest which is
protected by the action civile. It is broader than the action civile in that it can
concern both an action civile or a civil law claim. This procedure is unlikely to
have a great impact. In part this is because of the need to identify victims and
have them mandate the organization to represent them. This is hampered by the
restriction that only the written press may be used, for fear that using audio-
visual media might unfairly tarnish a company's image before it has been found
to have done wrong. More fundamentally, one might question why a consumer
organization would wish to involve itself in such a procedure. It can in any
event assist consumers to bring actions and this new procedure does not entitle
it to claim damages in its own right. Under this procedure consumer
organizations simply expose themselves to liabilities in terms of claims by
consumers if they do not exercise their mandate properly and by producers if
they damage their reputations unfairly. They may also be held liable for the
producers' costs if the action fails.
XXIV. INJUNCTIONS
The notion of collective injunction actions has clearly taken root in Europe
driven by EC law. Starting with the misleading advertisement directive, 134
successive consumer protection directives included provision for injunction
procedures. Drawing upon the diverse traditions within the Community these
provided standing to either public bodies whose task it was to protect consumers
or consumer organizations having the same function. Sometimes these were
clearly alternatives, 13 at other times it was arguable that the wording of the
directives required member states to give standing to consumer groups as well
as public authorities. This development culminated in a Consumer Injunctions
Directive, 136 to which we shall return when considering cross-border regulation.
Here it is clear member states have the choice of whether standing be granted
to public authorities or consumer organizations or both.'37 Granting it to both
is becoming the standard preference of legislators, although actual practice
remains linked to national traditions. The Directive's policy is aimed at the
133. See C. CON. art. 422 (Fr.)
134. Council Directive 84/450, 1984 O.J. (L 250) 17-20.
135. As in misleading advertising directive.
136. Council Directive 98/27, art. 3, 1998 0. (L 166) 51, 52.
137. Id.
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protection of the collective interests of consumers. 138 Its policy is not complete
as it does not cover all areas of consumer law - safety laws are one notable
omission - and of course it only provides for injunctive relief not damages.
The impact of this new European policy on the United Kingdom is
interesting. The United Kingdom has little history of consumer organizations
having standing to enforce consumer laws and indeed the Control of Misleading
Advertisement Regulations (implementing the EC Directive) only gave such
power to the Director General of Fair Trading.' 39 The first implementation of
the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations similarly restricted
standing to the Director General. However the Consumers Association
challenged this in the European courts and the incoming Labour Government
agreed to settle the case by granting standing to the Consumers' Association and
a host of other bodies. 4° A similar approach has been adopted when
implementing of the Consumer Injunctions Directive.' 4' It is not yet clear
whether this represents a change of culture. One suspects that so long as the
public authorities make a good fist of market surveillance, the private consumer
organizations will be happy not to invest their resources in court battles.
Indeed, the notion of representative action was taken to heart by the Labour
Government who set up a committee to look into how such a procedure should
work not only in the consumer context, but also in any setting where a collective
interest was at stake. Whilst the notion of representative actions for injunctions
and declaratory relief were accepted in principle,142 there is more hesitation over
including damage claims, although interesting this possibility was not excluded
in the final report. 14 However, if consumer organizations are to participate in
market surveillance, they need some encouragement, possibly in the form of
allowing the cy-presing at least part of the damages or allowing the recovery of
legal fees. Under the current situation all they have is the threat of costs liability
against them.
XXV. SOCIAL ACTION LITIGATION
Before concluding this survey of collective redress mechanism, it is worth
mentioning the Indian experience of Social Action Litigation.'14 This provides
138. Id. at art. I.
139. The Control of Misleading Advertisements Regulations, No. 915 (1988) (Eng.).
140. See now, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, No. 2083 (1999) (Eng.).
141. DTI Consultation paper, Injunctions Directive Implementation of Directive 98/27 EC on
Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers' interests, 19 (2000).
142. Although there remain some problems about bringing such actions before a private law right
of action has accrued if damage is an element of the cause of action.
143. See LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPT., REPRESENTATIVE CLAIMS: PROPOSED NEW PROCEDURES
(2001).
144. D. Harland, Collective Access to Justice-Some Perspectives from Asia and the Pacific, 90
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that where a person or class of person is unable to approach the Supreme Court
by virtue of poverty, disability or their socially or economically disadvantaged
position then any member of the public or a social action group acting bona fide
can.apply seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused. The
Court has been willing to act on a simple letter directed to the court and in some
cases has taken over the proceedings, for example establishing a socio-legal
commission to investigate the complaint. Although primarily aimed at instances
of state repression and exploitation of disadvantaged groups, it has been used
to further consumer concerns. Doubtless this model is the product of the
particular socio-economic conditions prevailing in India, but it nevertheless
serves to remind us of the need to give voice to the collective concerns of
groups which might be ordinarily excluded form the legal process, including
consumers.
XXVI. SUMMARY
Leaving to one side the special experience of India, we have a bleak picture
of how consumers are protected as a collective so far as compensation
procedures are concerned. Only in France and to some extent at the EC level
by virtue of the Injunctions Directive, is the notion of collective interest
recognized as a distinct legal category, but it is only in France and even their
hesitantly that there is seen as a need to compensate for harm caused to the
collective. It might be argued that the consumer class actions in the United
States represent an attempt to provide compensation for small but widely
dispersed losses that affect the consumer collective. The problem there is that
the incentives to lawyers tend not to require them to extract the best
compensation for consumers. Elsewhere the position with regard to public
bodies and consumer organizations seeking injunctive and declaratory relief
seems better, but the United States class action model where copied has almost
exclusively been used for high ticket value cases and not for the mass, small,
widely disbursed consumer claims. Indeed some systems seem to turn their face
against such a use of the class action procedure: the Australian federal
procedure contains a power to stop proceedings where the cost of distributing
money would be excessive as the class is too large and individual amounts
claimed are small. 45
One argument might be that there is not the same need for the regulatory
role performed by private lawyers in United States class action cases in other
Western countries, as in Europe and other common law countries, this function
is performed by regulators and consumer groups. However, evidently there is
a unmet need in these countries to deliver justice to consumers who have
CHULALNMGKORN L. REV. 126, 134-36 (1990).
145. S. 33M. Federal Court Of Australia Act 1976.
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suffered small losses and to prevent traders being unjustly enriched. If this
cannot be achieved directly by compensating consumers then attempts can be
made to achieve this indirectly by cy-pres orders giving damages to bodies
promoting the consumer interest.
However, it is undeniable that collective actions to protect the consumer
interest is a dynamic area of law which one can expect to see develop in the
future both as regards injunctive and declaratory relief and representative and
class actions. However, we have already commented that a lot of consumer
litigation takes place in the lowest level courts and in alternative dispute
resolution forums. It is arguable that many class actions for small individual
amounts are in reality large claims and do not belong in the small claims courts.
However, such claims may have to be litigated there and indeed one could
imagine localized problems affecting the residents of a particular area being best
sorted out by the local small claims court. Yet some class action schemes, such
as Ontario's, exclude small claims courts. This may be because there is a
feeling that small claims courts cannot handle the complexity of a class action.
By contrast, many ADR schemes are sophisticated enough to handle collective
disputes, and some indeed actually do accept some collective disputes. Some
individual complaints become, in effect, test cases where a decision in one case
is enforced at least on behalf of all others who bring a complaint on the same
terms, although not necessarily with respect to those consumers who have
suffered but have not contacted the ADR institution. "' These examples should
be followed and publicized so that the waves for organizational and procedural
reform Cappellti detected, converge rather that flow in separate directions. This
is the sixth wave of integration that we want to see developed.
XXVII. GLOBALIZATION
Our fifth wave in consumer litigation: the globalization of consumer
disputes, is perhaps the most talked about new wave in consumer access to
justice. One might suspect sometimes that it is a phenomenon that is more
talked about than real. For instance, a Eurobarometer survey found that only
2% of European consumers had a complaint about goods purchased overseas. '47
Given the internal market in Europe, one might expect this figure to be even less
elsewhere in the globe. Of this 2%, 43% complained in person or by telephone
to the seller, 36% did not react and only 6% consulted a lawyer. Interestingly,
146. Guy Dennis, Borrowers In Line for Mortgage Payout, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Aug. 26, 2001.
(showing a recent example in the UK concerning a decision by the Banking Omubudsman against lenders who
gave new customers a better deal on mortgage rates than existing customers, and that complaints have been
upheld against several banks and building societies who adopted this practice, and the implication is that
significant compensation will have to be paid to a large number of borrowers).
147. Les Europeens et l'acces A lajustice- Resultats significatifs de l'Eurobarometre 52.1.
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the most popular choice for European consumers as a means of resolving
disputes purchased abroad was a public consumer body. As we shall see this
option is not on the Community's agenda.
Although still small in numbers, it is reasonable to predict that cross border
consumer complaints will grow in significance. There are several factors giving
rise to the globalization of consumer disputes. As the inexorable rise (at least
before 11 September) in air traffic indicates the world's population is simply
becoming more mobile. It is to be expected that consumers will not leave their
passion for shopping at home and indeed will take advantage of local bargains
and differential pricing. This phenomenon is being encouraged by regional free
trade zones which not only remove taxation barriers, but (at least in the case of
the EC) positively encourage the consumer to act as an active competitive
dynamic within the internal market though the adoption of minimum consumer
protection rules throughout the Community.
Obviously the development of e-commerce is going to be a major factor
in the globalization of consumer disputes. Another dimension of the internet is
that it has the ability to take the consumer away from even its regional bloc and
allow him to contract anywhere in the globe and frequently in N. America!
The globalization of disputes also keys into many of the other waves we
have identified. Most obvious is the link with procedural changes, for the
distance between consumer and trader in global disputes makes the traditional
courts even more impracticable as a forum and inevitably gives succor to the
procedural wave and the trend towards ADR. However, it also gives impetus
to the organizational wave, for as individuals become less able to resolve
disputes across borders, so there is more need for collective solutions. Equally
one might argue that new economic solutions need to be adopted as individuals
who can afford to litigate at home, or can use self-help solutions within their
own jurisdictions, are more vulnerable when faced with the additional cost and
complexity of suing across borders. However, one sees little sign of there being
a lot of money to assist consumers resolve cross border disputes. We will also
suggest that if global mechanisms can be set up to assist consumers then this
might indeed help enhance the regulatory role of consumer litigation, which we
argue should be seen as an important element in modern redress regimes.
Amongst the consequences of this will be the ability of global regulators to
identify more easily bad practices in particular states and bring trading standards
up to international norms.
XXVIII. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
There have certainly been some attempts to make the traditional court
based remedies responsive to consumer needs. This is evidenced by the rules
of private international law. Within Europe, the 1968 Brussels Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
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Matters'48 contained special consumer protection rules ensuring that in certain
circumstances consumers could sue in their domestic courts and also only be
sued there.' 49 Similarly, the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations 1980 provides for circumstances in which consumers
cannot be deprived of the mandatory rules of their state. 50  These rules are
currently being updated with the intention of making them part of EC law rather
than merely Conventions that member states sign up to. This process has
already been completed for jurisdictional issues and negotiations on choice of
law matters are in progress.
The EC Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters' 5' was adopted with
an eye on the development of Internet shopping. Its provisions give consumers
access to their domestic courts where:
the contract has been concluded with a person who pursues
commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the
consumer's domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that
Member State or to several States including that Member State, and
the contract falls within the scope of such activities.
There is a certain ambiguity as to whether the provision covers sales made
on both passive and interactive web-sites, but the general view is that this is a
consumer friendly provision, as it seems to give consumers purchasing over the
net the right to sue in their home jurisdiction. However, the reality is that few
consumers will make use of it, because there are numerous practical obstacles
which militate against consumers suing parties across borders.' 52 Also, it has
been calculated that the average cost of suing across borders in the EU for a
2000 Ecu claim is 2500 Ecu, and the proceedings will take between 12 and 64
months depending on the country. 153 Allowing the consumer to sue in his own
148. See generally 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Jan. 1, 1998, 27 I.L.M. I.
149. 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Jan. 1, 1998, art. 13-15, 27 I.L.M. 1.
150. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for signature June 19,
1980, 266 Europ. T.S. No. 1.
151. Council Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2000 O.J. (L 12) 1.
152. See generally Report by the European Consumer Law Group, Jurisdiction and Applicable Law
in Cross-Border Consumer Complaints- Socio-legal Remarks on an Ongoing Dilemma Concerning Effective
Legal Protection for Consumer-Citizens in the European Union, E.C.L.G. 157/98 (1998), available at:
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/policy/eclg/rep0len.html (last visited October 12, 2002).
153. See Commission Communication to the Parliament, Council, Economic and Social Committee
and Committee of the Regions Concerning the Action Plan on Consumer Access to Justice and the Settlement
[Vol. 9:1
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courts alleviates the problem, but there remain significant practical problems for
consumers when suing a party in another state.
There is another problem that the European rules on jurisdiction face as
regards regulating the Internet and that is that they do not extend beyond
Europe. In particular, they do not cover companies based in the United States.
There are attempts to renegotiate the Hague Convention to deal with this issue,
but these negotiations look like being prolonged and when agreement is finally
reached it will be necessary for states to ratify the Convention. Indeed action
to deal with the consumer problems associated with globalization is most
evident within Europe, because the EC has both the need for such rules to
promote its internal market and the political mechanisms to address the issue.
One might hope that a body such as the OECD would take the lead in expanding
these rules beyond the member states of the EC. However, despite some efforts
at promoting guidelines for consumer protection and e-commerce, which raises
issues of dispute resolution and redress, this has not taken concrete form to-date.
Indeed in the field of product safety one sees the opposite phenomenon. The
OECD's notification system on consumer safety matters has suffered from the
development of binding notification procedures at the EC level.
XXIX. EUROPEAN INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE CROSS-BORDER
CONSUMER REDRESS
Although access to justice issues have long been mentioned in consumer
policy debates at the EC level the main impetus has been since the 1993 Green
Paper on Access of Consumers to Justice and the Settlement of Consumer
Disputes in the Single Market. 54 We have already noted that it adopted a
Resolution on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for out-of court
settlements of consumer disputes.'55 It has recently followed this up with a
Recommendation on the principles for out of court bodies involved in the
consensual resolution of consumer disputes. 56 Whilst the former covers third
parties who propose or impose solutions, the latter deals with third parties who
seek to find an agreement by common consent. Neither therefore covers
company internal procedures. The intention is to give consumers confidence
that these bodies are truly impartial, transparent, effective and fair. The
guidelines by and large reflect good practice. Our main concern, as regards the
of Consumer Disputes in the Internal Market, COM(96) 13 at 9.
154. Green Paper- Access of Consumers to Justice and the Settlement of Consumer Disputes in the
Single Market, COM(93)576 final.
155. Commission Recommendation on the Principles Applicable to the Bodies Responsible for Out-
of-Court Settlement of Consumer Disputes, 1998 O.J. (L 115) 31.
156. Commission Recommendation on the Principles for Out-of-Court Bodies Involved in the
Consentual Resolution of Consumer Disputes, 2001 O.J. (L 109) 56.
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impact of globalization is whether the obligation to comply with the Rome
Convention requirement that in some circumstances the mandatory rules of the
consumer's state should apply might not be too onerous for many ADR schemes
that lack adequate legal resources.
At the same time as the 1998 Recommendation was issued, a consumer
complaints form was produced. Interestingly, this had originally been intended
as a means of making it easier for EC consumers to use the courts of other
member states. This had to be abandoned as "[e]valuation [has shown] that use
of the form as a legal instrument for simplifying seizure of the national courts
is incompatible with the heterogeneity and rigidity of the procedural rules of the
individual legal orders."' 57 This is evidence that globalization of disputes will
lead to increased use of ADR because of the inability of the traditional courts
to adapt. Although interestingly Ireland has mooted the possibility of its small
claims court system being available on-line,'58 there has generally been little
movement in traditional courts to respond to the globalized nature of consumer
disputes, despite the United Kingdom devoting a conference to this topic when
it held the presidency of the EC in June 1998.
The complaints form guides the consumer to explain the nature of her
problem and the remedy sought through a series of multiple choice and free text
boxes. As the form is available in all the official languages, the use of multiple
choice clearly circumvents some of the language problems, but does not remove
them entirely as there is still some textual content required. The form is
intended in the first instance for use in negotiations between consumer and
trader, and if that fails, for facilitating the use of ADR procedures. Consumers
may turn to consumer organizations to assist them, but such bodies are aware
of their lack of expertise and the European Advisors Forum has sought to
develop a protocol on how cross border disputes should be handled. 59 To assist
consumers with disputes the Commission has set up thirteen European
Consumer Advice Centres. These have expertise in advising consumers about
cross-border consumer problems. However, these resources are obviously
thinly spread and another example of the wane of the first wave of providing
economic assistance to ensure consumers have legal redress. Mitchell has made
envious comparisons with the Action for Single Market schemes which are
located within ministries and therefore receive government backing. They
investigate queries and complaints from business and can take up the matter
157. Towards Greater Efficiency in Obtaining and Enforcing Judgments in the EU, COM(97)609 at
14.
158. Comm. on Consumer Policy Report, Government and Private Sector Initiatives to Promote and
Implement the OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce, DSTI/CP
(2000) 7 final at 9.




with the Commission or member states concerned, whereas the consumer
centers merely offer advice. 1
60
The Commission has created a European Extra-Judicial Network (EEJ-
NET), comprised of notified bodies which comply with its guidelines for ADR
bodies and national clearing houses.' 6' A similar scheme (FIN-NET) is already
up and running for financial services. Under EEJ-NET, the national clearing
houses will be both a national contact point providing domestic consumers with
information on ADR bodies in their jurisdiction, and also enabling European
consumers to access ADR schemes in other countries by contacts with the
clearing house in the supplier's state. It will also provide the consumer with
assistance in formatting and filing his complaint, although it is unclear to what
extent this covers assistance with translation costs.
In addition to its role as an information source and facilitator, it is also
foreseen that the clearing houses will provide support for policy makers through
its strategic role in monitoring and storing information about the level and
nature of complaints. This is a good example of how the regulatory function of
consumer litigation is being recognized.
The Commission has appreciated the need to enhance consumer access to
justice, but the barriers to this are immense. Frequently, for instance, it
comments upon the impossibility of interfering with national judicial
procedures. Yet it is bravely trying to promote the cause of consumer access to
justice. In its recent discussion document, Ideas for a Consumer Policy
Strategy, 6 2 it talks about the need to ensure access to justice for consumers
"both individual (agreement on applicable law for contractual and non-
contractual disputes, building on the approach for jurisdiction and enforcement
of judgments, alternative dispute resolutions and small claims courts) and
collectively (examining the potential of a mechanism for collective redress of
consumers at EU level).' 63
XXX. INTERNET
Similar hopes concerning regulatory objectives are also being expressed
for the global online dispute resolution (ODR rather than ADR!) bodies in the
field of e-commerce. For instance, the American Bar Association's Task Force
on E-Commerce and Dispute Resolution has suggested that as part of adhering
to an ODR Trustmark scheme there should be an obligation on the online
160. Id. at 102.
161. Commission Working Document on the Creation of a European Extra-Judicial Network
(EEJNET)
162. See Ideas for a Consumer Policy Strategy, http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/policy/
intro02-en.pdf (last visited October 12, 2002).
163. id.
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dispute resolution provider and/or trustmark entity to notify the public
authorities that have jurisdiction over the business activities of the particular
merchant. 164 A lot could be said about the moves to create online dispute
resolution schemes. It is clearly based on self-regulatory structures and a
recognition that traditional court structures cannot deal with low value cross
border disputes. However, equally there is also a recognition that consumers
need to have confidence in these schemes and a range of private and public
accreditation scheme are developing. The problem is to develop principles
which offer a globally recognized standard for a global medium. There are
some national standards, such as Trust UK, but these need to be part of an
international framework. Unfortunately, as the issue becomes globalized so it
becomes more difficult to agree standards and to ensure consumers have
confidence in those standards. Much more could be said on this topic, but for
present purposes it suffices to say that it is a clear example of the globalizing
trend in consumer litigation and also clear evidence that this will lead to
increased use of ADR.
XXXI. MAKING TRADERS ACCOUNTABLE ACROSS BORDERS
Of course as companies trade more and more across borders, there is a
problem of how to hold them accountable for compliance with consumer
protection laws. Indeed, the variety of consumer laws can be a headache even
for a firm seeking to trade ethically. Failing harmonization, one way around
this is for country of origin controls and systems of mutual recognition. These
are indeed hallmarks of EC internal market law. However, regulators still find
it harder to enforce laws in the global environment. There are some initiatives
such as the 24/7 initiative by the Attorney Generals in the United States to
ensure there is always someone available in every state to respond to urgent
internet problems. There are also examples of consumer agencies around the
world setting particular days aside to collaborate on seeking out Internet scams.
However, such efforts appear to involve running to stand still against the welter
of problems thrown up by the increased globalization of trade.
Once again the EC has developed a novel solution. It was apparent that
there was a need to develop strategies to prevent companies from taking
advantage of the fact that the internal market had not been matched by the
development of an internal legal order. This was obvious when French
companies targeted German consumers with misleading advertising. The
German consumer organizations had no standing before the French courts and
164. Draft Preliminary Report & Concept Paper, 2001 A.B.A. ASS'N TASK FORCE ON E-COMMERCE
& ALTERNATIVE Disp. RESOL.
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the French authorities had no interest (in some countries the problem would be
a lack of authority) to protect German consumers. 165
As previously described the Community had developed the notion of
collective injunctions in several consumer law directives. This policy
culminated in Directive 98/27/EC on injunctions for the protection of
consumers' interests, 166 which gave it an internal market dimension. This
Directive requires member states to notify bodies who can bring injunction
actions to prevent the infringement of the laws implementing a list of directives
found in its annex where this would harm the collective interest of consumers. 167
Although the Directive clearly offers the choice of these bodies being either
independent public bodies or consumer organizations, or both,168 in practice
both sorts of body are given standing. Not only do these bodies have standing
in domestic matters, 169 but they can also seek injunctions in other member states
where the interests they protect are affected. Thus, a German consumer
organization can seek an injunction before the French courts for misleading
advertising aimed at German consumers, but emanating from France. Member
states can introduce a requirement that the entity first consult with the defendant
and/or a qualified entity within the state where the injunction is sought. This is
again an instance of a regional rather than a global solution. It is of limited
assistance when one of the parties is outside that region. Again, one approach
may be to try to develop international agreements or bilateral agreements to take
these principles further, but one may doubt how fast developments of this nature
can take place. Nevertheless, this example serves to show how organizational
changes in consumer litigation (in the form of collective injunctions) are made
even more necessary because of the trend to globalization.
XXXII. CONCLUSIONS
Globalization enhances several of the trends that were becoming apparent
in consumer litigation and concerns to address this phenomenon will underpin
our thinking in the future. At the same time there is a need to remember most
consumer disputes are still for small amounts and concern products and services
purchased locally. Currently, there are few realistic avenues for redress for such
claims. The only practical way of improving redress is through development of
the organizational and procedural reform waves identified by Capelletti. These
165. Hans-W. Micklitz, Cross-Border Consumer Conflicts- A French-German Experience, 16 J.
CONSUMER POL'Y 411 (1993).
166. Council Directive 98/27, art. 2-3, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51.
167. Guidance has been provided on what amounts to collective interest, but this term remains
undefined in the legislation.
168. Council Directive 98/27, art. 3, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51.
169. Council Directive 98/27, art. 2, 1998 O. (L 166) 51.
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will assist the local as well as the global consumer. Indeed, many local
problems are likely to be found replicated in other parts of the globe and so the
distinction should not be too strongly defined between the two types of
consumer problem. The economic reform wave has certainly faltered.
However, what is needed is new thinking on how limited public funds for
consumer advice can best be used. How can consumer advice centers best be
organized, how can litigation strategies be developed to best increase welfare?
Part of this may be to appreciate the regulatory impact of litigation in both the
court and ADR sectors. Above all, the legal system in the broadest sense must
be viewed as a whole. Innovative solutions developed in the traditional legal
system may have to be transplanted into the ADR sector if their benefits are to
be realized to the full. We have seen decades of experimentation and
innovation. This has also resulted in fragmentation in the procedures and
avenues for consumer redress. Our final call is for the cross-fertilization of
ideas and the integration of solutions. This has been an essay in comparative
law, but our call is for the lessons of comparisons not to stop at national borders,
but also for. the various consumer redress mechanisms within national legal
systems to learn from the experiences of one another.
[Vol. 9:1
CROSS - CULTURAL ARBITRATION: DO THE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CULTURES STILL
INFLUENCE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION DESPITE HARMONIZATION?
Lara M. Pair J.D.
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................ 57
II. WHAT IS CULTURE ANYWAY? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 59
III. DIFFERENCES IN LEGAL CULTURE ............................ 61
A. Common Law & Civil Law ............................ 61
1. Oral or W ritten Proceedings ....................... 63
2. Discovery and Pre-Hearing Procedures .............. 64
3. Treatment of W itnesses .......................... 65
4. Record Keeping ................................ 66
B. Regional Cultures ................................... 67
1. Non-Arab Africa ................................ 67
2. East A sia ...................................... 68
3. Latin Am erica .................................. 70
4. Arab W orld .................................... 71
IV. USING THIS INFORMATION ................................... 73
V . CONCLUSION ........................................... 73
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine an International Commercial Arbitration hearing. Imagine how
the procedure of your International Commercial Arbitration works. Maybe you
are already savvy and know of some international rules or you have looked up
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration to get a
picture.' You are, for example, an Anglo-American plaintiff's lawyer. Now
imagine the other party to this International Commercial Arbitration. Where are
they from? Let us say they are East Asian. So you assume the other party has
read the same rules since you have agreed to the use of the UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration. The arbitrator is French and
I. KAVASS & LIVAK, MODEL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A
DOCUMENTORY HISTORY (William S. Hein Company 1985); UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, U. N. Commission on International Trade Law (1976), available at
http://www.unicatral.org/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb.htm (last visited August 27, 2002) (hereinafter
UNCITRAL).
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knows the rules quite well, mainly because she is the arbitrator. Now, as a
plaintiffs lawyer you want to "start the show", when the French arbitrator tells
you to limit your witness examination to 20 minutes each. Perplexed you
protest, because this is not what you are used to, but the arbitrator will hear
nothing.
What has happened? Differing expectations. In International Commercial
Arbitration more than just the legal issues are issues. Whether procedure is
agreed upon ad hoc, or institutional rules are used, expectations of the process
may well differ from participant to participant.2 Why? Divergence in cultural
backgrounds. This paper argues that despite harmonization of procedural rules
in International Commercial Arbitration, expectations of the process differ
based on cultural background of parties or arbitrators. In order to overcome
cultural barriers of this and other sorts, one should understand the differences
and use them creatively.3 This paper is intended to shed light on some of the
differences and thereby advocate understanding.
There are two caveats for this text. First, it must be clarified that the
lawyers may well be better informed than the parties and the expectations may
differ with increased experience and knowledge of background of other
participants.4 Second, my analysis applies to both ad hoc and institutional
arbitrations. The extent of the cultural influence on the process may differ.
Institutional arbitrations usually have more clearly defined rules of procedure
and tend to adopt a common approach for arbitrations, instead of a case-by-case
determination.
"Every person operates in his or her own private world perceptual field."5
Culture is part of what creates this field. This paper discusses how the
differences in culture influence the arbitral process. Notwithstanding the actual
norms prevailing in the International Commercial Arbitration process,
participants who may not know enough about this process (and who are basing
their expectations on experience gathered within their own legal culture) are
2. Participant in this paper is used to describe both parties and arbitrators.
3. PHILLIP HARRIS & ROBERT MORAN, MANAGING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 27 (1991).
4. With increased experience, the participants will schedule conferences in advance and discuss
issues of preference and procedure in more detail, so that initial expectations based on one's own, or the other
participant's cultures doesn't get the better of the proceeding. These issues often influence the choice of
arbitrators. Malkom Wilkey, The Practicalities of Cross-Cultural Arbitration, in CONFLICTING LEGAL
CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 79, 80 (Stefan Frommel & Barry Rider eds., 1999). The location
of the arbitration can also be influenced by culture. For example, due to their cultural background Switzerland
has arbitration rules advantageous for litigation against a foreign sovereign. Sigvard Jarvin, Leading
Arbitration Seats - A (Mostly European) Comparative View, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 39, 52 (Stefan Frommel & Barry Rider eds., 1999); see also Cbemado Cermades,
Overcoming the Clash of Legal Cultures: The Role of Interactive Arbitration, in CONFLICTING LEGAL
CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 147, 165ff (Stefan Frommel & Barry Rider eds., 1999).
5. See HARRIS & MORAN, supra note 3, at 29.
bound to face surprise. This cannot be an exhaustive treatment of the matter and
will be a mere sample. To this end I will set a framework of reference based on
Harris' and Moran's definition of culture and introduce three different levels of
the concept 'culture'. Then this text will go on to show procedural differences
in the main legal cultures (Common Law and Civil Law) and how these
differences came about. Regionally based distinctions within these main
systems follow. This analysis will not include differences in substantive law.
II. WHAT IS CULTURE ANYWAY?
This section will identify what makes culture and create a working
definition. Some definitions, which can be found in dictionaries or sociologists'
writings define culture as "the total pattern of human behavior and its products
embodied in thought, speech, action, and artifacts and dependant of man's
capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations
through the use of tools, language, and systems of abstract thought."6 Others
define culture as a complex of typical behavior and standardized social forms
particular to one social group, or an atmosphere of social beliefs, preferences,
expectations, and common principles.'
I will adopt Phillip Harris' and Robert Moran's definition. "Culture gives
people a sense of who they are, of belonging, of how they should behave, and
what they should be doing." 8 It implies values and patterns that influence
attitudes and actions.9 In short, it is that which makes one function on a very
subconscious level.' 0
Culture can be separated into different subcategories. There are three
analytical levels, which group together certain aspects of culture. The first level
is called technical and is the unemotional, easily transferable part of culture,
such as grammar of a language."' The second, so-called formal aspect refers to
rituals both obvious and hidden, 12 such as taking off one's hat when entering a
room. 3 These rituals are learned by trial and error.' 4 Obviously, the hidden
ones are not easily learned and one of differing culture will not easily admit to
6. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, A-K 552 culture 5(a) (3rd ed. 1966).
7. Horatio Grigera Naon, Latin American Arbitration Culture and the ICC Arbitration System, in
CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 79, 117 (Stefan Frommel & Barry Rider eds.,
1999).
8. See HARRIS & MORAN, supra note 3, at 12.
9. Id.
10. Insights into the workings of culture have been discovered by the behavioral sciences, i.e.
sociology, psychology and anthropology.
11. See HARRIS & MORAN, supra note 3, at 39.
12. Id. at 39, 40.
13. This is a western cultural habit.
14. See HARRIS & MORAN, supra note 3, at 39, 40.
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their effect. This level is prone to misunderstandings and is emotionally
charged. The third level is the informal level. 15 It describes automatic and
almost unconscious responses. 16 This level is also highly emotional and is only
learned through modeling, e.g., how males and females interact. These levels
form the basis of culture.
17
Culture influences many aspects of life, attitude, social organization,
thought patterns, space requirements, body language, and time sense. 8 Thought
patterns bear effect on the process of reasoning, be it legal or otherwise. What
is perfectly logical, self-evident and reasonable for one culture may be
offensive, illogical, and unreasonable for the other. Cultural background
strongly influences the legal systems and understandings. 9 International
Commercial Arbitration being an alternative legal instrument will be expected
to be similar in goals and procedure to the legal system the participant is used
to. Persons always expect what they are used to, to be the norm. Therefore,
cultural backgrounds, by birth or education, also influences how people
approach arbitration and what they expect of it in substance as well as in
procedure and formalities. This expectation will in many instances be based on
repeated experience in the person's cultural context.
While the substantive outcome in International Commercial Arbitration is
not usually based on cultural expectation, procedure is. Substantive law and
even basic norms will differ not only from culture to culture but also from
country to country.2 Laws are specific and while the expectation is that the
decision is at least based on some legal principle, there is no expectation of one
concrete and certain outcome.2' Procedure however, in its most basic form is
expected to be the same based on continuous, substantially identical
reoccurrence in one's own culture. Participants expect procedure as a part of
the formal aspect of culture. A common law, Anglo-American Lawyer will
most likely expect a highly adversarial approach, while a civil law East Asian
will expect that an inquisitorial and conciliatory approach be taken by the
arbitral panel and all parties involved. This basic difference plays out in the




17. See generally the works of E.T. HALL, THE SILENT LANGUAGE; THE HIDDEN DIMENSION:
BEYOND CULTURE; AND THE DANCE OF LIFE.
18. See HARRIS & MORAN, supra note 3, at 40-42.
19. See generally PIETER SANDERS, QUO VADIS ARBITRATION (1999).
20. Even the two common law countries, the United Kingdom and United States, differ widely on
how much discovery is allowed.
21. This is not to mean that participants cannot be completely surprised by an outcome. Often a
different legal principal was applied than expected.
Expectancy of a certain procedure is worth analyzing in light of the predominant
legal systems. The arbitrator may be of a culture that expects the proceeding to
be conducted in one way, while the parties may be prepared for another, their
own way. What the main differences are and how exactly they can play out will
be discussed below.
H. DIFFERENCES IN LEGAL CULTURE
Two legal systems or cultures are predominant in the world today:
Common Law and Civil Law. Within these main legal systems, different
regionally based sub-cultures exist, which maintain their own special
traditions.2 This section will discuss the attributes of first Common and Civil
Law, and then continue to describe local distinctions.23 This paper will briefly
sketch infra how these differences and distinctions arose and what purposes they
serve in their respective environments.
Recent doctrinal writings indicate an increasing trend toward
harmonization of international arbitral procedure.24 For example, it is generally
accepted that a person who has served as mediator or conciliator between the
parties to the current dispute shall not serve as umpire. 25 Domestic legislation
and procedures of international organizations concerning International
Commercial Arbitration evidence this assessment further.26 This text will focus
on the remaining differences. Nevertheless, cultural differences are far from
irrelevant today, because neither ad hoc nor institutional rules adopted by the
parties answer all procedural questions.27
A. Common Law & Civil Law
While rules, which have been agreed upon by the parties, give some
guidelines for the procedure, the individual preference of the participants plays
an important role. This preference relates to the cultural background of each
22. See generally SANDERS, supra note 19.
23. These attributes will be directed at procedure only.
24. See e.g., SANDERS, supra note 19, at 55; see also Lucy Reed & Jonathan Sutcliffe, The
"Americanization ofInternational Arbitration?, 16(4) MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 37,(2001).
25. Bernardo M. Cremades, Overcoming the Clash of Legal Cultures: The Role of Interactive
Arbitration, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Stefan Frommel & Barry
Rider eds., 1999). He limits this statement by saying that parties can still nominate the person if so desired.
26. Most modem international arbitration conventions such as the PCA rules on arbitration of
environmental disputes, as well as the increasing adoption of the UNCITRAL model law into domestic law
(or its use as guiding light), are only examples of increased harmonization of rules for arbitration. This is true
for both institutional and ad hoc arbitrations, as discussed before.
27. See Christian Borris, The Reconciliation Between Common Law and Civil Law Principles in the
Arbitration Process, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1,4 (Stefan Frommel
& Barry Rider eds., 1999).
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participant and influences all aspects of the International Commercial
Arbitration, for example, choice of International Commercial Arbitration rules,
arbitrators, location for the International Commercial Arbitration, and
expectations in process and outcome. 8
Methodology of the approach makes the first difference, which impacts
expectations, apparent. A Common Law lawyer expects an adversarial
approach,29 where the judge or arbitrator has a limited role. The adversarial
approach manifests itself in all stages of the proceeding: notification,
identification of facts, responsibilities of the parties, and so forth. 30 This system
was created because of mistrust of judges, the smaller the roles of judges in the
proceedings the easier for the parties to believe in the justice and fairness of the
outcome. 31 The Civil Law expects an active judge and an inquisitorial system.32
This distinction appears logical, based on the assumption that not a jury but the
judge decides the case and hence needs to make sure he has all the information.
In Civil Law countries, judges were not mistrusted. Their education made them
experts in assessing a case correctly, while the juror, potentially a neighbor, was
considered more concerned with his or her own interests and not trained to deal
with important legal issues.
The second distinction between Common Law and Civil Law is that there
is no clear division of interlocutory proceeding and hearing in Civil Law.34
Common Law admits information of the pre-hearing stage only in exceptional
circumstances. This separation can be explained by reference to the mistrust of
judges and the jury system in Common Law countries once again. Where, as
in Civil Law, the judge is also the fact-finder, he will get to know everything
about the case regardless. There is no practical reason for a divorce of hearing
and pre-hearing phase. In Common Law, the jurymen do not receive any
information before the proceeding. 35 Therefore, all the information needs to be
introduced to the jury again. Lawyers have to select and properly present
information, because the jury is composed of laypersons, which might consider
irrelevant evidence or fail to understand anything too complicated.
28. RICHARD GARNETT ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
52(1999).
29. See Reed & Sutcliffe, supra note 24.
30. See GARNETr ET AL., supra note 27, at 53.
31. See Borris, supra note 27, at 6. In the U.S. judges were English and were disliked and the
United States mistrusted authority, mainly because of the age of their democracy.
32. See BORRIS, COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW: FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES AND THEIR IMPACT
ON ARBITRATION, 78 (1994); see also Lucy Reed & Jonathan Sutcliffe, supra note 24.
33. See BORRIS, supra note 32, at 178.
34. See GARNETT ET AL., supra note 28, at 54.
35. They are not yet selected.
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To illustrate the cultural impact at all stages of the proceeding, this paper
will discuss the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration 36 in light of some specific expectations in the proceedings, differing
between Common Law and Civil Law. This paper will treat only the
UNCITRAL rules for this purpose due to their representativeness and their wide
use.37 These rules provide for great discretion in determination of procedure.38
Most commonly cited differences that influence the expectations are:
a) Whether the proceedings are oral or in writing;
b) Discovery and pre-hearing procedure;
c) Treatment of other witnesses, specifically parties and cross-
examination; and
d) Record keeping.
1. Oral or Written Proceedings
The UNCITRAL rule 24(1) leaves the decision whether to hold a hearing
to the arbitral tribunal, unless parties agree otherwise. A hearing shall be held
if a party so requests.39 It is not stated which weight will be given to such
pleadings and how much detail will be good practice depends on any given
arbitrator's preference.
Under the Common Law, pleadings have little value, because the oral
hearing is of most importance.4" The fact finder has to be convinced during the
"show", the proceeding of whatever nature.4" This can largely be explained by
the need for persuasion of a jury of laypersons. Paper tends to be less
persuasive than emotions and live testimony. In Civil Law all information has
to be identified and provided in writing and often in excessive detail as soon as
possible. This is evidenced by e.g., the German Code of Civil Procedure § 296.
A judge is not (should not be as easily) moved by emotion and a judge could
extract the relevant facts more quickly from paper than from lengthy witness
testimony and cross-examination.42 The Civil Law lawyer expects the
documents provided to amply support the point of view, and the Common Law
36. See UNCITRAL supra note 1.
37. There are regional arbitration rules precisely because there are differences in culture. See
SANDERS, supra note 3, at 13.
38. UNCITRAL, supra note 1, at § 19.
39. UNCITRAL, supra note 1, at § 24(1).
40. See Borris, supra note 27, at 6.
41. See Patouchi and Ian L. Meakin, Procedure and Taking of Evidence in International
Commercial Arbitration, RDAIIBLJ 88 (1996).
42. The judge can ask a witness everything he needs to know when documents are not sufficient.
Often this will be unavailable. Thus, the Civil Law judge prefers paper as a general matter.
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lawyer is perplexed because of the lack of weight given to his advocacy by the
Civil Law arbitrator.43
2. Discovery and Pre-Hearing Procedures
The secondly impacted area of arbitral procedure is the pre-hearing stage,
including discovery. The UNCITRAL rules provide in article 23(1) that parties
should support their claims and defenses with all relevant documents, but are
also allowed to use references to evidence to be submitted later only, unless
otherwise agreed. 4 In other words, information must be provided, but the point
in time is up to the party, so long as a reference to this evidence exists. In
article 24(3), UNCITRAL requires all material submitted to the panel to be
submitted to the other party as well.45 This is the extent to which pre-hearing
procedure is discussed in the Model Law.
Due to this freedom of procedure, culture has room to create expectations.
In Common Law, discovery and pre-hearing procedure are considered one of
the most important tools in dispute resolution (eitherjudicial or through ADR) 6
Pre-hearing discovery is necessary in Common Law. The evidence needs to be
neatly presented for the reasons discussed supra, which is impossible if the
hearing is the first time the evidence is encountered by the parties. Thus, while
attempting to receive as much information as possible before the hearing, the
Common Law advocate will seek to delay rendering information to obtain a
strategic benefit. With these considerations in mind, the advocate will submit
evidence late and potentially upset the Civil Law arbitrator, who seeks prompt
disclosure of all relevant information.
In Civil Law the obligation to disclose every relevant piece of information
as soon as possible renders extensive Common Law discovery (partially)
unnecessary.47 For many Civil Law jurisdictions, such as Germany, discovery
is also connected with privacy concerns.4" In Civil Law there is no need to
present the evidence the neat Common Law way. Evidence is presented over
time and is reviewed by the judge regardless of when it becomes known. If any
information appears to be missing, the arbitrator or judge will request it.
Also depositions take on varying degrees of importance for Common Lawyer
and Civil Lawyer. If the hearing is approached with the expectation of a
deposition not being primary evidence, the conduct at the deposition (if they
take place at all) is going to be different from the expectation of it being
43. Compare Lucy Reed & Jonathan Sutcliffe, supra note 24, at I.
44. UNCITRAL, supra note 1, at § 23(1).
45. UNCITRAL, supra note 1, at § 24(3).
46. See Christian Borris, supra note 27, at 10.
47. Id. at 10ff.
48. Id. at 11.
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equivalent to a witness statement on the stand. Preparation needs to be adapted,
the lawyer has to take into account that the entire material will be reviewed and
that withholding of information harms the case rather than helping it. In
addition, a Civil Law arbitrator may even prefer a written statement to an oral
one for reasons of efficiency, 49 as mentioned above.
3. Treatment of Witnesses
Treatment of witnesses is another area where cultural difference is most
visible. ° The UNCITRAL is silent on the matter. Several issues are implicated
in the treatment of witnesses:
1) Whether a party can be a witness;
2) Whether the statements can be written;
3) Whether written statements are preferable over directly
examined witnesses; and
4) Whether cross-examination should take place.
In Common Law a party may be called as witness, while the Civil Law
does generally not allow parties to be witnesses.' In Civil Law, the expectation
is that the position of parties will be amply reproduced through other
documents. In Civil Law, managers of a company are considered parties.
Although the question whether a party can be a witness remains a distinction
between Common and Civil Law, in International Commercial Arbitration it is
a distinction without a difference. Practice has settled toward the Common Law
approach. 2
Whether written witness statements are admissible depends on the
procedure chosen, but largely, as in the UNCITRAL 3 The inference drawn
from a written statement depends on the legal culture of the arbitrator. In
Common Law countries, due to the importance of the actual hearing and the
separation of information gained before the hearing from information presented
at the hearing, cross-examination remains the best tool to test witness
credibility 4 and to bring out facts not otherwise presentable.55 In Civil Law
countries, the judge examines witnesses as to contentious issues. He, as the
49. See Reed & Sutcliffe, supra note 24, at Il.
50. Id. at IV.
51. See Borris, supra note 28, at 15; see also Reed & Sutcliffe, supra note 24, at IV.
52. Id.
53. See Reed & Sutcliffe, supra note 24, at IV.
54.
54. See Lawrence Newman, International Arbitration Hearings: Showdown or Denounent, 5
TUL.J.INT'L & COMP.L. 393, 395 (1997).
55. See Christian Borris, supra note 27, at 13.
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fact-finder and a professional, is deemed to assess the witness credibility by
himself and only with reference to statements he deems important. 56 Although
a difference between the two traditions, this point adds little to the point made
supra concerning pretrial procedure.
The distinction in treatment for unwilling witnesses depends less on
culture and more on country, the procedure what one needs to compel
the witness differs. 57  These issues are related much more to
substantive law and does not relate as strongly to culture. Hence, it
exceeds the scope of this paper and will not be treated in more
detail. 8
4. Record Keeping
The UNCITRAL does not mention record keeping. In the Common Law
tradition, a reporter records the proceeding verbatim. 9 In the Civil Law system,
the chairman usually takes notes of the witness statement in the manner in
which he sees fit. The parties discuss these notes and supplement them to
prepare a written summary.6" A summary makes sense where the evidence is
mostly documentary and witnesses are heard for specific information only. This
method obviously reduces the impact of cross-examination in case it is
conducted and can be the source of great dismay on Common Law lawyers, who
rely on every word that the witness utters.
Although the above-mentioned differences in legal cultures factor into the
proceedings, they are not the only issues to be considered. Within the
predominant legal systems, further subdivisions exist.
The Common Law and Civil Law concepts and the respective conceptions
of International Commercial Arbitration and legal culture have radiated
throughout the world.6' The concepts are largely colonial remainders and can
56. Id.
57. In the United States, arbitrators can subpoena witnesses. In England, only the court may do so.
In Denmark, the arbitral tribunal has to make a request to the court to subpoena, while in Belgium, the parties
can ask a court themselves. See SANDERS, supra note 3 at 256f.
58. For an American case illustrating this point see In Re: Application of Technostroy Export, 853
F.Supp. 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). In this case arbitration took place in Sweden. The Russian party to the
arbitration proceedings sought discovery in New York in connection with the arbitration. The American party
objected on grounds that discovery in the place or arbitration was not available without the ruling of the
arbitrator and that discovery must, if at all, be mutual. The court agreed on this basis. While this case shows
differences from country to country, it is not truly culturally based. The Russian party was well aware of the
differences and sought to use them in their favor.
59. See Newman, supra note 54, at 84.
60. Id.
61. Id.
be traced in individual tradition to the respective colonial powers and their legal
systems.62
B. Regional Cultures
Today, either Civil or Common Law influence most nations; nevertheless
differences lay in the regional applications. This section discusses each culture
and its distinction and the impact on the International Commercial Arbitration.
The main cultures this paper refers to are Non-Arab African Countries, Latin
American Countries, East Asian, and Arab Countries; e.g., Belgium for the
former Congo, the Netherlands for Indonesia.63
1. Non-Arab Africa
This section excludes Arab countries like the Sudan, because cultural
differences in Arab Countries are considered together, due to the shared feature
of Shari'a law.
There is currently no African distinctiveness in the procedural rules. 64 This
however, does not prejudice certain culturally based expectations. In non-Arab
Africa, a common dislike of arbitration is based on the perceived potential for
the bigger bargaining power to abuse the freedom of contract and thus oppress
the other party.65 Countries in Africa are particularly well known for their
dispute settlement processes that are conciliatory in nature.66 African social
values in conjunction with strong family units fostered this conciliatory
environment rather than the (in comparison) more adversarial arbitration
process. 67 Before colonialization every region in Africa had these conciliatory
methods of dispute resolution, which were suppressed but not destroyed during
the colonialization period.68
In the francophone areas of Africa, International Commercial Arbitration
was largely suppressed.69 This might also explain the current lack of significant
participation of African arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration. As
62. For example, Belgium for the former Congo, and the Netherlands for Indonesia. See Phillip
McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A "Second Look" at International Commercial
Arbitration, 93 Nw.U.L.REV. 453, at ch. Hl. intro. (1999).
63. Id.
64. Roland Amoussou-Guenou, Part IV - Francophone Africa, in ARBITRATION IN AFRICA 269,
276, 277 (Cotran et al. eds., 1996).
65. See AMAzuA.AsoUZtJ, INTERNATIONALCOMMERICAL ARBITRATON AND AFRICAN STATES, 14
(Cambridge University Press 2001).
66. Id. at 15.
67. Id. at 16.
68. Id. at 115.
69. See SANDERS, supra note 19, at chap. 11 intro.
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Africa consists mostly of developing countries, International Commercial
Arbitration is viewed with skepticism.
70
In traditional African alternative dispute resolution, little procedural
uniformity can be found. Much of African tradition ADR is based on custom
and thus, widely varies and is highly informal. 71 There is for example no formal
requirement of writing or record keeping in traditional African dispute
resolution72 and a written agreement to arbitrate is today almost unknown.73
This results, usually in much control of courts over procedure. Lawyers
may have to get leave from a court for many things they would usually expect
to be handled by the arbitral panel. In fact, the courts form an essential element
of procedure and process in arbitration in Africa. Arbitral functions required
under a law or treaty in Africa could, for the sake of efficiency, specialization
and centralization be conferred to a-court.74
2. East Asia
Asia has a very distinct cultural approach to International Commercial
Arbitration. Two important differences dominate the picture. First, the
conception of Western Common Law and Civil Law (which form the basis of
Asian legal systems as well) has certain assumption for the role of codes and
contracts that are not shared in most of Asia.75  The conceptions of the
contractual or institutional rules for International Commercial Arbitration are
thus approached (like any other contract or code) with different understandings
of their meanings, although the terms may be clear. East Asian culture prefers
non-confrontational methods of conflict resolution. 76 A typical example is
Japan. Under a stable feudal regime, which lasted for more than 250 years until
1868 (Tokugawa period), the practice of law was not allowed. There was a
strong communal system to promote amicable settlement of disputes and to
suppress litigation. Litigation was condemned as a moral wrongdoing to the
society and to the other party. A good judge was not supposed to give a
judgment but to try to bring about a good conciliation. This tradition was
deeply embedded in the people's mind and formed the dispute resolution culture
in Japan,77 as well as other East Asian Countries. The legal basis for modern
70. This skepticism is slowly declining. See David Butler & Eyvind Finsen, Southern Africa, in
ARBITRATION IN AFRICA 193, 198 (Cotran et al. eds., 1996).
71. See ASOUZU, supra note 65, at 118.
72. Id. at 119.
73. Id. at 141.
74. Id. at 172.
75. See McConnaughay, supra note 62, at 458.
76. Id.
77. See YASUHEI TANIGUCHI, Is THERE A GROWING INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CULTURE? AN
OBSERVATION FROM ASIA, chapter I (Albert Jan van den Berg ed. 1998).
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arbitration procedure was first established in Japan in 1890, with the enactment
of the Code of Civil Procedure (Law No. 29, 1890), which substantially
followed the German Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 as a model.78 But even
though Japan has modernized its arbitral practice, the mistrust of arbitration can
still be felt in e.g., the requirement of specificity of the arbitral agreement.
79
Another aspect of Japanese arbitration is the remaining tendency to structure an
arbitration in a conciliatory fashion, e.g., the default number of arbitrators is
two, an even number as opposed to the otherwise chosen odd numbers.8°
And will approach International Commercial Arbitration with the same
culturally based attitude.81
More than 120 years ago, von Jhering wrote about Der Kampf ums
Recht (the fight for the right). Litigation is an arena where such a
fight takes place. It is a moral wrong not to assert one's right. What
I call the conciliation culture, on the other hand, is based on a
diametrically opposed ideology. It stems from a deep mistrust in any
pre-set rules of law and the concept of right as an absolute
entitlement.82
When a Western culture and a East Asian culture join for International
Commercial Arbitration, the approach of the lawyers have to be adapted to the
culturally based preference of the arbitrator. Overly confrontational behavior
may lead an East Asian arbitrator to draw different inferences from a non-East
Asian arbitrator.83
The second important difference of culture influencing the arbitral
procedure is confidentiality. International Commercial Arbitration is a loss of
face for the East Asian party.t While Western culture prefers open
proceedings, the East Asian party will prefer to keep it proceedings and most
information confidential. These differences in preference will also influence
how the proceeding will be conducted despite general and very loose norms
about it in institutional rules and most International Commercial Arbitration
contracts.
78. See Prof. Teruo Doi, Japan, in ICCA HANDBOOK chap. I (1)(1996).
79. Id. at chap. L
80. Id. at chap. 1(3).
81. See SANDERS, supra note 19, at 64.
82. See TANIGUCHI supra note 77, at section (In).
83. See Urs Martin Lauchli, Cross Cultural Negotiations with a Special Focus on ADR with the
Chinese, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1045, 1076 (2000). Promotion of long-term relations and the preference
for conciliation will always the guide the Chinese mediator.
84. See McConnaughay, supra note 62, at 459.
85. The UNCITRAL is silent on the matter.
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In CIETAC (China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission) for example, rules for arbitration are structured very differently
from common western arbitration rules. The rules provide for no appellate
process, which is usually common for international commercial arbitration
institutions. Another difference, again showing the preference for conciliation
is that the arbitral tribunal may conciliate if they so choose.86 The last important
difference in the Cietac procedure is the availability of a summary procedure for
amounts below RMB 500.000 Yuan. 87 Many western lawyers find the CIETAC
rules oppressive and unworkable.
3. Latin America
Latin America has a slowly disappearing hostile attitude toward
International Commercial Arbitration.88 Traditionally, Latin American countries
developed theories such as the "Calvo" and "Drago" doctrines to prevent
complete freedom of contract concerning international commercial arbitration. 89
A number of Latin American countries have modernized their arbitration laws
or are in the process of doing so, mainly to attract international arbitration
business. 9° Some countries modernizing their laws base their new arbitration
legislation on the Model Law of UNCITRAL. This is the case in Brazil,
Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. 9' Where International Commercial Arbitration
is conducted, the arbitral panels have an even stronger stand during the
proceeding than even ordinary Civil Law arbitrators would take. They act
mostly without judicial assistance.9 A Latin American participant would thus
expect strong control during the proceeding itself from the arbitrator. Latin
American participants in International Commercial Arbitration would expect
rather inflexible rules and may thus be surprised at International Commercial
Arbitration, where the rules are so amendable toward party autonomy.
93
Nevertheless, Latin American courts maintain strong supervisory powers over
86. Arbitration .Rules, China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission § 46
(1998), at http://web.signet.com.sg/-arbiter/cietac2.html (last visited September 5, 2002).
87. Arbitration Rules, China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission §64ff
(1998), at http://web.signet.com.sg/-arbiter/cietac3.htm (last visited September 5, 2002).
88. See SANDERS, supra note 19, at 39; see also Fernando Mantilla-Serrano, Major Trends in
International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America, 17(l) J. INT'L ARB. 139 (2000).
89. See ASOUZU, supra note 65, at 413.
90. See ARTHUR D. HARVERD, THE CONCEPT OF ARBITRATION AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIETY, THE
COMMERCIAL WAY TO JUSTICE (Geoffrey M. Beresford ed., 1997).
91. See Charles Robert Norberg, Inter-American Commercial Arbitration-General Introduction to
Inter-American Commercial Arbitration, in ICCA HANDBOOK chapter 2 (1996).
92. See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 88, at 141.
93. Id.
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the arbitral process.94 Party autonomy is not paramount like in the traditional
Western World.
4. Arab World
Arbitration has an important role in the mentality, history, and customs of
Arab Nations.95  In contrast to other regional structures, the concept of
International Commercial Arbitration in the Arab world is truly culturally based,
(the basis is the Muslim faith.) because both Civil Law and Common Law have
influenced different Arab countries.96
The predominantly impacting factor is the Shari'a, the religious law for
Muslims. 97 In Moslem Law the very concept of International Commercial
Arbitration was disputed. There are two views on this topic: the first holds that
International Commercial Arbitration is a form of amiable composition,
conciliation.98 According to this view, the number of arbitrators is even and a
decision requires unanimity. The other sees it as judicial action with an odd
number of arbitrators. 99 The Ottoman Empire adopted the conciliation
approach.100
In the Arab World, much like in Asia, International Commercial
Arbitration is more similar to conciliation,' 01 because the focus is on the
spiritual and the relationships not on an allocation of blame. A very important
distinction is that it is expected that the Shari'a and its procedural requirements
apply regardless of what the contract states.0 2 This is especially true for
International Commercial International Commercial Arbitration because the
Shari'a law has an element of international law. It applies regardless of the
jurisdiction the Muslim is in, based on religion, transcending national
boundaries.'03
Expectations of Muslim arbitrators and participants in specific parts of the
arbitral procedure vary distinctly from Western approaches. The UNCITRAL
provides for party autonomy, but in absence of an agreement, the number of
94. See e.g., Prof. Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, Colombia, in ICCA HANDBOOK.
95. See Abdul Hamid EI-Ahdab, General Introduction on Arbitration in Arab Countries, in I ICCA
HANDBOOK chap. 1.
96. See SANDERS, supra note 19, at 50. Common Law for Iraq, Jordan, Sudan and Civil Law for
Algeria, Lebanon and Libya.
97. Although it contains only few references to arbitration.
98. See E1-Ahdab, supra note 95, at chapter H.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 133.
102. It is further applicable extraterritorially.
103. See Austin Amissah, Ghana, in ARBITRATION IN AFRICA 113, 128 (Cotran et al. eds., 1996).
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arbitrators is three, not one." 4 A Muslim Lawyer from a traditionally religious
country will expect that only one arbitrator is chosen. The Shari'a permits
exceptions to the one arbitrator rule, but if an exception is permitted, the
decision of the panel has to be unanimous.' °5 In non-Arab cultures, the majority
rule applies. This leads to different expectations in the choice of arbitrators and
if there is more than one arbitrator a different expectation in the outcome (ay a
close case has 5 arbitrators). The Arabic parties may well expect that at least
one sees the other side, thus avoiding any result of the arbitration and
encouraging a settlement.
Shari'a also limits the expectations of who can be an umpire. An Arab
party will expect, in accordance with the Shari'a, that the arbitrator must be a
male and familiar with the Shari'a, 106 while other cultures will not expect such
limitations. UNCITRAL article 11 does not provide for qualifications or
gender, but contains complete party autonomy. The Shari'a law, however,
provides for much procedural freedom. The only requirements for Arbitration
procedure are that the award must specify that the arbitrator heard the parties'
arguments and that the proceedings took place in his presence.107
The influence of Shari'a on International Commercial International
Commercial Arbitration is however declining, since it does not apply where e.g.,
international conventions supercede. °8
I will address these modem developments by contrasting the examples of
Egyptian and Tunisian treatment of International Commercial Arbitration with
what has been described so far. The Egyptian arbitration laws are inspired by
the UNCITRAL rather than Shari'a, as it is the case in Saudi Arabia.10 9 In the
new Egyptian Legislation enacted in 1994 for example the application of the act
is limited by territory, unlike earlier arbitral acts that were applied
extraterritorially like in Shari'a. Arbitrators needed to be appointed in the
instrument already under older legislation, the new legislation provides for party
autonomy. "0
In Tunisia, prior to 1993 only domestic arbitration was regulated. Again,
the act is modeled on the UNCITRAL model law. The number of arbitrators
needs to be uneven and the majority rule applies unlike prescribed in Shari'a
104. UNCITRAL, supra note 1, at § 10.
105. See SANDERS, supra note 19, at 51.
106. See generally Afchar, The Muslim conception of Law, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, vol 2 ch. I (1975); see also SANDERS, QUO VADIS ARBITRATION 51 (1999).
107. See Abdul Hamid EI-Ahdab, General Introduction on Arbitration in Arab Countries, in I ICCA
HANDBOOK, chapter 2(4)(1996).
108. See Amissah, supra note 103, at 130.
109. ABDULHAMADEL-AHDABARBIRATION WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES 155 (2nd ed. 1999).
110. Id. at 173.
2002]
Law, where unanimity is the norm."' Nevertheless, an inexperienced lawyer
or layperson may still expect some of the commands of the Shari'a law to be
universal, or at least the norm.
IV. USING THIS INFORMATION
Knowing the distinctions this paper has shown is helpful in every
International Commercial Arbitration. However, knowledge is only the key, not
the solution. Depending on the stage of the process, the solution is one of two
things: either the choice of the right arbitrator or an initial conference.
The participants to International Commercial Arbitration should select an
arbitrator according to his experience (both life and legal) and cultural
background (not just nationality) to obtain a strategic benefit. What the 'best
bet' concerning background and experience is depends on what the parties want
to achieve.
An initial conference should take place regardless, to clear any
misunderstandings before any further steps after the arbitrators are chosen.
During the initial conference, not only should applicable law and location of the
proceeding be discussed, but also the weight of specific forms of evidence, the
treatment of witnesses, and the role of the arbitrator (whether he should be
attempting conciliatory techniques where he sees the possibility, or whether
such techniques would be regarded by the parties as bias). Depending on the
cultures and backgrounds of the participants, the list of what should be
discussed varies. This paper gives a useful set of possible considerations for
each culture.
V. CONCLUSION
There are problems that rules do not solve. 1 2  Neither ad hoc nor
institutional rules contain answers for all procedural questions that may arise in
International Commercial Arbitration. On the contrary, as seen on the example
of the UNCITRAL rules, these rules are often deliberately vague to avoid
prejudicing the arbitral tribunal's discretion.1"' There is a recognizable influence
of culture even in the experienced lawyer or arbitrator. Despite harmonization
of rules governing International Commercial Arbitration, increased
globalization and perforation of information about other legal systems, this
paper showed that culture continues to play a role.
I 11. See Habib Malouche, Tunesia, in VI ICCA HANDBOOK, 2 (1996).
112. Lawrence W. Newman, Pre-hearing Conferences - Cross Cultural Conflicts, Address at
Seminar at Baker & MacKenzie New York (November 25, 1996), in 8 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 82,
87(1997).
113. See GARNETT supra note 28, at 4.
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This paper was intended to serve a guide for the unwary to begin to
research what to expect and what strategy may be more successful with which
culture. It is also intended to advocate initial conferences with all participants
about their expectations to avoid embarrassing moments in the course of the
International Commercial Arbitration. As stated in the introduction, this text
attempted to create a new understanding and respect for the other cultures, an
understanding that avoids judging others by one's own standards, because at one
point the other's standards might be there to judge you. Preparation, insight,
and respect are very helpful tools to avoid problems in cross-cultural
International Commercial Arbitration.
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I. INTRODUCTION
NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 in response to violations of
human rights raises a number of legal and moral questions concerning the right
* Professor Jeffrey S. Morton received his Ph.D. from the University of South Carolina in 1995,
specializing in international law. The author of The International Law Commission of the United Nations
(University of South Carolina Press, 2000) and numerous journal articles, professor Morton is currently
Associate Professor of International Law & Politics and Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of
political science at Florida Atlantic University.
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of states to respond to humanitarian disasters. The decision by ten NATO
members to intervene without an explicit authorization from the United Nations
Security Council brings to the fore several legal issues relating to the right of
states to impede upon the territorial sovereignty of other states, the balance
between state rights and individual rights, and the role of the Security Council
in controlling the international use of force. The scholarly debate over the
legality of NATO's intervention has not produced a consensus on these issues.
Despite a general agreement on the historical facts involved in the case the legal
community is deeply divided over the most relevant and authoritative legal
principles which should be used to reach a judgement on NATO's actions. As
Pellet correctly notes, the divergent legal positions taken by leading scholars
reflect the different "angles" from which they analyze the same debate.'
While a full legal account of NATO's intervention requires both an
assessment of the onset of the war as well as an analysis of the conduct of
NATO forces once the war had begun, the scope of this article will be limited
to the right of NATO to intervene, as restricted by contemporary jus ad bellum
legal principles. A strict application of the United Nations Charter's
requirement of a Council authorization results in a conclusion that NATO's
intervention in Yugoslavia constitutes a violation of international law, while an
assessment of the intervention that takes into account additional Charter
principles, the totality of Security Council resolutions addressing the situation
in Kosovo, and non-Charter international law provides grounds for a legal
justification for NATO's actions. The International Court of Justice, where
cases by Yugoslavia have been filed against the states involved in the
intervention, will be the final arbiter of which assessment will prevail.
This article begins with an overview of NATO's intervention in 1999. Next, a
review of the evolution of the laws of war is undertaken, with particular
attention paid to the emergence of Charter law and its implications for the
traditional laws of nations. The following section outlines the case filed by
Yugoslavia against the NATO states that participated in the intervention, which
leads to a legal assessment of the intervention. A conclusion section addresses
the chief legal and political issues raised by the NATO intervention in
Yugoslavia and its implications for the progressive development of international
law.
II. THE NATO INTERVENTION
Background information on the Kosovo crisis is well documented in the
literature. Kosovo gained autonomy within the state of Serbia in 1946, and this
special status was confirmed in the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. The
1. Alain Pellet, Brief Remarks on the Unilateral Use of Force, II EUR. J. INT'L L. 385 (2000).
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autonomy, however, was revoked in 1989, a move justified by Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic who claimed that the Serb minority in Kosovo was at risk.
Kosovo Albanians, in response, resorted to the development of parallel
institutions to protect the interests of the general population of the province,
along with insurrection tactics aimed at either retaining the province's lost
autonomy or gaining independence from Yugoslavia.
The situation in Kosovo became more explosive after the financial and
governmental collapse in neighboring Albania in 1997, after which men,
materiel and arms flowed freely across the unguarded border. The Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) capitalized on the situation by increasing its attacks on
Yugoslav positions and officials. Yugoslav forces responded with large-scale
attacks on KLA and ethnic Albanian positions, resulting in more than 200,000
Kosovar refugees and displaced persons in 1998 alone. Three United Nations
Security Council resolutions, invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, addressed the
situation in Kosovo, regretting the loss of life and qualifying the situation as a
threat to regional peace and security. The Russian Federation emphasized that
despite the reference to Chapter VII no use of force was contemplated,2 whereas
the United States announced that NATO was planning military operations to
guarantee, if necessary, compliance with the terms of the resolutions. The
military threat pushed the Belgrade government to sign two agreements. The
first agreement, concluded with the OSCE, established the Kosovo Verification
Mission (KVM), which was charged with monitoring compliance with Security
Council Resolution 1199. The second agreement, concluded with NATO,
established a NATO air surveillance mission over Kosovo and defined the main
technical aspects of the operation.
A diplomatic initiative was undertaken in January of 1999, when members
of the Contact Group (France, Italy, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States) convened negotiations between the Kosovo Albanians and the
Yugoslav government to address a political framework for Kosovo' s autonomy
within Serbia for a three-year period, deferring a final settlement. The
agreement drafted at the Rambouillet conference warned of NATO action in the
event that an interim settlement was not reached. When the Kosovo
representatives accepted the provisions in the Rambouillet Accord and Belgrade
rejected them, NATO commenced its military campaign ostensibly to halt what
Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic, referred to as "...the systematic,
state-directed murder of other people."4
2. U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3930th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3930 (1998).
3. Id. at5.
4. Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic, Address to the Canadian Senate and House of
Commons, (Apr. 29, 1999).
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On March 24, 1999, NATO launched its air attack against Yugoslavia.
The 78-day attack was commenced in response to failed efforts to negotiate a
political settlement of the crisis over Kosovo's autonomy and the ensuing
humanitarian dilemma in the province. The NATO intervention, labeled
Operation Allied Force, was undertaken with five stated non-negotiable
objectives, as follows:
I. An end to the killing by Yugoslav army and police forces in
Kosovo;
2. Withdrawal of those forces;
3. The deployment of a NATO-led international force;
4. The return of all refugees; and
5. A political settlement for Kosovo.5
On the day that the NATO bombing began, President Clinton referenced
three intentions of the intervention, namely, to avert a humanitarian catastrophe,
preserve stability in a key part of Europe, and maintain the credibility of
NATO.6 In the months following the conclusion of the war, United States
Secretary of Defense William Cohen and General Henry Shelton, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave a joint statement before the United States Senate
Armed Services Committee which outlined the following objectives of
Operation Allied Force:
1) Demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to
Belgrade's aggression in the Balkans;
2) Deter Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic from continuing
and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians and create
conditions to reverse his ethnic cleansing; and
3) Damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the
future or spread the war to neighbors by diminishing or
degrading its ability to wage military operations.7
A common denominator of the three expressions of intent that underpinned
NATO's decision to intervene in Yugoslavia is the objective to end Yugoslav
attacks on innocent civilians. It is upon the humanitarian objective that some
NATO members justified their participation in the intervention.
5. Christine Chinkin, Kosovo: A "Good" or "Bad" War? 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 841, 845 (1999).
6. President Bill Clinton, Statement Confirming NATO Air Strikes on Serb Military Targets, FED.
NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 24, 1999.
7. William S. Cohen & Henry H. Shelton, Joint Statement on Kosovo After Action Review in the
US Mission to NATO, 6 SECURITY ISSUES DIG. 2 (1999).
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III. THE LAWS OF WAR
The laws that regulate the use of force in international relations date to
antiquity. In contemporary times, the international laws of war were codified
in a series of multilateral treaties that sought to provide specificity to the legal
rights and responsibilities of combatants involved in war. Before outlining the
laws that regulate nations and their combatants, a brief review of the pre-modem
development of the laws of war is provided. That section is followed by an
examination of the laws of war with respect to the right of nations to go to war.
A. The Historical Evolution of the Laws of War
Rules that regulate warfare date, at a minimum, to classical Greek times,
with two documented agreements establishing limitations on recourse in time
of war. The first effort is reported by the geographer Strabo, who claimed that
in the course of the War of the Lelantine Plain on the island of Euboea (circa
700 B.C.) the parties to the conflict agreed to ban the use of projectile missiles.8
A second agreement, again limiting combatants in time of war, is found in the
writings of the orator Aeschines, who suggests that after the First Sacred War
(circa 600 B.C.) the victorious states swore never again to cut off besieged
fellow Greeks from food or water.9 While the formal development of the laws
of war during classical Greek times appears to be limited to these two instances,
less formal rules that regulate warfare developed in the form of unwritten
conventions governing interstate conflict. Chief among these rules are the
necessity of a declaration of war, the binding nature of treaties during war, the
respect for non-military symbols, the right to request a return of dead soldiers,
restrictions on the treatment of prisoners of war, and prohibitions on the
targeting of non-combatants.
10
During the Age of Chivalry, the rules that regulate military behavior were
influenced by the Romans, whose principal focus was the regulation of the right
to go to war, which, accordingly, required justification. Stacey notes that the
two central justifications for going to war were defense of frontiers and the
8. See Everett L. Wheeler, Ephorus and the Prohibition of Missiles, 117 TRANSACTIONS
AM. PHILOLOGICAL ASS'N, 157 (1987).
9. JOSIAH OBER, Classical Greek Times, in THE LAWS OFWAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE
WESTERN WORLD 12, 12 (Michael Howard et al., eds., 1994).
10. For a review of literature relating to the norms of warfare during classical Greek times, see also
FRANK E. ADCOCK & D.J. MOSELEY, DIPLOMACY IN ANCIENT GREECE (St. Martin's Press 1975); YVON
GARLAN, WAR IN THE ANCIENT WORLD (Janet Lloyd trans., W. W. Norton ed., 1975); PIERRE DUCREY,
GUERRE ET GUERRIERS DANS LA GRECE ANTIQUE (Payot 1985); W. KENDRICK PRITCHETT, THE GREEK STATE
AT WAR (University of California Press 1971); PETER KARAVITES, CAPITULATIONS AND GREEK INTERSTATE
RELATIONS (Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht eds., 1982); and VICTOR D. HANSON, THE WESTERN WAY OF WAR
(Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1989).
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pacification of barbarians living beyond the frontiers." While the Romans
contributed to the development of the laws of war as they pertain to the right to
initiate conflict, the rules developed during classical Greek times relating to
conduct in time of war were degraded. Prisoners could be enslaved or
massacred, plunder was general, and no distinction was recognized between
combatants and non-combatants.
By the eleventh century, however, the distinction between combatant and
non-combatant began to re-emerge. 2 Knights were regulated in their treatment
of other combatants at a time when the number of combatants was increasing.
By the fourteenth century, the combined effect of knightly practice and legal
theory gave rise to a formal system of military law. Secular in their creation, the
laws of war at the time were little influenced by a more restrictive code of
conduct that emerged from the church. In some ways, the church's position on
the laws of war was more advanced and restrictive than the laws that emerged
from either proclamation or practice of participants. On the issue of the right
to go to war, the church held that for a war to be 'just' it must be preceded by
a declaration issued by a competent authority, fought for a just cause,
proportional, and toward the aim of establishing a condition of peace. The
church's position on the rights and duties of combatants once war had
commenced was much less developed, reflecting the church's primary concern
with the onset of war.
Thus, while the evolution of international law as it pertains to war can be
traced to pre-modem times, the development of a system of laws designed to
regulate both the occurrence and conduct of interstate war remained at a
primitive stage both in theory and practice until modem times. Parker
concludes that most of the modem rules concerning restraint in war did not
appear before the middle of the sixteenth century.13 The sections that follow
examine the contemporary laws of war, with reference to their post-1500
development. The review focuses on the right of states to enter into war, jus ad
bellum, solely, as that set of laws is essential to undertaking a legal analysis of
NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999.
B. Jus ad Bellum
The legal right of states to enter into war has undergone a transformation
over the course of modem history. In the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War
(1618-1648) the Treaties of Westphalia ushered in the birth of modem
11. Robert C. Stacey, The Age of Chivalry, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN
THE WESTERN WORLD, supra note 9, at 40.
12. See GLENN R. BUGH, THE HORSEMEN OF ATHENS (Princeton University Press, 1988).
13. GEOFFERY PARKER, Early Modern Europe, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE
IN THE WESTERN WORLD, supra note 9, at 40.
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international law. Without the overarching presence of the church, which had
imposed a set of binding laws on states within the geographic confines of the
Holy Roman Empire, states were required to negotiate a set of acceptable rules
of military engagement. During the era of legal positivism, which peaked
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and continued to strongly
influence international law during the twentieth century, influential legal
scholars14 upheld the position that recourse to war was a sovereign right of states
and that the competent authority of states enjoyed nearly unfettered competence
de guerre. According to Beck, Arend and Vander Lugt, the essential
characteristic of legal positivism is that international laws are binding only when
grounded firmly in state consent. 15
It was not until the conclusion of the First World War that international law
began to move in the direction of a prohibition of the right of states to enter into
war. Through its justification of the imposition of sanctions on Germany by
maintaining that Germany and its allies were responsible for an act of
aggression, Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles characterized aggression as
an illegal act.'6 Article 15, paragraph 7 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations restricted entry into war to instances when the aim was the
"maintenance of right and justice.' ' 17 The movement to prohibit recourse to war
was furthered by the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 18 which bound states not to be
the first to opt for war. The treaty states:
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare ...that they condemn
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and
renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with
one another. The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement
or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of
whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall
never be sought except by pacific means.'9
14. E.g., Johann Jacob Moser, Emerich de Vattel, Richard Zouche, John Austin, and Hans Kelsen.
15. INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (Robert J. Beck et al., eds., 1996).
16. Treaty of Versailles, Art. 231, L.N.T.S. (1919).
17. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 15, para. 7.
18. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928,
art.l L.N.T.S. 1.
19. Id. at art. 2.
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C. Charter Law: Contemporary Extensions of Jus Ad Bellum
It is, however, not until the entry into force of the United Nations Charter
that the international community adopted a general prohibition on the right of
states to go to war. Article 2, paragraph 4, states "All members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state.""°
On the basis of the principle of non-intervention alone, as espoused in
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, there is no legal recourse to war.
The force of this prohibition has been reiterated and confirmed by a series of
legal documents and agreements. General Assembly Resolution 2131 (1965)
on the inadmissibility of intervention in the internal affairs of states, as well as
General Assembly Resolution 2625 (1970) stand out in this regard. 2' Further,
the International Court of Justice, in its ruling in the Nicaragua case, reaffirmed
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and the United Nations'
prohibition on intervention.22 It can be argued, with reference to the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that the prohibition on resorting to
force has evolved to the point of jus cogens, or compelling law.23
At the same time, Charter law does make exceptions to the general rule that
war is illegal. In three instances, states may legally enter into war: self-defense,
collective self-defense, and authorization by the United Nations Security
Council acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.2 4 While there
is much disagreement among international lawyers and scholars over precisely
what gives rise to each of these three exceptions to the principle of non-
intervention, it is clear that the right of states to go to war was dramatically
restricted by the United Nations Charter.
IV. YUGOSLAVIA'S CLAIMS AGAINST NATO STATES
In response to NATO's bombing campaign, Yugoslavia instituted
proceedings before the International Court of Justice on April 29, 1999, against
the ten NATO members directly involved in the attack.25 Yugoslavia asked the
20. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
21. G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1408th plen. mtg. at 20 (1965); G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., 1883rd plen. mtg. at 21-22 (1970) (German version).
22. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
23. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 1.
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (The right of self-defense is established in Article 51. The Security
Council is empowered by Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, which states that the Council "shall
determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and then decides on
the necessary coercive measures "to maintain or restore international peace and security.")
25. ,Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
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court to hold each of the respondents individually responsible for certain
breaches of international law arising from their participation in the air
campaign. The Yugoslav case centered upon a series of alleged violations of
the law of nations, specifically:
1) The obligation not to violate the sovereignty of another state;
2) The obligation banning the use of force against another state;
3) The obligation not to intervene in the internal affairs of another
state;
4) The obligation to protect the civilian population and civilian
objects in wartime;
5) The obligation to protect the environment;
6) The obligation relating to free navigation on international rivers;
7) The obligation to respect fundamental human rights and
freedoms;
8) The obligation not to use prohibited weapons; and
9) The obligation not to deliberately inflict conditions of life
calculated to cause the physical destruction of a national group.
Simultaneously, Yugoslavia submitted requests for the indication of
provisional measures asking the Court to order each of the respondents to "cease
immediately acts of use of force" and to "refrain from any act of threat or use
of force" against Yugoslavia.26 The allegations submitted by Yugoslavia against
the NATO powers cover a vast range of international law, including the laws of
war and human rights law. Since the scope of this article is to limited to the
legal restrictions on states relating to the onset of war, only the first three
alleged breaches are relevant.
In order to establish the Court's jurisdiction in each of the ten cases
submitted, Yugoslavia invoked various bases of jurisdiction, including:
1) Article 36, paragraph 2 of the ICJ Statute in the cases against
Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom;
2) Article 38, paragraph 5 of the Rules of Court in the cases
against France, Germany, Italy, and the United States;
3) Article IX of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the cases against all
ten respondents;
4) Article 4 of the Convention of Conciliation, Judicial Settlement
and Arbitration between Belgium and the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia (1930); and
26. Concerning Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.), Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures, 1999, I.C.J. No. 114 (June 2), available at http: //www.icj-cij.org.
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5) Article 4 of the Convention of Conciliation, Judicial Settlement
and Arbitration between the Netherlands and the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia (193 1).27
The Court rejected Yugoslavia's requests for the indication of provisional
measures on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction prima facie. The Court's
rejection of the request for provisional measures by Yugoslavia to require the
respondents to cease the military campaign was a serious blow to Yugoslavia's
attempt to end the conflict, however, it did not affect the underlying issues
relating to the legal status of the NATO intervention. In that regard, the Court
declared itself profoundly concerned with the use of force in Yugoslavia, which
"under the present circumstances ... raises very serious issues of international
law."28 It emphasized that all parties before it must act in conformity with their
obligations under the United Nations Charter and other rules of international
law, including humanitarian law." Finally, the Court reminded the parties that
they should take care not to aggravate or extend the dispute between them and
that, when such a dispute gives rise to a breach of the peace, the United Nations
Security Council has special responsibilities under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter."
The underlying claim that NATO members violated the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia was not dismissed, save for the cases against
Spain and the United States on the ground that the Court was manifestly without
jurisdiction in the two cases since neither state had signed the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction clause without reservation. The cases brought by
Yugoslavia against the eight remaining NATO respondents, therefore, remains
on the Court's docket.
V. THE LEGALITY OF THE USE OF FORCE BY NATO
DURING THE Kosovo WAR
A determination of the legal status of NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia
in 1999 depends on a consideration of several issues, namely:
1) The extent to which international law upholds the sovereign
rights and territorial integrity of states; 3'
27. Id.
28. ld. at$ 17.
29. Id. at M 19, 48.
30. Id. at W 37-38, 49-50.
31. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 7.
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2) The impact of the rise of individual rights, as reflected in
contemporary human rights law, on the sovereign rights of
states;
3) The legal restrictions placed ol states to prohibit the use of
military force against other states;
32
4) The role of the UN Security Council in controlling the
international use of force; 33
5) The interpretation of Security Council authorization of activity
short of the use of force in response to threats to regional or
international peace and security; and
6) Security Council post facto treatment of unauthorized uses of
force.
While the aforementioned issue areas provide a definitive set of criteria
upon which a determination of the legal status of NATO's intervention in
Yugoslavia can be based, a final judgment of NATO's action depends on one's
interpretation of Council resolutions, core Charter principles, legal principles
embodied in traditional (pre-Charter) international law, and the legal obligations
of states. As Falk remarks, "...the NATO initiative on behalf of the Kosovars
has provoked extremely divergent interpretations of what was truly at stake, the
prudence of what was undertaken, and the bearing of law and morality on this
course of events.,
34
At the heart of the debate are the values believed to be central to the world
community. On this point, Cassese notes that "in the current framework of the
international community, three sets of values underpin the overarching system
of interstate relations: peace, human rights, and self-determination." 3 While
legal scholars may concur with Cassese as to the three principle values
underpinning interstate relations, there is disagreement over which of the values
prevail over the others. At the time of the drafting of the United Nations
Charter in 1945, it can be readily concluded that the "peace among nations"
value predominated. This proposition is strengthened by the Charter's
restrictive position taken on the right of states to use force in their international
relations, the territorial integrity of nation-states, and the Security Council's
monopoly on the authorization of force except in the case of self-defense.
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
33. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, 42.
34. Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 847, 847 (1999).
35. Anthony Cassese, Ex Iniuria lus Oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community? 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 23, 24 (1999). (The
"peace" that Cassese refers to would more accurately be termed "peace among nations" in order to distinguish
it from "peace within nations.")
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Prioritizing interstate stability comes at the expense of intrastate stability, as
exemplified by the Security Council's non-involvement in numerous internal
conflicts during the Cold War era.
Since the framing of the Charter, however, international human rights laws
have been codified and have entered into force. The drafting of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, considered by many to have entered into custom,
the entry into force of the Genocide Convention, and the codification of
numerous human rights conventions,36 reflect a jurisprudence challenge to the
notion that the peace among nations value prevails over the human rights
value.37 Since the Security Council's monopoly on non-defensive uses of force
is based on the view that the peace among nations value takes priority over other
values, it can be argued that the emergence of international human rights erodes
the centrality of the Council in determining the legitimacy of intervention in
support of human rights.
In performing a legal analysis of NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999,
therefore, we are confronted with a dilemma. Do we strictly apply the United
Nations Charter as it was drafted in 1945, with its preference for peace among
nations over alternative values such as human rights? Do we allow a more
liberal application of the Charter as it relates to the process of attaining Security
Council authorization for intervention? Do we take into account the post-
Charter development of human rights law and its implication for the use of force
in response to humanitarian disasters? Is the NATO intervention in Kosovo
simply another of a long list of post-World War H military interventions that a
strict interpretation of Charter law deems illegal, or is it instead a watershed
event that ushers in a new era of legally acceptable humanitarian interventions
that do not require Security Council authorization? Hilpold states that the
NATO intervention may constitute the most far-reaching challenge to the
36. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 1, (1948),
available at http://www.un.org/overview/rights.html; see also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 A (IMl) (1948); Convention on the Political Rights of Women, G.A.
Res. 640 (VII) (1952); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Jan. 4, 1969,660 U.N.T.S. 195; International Covenanton Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI)
(1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (1966);
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/eedaw/; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46 (1984); Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989),
at http://www.unicef.org/crc/introduction.htm; (for an exhaustive list of international human rights documents,
see THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 1945-1995 (United Nations Department of Public
Information, 1995)).
37. I leave out of this discussion the self-determination value since, in my opinion, self-
determination, despite a widespread acknowledgment of its existence in contemporary international law, has
not risen to the level of the peace among nations or human rights values.
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doctrine on non-intervention.38 These are difficult questions that cannot be
answered definitively at the present. There is no broad consensus among legal
experts on the subject. The amount of scholarly attention paid to a legal
assessment of NATO's intervention, however, underscores the vitality of the
debate and signals that this jurisprudence debate is not over.39
Three distinct analyses of NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia are
presented below. The first, reflecting a strict interpretation of Charter law's
restriction on the use of force, leads to the conclusion that NATO members
acted outside the bounds of international law in intervening in Yugoslavia in
1999. Simma reflects a strict interpretation of Charter law when he states:
[I]f the Security Council determines that massive violations of human
rights occurring within a country constitute a threat to the peace, and
then calls for or authorizes an enforcement action to put an end to
these violations, a humanitarian intervention by military means is
permissible. In the absence of such authorization, military
coercion ...constitutes a breach of Article 2(4) of the Charter.4"
The second analysis, which reads more liberally into Charter principles as
they relate to the process by which authorization for intervention is granted,
takes into account implied Security Council authorization for intervention, a
failed effort by the Russian Federation to formally label the intervention as
illegal, and a Council resolution adopted after the Kosovo War was completed.
Working within Charter law, this perspective makes possible the argument that
NATO members, despite the lack of an explicit Security Council authorization
38. Peter Hilpold, Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need for a Legal Reappraisal?, 12 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 437, 437 (2001).
39. See Peter H.F. Bekker, Legality of Use of Force, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 928 (1999); Paolo
Benvenuti, The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503 (2001); Niels Blokker, Is the Authorization Authorized?:
Powers and Practices of the UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by 'Coalitions of the Able and
Willing, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 541 (2000); Cassese, supra note 35; Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory
Intervention in Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 834 (1999); Chinkin, supra note 5; Falk, supra note 34; Thomas
Franck, Lessons of Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L..541 (1999); Tarcisio Gazzini, NATO Coercive Military
Activities in the Yugoslav Crisis (1992-7), 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. (2000); Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Limits of
Unilateral Enforcement of Community Objectives in the Framework of UN Peace Maintenance, I I EUR. J.
INT'L L. 361 (2000); Hilpold, supra note 38; Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council:
Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspections Regime, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
124 (1999); Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. (2000); W. Michael
Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive Process: the Special Problem
of Humanitarian Intervention, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 3 (2000); Pellet, supra note 1; and Ruth Wedgewood,
NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 Am. J. Int'l L. 828 (1999).
40. Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EU R. J. INT'L L. 1, 5
(1999).
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to intervene militarily, did not violate international law. Falk supports this more
liberal interpretation of Charter processes, contending that "[s]o long as a purely
textual analysis of the relevant norms is relied upon, the divergences between
humanitarian imperatives and the prohibition of forcible intervention
unauthorized by the United Nations cannot be satisfactorily reconciled."'"
The third analysis moves beyond Charter law, taking into account the
totality of the unfolding situation in Kosovo, and recognizes the erosion of state
sovereignty as a result of the rise of human rights. Reisman represents this
perspective when he states that while "...all appreciate that NATO's action in
Kosovo did not accord with the design of the United Nations Charter ...a
judgment must be made in light of the law at stake, the facts and feasible
alternatives at the moment of the decision. 42
A. A Strict Application of Charter Principles Relating to the Use of Force
Since 1945 international law, as reflected in the United Nations Charter,
prohibits the use of force except in three instances: self-defense, collective self-
defense, and after authorization by the United Nations Security Council. A
determination of the legality of the NATO intervention, therefore, requires the
application of the three Charter exceptions to the principle of non-intervention.
1. Self-defense and Collective Self-defense
The right of self-defense is firmly rooted in the United Nations Charter, as
reflected in Article 51, which states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations ...
It is commonly recognized that unless a humanitarian crisis transcends
international borders and leads to armed attacks against other states, recourse to
Article 51 [self-defense and collective self-defense] is not available." Any
effort to expand the concept of self-defense to include the right to grant
emergency help to a people that is victim of an oppressive government has no
basis in international law. It is clear, therefore, that a justification of the NATO
intervention in 1999 cannot be found in an application of either self-defense or
collective self-defense.
41. Falk, supra note 34, at 847.
42. Reisman, supra note 39, at 3.
43. United Nations Charter, Article 51.
44. See, Simma, supra note 40; Cassese, supra note 35.
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2. Security Council Authorization
The determination of the legal status of the intervention from a strict
interpretation of the Charter, therefore, rests on the presence or absence of an
authorization issued by the Security Council. Scholars that base their legal
assessment of NATO's intervention on a strict interpretation of Charter
provisions conclude that the use of force by NATO members constitutes a
violation of international law.45
The Security Council addressed the deteriorating situation in Kosovo in a
series of meetings in 1998 that resulted in three resolutions prior to the onset of
NATO's aerial campaign. In its first resolution on the topic, the Security
Council condemned the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against
civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as acts of terrorism by
the Kosovo Liberation Army.46 Resolution 1160 also called upon the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia to take the necessary steps to achieve a political
solution to the issue of Kosovo through dialogue and to implement the actions
indicated by the Contact Group in its statements dated March 9 and March 25,
1998. The resolution prohibited the sale or supply of weapons, ammunition,
military vehicles, equipment, and spare parts to Yugoslavia. The first Security
Council resolution contained two important guidelines relating to the future
international response to the situation in Kosovo. In a preambular clause, which
was restated in operative clause five, the Security Council affirmed the
commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia. In so doing, the Council denied any right of intervention at that
time. The affirmation of Yugoslav sovereignty and territorial integrity,
however, was balanced by a warning found in operative clause nineteen, which
emphasized that a failure to make constructive progress towards the peaceful
resolution of the situation in Kosovo "will lead to the consideration of additional
measures."47 It is clear that the first Security Council Resolution on Kosovo
does not provide an authorization for military intervention.
A second Security Council resolution was passed on 23 September 1998,
in response to intense fighting in Kosovo that resulted in numerous civilian
casualties and 230,000 displaced persons.48 The resolution underlined the
responsibility of Yugoslavia to create the conditions necessary for the return of
refugees and displaced persons. While Resolution 1199 reaffirmed the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, it also emphasized the need
to ensure that the rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo were respected. The
45. See id.; Chamey, supra note 39.
46. U.N. SCOR, 3868th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 160 (1998).
47. Id. at 4.
48. U.N. SCOR, 3930th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998).
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second Security Council resolution, moving in the direction of an authorization
for intervention, affirmed that the deteriorating situation in Kosovo constituted
a threat to peace and security. The rights of states to address the situation were
limited by Resolution 1199, however, to the provision of available personnel to
fulfil the responsibility of effective and continuous international monitoring in
Kosovo, the provision of adequate resources for humanitarian assistance, and
the application of the principles embodied in Resolution 1160. The Security
Council again decided that "should the concrete measures demanded in
Resolutions 1160 and 1199 not be taken, to consider further actions and
additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region."'49
In its third resolution, the Security Council expressed its concern and alarm
over the deteriorating situation in Kosovo.50 The resolution also reiterated the
commitment of Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia. The Council's endorsement of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia was qualified but not undermined by the thirteenth
operative of Resolution 1203, which states: "Urges Member States and others
concerned to provide adequate resources for humanitarian assistance in the
region and to respond promptly and generously to the United Nations
Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance Related to the
Kosovo Crisis."'"
Cassese notes that the action of NATO countries radically departs from the
Charter system for collective security, "which hinges on a rule (collective
enforcement action authorized by the Security Council) and an exception (self-
defense). 52 Lobel and Ratner argue that, as a result of Article 2(4), explicit and
not implicit Security Council authorization is necessary before a nation may use
force that does not derive from the right of self-defense under Article 5 1.53
They continue by noting that "[r]equiring clear Security Council authorization
acts as a brake on the use of force by the international community: it is a
procedural condition designed to fulfill the Charter's substantive goal of
ensuring that force be employed only when absolutely necessary. '54 Simma,
while recognizing that NATO's action was in response to gross violations of
human rights,55 concludes that countermeasures to such atrocities must not
49. ld. at 5.
50. U.N. SCOR, 397th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998).
51. Id. at5.
52. Cassese, supra note 35, at 24.
53. Lobel & Ratner, supra note 39, at 129.
54. Id.
55. Simma, supra note 40.
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involve the threat or use of force, a legal position confirmed by the General
Assembly's Declaration on Friendly Relations of 1970.56
In the midst of the military campaign, the Security Council drafted and
passed Resolution 1239 (1999) which effectively avoided a comment on
NATO's actions.57 The resolution commended the efforts of member states, the
UNHCR, and other international relief organizations in providing relief
assistance to the Kosovo refugees and urged all concerned to work towards the
aim of a political solution to the crisis. At the conclusion of the aerial
bombardment, the Security Council addressed the situation in Kosovo and
passed Resolution 1244 (1999), which established an international security
presence in Kosovo with express responsibility to:
a) Deter renewed hostilities, maintain and where necessary enforce
a cease-fire, and ensure the withdrawal and prevent the return
into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and
paramilitary forces;
b) Demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA);
c) Establish a secure environment in which refugees and displaced
persons could return home;
d) Ensure public safety and order;
e) Supervise demining;
f) Support the work of the international civil presence;
g) Conduct border monitoring duties; and
h) Ensure the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the
international civil presence, and other international
organizations.58
The opinion of the ICJ on the matter of the legal status of NATO's
intervention will weigh heavily upon the international legal community. While
the Court has yet to render a decision in Yugoslavia v. NATO members, its first
pronouncements indicate that it is not willing to set aside the Charter's
prohibition on the use of force in favor of a right of humanitarian intervention,
as it declared itself to be "profoundly concerned with the use of force in
Yugoslavia" and that "under the present circumstances such use raises very
serious issues of international law. 59
The conclusion that NATO's actions constitute a violation of core
principles of international law and, as a result, must be categorized as illegal
56. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 21.
57. U.N. SCOR, 4003rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1239 (1999).
58. U.N. SCOR, 401 lth mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
59. See Concerning Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.): Request for the Indication
of Provisional Measures, 1999 I.C.J. No. 105 (June 2).
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reflects a strict adherence to Charter Law as it was initially codified, reluctant
to take into account norms or legal developments since 1945.
B. A Liberal Analysis of Charter Law
To conclude that the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 absent of
explicit Security Council authorization was a legal act requires a closer
examination of the actions of the Council as they relate to the unfolding
humanitarian disaster in Kosovo and a consideration of alternative
interpretations of Charter provisions as they relate to Council authorization for
intervention. It is clear that the Security Council did not explicitly authorize
states to use force to relieve the Kosovo population of its humanitarian plight.
In fact, in each Council resolution the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia were explicitly upheld. Therefore, to contend that NATO acted in
accord with prevailing international laws and norms, a more liberal
interpretation of Charter principles as they relate to the process of authorized
intervention must be undertaken.
1. Ambiguous Authorization
While an explicit Security Council authorization to use force is a central
requirement of a strict interpretation of the United Nations Charter, the
ambiguous nature of Council resolutions historically has given rise to the notion
that authorization may exist despite the absence of an explicit Council
authorization. Lobel and Ratner note that the Iraqi inspections crisis of 1998
raises similar questions relating to state intervention on the basis of an
ambiguous Council authorization to use force.6 ° In the Iraqi case, the United
States and the United Kingdom asserted the right to use force in order to enforce
inspections of weapons facilities based on Resolution 678 (1990), which
authorized the use of force to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi control.6' In the
Kosovo case, United States officials argued that the mere invocation of Charter
Chapter VII with regard to the Kosovo situation was sufficient to authorize a
resort to force. 62 The Dutch representative on the Security Council contended
that Resolution 1203 clearly stated that the Council was acting under Chapter
VIII of the Charter and that NATO action followed directly from Resolution
1203.63
60. Lobel & Ratner, supra note 39.
61. U.N. SCOR, 2963rd mtg. at 27-8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1999).
62. See John M. Goshko, U.S., Allies Inch Closer to Kosovo Intervention; UN Council to Vote on
Key Resolutions, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1998, at A21.
63. See Press Release, U.N., Security Council Rejects Demand for Cessation of Use of Force against
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. SC/6659 (March 26, 1999), available at
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2. The Council's Refusal to Deem NATO's Actions Illegal
Scholars have referenced the fact that the Security Council explicitly
rejected the proposition that NATO's actions were illegal. 64 A resolution
sponsored by the Russian Federation declaring that the NATO action was
unlawful and directed that it be terminated was supported by only three states--
Russia, China, Namibia-and was rejected by the remaining twelve Council
members.65 Thus, while no one contends that the Security Council specifically
authorized the NATO intervention, Wedgwood recognizes that the omission of
a Council authorization represents the unwillingness of Russia to endorse
NATO's actions, which would have undermined Russia's influence over an
issue that directly involved its interests.66 Speaking before the vote, the Russian
representative stated that the aggressive military action taken by NATO was a
threat to international peace and security and grossly violated key provisions of
the United Nations Charter. The United States representative, also speaking
before the resolution was voted on, focused attention on the actions of
Yugoslavia, stating that the Charter did not sanction armed assaults on ethnic
groups or imply that the world should turn a blind eye to a growing
humanitarian disaster. Canada's position was that the supporters of the Russian
resolution placed themselves outside of the international consensus which held
that "...the time had come to stop the continued violence perpetrated by the
Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against its own people., 67
3. Ex Post Facto Authorization
While strict Charter advocates claim that explicit Security Council
authorization for non-defensive uses of force must be granted prior to the onset
of war, more liberal interpretations allow for Council authorization ex post
facto, or after the fact. Much attention has been paid to Security Council
Resolution 1244, which was passed after the aerial campaign had ended and an
agreement on the resolution of the Kosovo situation had been concluded.
Resolution 1244 (1999), as Pellet notes, dramatically changed the picture.68
While it did not formally declare that NATO's intervention was lawful, it
clearly endorsed the consequences of the intervention. Pellet concludes that
"...there certainly were doubts as to the legality of NATO's action before 10
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/l1999/19990326.sc6659.html.
64. Pellet, supra note 1; Wedgwood, supra note 39.
65: Id.
66. Wedgwood, supra note 39.
67. Press Release, U.N. SCOR, supra note 63.
68. Pellet, supra note 1, at 387 (quoting Wedgewood, supra note 39).
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June 1999, [h]owever, when put together, the arguments in favor of its
lawfulness become persuasive-and particularly so in light of Resolution
1244. i69
4. Regional Responses to Threats to the Peace
Further support for a legal defense of NATO' s intervention can be found
in Charter Article 52(1), which provides:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for
regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their
activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the
United Nations.7'
Pellet concludes that NATO's intervention is an illustration of "regional or
collective unilateralism."'" He continues by arguing that actions taken by
groups of states imply some checks and balances, both in the decision-making
process and in action that purely unilateral interventions cannot.72
A problem created by Article 52(1) is that, in the event of what Lobel and
Ratner refer to as "contracting out" by the Security Council to individual
member states or regional organizations to revolve a dilemma, the Council
leaves states with wide discretion to use ambiguous, open-textured resolutions
to exercise control over the initiation, conduct and termination of hostilities.73
This problem is reflected in attempts by United States officials, in particular, to
claim that the mere invocation of Charter Chapter VII with regard to the Kosovo
situation was sufficient to authorize the resort to force.
The crucial question, however, remains the conditions under which a
regional organization can carry out enforcement actions pursuant to subsequent
Charter Article 53(1), which addresses the degree of control that the Security
Council ought to exercise over such operations. Gazzini notes that Article 53(1)
introduces a distinction between the utilization of regional organizations by the
Security Council and the autonomous enforcement by regional organizations
acting upon a Security Council authorization. 74  The scholarly community
remains divided on this later, and most crucial, point. Some claim a strict
69. Id.
70. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
71. Pellet, supra note 1.
72. Id.
73. Lobel & Ratner, supra note 39.
74. Gazzini, supra note 39.
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control by the Council, including the start-up, supervision, and termination of
enforcement actions," while others recognize that under certain circumstances,
such as genocide, an implicit authorization or ex post facto authorization by the
Council may suffice.7 6  In any case, Article 54 imposes upon regional
organizations the obligation to keep the Security Council fully informed on the
activities they contemplate to undertake or have already undertaken.
C. Extra-Charter International Law
The strongest case for the legality of NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia
in 1999 is made with reference to extra-Charter international law. This position
rejects the notion that international law begins and ends with the entry into force
of the United Nations Charter, recognizing that pre-Charter legal principles and
post-1945 legal developments provide states with certain rights and duties
irregardless of the provisions laid down in the UN Charter.
1. Humanitarian Intervention
Hilpold notes that "...the events in the first half of 1999 reanimated the old
discussions of whether there is a right to humanitarian intervention in
international law."77 Perhaps the strongest argument supporting the legality of
NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia is one that rests on a perceived
humanitarian intervention right. Wedgwood concurs that "humanitarian
necessity" remains the core of NATO's justification for military force in
Kosovo and, as noted earlier, was an expressed objective in every major NATO
statement on the intervention.78 Chinkin confirms that several official
statements by NATO members reference the humanitarian interest in
intervening in Yugoslavia in 1999.79  Schachter reflects the humanitarian
intervention perspective when he writes that "Even in the absence of ... prior
approval [by the Security Council], a state or group of states using force to put
an end to atrocities when the necessity is evident and the humanitarian intention
is clear is likely to have its action pardoned."8
75. A. GIOIA, The United Nations and Regional Organizations in the Maintenance of Peace and
Security, in THE OSCE IN THE MAiNTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY (M. Bothe et al. eds., Klumer Law
International, 1997).
76. Simma, supra note 40.
77. Hilpold, supra note 38, at 442.
78. Wedgwood, supra note 39, at 832.
79. Christine Chinkin, The State that Acts Alone: Bully, Good Samaritan or Iconoclast?, 11 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 31 (2000).
80. B.G.RAMCHARAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE OF EARLY-WARNING AND PREVENTIVE
DIPLOMACY: THE EMERGING GLOBAL WATCH 126 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1991).
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This legal justification for NATO's intervention is strongest because it
reduces the role of the Security Council in authorizing the non-defensive use of
force, the linchpin of the strict Charter interpretation school. The humanitarian
intervention defense requires differentiating Charter Law from traditional
international law, recognizing the two as concurrent legal systems albeit with
substantial overlap. Even though both bodies of legal rules function in a similar
way in many respects, Pellet observes that this does not mean that the Charter
mechanisms are part of the general law of international responsibility or that
both regimes are entirely intermingled.8 He continues by noting that "...some
arguments in favor of NATO's intervention ... can ...be based on the law of state
responsibility," a distinct yet complimentary legal regime that co-exists with
Charter Law. 2
A legal justification of NATO's intervention on humanitarian grounds is
supported by what French scholars have termed the devoir d'ingerence, or duty
to intervene in response to a humanitarian catastrophe. Advocates of the
principle contend that regardless of the cause of a humanitarian catastrophe,
external actors have a right and/or duty to intervene. Initially, the doctrine was
designed to justify an intervention by humanitarian NGOs, however; its leading
proponents have more recently attempted to extend the duty of intervention to
states.
The humanitarian intervention defense, while not well-grounded in
contemporary international law, led Hilpold to observe that "NATO's
intervention in Kosovo has brought about a flurry of contributions in the legal
literature suggesting the need to take a completely different stance towards the
perennial controversial subject of humanitarian intervention." '  Cassese
provides a series of conditions, which could give rise to the right of
humanitarian intervention even in the absence of any authorization by the
Security Council, as follows:
i) Gross and egregious breaches of human rights involving loss of
life of hundreds or thousands of innocent people, and amounting
to crimes against humanity, are carried out on the territory of a
sovereign state, either by the central governmental authorities
or with their connivance and support, or because of the total
collapse of such authorities cannot impede those atrocities;
81. Pellet, supra note 1, at 387.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., M. BETrATI AND B. KoUcHNER, LE DEVOIS D'INGERENCE: PEUT-ON LEs LAISSER
MOURIR? (Denoel 1987); PIERRE LEGROS, MARIANNE LIBERT, AND BERNARD KOUCHNER, L'EXIGENCE
HUMANITAIRE: LE DEVOIR D'INGERENCE (Les Presses du Management 2000).
84. Hilpold, supra note 38, at 442.
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ii) If the crimes against humanity result from anarchy in a
sovereign state, proof is necessary that the central authorities
are utterly unable to put an end to those crimes, while at the
same time refusing to call upon or to allow other states or
international organizations to enter the territory to assist in
terminating the crimes. If, on the contrary, such crimes are the
work of the central authorities, it must be shown that those
authorities have consistently withheld their cooperation from
the United Nations or other international organizations, or have
systematically refused to comply with appeals,
recommendations or decisions of such organizations;
iii) The Security Council is unable to take any coercive action to
stop the massacres because of disagreement among the
Permanent Members or because one or more of them exercises
its veto power. Consequently, the Security Council either
refrains from any action or only confines itself to deploring or
condemning the massacres, plus possibly terming the situation
a threat to the peace;
iv) All peaceful avenues which may be explored consistent with the
urgency of the situation to achieve a solution based on
negotiation, discussion, and any other means short of force have
been exhausted, notwithstanding which, no solution can be
agreed upon by the parties to the conflict;
v) A group of states decides to try to halt the atrocities, with the
support or at least the non-opposition of the majority of Member
States of the United Nations;
vi) Armed force is exclusively used for the limited purpose of
stopping the atrocities and restoring respect for human rights,
not for any goal going beyond this limited purpose.
Consequently, the use of force must be discontinued as soon as
this purpose is attained. Moreover, it is axiomatic that use of
force should be commensurate with and proportionate to the
human rights exigencies on the ground. The more urgent the
situation of killings and atrocities, the more intensive and
immediate may be the military in response thereto. Conversely,
military action would not be warranted in the case of a crisis
which is slowly unfolding and which still presents avenues for
diplomatic resolution aside from armed confrontation.85
Application of the aforementioned criteria to the situation in Kosovo in the
period leading up to NATO's intervention provides a strong justification for
NATO's resort to force. For each criterion, a compelling case can be made for
humanitarian intervention.
85. Cassese, supra note 35, at 27.
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2. Intervention in Response to Genocide
The principal obstacle to establishing a right of humanitarian intervention,
even under the conditions forwarded by Cassese, is that states could abuse the
right in order to provide legal cover for interventions that serve their own
narrow self-interest.86 The fear historically has been that once granted, a right
of humanitarian intervention would so undermine state sovereignty that the
institution of international law would be rendered ineffective. What is possible,
however, is an established right of humanitarian intervention in extreme cases,
most notably in response to genocide. Justification for the assertion that
protections afforded under the doctrine of state sovereignty are called into
question in the event of the commission of the crime of genocide is found in
Falk, who states that "genocidal behavior cannot be shielded by claims of
sovereignty...
It is established in international law that genocide constitutes an erga
omnes offense, making it a concern of all states.88 Consequently, in the event
of the crime of genocide, every state may lawfully consider itself injured and is
thus entitled to resort to countermeasures against the perpetrator. Simma
concludes that "[iun the face of genocide, the right of states, or collectivities of
states, to counter breaches of human rights most likely becomes an
obligation."89 Support for this contention is found in the judgment of the
International Court of Justice in the 1996 case brought by Bosnia-Herzegovina
against Yugoslavia. 90
Lobel and Ratner, who label NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia as a
violation of international law, nonetheless open the door to the possibility of
unauthorized intervention in response to genocide.9' They state that "[biut in
the extreme case of an ongoing genocide for which the Security Council will not
authorize force, perhaps the formal law ought to be violated to achieve the
higher goal of saving thousands or millions of lives." They continue by stating
that "[s]ilence by the Security Council might then reflect a community
consensus that the legal requirement for its authorization ought to give way to
86. Id.
87. Falk, supra note 34, at 847.
88. See Jeffrey S. Morton, The International Legal Adjudication of the Crime of Genocide, 7 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 329 (2001) (for a review of the historical evolution of the genocide regime and a detailed
assessment of the Genocide Convention (1948)).
89. Simma, supra note 40, at 2.
90. Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), 2001 I.C.J. (April 23).
91. Lobel & Ratner, supra note 39.
the moral imperative. 9 2  Franck and Rodley provide support of the
humanitarian intervention defense without recognizing an existing norm or rule
in international law that permits it.93 They state that "In exceptional
circumstances ... a large power may indeed go selflessly to the rescue of a
foreign people facing oppression. But surely no general law is needed to cover
such actions."94
VI. CONCLUSION
The anticipated implications of NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia for the
progressive development of international law and order are divergent, reflecting
the three schools of thought on the right of state intervention. If the prevailing
legal opinion is that the intervention, by virtue of its lack of Council
authorization, constitutes a violation of international law, the principal
implication is that the rights of individuals remain subservient to the rights of
states.
If, however, a consensus develops around the proposition that NATO
actions in response to the Kosovo crisis were legal, despite the absence of a
formal Security Council authorization, the international legal order will have
undergone a significant revision. Wedgwood notes that the war over Kosovo
may mark the end of Security Council "classicism," and the emergence of a
limited and conditional right of humanitarian intervention, permitting the use
of force to protect the lives of a threatened population when the decision is
taken by what most of the world would recognize as a responsible multilateral
organization and the Security Council does not oppose the action.95 Cassese
claims that "this particular instance of a breach of international law may
gradually lead to the crystallization of a general rule of international law
authorizing armed countermeasures for the exclusive purpose of putting an end
to large-scale atrocities amounting to crimes against humanity and constituting
a threat to the peace. '9 6 Gazzini claims that a process of reinterpreting Article
2(4) is underway, and has been gaining ground since post-Cold War military
activities took place in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti and Liberia.97 While
state practice remains insufficiently consistent to make a broad-based claim on
the emergence of an international norm allowing intervention in response to
92. Id. at 136.
93. Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian
Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 275 (1973).
94. Id. at 290-1.
95. Wedgwood, supra note 39, at 828.
96. Cassese, supra note 35, at 29.
97. Gazzini, supra note 39.
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humanitarian disasters, a determination that NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia
in 1999 was legal would represent a continuation of the trend since 1990. What
distinguishes the Kosovo case from those that preceded it is that, in the previous
cases, there was no claim that intervention was permissible absent of a Security
Council authorization. Finally, the Secretary General's call for Council action
to meet future humanitarian crises may draw support for what he referenced as
the development of an "international norm in favor of intervention to protect
civilians from wholesale slaughter."98 Pellet concludes that it is essential that
new 'community' mechanisms be found in the future in order to avoid being
restricted to a choice between unqualified respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of a state committing gross violations of human rights, on the
one hand, and the right of intervention without Security Council authorization,
on the other.99
What is clear from a review of the literature on the legal status of NATO's
intervention in Yugoslavia is that very few scholars provide unqualified
conclusions on the legality or illegality of the intervention. The majority of
scholars that qualify the intervention as a violation of international law
recognize that a counter case can be made. Simma, for example, despite his
contention that NATO violated Charter Law, seems to consider that the
intervention was "not that much illegal."'00 At the same time, those that
conclude that NATO's actions reflect the emergence of a new legal norm
permitting intervention without an explicit Security Council authorization to do
so recognize the general United Nations prohibition on the use of force.
Cassese downplays the illegality of the intervention, stating that "...any person
deeply alert to and concerned with human rights must perforce see that
important moral values militated for the NATO military action."'' And, it
appears, the lines dividing the scholarly community are not static. Hilpold
observes that "[t]he number of writers criticizing the concept of a right to
humanitarian intervention-once decisively preponderant-seems to dwindle;
even writers with a long record of opposition against such a legal right were
looking for suitable justifications."''0 2 It is also evident that the Kosovo case is
not an exception, but rather another critical example of a rapidly changing norm
of international law that places human rights on par with, or at exceptional
times, superior to states rights. At present, Slobodan Milosevic stands trial on
98. Press Release, U.N., Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, Presents His Annual Report to the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7136, GA/9596 (September 20, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/1999/l9990920.sgsm7l36.html.
99. Pellet, supra note 1, at 385.
100. Simma, supra note 40.
101. Cassese, supra note 35, at 25.
102. Hilpold, supra note 38, at 442.
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sixty-six counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, all
committed while he was head of state. Prior to that, but also recently, it was
determined that head of state immunity for Augusto Pinochet was superceded
by recent human rights conventions, despite the fact that the crimes charged
against him occurred while he was the head of state of Chile. If the
international community is willing to sacrifice classic principles of immunity
in order to uphold emerging principles of human rights, sacrificing state
sovereignty to uphold the same principles is a matter of degree and does not
represent a fundamental shift in legal thinking. As was evident in the judgment
in the Nicaragua Case, the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force is a legal
principle that is subject to change as the result of the development of a
customary law norm.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States federalist model, constituent states haven't much
opportunity to irritate foreign nations. They cannot declare war, nor make
treaties, nor assist or prevent immigration, nor offer or deny amnesty, nor pass
legislation that unduly burdens international trade. In short, most state activity
that could touch on foreign relations is insulated from international criticism by
the Constitutional provisions committing such things to the federal government.
One thing states may do, however, is execute criminal offenders who are
under the age of eighteen. This practice puts the states of the United States into
a very small minority on a global scale, and it has drawn the ire of the
international community.
While no pending congressional legislation compels U.S. constituent states
to abolish their death penalties, at least one proposal provides for the federal
government to "urge" states to do so. In 2001, Wisconsin Democrat Senator
Russell Feingold introduced two bills in the United States Senate.' The first
(S. 19 1) sought to abolish the Federal death penalty2 and the second (S.233) to
impose "a moratorium on executions by the Federal Government and urge the
States to do the same, while a National Commission on the Death Penalty
reviews the fairness of the imposition of the death penalty., 3 This National
Death Penalty Moratorium Act. (NDPMA) requested the appointment of a
federal Commission to study the federal death penalty policy. 4 On June 13,
2001, it was referred to the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights for hearings.5
In light of the September 11 th, 2001 attacks on the United States (with
foreign relations issues much on Congress's mind), one might posit that
Congress could pass an Act forbidding states to carry out the death penalty for
fear of the backlash this United States policy invites from the international
community.
When Congress is silent, the United States Supreme Court crafts federal
common law to either approve a state practice by finding it constitutional- as
1. This is not the first time Congress has ruminated upon Senator Feingold's proposals for a ban
on the death penalty. See, for example, the Federal Death Penalty Abolution Act of 1999, available at
http://feingold.senate.gov/issuearea/abolitionbill.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) (introduced in the first
session of the 106th Congress as S. 1917) and the National Death Penalty Moratorium Act of 2000, which was
referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee in April 2000. The 2000 bill's status is available on the Library
of Congress' Bill Summary and Status for the 106th Congress, linked at http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last visited
Oct. 12, 2002).
2. 147 CONG. REc. S581 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2001) (bill number S.191).
3. 147 CONG. REC. S923 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2001) (bill number S.233).
4. 147 CONG. REC. S923 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2001) (bill number S.233).
5. Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress, at
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/dl06query.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) (retrieve updates by bill number).
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it has done to date in the juvenile death penalty6- or sanction a state practice
by finding it unconstitutional, as it did in Brown v. Board of Education.7
Although the Supreme Court has decided a few such cases during and since the
Cold War,8 the Court usually abstains from meddling in foreign affairs by way
of federal common law, preferring to leave such matters to Congress.9
When Congress is vague, the Supreme Court can interpret federal statutes
to incorporate international law standards into a federal common law that
overrides states' domestic policies. 0 In so doing, the Court tries to avoid policy
conflicts with other branches' foreign affairs activities: "[o]ne reason so few
questions of foreign relations federalism get answered is because the Court has
chastened itself to avoid constitutional grounds for decision, including by
construing statutes in order to avoid them.""
But when Congress clearly speaks (in our hypothetical, to say "you must
strike the juvenile death penalty from your state law"), a statutory pre-emption
inquiry attaches: "The Constitution enables the Federal Government to pre-
empt state regulation [that is] contrary to federal interests."2 A valid
congressional Act trumps state law every time, so a state that wants to retain its
juvenile death penalty laws must attack the Act on grounds that Congress did
not have power to pass such an Act, i.e., that the federal government's interest
6. Erica Templeton, Note, Killing Kids: The Impact ofDomingues v. Nevada on the Juvenile Death
Penalty as a Violation of International Law, 41 B.C. L. REV 1175, 1184-85 (2000) (citing Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)).
7. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). See also infra note 114 for scholarly
commentary. But see Edward T. Swaine, The Undersea World of Foreign Relations Federalism, 2 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 337, 352 (2001) ("Congress should be given the opportunity to override state activities with which
it would disagree; at the same time, if a fully informed Congress elects not to preempt the relevant activities,
it seems inappropriate to presume that they are incompatible with the national interest.").
8. For a detailed discussion, see Swaine, supra note 7, at 339, n.6 (citing at n.6 Zschemig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429 (1968), in which the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional, as applied, an Oregon intestacy statute that imposed conditions
discriminating against East Germans. The Court was famously unclear as to the
precise basis for its concern-- the effect of the state courts' polemical decisions abroad,
their potential for embarrassing the executive branch, or the fact that the state was
attempting to conduct foreign relations-- and why doing any of those things would be
unconstitutional.
9. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 454,
n.361 (1998) (citing, at n.361, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298, 331 (1994) and
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259 (1991) as examples of cases where the Supreme Court
abstained from creating federal common law foreign policy, instead deferring to Congress to draft or amend
appropriate legislation).
10. See id. at 449. See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (standing for the
proposition that international law standards, when adopted by the United States Supreme Court as federal
common law standards, become the supreme law of the land).
I1. Swaine, supra note 7, at 342. See also the cases Bradley examines, supra note 9.
12. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
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is insufficient to pre-empt state legislation. This paper will explore whether
federal foreign affairs concern justifies a juvenile death penalty prohibition and
evaluate the likely fate of states' challenges to the constitutionality of such an
Act.
II. INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY OF THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
A. The ICCPR and the United Nations Position
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 3 is an
international human rights treaty, entered into by the Executive and ratified by
the United States Senate.14 The ICCPR provides that "[s]entence of death shall
not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age
and shall not be carried out on pregnant women."'
15
The United States does not comply with this ICCPR provision; it took a
reservation to this part of the ICCPR during treaty ratification. 16 As of early
2001, the United States is one of only six nations in the world that executes
citizens under the age of eighteen years.' 7 Amnesty International reported in
1998 that the United States had executed nine persons between 1990 and 1998,
all of whom were age seventeen at the time of offense. 8
As of 2000, eleven nations "filed complaints [against the United States]
with the Human Rights Commission (the commission in charge of monitoring
compliance with the terms of the ICCPR)" protesting the United States's ICCPR
reservation and the U.S. constituent states' policy of permitting juvenile
executions. 19 Amnesty International has likewise criticized the United States'
ICCPR reservation.20 In 1997, the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights itself also obliquely chastised the United States for its ICCPR
13. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), available at
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) [hereinafter ICCPR].
14. John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements,
99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 806-807 (2001).
15. ICCPR, supra note 13, Part III, art. 6, 5.
16. See, e.g., Templeton, supra note 6, at 1192 (citing William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 277 (1995)).
17. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, JUVENILES AND THE DEATH PENALTY- EXECUTIONS WORLDWIDE
SINCE 1990, at 3 (Nov. 1998) (Amnesty International Index No. ACT 50/11/98). See also 147 CONG. REC.
S582 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold) ("The others are Iran, Pakistan, Nigeria, Saudi
Arabia and Yemen.").
18. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 17, at 5.
19. Templeton, supra note 6, at 1186.
20. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 1999 UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS- MAKING HUMAN
RIGHTS WORK: TIME TO STRENGTHEN THE SPECIAL PROCEDURES, at 3 (Nov. 1998) (Amnesty International
Index No. IOR 41/01/99).
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reservation: the Commission "[urged] all States that still maintain the death
penalty to comply fully with their obligations under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
notably not to impose the death penalty ... for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age. . ... 2' The United Nations Sub-Commission on
Human Rights "Condemns unequivocally the imposition and execution of the
death penalty on those aged under 18 at the time of the commission of the
offence .... Calls upon also States... to abolish by law as soon as possible the
death penalty for those aged under 18 at the time of the commission of the
offence and, in the meantime, to remind their judges that the imposition of the
",22death penalty against such offenders is in violation of international law ....
B. U.S. Supreme Court Approval of U.S. State Law
An impressive body of scholarly debate has coalesced around the question
of whether the United States Supreme Court should give the international
community's standards of conduct the force of United States law.23 Historical
federal cases such as Chisholm v. Georgia24 and modern ones such as Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala25 support the proposition that the United States Supreme Court is
legally bound by the tenets of customary international law.26 Scholars also
argue that older piracy cases indicate that the United States Supreme Court's
concern for international law standards is specifically recognized in context of
human rights.27
The Supreme Court, however, does not consider itself bound by standards
of international conduct with regard to the juvenile death penalty. During the
late 1980s, the Court set schizophrenic precedent on the issue of whether
international standards should play any role in analyzing whether the juvenile
death penalty passes an Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment"
challenge. In 1988's Thompson v. Oklahoma,28 the Court comfortably
21. E.S.C. Res. 1997/12, U.N. ESCOR, Human Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 36th mtg., Supp. No. 3, at
70, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/150 (Apr. 3, 1997).
22. E.S.C. Res. 2000/17, U.N. ESCOR, Human Rts. Comm., Sub-Comm. on Human Rts., 56th
Sess., 26th mtg., at 50, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2000/17 (Aug. 17, 2000) (emphasis in original).
23. Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1825-26
(1998) [hereinafter Koh, State Law].
24. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed 440 (1793).
25. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
26. Koh, State Law, supra note 23, at 1825-26, n.8-10 (1998). Koh also provides an excellent
capsule summary of the United States Supreme Court's history of incorporating international law standards
into federal common law.
27. Id. at 1826 (citing G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and International Law: The Piracy
Cases, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 727 (1989)).
28. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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integrated the international community's majority standard into its opinion.
Thompson, age fifteen at the time of offense, "was convicted of first-degree
murder and sentenced to death."29 The Oklahoma statute at issue provided that
a "'Child' means any person under eighteen (18) years of age, except for any
person sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years of age who is charged with
murder."30 The trial court, after a hearing, determined that Thompson could be
tried as an adult.3' This decision was perhaps due to the fact that Thompson
acted in concert with others, as well as due to the evidence surrounding the
victim's death: "The evidence disclosed that the victim had been shot twice,
and that his throat, chest, and abdomen had been cut. He also had multiple
bruises and a broken leg. His body had been chained to a concrete block and
thrown into a river.... ,32 "We have previously recognized," said the Court, "the
relevance of the views of the international community in determining whether
a punishment is cruel and unusual. 33 The Court surveyed the policies of
several international States to conclude that "it would offend civilized standards
of decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his
or her offense."34
The following year, in Stanford v. Kentucky,35 the Supreme Court eroded
its Thompson holding to announce that "in the United States, the juvenile death
penalty is constitutional as applied to sixteen and seventeen-year-old
defendants."36 Stanford was a consolidated case. Petitioner Stanford was just
over seventeen when he and an accomplice "repeatedly raped and sodomized
[a gas station attendant] ... during and after their commission of a robbery ....
They then drove her to a secluded area near the station, where Stanford shot her
point-blank in the face and then in the back of her head . . . ."" The second
petitioner, Wilkins, was just over sixteen when he and an accomplice robbed a
convenience store. 38 He stabbed the attendant eight times on three separate
occasions, leaving her to die on the floor.39 Both Kentucky and Missouri
29. Id. at 818.
30. Id. at n.2 (citing OKLA. STAT., Tit. 10, § 1101 (1) (Supp. 1987)).
31. Id. at 819-20.
32. Id. at 819.
33. Thompson, 487 U.S. at n.31
34. Id. at 830. See also Templeton, supra note 6, at 1183-84 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815 (1988)) (noting that the Supreme Court "emphasized that the views of the international community
are relevant in determining whether punishment is cruel and unusual" under the United States Constitution's
Eighth Amendment.).
35. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
36. Templeton, supra note 6, at 1184-85 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)).
37. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 365.
38. Id. at 366.
39. Id.
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allowed the petitioners to be tried as adults because of the gravity of the
crimes.40
Considering an Eighth Amendment challenge that the punishment was too
cruel and unusual to pass constitutional muster, the Court noted that execution
of young people was probably not prohibited in the Framers' time because "the
common law set the rebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit any felony
at the age of 14, and theoretically permitted capital punishment to be imposed
on anyone over the age of 7.,,4I The Court then said any Eighth Amendment
violation would arise from a violation of decency as defined by the values "of
modem American society as a whole. 42 Affirming these two convictions, the
Court specifically rejected Thompson's reliance on international standards: "We
emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive,
rejecting the contention... that the sentencing practices of other countries are
relevant."
43
Thus, as law of the land exists today, Congress stands silent; the ICCPR is
non-binding; and no other treaty provisions prevent U.S. constituent states from
enforcing their juvenile death penalties. To the contrary, the United States
Supreme Court has formulated a "federal common law" that finds the death
penalty a constitutional punishment when imposed by states on a person under
age eighteen at the time of offense.44 Under Stanford's reasoning, the
international "community's conceptions of decency" matter not at all.45
Im. THE CONCEPT OF INTERNALIZATION
Where the Supreme Court closes a door, Congress and the Executive may
open windows. In the United States, any of the government's three branches
may legally internalize international norms, making them binding on federal
courts.46 "Sometimes, as in the case of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, the executive branch takes the lead .... Sometimes Congress
takes the lead, spurred by nongovernmental organizations... [and] in recent
human rights cases, federal courts have taken the lead, but only with the express
40. Id. at 365-66.
41. Id. at 368.
42. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369.
43. Id. at n.1.
44. See, e.g., id. But see Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83
VA. L. REV. 1617, 1639-1641 (1997) (asserting that customary international law guides most federal courts
in human rights decisions). See also id at 1713 ("[T]hese customary international human rights norms are
based almost exclusively on the very treaties that the political branches have taken pains to exclude from the
domain of federal law.").
45. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at n. I.
46. Koh, State Law, supra note 22, at 1860.
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congressional directives in the ATCA [Alien Tort Claims Act] and the TVPA
[Torture Victims Protection Act].""
Harold Hongju Koh, in discussing the ways in which a State internalizes
international standards of conduct, suggests four steps along a spectrum of
compliance, drawing a distinction "among four relationships between stated
norms and observed conduct: coincidence, conformity, compliance, and
obedience. '48 A State can move toward "willing compliance" with one or more
internal tactics: a State socially internalizes "international human rights norms"
when " a given standard of conduct acquires so much public legitimacy that
there is -widespread general obedience to it."'49 A State legally internalizes an
international standard of conduct when the standard is "incorporated into the
domestic legal system through executive action, judicial interpretation,
legislative action, or some combination of the three."50  Finally, a state
politically internalizes an international standard of conduct "when political elites
accept an international norm, and adopt it as a matter of government policy."'"
Koh does not specify whether this governmental policymaking is consistently
formal (legislation) or informal (consistent political practice), but one may posit
that either would qualify.
Assuming arguendo that the forbearance to juvenile offenders is indeed an
international standard of conduct (justified either by common practice or byjus
cogens), any U.S. constituent state's forbearance to do so is only coincidentally
obedient to the international standard, because the Supreme Court of the United
States has given the practice its stamp of approval.52 This places the United
States at the far end of Koh's spectrum because of the wide disparity between
the "stated [international] norms and [the constituent states'] observed
conduct."53
Senator Feingold' s NDPMA represents movement toward "conformity" or
"compliance," because it suggests a formal moratorium on the internationally
questionable conduct.54 Adopting Koh's terminology, our hypothetical Juvenile
47. Id.. The Alien Tort Claims Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, was amplified by the Torture
Victims Protection Act (1992), which gives rise to private causes of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1350. See 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 48 (3d
ed., Kluwer Law International 1996).
48. Harold Hongju Koh, Review Essay: Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, n.3 (1999) (reviewing ABRAN CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey].
49. Id. at 2656.
50. Id. at 2657.
51. Id. at 2656-57.
52. See generally Stanford, 492 U.S. 361.
53. See Koh, Why Do Nations Obey, supra note 48, at n.3.
54. See id.
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Death Penalty Prohibition Act would place the United States farther along the
internalization spectrum: it would be a legally internalized obedience to the
international standard of conduct.55
IV. JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY PROHIBITION AS A FOREIGN COMMERCE
REGULATION
The first way Congress could legally internalize a national juvenile death
penalty prohibition is through a pre-emptive federal regulatory scheme enacted
under congressional foreign commerce power. Removing from analysis for the
moment the question of Congressional authority to legislate in support of
executive treaty-making power (discussed in the next section), this section will
explore whether Congress could defend a juvenile death penalty prohibition by
claiming that constituent states' policies impermissibly burden foreign
commerce.
A. Congressional Authority over Foreign Commerce
The United States Constitution textually authorizes Congress "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations ... ,56 This authority is characterized as
Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause power when Congress uses it to limit state
action.57 When Congress acts pursuant to this plenary power, its authority is
limited only by other checks and balances built into the Constitution's text and,
arguably, by the structure of the Constitution itself. Congress cannot, for
example, legislate in "areas beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause," nor
may Congress "commande[er] ... the executive or legislative branches of the
state governments, [nor] overrid[e] state sovereign immunity in either federal
or state court .... "58
In 2000, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council59 laid out the latest
federal pre-emption tests that apply when a state law allegedly burdens foreign
commerce. No standard of international conduct comes into play; the analysis
looks to domestic congressional intent. A state law is pre-empted if "Congress
intends federal law to 'occupy the field' ... in that area. '60 Similarly, "state law
is naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute,"'" with
"conflict" defined as a situation "where it is impossible for a private party to
55. See id. at 2657.
56. U.S. CONST. art. I sec. 8.
57. See, e.g., Swaine, supra note 7. See also U.S. CONST. art. I sec. 8.
58. Yoo, supra note 14, at 763 (internal citations omitted; cases dated between 1995 and 2000). See
also id at 817-18 for more detailed discussion.
59. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
60. Id. at 372 (internal citations omitted).
61. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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comply with both state and federal law ... [or] where [state legislation] stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment ... of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. 62 To determine whether state law "stands as an-obstacle" to federal
purposes, the Supreme Court will "examin[e] the federal statute as a whole" to
identify the statute's "purpose and intended effects. 63
B. Congressional Concern: The Cost of Non-Compliance
Some human rights treaties, such as the American Convention on Human
Rights (ACHR), provide by their terms that the treaties may affect member
States' internal economic affairs. For example, in the ACHR, member States
voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the treaty-created Inter-American Court
of Human Rights and agree to pay such judgments or sanctions as the that court
may impose.' Although this is an economic concern, it is not necessarily a
commercial concern in the sense of transnational monetary exchange.
The ICCPR, as a resolution of the United Nations general assembly, is
subject to the United Nations' charter-authorized enforcement procedures.65 The
United Nations generally eschews strong-arm enforcement tactics.66 However,
when a member State's practice becomes truly offensive to the United Nations'
collective membership, the United Nations Security Council can and will
authorize enforcement actions that may include both non-coercive tactics such
as multinational agreements and coercive tactics such as authorized trade
61
sanctions.
Although some scholars argue that because "none of the parties [to a
human rights agreement] are exchanging rights or benefits... individual states
have no coercive power," 68 the United Nations recognizes that trade sanctions
do impact States' economies, sometimes to the extent that they interfere with
62. d at 372-73 (internal citations omitted).
63. Id. at 373 (internal citations omitted).
64. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, entered into force July
18, 1978, ch. VuI, sec. 3, art. 68(2), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties.html (last visited
Oct. 12, 2002) (also known as the "Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica") [hereinafter ACHR].
65. See UNITED NATIONS DEPT. OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, UN PEACEKEEPING, U.N. Doc.
DPI/1851/Rev.9 (June 1999), available at http://www.un.org/News/facts/peacefct.htm (last visited Oct. 12,
2002) [hereinafter UN PEACEKEEPING].
66. See id.
67. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, IMAGE AND REALITY-
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS (June 1999), at ch. 4, available at
http://www.un.org/geninfo/ir/ch4/ch4_txt.htm#q2 (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) (chapter entitled "What Does
the United Nations Do for Human Rights and Justice?") (discussing the United Nations's "sustained anti-
apartheid campaign" against South Africa).
68. Templeton, supra note 6, at 1192 (citing William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 277 (1995)).
States' overall economic development.69 The United Nations has urged States
to refrain from taking "unilateral measures ... in particular those of a coercive
nature with extraterritorial effects, which create obstacles to trade relations
among [international] States ... imped[e] the full realization of the rights set
forth in... international human rights instruments."7
Congress will argue that, if an international State imposed a unilateral trade
sanction on the United States in protest to the federal government's failure to
prohibit its constituent states from imposing ajuvenile death penalty, the State's
action would affect the United States' economy as a whole.7 Congress can
easily identify the potential economic impact. The countries objecting to the
United States' ICCPR reservation include some of "the United States' closest
allies: France, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Spain. 72 These States are also major
United States trading partners.73 As of 1999, Western Europe accepted 22.5%
of the United States' total exports, generating United States revenues of nearly
$153 billion.74 Norway alone imported $1.8 billion of United States goods
during 2001. 73
C. The Fate of a State Challenge
To determine whether Congress can pre-empt the state's death penalty with
this rationale, the Supreme Court, upon a challenge, will look to Congress'
purpose: avoiding unilateral trade sanctions and preserving economic
relationships with the identified trading partners.76 A state could argue that a
mere potential for trade sanctions- when no foreign State has yet imposed such
sanctions nor threatened to do so- is not a sufficient federal concern to justify
Congress in forbidding states to enforce their own criminal laws.
69. See Res. 2000/11, U.N. GAOR, Human Rts. Comm., 56th Sess., 52d mtg., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/2000/I 1 (Apr. 17, 2000).
70. Id.
71. Most NGO reporting in this area examines the effect on the United States economy of sanctions
imposed by the United States on a foreign State- rather than against the United States as suggested here-but
the import-export revenue numbers apply to either situation.
72. Templeton, supra note 6, at n.98.
73. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE DOMESTIC COSTS OF SANCTIONS ON FOREIGN
COMMERCE 30 (Mar. 1999).
74. Id.. See also id at 39 et seq. (discussing and providing statistics on additional "trickle-down"
economic effects of trade restrictions).
75. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2002 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 316 (2002) (section entitled "Country Reports: Norway").
76. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at n.17 (implying that the Supreme Court's recognition of a general
Congressional desire to maintain cooperative relationships with allies is a valid rationale for federal
legislation). See also id. at 390 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is perfectly obvious from the record ... that the
inflexibility produced by the Massachusetts statute has in fact caused difficulties with our allies.").
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If the state was arguing that the juvenile death penalty does not pose a
domestic interstate commerce burden, this argument might succeed.
"'[S]anctioning authority is rarely granted by treaty, rarely used when granted,
and likely to be ineffective when used."' 77 Domestic commerce power requires
Congress to show some actual effect on interstate commerce, an effect that is
not de minimis. United States v. Lopez78 overturned a congressional gun control
act because the Act was not sufficiently related to interstate commerce concerns.
The government argued that handguns in schools engendered violent crime and
interfered with the "learning environment," and that both endangered the
economy by threatening interstate travel and economic participation. 79  The
Court held that Congress's regulatory power under the domestic Commerce
Clause was limited to concerns with a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce.
80
In domestic commerce clause legislation "Congress normally is not
required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity
has on interstate commerce,"'" but the Lopez Court refused "to pile inference
upon inference" to find a commerce link where Congress had provided no
record to aid the court in evaluating a commerce effect.82 The Court affirmed
this reasoning in Jones v. United States,83 holding that arson of a private home
could not be prosecuted under federal criminal law. The mere fact that the
home was used to secure an interstate loan and received natural gas from outside
the state did not establish a sufficient interstate commerce relationship to trigger
federal jurisdiction.'
If Congress passed a national juvenile death penalty prohibition based
solely upon its speculation that economic sanctions might be imposed, the Lopez
and Jones precedents would allow- although they would not compel- the
Supreme Court to find that the state legislation should stand until and unless
Congress shows that the state law actually affects international economic
relations.
However, the dormant foreign commerce clause analysis is different, and
the scrutiny of state action "more rigorous."85 First, the test for a state's foreign
77. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey, supra note 48, at 2635-36 (quoting ABRAN CHAYES & ANTONIA
HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS
(1995)).
78. 514 U.S. 549 (1994).
79. Id. at 563-64.
80. Id. at 556-57, 559.
81. Id. at 562.
82. Id. at 567. See also id at 563 (discussing lack of evidence in congressional record).
83. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
84. See generally id.
85. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, n.9 (1980). See also Swaine, supra note 7, at 345
(discussing a "market participant exception" to the dormant foreign commerce clause).
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commerce burden is more broad and more vague than the domestic commerce
power. If the federal legislative scheme seeks to achieve uniformity in foreign
commerce relations, it receives judicial deference when it conflicts with a state
statute.86 Second, although the pre-emption rules for matters touching on
foreign commerce are the same as those used in a domestic pre-emption
analysis,87 the foreign and domestic inquiries diverge when the Supreme Court
begins to examine Congressional purpose and the effect of the federal statutory
scheme.
In 2000, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council8 8 illustrated this
divergence. Crosby analyzed foreign commerce clause pre-emption to find that
a Massachusetts law restricting state businesses' trade with the State of Burma
(now. Myanmar) was pre-empted by the federal Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (hereinafter the "Foreign
Operations Act"), which also regulated trade with Burma.89 Even to the extent
that Massachusetts's law did not directly conflict with the Foreign Operations
Act, the Supreme Court found that the law kept the Executive from "working
together with other nations in hopes of reaching common policy and
'comprehensive' strategy" with regard to Burma relations, a power granted to
the Executive by the Foreign Operations Act.90 Crosby did not examine whether
the Massachusetts law had an actual impact on foreign commerce, nor did it ask
the extent of such impact if indeed it existed.9' The mere potential of state
interference with the bargaining power conferred upon the Executive by the
Foreign Operations Act was sufficient to pre-empt the state's statute.92 As
compared to the "show us some record" Lopez test for domestic commerce
power, the "if you can imagine it, you can pre-empt it" Crosby test illustrates
that Congress' foreign commerce legislation receives a higher level of judicial
deference.
Crosby does offer slight hope for states with language implying that a state
regulation that merely "complicates" diplomatic relations might not present the
same danger as a state regulation that substantively restricts federal economic
86. See, e.g., Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381. See also Japan Line Ltd., et al. v. County of Los Angeles et
al., 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (invalidating California's ad valorem property tax levied against ships of Japanese
nationality, when the ships were owned by a Japanese shipping line, subject to property tax in Japan, and
solely used for interstate commerce).
87. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. et al. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and D'vmt
Comm'n et al., 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (setting forth a domestic pre-emption analysis); compare Crosby,
530 U.S. at 372-73 (applying the same analysis in a foreign commerce analysis).
88. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
89. Id. at 389.
90. Id. at 382.
91. See generally id.
92. See id. at 382.
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bargaining power.93 Congress has also been known to indulge U.S. constituent
states' foreign commerce goals by recognizing states' wishes and custom-
tailoring international trade agreements.94 However, in light of Crosby's
deferential standard and federal courts' general reluctance to countermand any
congressional foreign policy goal,95 these are dangerously flimsy hooks on
which to hang a state challenge against federal foreign commerce pre-emption.
V. JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY PROHIBITION AS ARTICLE 11 LEGISLATION
The second way Congress could legally internalize a national juvenile
death penalty prohibition is by passing legislation to execute the terms of
treaties and agreements adopted by the Executive.9 6 In this scenario,
Congressional "Article Ir" power is precipitated by Executive power.97 The
Executive cooperates with other international States to formulate United States
international policy, and Congress is charged with promulgating domestic
legislation that supports those policy goals.98
A. The Domestically Intrusive Nature of Human Rights Treaties
The ICCPR, and similar human rights treaties, 99 represent an emerging
trend toward international agreements specifically designed to influence the
member States' domestic laws.' 0 As international States become more
economically and socially interdependent, international treaties and agreements
begin to "resemble domestic legislation in directly mandating norms of public
and private conduct ... [and] the treaty power ... threatens to supplant the
domestic lawmaking process."' 0 ' Two treaties similar to the ICCPR illustrate
this claim; the United States has ratified neither of them.'02
93. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381.
94. Swaine, supra note 7, at 344 (discussing United States negotiations for the World Trade
Organization's 1994 Agreement on Government Procurement and noting that "the US wound up permitting
substantial variation among state commitments, even excluding more than a dozen states from any
obligation.").
95. See supra notes 8, 9. See also Swaine, supra note 7, at 338 (discussing and citing Miami Light
Proj. v. Miami-Dade County, 97 F Supp 2d 1174 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Gerling Global Reins Corp. v.
Quackenbush, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8815 (E.D. Cal. 2000); and Gerling Global on appeal at 240 F3d 739
(9th Cir. 2001)).
96. See U.S. CONST. art. U; U.S. CONST. art. I sec. 8.
97. Bradley, supra note 9, at 444-45 (noting also the effect of Missouri v. Holland).
98. Id.
99. For a list of treaties see Bradley, supra note 9, at n.29.
100. Bradley, supra note 9, at 396-97.
101. Yoo, supra note 14, at 760.
102. Templeton, supra note 6, at 1187; Yoo, supra note 14, at 807 (discussing treaties that the Clinton
Administration had not ratified at the time of publication).
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),'°3 for example, provides
that "1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life.
... 2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival
and development of the child,"'"' and that "[n]either capital punishment nor life
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences [sic]
committed by persons below eighteen years of age . . . ."'0 Member States
agree to submit regular compliance reports "to [a] Committee, through the
Secretary-General of the United Nations."'0 6 Although the CRC creates no
specialized international court and does not textually require member States to
change their constituent states' domestic laws, this Convention "contains a
number of provisions that may be inconsistent with current U.S. [constituent
states'] family law."' 7
Like the CRC, the ACHR also forbids capital punishment for people under
age eighteen at the time of offense. 8 The ACHR is more legislatively robust
than the CRC, featuring a "Federal States" section that specifically provides for
intrusion into member States' domestic policymaking: "Where a State Party is
constituted as a federal state, the national government of such State Party shall
implement all the provisions of the Convention over whose subject matter it
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction."'0' 9 The ACHR also admits that
a federalist system might struggle with Constitutional limitations, and it
allows- in fact compels- such a State's federal government to exercise upon
its "constituent units" all persuasive power it can leverage: "[T]he national
government shall immediately take suitable measures, in accordance with its
constitution and its laws, to the end that the competent authorities of the
constituent units may adopt appropriate provisions for the fulfillment of this
Convention." 10
B. Executive as Lawmaker: Sole Executive Agreements
Provisions such as these give the Executive a de facto lawmaking role if
they appear in Sole Executive Agreements. The President, acting alone, enters
into a Sole Executive Agreement,"' which "generally has the same legal effects
103. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, 44 UN. GAOR Supp. (No. 49)
at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept. 2 1990 [hereinafter CRC].
104. Id. at Part I, art. 6(1)-(2).
105. Id. at Part 1, art. 37(a).
106. Id. at Part n1, art. 44(l)(a)-(b).
107. Bradley, supra note 9, at 402.
108. ACHR, supra note 64, ch. H, art. 4(5).
109. Id. at ch. m, art. 28(1).
110. Id.
111. BORN, supra note 47, at 20.
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as a treaty."' 2 A Sole Executive Agreement can "trump inconsistent state law"
as long as it is enacted on subject matter that the Constitution commits to
Presidential authority. 13 As discussed in the state challenge section below, this
"invisible lawmaking" begs an inquiry into the proper exercise of Executive
power if such power is used to override U.S. constituent states' sovereignty." 1
4
C. Congress as Lawmaker: Enabling Treaties and Agreements
In contrast to a Sole Executive Agreement, a "treaty" is an agreement
approved by both the Executive and by two-thirds of the Senate." 5  Self-
executing treaties made by the Executive are direct exercises of a
constitutionally authorized Executive power." 6 When the Executive acts, self-
executing treaties become the law of the land, but non-self-executing treaties
need enabling legislation from Congress before they bind United States
courts. " 
17
A Congressional-Executive Agreement is not a "treaty" under the United
States Constitution," I8 because it is "approved by . . . the President and a
majority of each House of Congress."" 9  However, like treaties, these
Agreements may also be self-executing or non-self-executing. 2° They are
generally considered to have the same legal force as a treaty.' 2' The North
American Free Trade and World Trade Organization Agreements, for example,
are Congressional-Executive agreements.' 22
In treaties and Congressional-Executive agreements, most of the
lawmaking role remains with Congress; the Necessary and Proper Clause
authorizes Congress to pass enabling legislation for non-self-executing treaties
and to further the goals of other agreements made by the Executive.'23 Some
112. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT [THIRD] OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303(4) and Reporter's Note
11 (1987); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th
Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955)).
113. Yoo, supra note 14, at 778.
114. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (finding
unconstitutional an executive order to nationalize private steel mills in support of the United States war effort).
115. See, e.g., BORN, supra note 47, at 19. See also U.S. CONST. art. H sec. 2.
116. U.S. CONST. art. I sec. 2.
117. See, e.g., BORN, supra note 47, at 19-20. See also U.S. CONST. art. VI.
118. See U.S. CONST. art. Hl sec. 2.
119. BORN, supra note 47, at 20 (citing RESTATEMENT [THIRD] OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303
(1987); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); B. Altman Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
120. Id. at 20, n. 105.
121. Yoo, supra note 14, at 759.
122. Id. at 758-59. See also Bradley, supra note 9, at 444 (discussing "federalism concerns" in the
context of NAFTA and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)).
123. "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
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also argue that the Senate also retains a significant policymaking role even when
the Executive exercises plenary treaty-making power: "Congressional interests
are often directly represented at the negotiating table. Even when Members of
Congress are not allowed to participate directly in such treaty negotiations, the
knowledge that any negotiated agreement must return to Congress for
ratification necessarily pervades the executive branch's negotiating position." 124
On the other hand, although the Senate has the power to refuse ratification, it
"has little freedom to modify [a treaty's] substantive provisions" when the treaty
is presented for ratification. 125 In either scenario, Article II authority allows
both House and Senate to legislate in areas traditionally reserved to states'
domestic policy when furthering the policy goals of a Sole Executive
Agreement, a treaty, or a Congressional-Executive Agreement.
26
D. Congressional Concern: Policy Implications of Human Rights Treaties
1. Concern for Cohesive Human Rights Agenda
In defending a juvenile death penalty prohibition enacted as part of an
Article II policy initiative, Congress will argue that the prohibition must be
federally enforced against U.S. constituent states, because an international State
simply cannot advance a human rights policy agenda without interfering with
actions historically considered domestic. 127 "Human rights violations usually
take place within a nation's territory and usually involve a nation's own
citizens. But as these purely 'domestic' acts take on international legal and
political significance, they too implicate foreign relations."'' 28 Congress will
argue that a human rights policy agenda- as opposed to, for instance, an
economic policy agenda- necessarily controls the treatment of individuals, and
to the extent that such control used to rest in the hands of constituent states, it
must now become federal control to further a greater good. 129 "The usual
explanation for the federal privilege is that national power is required to resolve
collective action problems. Foreign policy often looks like a public
good ....
or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I sec. 8.
124. Koh, State Law, supra note 23, at 1854 (internal citations omitted).
125. Yoo, supra note 14, at 847.
126. Bradley, supra note 9, at 444-45 (noting also the effect of Missouri v. Holland).
127. See id. at 453 (discussing a "demonstrable need" for transnational cooperation in setting
standards for human rights).
128. Goldsmith, supra note 44, at 1673.
129. See id.
130. Swaine, supra note 7, at 343.
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2. Concern for International Public Opinion
Senator Feingold's arguments in support of federal death penalty abolition
included low deterrent value, potential for equal protection violation, risk of
erroneous execution, and- germane to this section- concern over international
public opinion and the United States's global reputation. 131 Decrying the death
penalty in general, Senator Feingold expressed special concern over the
international public reaction to the United States' juvenile death penalty:
Courtesy of the Internet and CNN International, the world observes,
perplexed and sometimes horrified, the violence in our nation ....
Even China--the country that many members of Congress, including
myself, have criticized for its human rights abuses--apparently has the
decency not to execute its children. This is embarrassing. Is this the
kind of company we want to keep? Is this the kind of world leader
we want to be? ... [N]o one can reasonably argue that.., executing
child offenders is a normal or acceptable practice in the world
community. And I don't think we should be proud of the fact that the
United States is the world leader in the execution of child
offenders. 132
When all entities involved in creating a standard accept that standard, the
entity that "defies" the norm loses face in the eyes of its peers. 33 Templeton
asserts that if the United States continues to allow the juvenile death penalty,
"[c]osts to the United States will include loss of leadership and prestige...
[and] disrespect for international law. . . ."t31 Specifically, if the United States
shows no intention of enforcing treaties such as the ICCPR against its own
states, it will be hard-pressed to explain why its initial participation in the
human rights treaty-making process is anything more than pro forma ink-
spreading. 135 At best, this could make other negotiations uncomfortable for the
131. See generally 147 CONG. REC. S581 et seq. (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Feingold).
132. 147 CONG. REC. S582 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
133. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey, supra note 48, at 2639 (discussing and citing ABRAN CHAYES &
ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS 120 (1995)).
134. Templeton, supra note 6, at 1215.
135. id. at 1187 (noting that although the United States has actively participated in drafting both the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the American Convention on Human Rights, it has not yet ratified
either treaty). See also Norman Dorsen, Civil Liberties, National Security and Human Rights Treaties: A
Snapshot in Context, 3 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 143, 153 (1997) ("[T] he United States has not taken
appropriate steps to ensure its own compliance with the international human rights treaties that it has ratified,
and this diminishes its authority in speaking to others.").
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* Executive; at worst, it could result in a loss of allies' trust and an associated
reluctance to enter into other agreements with the United States.'36
3. Concern for National Security
Congress could also characterize a national juvenile death penalty
legislation as part of a national security agenda rather than- or in addition to-
a human rights agenda that simply calls for "collective action.' 37
In the context of formal military security, it is difficult if not impossible to
imagine the United Nations authorizing peacekeeping forces to convene on a
Kentucky courthouse. Although the United Nations technically has authority
to attempt such action, the imagination is further challenged in light of the facts
that 1) United States contributions comprise twenty-five percent of the United
Nations' annual budget,'38 2) United States contributions comprise over thirty
percent of the United Nations' peacekeeping budget,'39 and 3) as a permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council, the United States can veto any
proposed peacekeeping operation.14°
If official sanction by the United Nations is beyond the reach of reasonable
imagination, however, terroristic retaliation by a rogue State certainly is not. "If
one state's activities raise hackles in a foreign country, that country may
retaliate in a way that affects other states.' 14 1 "Costs to the United States will
include . . .endangerment of U.S. citizens . ,,I42 In the wake of the
September 1 lth, 2001 attacks on the United States, such claims hardly need the
support of examples; "[e]ven the most exquisitely targeted retaliation has
spillover effects."143 The 1995 United States Oklahoma City bombing took 168
lives, and insurance claims alone totaled an estimated $125 million.' 44 The
insurance industry similarly reported a $510 million impact from the 1993
136. See supra note 76(discussing the Supreme Court's recognition in Crosby that a desire to
preserve allied relationships is a valid Congressional concern).
137. Bradley, supra note 9, at 453.
138. UNITED NATIONS DEPT. OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS, U.N.
Doc. DPI/1753/Rev.17 (June 1999), available at http://www.un.org/News/facts/setting.htm (last visited Oct.
12, 2002) ("The top seven contributors to the UN are the USA (25%); Japan (17.98%); Germany (9.63%);
France (6.49%); Italy (5.39%); the United Kingdom (5.07%); and Russia (2.87%). Collectively, they account
for more than 72% of the regular UN budget.").
139. Id.. But see UN PEACEKEEPING, supra note 65(noting that the United States owes the United
Nations over $1 billion on its peacekeeping share assessment).
140. UN PEACEKEEPING, supra note 65.
141. Swaine, supra note 7, at 343.
142. Templeton, supra note 6, at 1215.
143. Swaine, supra note 7, at 344.
144. CNN.com Europe, Insurance claims to reach billions, Sept. 12, 2001, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/BUSINESS/09/l2/ins/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
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United States World Trade Center bombing.'45 From the September 2001
United States World Trade Center attacks, insurance claims are expected to
exceed $775 million for insurance companies in the United States and
worldwide; 146 United States airlines anticipate an industry-wide loss of at least
$2 billion in consumer dollars; 147 and publicly traded stocks on every worldwide
have struggled to regain their post-attack financial positions. 141
E. The Fate of a State Challenge
1. Attacks on Congress's Rational Basis
a. On the Need for a Cohesive Human Rights Agenda
A state can invoke precedent to argue that a mere Congressional
preoccupation with "speaking with one voice" in foreign affairs policy does not
override a Constitutional protection as fundamental as states' rights to maintain
their own criminal laws.' 49  In the same vein, a state can note that the
participation of all three federal branches in foreign affairs policymaking
already counteracts the "speak with one voice" argument in favor of
nationalizing all foreign relations. 50 However, Congress can counter-argue that
these precedents primarily apply in pre-emption cases where Congress stands
silent, and that when Congress has actively legislated, the "one voice"
broadcasts at a much higher volume to override states' domestic law.'
51
b. On Concern for International Public Opinion
If a state tries to challenge Congress' concern for international public
opinion as a legislative basis, it should note that the Supreme Court already
believes that "public opinion [is] an appropriate factor" to consider in
constitutional analysis. 152 The only real argument a state could pose in this




148. BBC News, Markets return to pre-attack levels, Oct. 12, 2001, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business/newsid_1594000/1594438.stm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
149. See Swaine, supra note 7, 338, n. I (citing Barclays Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S.
298, 303 (1994) to observe that the "one voice" justification was not enough to trigger dormant foreign
commerce clause pre-emption).
150. Bradley, supra note 9, at 444-45.
151. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381 (discussing uniformity when a Congressional Act has been passed).
Compare Japan Line, 441 U.S. 434 (invalidating California's ad valorem property tax with a "one voice"
analysis).
152. James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation, 1993 B.Y.U.L.
REV. 1039, 1086 (1993) (discussing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
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than domestic, public opinion. The state will cite in its support Stanford,
wherein the Supreme Court clearly stated that it did not care to invite other
countries' standards of morality into federal common law vis-t-vis the
constitutionality of a juvenile death penalty.'53
However, Stanford merely reflected the Supreme Court's refusal to
incorporate international "conceptions of decency"'154 into an Eighth
Amendment analysis. Stanford does not indicate that the Supreme Court would
find irrational a congressional record indicating that Congress has chosen to
consider international public opinion. The Supreme Court holds no grudge
against public opinion per se: it has itself weighed international public opinion,
particularly during the Civil Rights era when federal amicus briefs argued that
international disapproval of the United States' apartheid customs were
interfering with the Executive Department's ability to conduct foreign affairs. 155
Further, nothing in Supreme Court precedent indicates that Congress would
be considered irrational for relying on policy recommendations that come from
scholars and sources outside United States borders.'56 United Nations
authorities have made their opinions on the juvenile death penalty quite clear. '57
If Congress chooses to consider these standards and incorporate them against
constituent U.S. states through legislative channels, the Supreme Court might
well shrug at a state challenge and conclude voxpopulii vox dei. 1
58
c. On.Concern for National Security
A state can argue that Congress is irrational to concern itself with the
possibility of formal UN-authorized military action against the United States,
simply because international political realities make that scenario so far-fetched.
Similarly, a state can argue that while Congress is rational to concern itself with
rogue state retaliation, such concessions would fly in the face of the United
States very public commitment itself to a zero-tolerance policy for terroristic
pressures."' These arguments are sound, but in light of Congress' reaction to
153. Stanford, 492 U.S. at n.1.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 152, at 1106-1107 (discussing Brown v. Board of Education, 349
U.S. 294(1955)). See also PAUL BREST ETAL., PROCESS OFCONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING-CASES AND
MATERIALS 739-40 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing the role of Cold War international public opinion in the Brown
decision).
156. Wilson, supra note 152, at 1085 (discussing the treatment of scholarly work and legal
commentary in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)).
157. See supra notes 21, 22.
158. See Wilson, supra note 152, at 1085 (discussing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) and
quoting Justice Powell's dissent: "The assessment of popular opinion is essentially a legislative, not ajudicial,
function.").
159. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPT. OF STATE, TERRORIST THREATS AGAINST AMERICA,
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the September 2001 attacks, 160 the current political climate, and the Supreme
Court's history of deferring to Congress' national security legislation, the
Supreme Court might not care to publicly agree that any Congressional
legislation reflecting a national security concern is irrational. When Congress
invokes "national security" as its rational basis for federal legislation, the Court
may invoke standing, mootness, or ripeness concerns to justify abstention from
decision. 161 It may employ a "balancing test" that often balances in favor of the
asserted national security concern. 162 Or it may simply decline to examine the
issue at all; the Supreme Court exercises a "virtually unlimited judicial
deference to the government" in cases touching on national security. 63
2. Tenth Amendment State Sovereignty Argument
In 1920, the Supreme Court, in Missouri v. Holland,'64 set the tone for
Congressional control of state action touching on international relations. "Prior
to [Missouri v. Holland] . . . it was at least unclear whether the Tenth
Amendment restricted the national government's treaty power,"'165 but the
Supreme Court made the issue quite clear: the Tenth Amendment fell to federal
foreign affairs interests.
The treaty in Missouri v. Holland, made between the United States and
Britain, provided protection for migratory geese and "agreed that the two
(Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony to the Committee on
International Relations, Washington, D.C.) (Sept. 25, 2001); UNITED STATES DEPT. OF STATE, PRESIDENT
DISCUSSES WAR ON TERRORISM (President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, World Congress Center,
Atlanta, Georgia) (Nov. 8, 2001); United States Dept. of State Counterterrorism Office, Talking About
Terrorism, at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) (presenting the United States
Counterterrorism Policy as:
First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals; Second, bring terrorists to
justice for their crimes; Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor
terrorism to force them to change their behavior; and Fourth, bolster the
counterterrorism capabilities of those countries that work with the U.S. and require
assistance.
160. A representative sample of the 107th Congress post-attack Public Laws include the Public Safety
Officer Benefits Bill (H.R. 2882); the Victims of Terrorism Relief Act of 2001 (H.R. 2884); the 2001
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the
United States (H.R. 2888); the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (H.R. 2926); The "USA
PATRIOT' Act (H.R. 3162); the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (S. 1438); and the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (S. 1447). All these bills and public laws are available online from
the Library of Congress, Legislation Related to the Attack of September 11, at
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/terrorleg.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
161. Dorsen, supra note 135, at 147.
162. Id. at 146.
163. Id.
164. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
165. Swaine, supra note 7, at 340.
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powers would take or propose to their law-making bodies the necessary
measures for carrying the treaty out."'66 A Congressional Act recognizing the
treaty's terms authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate the
enabling regulations. 67 The State of Missouri lodged a Tenth Amendment
argument that its internal regulations governing migrating geese in Missouri
airspace should take precedence over the federal treaty. 68 The Court concluded
that, even though the federal treaty affected states' rights to govern actions on
state soil (or, in this case, state skies), states had no Tenth Amendment right to
gainsay federal treaty power when the treaty sought to further "a national
interest of very nearly the first magnitude."'
' 69
This power survives today: when Congress legislates pursuant to the
Necessary and Proper Clause to enforce the Executive's Article II power,
Congress can override state sovereignty even in areas traditionally committed
to states' domestic policymaking. 70 And perhaps that was exactly what the
Court in 1920 sought to achieve: "We might reasonably conclude ... that the
Court unwittingly created a nationalist monster. But the Court rendering
Holland might also (perhaps even simultaneously) be dismayed by the
blossoming of state-conducted international relations and their tension with
national authority ....
A state could assert its Tenth Amendment rights against the broad Missouri
v. Holland reasoning by arguing two rather esoteric points. First, a state could
claim that in light of the political climate at the time of that decision, 7 2 Missouri
v. Holland contemplates a structural "subject matter limitation" on
Congressional legislation, one that tracks the Executive's subject matter
limitation.' 73 Swaine argues that "the President's negotiating function..
warrants the dormant preemption of state activities approximating the
negotiation with foreign powers- but would not extend, for example, to state
conduct concerning foreign private parties, or applying equally to foreign and
domestic parties alike."' 17
4
If this is true, it logically follows that state conduct concerning domestic
private parties would also fall outside of Missouri v. Holland, and Tenth
166. Holland, 252 U.S. at 431.
167. Id. at431-32.
168. Id. at431-34.
169. Id. at 433-34, 435. See also Swaine, supra note 7, at 340 (discussing Missouri v. Holland's
expansion of federal treaty power beyond "purely international matters").
170. Bradley, supra note 9, at 444-45; Yoo, supra note 14, at 827.
171. Swaine, supra note 7, at 341.
172. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 9, at 458-61 (arguing that the Holland decision was made in a
different political context than that of modem-day foreign affairs).
173. Swaine, supra note 7, at 353; Bradley, supra note 9, at 451 ("Holland itself arguably assumed
that there was such a limitation on the treaty power.").
174. Swaine, supra note 7, at 353.
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Amendment protections would still apply to state decisions to enforce the
juvenile death penalty. "These [human rights] foreign relations issues are much
more closely tied to traditional state prerogatives than traditional foreign
relations issues, and decentralization of these matters often serves salutary
ends."'175 Unfortunately, this theory is not widely accepted.
176
Second, the state could seek to distinguish Missouri v. Holland by asserting
that geese are distinguishable from juvenile offenders. The Court in Holland
made much of the fact that the treaty in question was designed to preserve
geese, and if Missouri killed all the subject geese there would be little point in
having a treaty at all. 177 The Court also noted that the geese were "only
transitorily within [Missouri and had] no permanent habitat therein."' 78
Holland is a brief opinion, drafted with an elegant economy of word and
phrase. There is no reason to assume that these qualifying phrases are anything
less than deliberate loopholes that allow a state to argue the fundamental Tenth
Amendment principle "that a State's government will represent and remain
accountable to its own citizens."'' 79 Constituent states that legislate and enforce
the juvenile death penalty against their own citizens do not, by so doing,
undermine the entire human rights agenda of the ICCPR and other treaties. Nor
do the states seek to control with these criminal laws anything, or anyone, other
than people properly subject to state jurisdiction."' Therefore, the state can
argue, Holland's extension of Article II power simply was not meant to apply
to every provision of every treaty that Congress seeks to enforce.
3. Structural Federalism Argument
a. Supreme Court Precedent
Assuming arguendo that neither argument works and that the Tenth
Amendment lies crushed under the wheels of Missouri v. Holland, structural
federalism itself protects states' rights to flirt with international disapproval by
enforcing their own criminal laws.' 8' If Congress forbids such enforcement
175. Goldsmith, supra note 44, at 1714.
176. Bradley, supra note 9, at 451.
177. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
178. Id.
179. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1996).
180. The jurisdictional and prudential questions surrounding enforcement of these laws against a
citizens of foreign States who commit crimes in the United States are beyond the scope of this paper.
181. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 14, at 769-71 (rebutting the proposition that the Necessary and Proper
Clause leaves Congress largely unchecked in this area with the proposition that state sovereignty curbs the
constitutionality of legislation enacted pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause). Cf Swaine, supra note
7, at 344 ("[T]he availability of plenary national foreign affairs authority substantially rebuts any such claim,
since (so far as we know) it may be exercised without regard to limits on domestic authority.").
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pursuant to the ICCPR or another ratified human rights treaty, the state will find
itself arguing against the scope of plenary Executive power, because Congress
is acting under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enforce the Executive's
Article II prerogatives.
8 2
The state can argue that under a separation-of-powers doctrine (as
distinguished from the "subject matter limitation" proposed in the Tenth
Amendment analysis above), Congress may not use its Article II power to effect
against states an action that the Executive alone could not effect.'83 This is a
high hurdle to leap because of the Executive's broad foreign affairs power, but
there is some helpful case law for the state.
First, dicta in the "Pentagon Papers" case implies that the Supreme Court
finds some constitutional protections to be fundamental to "the very foundation
of constitutional government."'" The Court refused to enjoin newspapers from
publishing government documents, even over government arguments of national
security concerns: "The word 'security' is a broad, vague generality whose
contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in
the First Amendment."' 185 The state challenging a Congressional Act prohibiting
the death penalty can argue that even if Missouri v. Holland overrides the Tenth
Amendment, the Constitution's structure- i.e., the very fact that it provides for
state sovereignty and a check-and-balance system-is at least as "fundamental"
as the First Amendment. However, because the "Pentagon Papers" case is only
a plurality decision, and because at least one Justice believed that Congressional
legislation itself denied the Executive this injunctive power,186 a state might not
want to rely too heavily on this case when challenging a congressional Act.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube 187 gives a state better ammunition for its
argument. There, the Supreme Court considered, and rejected as
unconstitutional, an Executive Order that sought to nationalize steel mills in the
interest of preventing a labor strike and ensuring a source of steel supply for the
war effort. 88 The state can cite Youngstown's holding that "[i]n the framework
of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."' 189 The state can argue
182. Holland, 252 U.S. at 431.
183. See Wilson, supra note 152, at 1114 (discussing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952)). See also Yoo, supra note 14, at 839-840 (discussing the Framers' textual decision to
enumerate certain powers in Article I and others in Article II, with the effect of restricting most lawmaking
functions to Congress rather than the Executive, even when the Executive acts pursuant to plenary power).
184. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (quoting
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365).
185. Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
186. See id. at 744 (Marshall, J., concurring).
187. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
188. Id. at 582-83.
189. Id. at 587. ,
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that an Executive treaty that binds the federal government to promulgate certain
federal laws and influence state laws- as does the ACHR, with its "Federal
States" section- represents a lawmaking function, and one beyond Presidential
power. If the Executive exceeded Article II power in signing the treaty,
Congress's enabling legislation for that same treaty is neither necessary nor
proper.' 90
Finally, a state can argue a compelling prudential consideration in favor of
a structural federalism check: even if neither the Constitution nor precedent
outright prohibits Congress from passing a national juvenile death penalty
prohibition, the Supreme Court's blessing on such an Act would open the door
to a cascade of nationalist powers neither intended nor desired by the Framers.
Lopez recognizes this possibility and firmly decides against such an expansion
of federal power.' Jones, while its language is not as compelling as that of
Lopez,192 cements Lopez in Supreme Court jurisprudence by following its
general anti-nationalist tone.
b. History of Congressional Deference
Although Congressional goodwill is not legally binding, a state can argue
that Congress' history of deference to states' rights in the context of human
rights treaties evinces a general belief among the political branches that the
Constitution protects a state's right to enforce its own criminal laws. '9'
"Political branches ...often choose to protect state interests over foreign
relations interests when the two appear to clash ... a variety of international
human rights treaties.., create numerous potential conflicts with state law."' 194
190. Congress could, however, authorize the President to sign such a treaty as part of the
Congressional lawmaking function. See id at 585.
191. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.
Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road ... but we
decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us to conclude ... that
there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local
.... This we are unwilling to do.
(internal citations omitted).
192. Jones, 529 U.S. at 857-58 (following Lopez in its unwillingness to construe a Federal statute to
criminalize state activity on basis of the Commerce power, but implying that if Congress had clearly spoken
the result might be different).
193. See Yoo, supra note 14, at 807-08 ("Some human rights agreements have languished in the
Senate for up to 30 years .... Senate leaders opposed several of these treaties because of the concern that
they require more expansive individual rights than those in the Constitution.").
194. Goldsmith, supra note 44, at 1675. See also Bradley, supra note 9, at 444 (discussing
deference).
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When the Senate ratifies treaties that affect domestic law, it usually attaches to
the ratification a set of "reservations, understandings, and declarations ... that
limit the treaties' effect on domestic law."' 95 Some human rights treaties invite
legislative "overlap and conflict ...at the state level."'96 The ICCPR in
particular triggers Congressional concern because its provisions seek to override
state law. 197 The ACHR and CRC, as discussed above, threaten to do the same
if ratified. When the United States established its reservation to the ICCPR, it
clarified that part of its reason for doing so was to retain "the constitutional
balance of authority between State and Federal governments." '198 Although
certainly the Senate can decide to ratify those treaties, the state can assert (albeit
a bit hyperbolically) that rejecting this deference to states' rights- a move that
fundamentally calls into question the United States' three-pronged
governmental system as a whole- might harm the United States' international
image even more than would the irritating practice of executing juvenile
offenders.
VI. CONCLUSION
If Congress adopts the international majority's standard against executing
juvenile offenders, internalizes that standard with an Act that enables a treaty
or stands alone under Congressional foreign commerce power, and supports its
decision with a congressional record that shows a rational basis for the Act a
state will have a hard time challenging such action on any clearly-established
legal or constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court, considering such a
challenge, can choose to follow one of two paths. It can find that that the United
States federalist model must shift to accommodate the United States' greater
role as a global citizen-State. Under that rubric, the Supreme Court could easily
decide that Congress' reach in pursuit of that goal extends to tinkering with
states' criminal laws.
Conversely, the Court can support the state legislation in favor of a greater
concern for states' interest in promulgating their own criminal laws. Although
the Constitution does commit most federal affairs to the nationalist agenda,
"[plerhaps states need to be recognized as not just the objects of customary
international law, but also as its subjects, and acknowledged as potential
contributors to its norms."' 99 And while "[s]tate initiatives to protect human
195. Bradley, supra note 9, at 428 (1998). See also Goldsmith, supra note 44, at 1675 (making the
same point).
196. Bradley, supra note 9, at 397 (1998). See also Dorsen, supra note 135, at 152-53 (discussing
the overlap in the context of individual civil rights).
197. See Goldsmith, supra note 44, at n.235.
198. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 102-23, at 18-19 (1992)).
199. Swaine, supra note 7, at 354.
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rights in places like South Africa and Burma are striking in part because they
seem unlikely,"2" that is no reason to exclude states-qua-states from the arena
of international human rights initiatives. Perhaps U.S. constituent states are
willing to become active and educated participants in the international juvenile
death penalty debate. If so, a Supreme Court decision approving a
Congressional fiat that not only extinguishes states' laws but also excludes
states from further participation in the internalization process is both
unnecessarily patriarchal and a dangerous precedent.
200. Id. at 343.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The feeling of security is something that everyone covets and pursues,
more so, when you are in the position of a plaintiff initiating a lawsuit. You
would Want to have some reason to believe that there will be money awarded
to you in the event that you are successful in the litigation. This expectation can
become a mere fantasy and an absolute nightmare when you encounter a
defendant who is certain to remove all of his assets out of the country in order
to avoid the court's judgment, which in turn leaves you, the plaintiff, with
absolutely nothing to collect. While there are some safeguards available to a
plaintiff in these situations, the purpose of this paper is to show that the
American legal system falls short of fully protecting plaintiffs in these matters.
Moreover, it also examines the alternative available to the American legal
system, the Mareva injunction.
The American legal system offers a few choices to a plaintiff who seeks
protection from a defendant removing his assets before or during trial. Let us
first take a look at these choices to understand them and to allow us to compare
* J.D. Candidate, May 2004, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, B.A.
Florida International University, 2000.
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them to the Mareva injunction, in order to point out their shortcomings and
inadequacies and show how they fail to give the plaintiff the complete
protection and security that the Mareva injunction provides.
I. THE PRE-JUDGMENT ATTACHMENT
The pre-judgment attachment is issued by a court when a plaintiff shows
that not only are his claims valid, but that there is also a likelihood that the
defendant will remove or dissipate his assets or property from the jurisdiction.'
The order would allow a sheriff to physically seize the defendant's tangible
property located within the jurisdiction, and it would also create a security lien
on the defendant's assets that the order is targeting.2 Nevertheless, the problem
with the pre-judgment attachment arises when we look at the plaintiffs
particular claim.' Since the pre-judgment attachment is controlled by state
statute, it is limited to only certain claims listed by the statute.4 However, the
most important factor that makes this choice unappealing to a plaintiff, is the
fact that it requires the court to have in rem jurisdiction over the property.5 In
rem jurisdiction is an action against property within the jurisdiction, not against
any person in particular.6 So if the defendant has assets anywhere outside of the
court's jurisdiction, the court would be unable to seize them, and a defendant
that acts swiftly may transfer his assets held within the jurisdiction. The latter
point is crucial in the analysis of this paper, since it is concerned with the
freezing of assets located overseas, and the pre-judgment attachment would
automatically be ruled out as a remedy because of its jurisdictional limitations.
Many commentators also argue that the pre-judgment attachment is
intrusive because it has the effect of creating a security lien in the defendant's
assets and it encumbers titles.8 These additional liabilities that it imposes upon
the defendant, can force him into bankruptcy, thus leaving him with nothing to
satisfy the plaintiff's judgment. 9
1. Lars E. Johansson, Comment, The Mareva Injunction: A Remedy in the Pursuit of the Errant
Defendant, 31 U.C. DAVis. L. REV. 1091, 1098 (1998).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Mary A. Nation, Granting a Preliminary Injunction Freezing Assets Not Part of the Pending
Litigation: Abuse of Discretion oran Important Advance in Creditors' Rights?, 7 TUL. J. INT'L. COMP. L 367,
369 (1999) (discussing that the attachment is not available to a plaintiff seeking monetary damages).
5. Johansson, supra note 1, at 1099.
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (7th ed. 1999).
7. Johansson, supra note 1, at 1096.
8. Id. at 1098.
9. Id. at 1102.
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If we look at the amount of people and businesses that have their assets in
located overseas, the chances that plaintiffs involved in litigation in the
international arena will encounter such problems and face the reality of a pre-
judgment attachment's ineffectiveness in those matters are significant.
Consequently, it becomes clear after looking at the pre-judgment attachment's
features, that from an international law standpoint, it is completely ineffective
because a court will never be able to have control or power over any asset that
is found outside of the country.
ImI. THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Another form of protection that the American legal system makes available
to a plaintiff is the preliminary injunction, which is issued before the trial begins
in order to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff while the court considers
whether to grant permanent relief.'l Its purpose is to preserve the status quo
between the parties pending a final determination on the merits." However, it
is only granted after the defendant has been given notice and an opportunity to
participate in a hearing on the issue. 2 Moreover, the preliminary injunction is
only available if the plaintiff is seeking equitable relief. 1' Some authorities
argue that if the plaintiff seeks "legal" relief, then only a preliminary attachment
can be used, and that a court granting a preliminary injunction under those
circumstances when the assets being frozen are not part of the pending
litigation, is abusing its discretion. "4 Nevertheless, the majority leans towards
granting a preliminary injunction regardless of the type of relief sought by the
plaintiff, as long as the plaintiff can show he will suffer irreparable injury or that
failure to grant it would make the defendant judgment proof."
Some courts have granted preliminary injunctions even though the remedy
sought was legal, but it was granted because if not, any other available equitable
remedies would have been extinguished.16
In the case of De Beers Consol. Mines v. U.S., 325 U.S. 212 (1945), the
United States sued a corporation that produced gems and industrial diamonds
and exported them to the United States. 7 The United States claimed that the
defendant conspired to monopolize United States commerce with foreign
10. MARC ROHR, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE, 26 (2002).
11. Samuel K. Alexander, Irl, Book Review, 39 VA. J. INT'L. 503,526 (1999) (reviewing DR. MARK
S.W. HOYLE, THE MAREVA INJUNCTION AND RELATED ORDERS (1997)).
12. Id. at 525.
13. Johansson, supra note 1, at 1098.
14. Nation, supra note 4, at 371.
15. Id. at 369.
16. Id. at 382 (discussing that the preliminary injunction was justified because removal of the assets
by the defendant would have made any other remedy inadequate to the plaintiff).
17. Id. at 373.
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nations, and the United States tried to prevent further monopolization by the
defendant by obtaining a preliminary injunction freezing their assets and
property in the United States.'8 The Court reversed the granting of the
injunction because it would create a "sweeping effect" where every plaintiff
going to the court for any type of relief, would be able to impose an injunction
on the defendant by merely stating that the defendant might transfer his goods.' 9
The court in reversing the injunction, reasoned that the injunction requested
dealt with a matter wholly outside of the issues in the lawsuit, and that it
involved property which in no circumstances could be dealt with in any final
injunction that could be entered.2°
In In Re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (1994), the families of
torture victims sued Ferdinand Marcos and his estate, and applied for an
injunction against it.2' The purpose of the injunction was to prevent the
defendant from encumbering real property that was located in New York, which
had been allegedly purchased with funds illegally taken from the Philippines.2
When the case finished, the plaintiff sought a continuance of an injunction in
another suit against the Marcoses in California, which was granted.23 However,
since the plaintiff only sought monetary damages, the defendant claimed that the
court had abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction.24 The
purpose of the injunction in this case was to personally prevent them from
transferring assets wherever they might have been located, including assets in
banks in other countries. 25 The court said that it could issue the injunction in
order to prevent a defendant from dissipating assets, in order to preserve the
possibility of equitable remedies that could have arisen later in the
proceedings.26 Thus, in this case, the court said that the district courts had the
authority to issue preliminary injunctions where the plaintiff could show that
monetary damages would be inadequate due to "impending insolvency of the
defendant or that the defendant [had] engaged in a pattern ... of dissipating
assets to avoid judgment. '' 27  The court mentioned the De Beers case in
reasoning that only allowing preliminary injunctions in extraordinary cases
18. See generally 325 U.S. 212 (1945).
19. Nation, supra note 4, at 383 (explaining that granting the injunction under those circumstances
would be completely unjustified by the long history of equity jurisprudence).
20. DeBeers, 325 U.S. at 212.





26. Nation, supra note 4, at 382 (explaining that the asset freeze was a provisional remedy to giving
final relief).
27. Id. at 383.
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where equitable relief is not sought, the "sweeping effect" of concern in the
DeBeers case, could be avoided.28
So we have seen that the United States courts may grant preliminary
injunctions outside of suits asking for equitable relief, and we saw its denial
where the funds sought to be frozen, had nothing to do with the final relief or
decree sought. On the other hand, this shows a rather inconsistent if not
unpredictable argument and trend between the different courts of the American
legal system. It seems unlikely that a plaintiff could rely on a strong precedent
for expecting the preliminary injunction to serve as protection in freezing a
defendant's assets.
In the case of Grupo Mexicano de Desarollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund,
Inc., 527 U.S. 308, (1999), the plaintiff, an investment company, bought $75
million in unsecured notes from a Mexican company, who along with four other
subsidiaries named as defendants in the suit, guaranteed the notes.29 The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant was insolvent and claimed that it was giving
its Mexican creditors preference on the notes, which frustrated any judgment the
plaintiff could obtain in the United States.3° The plaintiff sued for the amount
of the notes and to obtain a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendant from
removing its assets. 3' The Court held that granting the preliminary injunction
to freeze the defendant's assets was beyond the district court's equitable
authority, and since the plaintiff sought a legal remedy based on a breach of
contract and not an equitable remedy based on an existing statute, the
preliminary injunction was inappropriate.32 Furthermore, the Court held that a
United States district court could only award a preliminary injunction if it
provides a remedy that would have been available from the English Court of
Chancery at the time the United States Constitution was adopted in 1787.33
To complicate matters further, the injunction requires that the plaintiff meet
several requirements, such as showing that they will suffer irreparable injury if
the injunction is not issued, which is a requirement that is normally not satisfied
and leads to a denial of the granting of the injunction.
These two remedies, while providing some protection to a plaintiff, do not
give enough coverage and foster more uncertainty than assurance, because the
preliminary injunction will be denied if it targets a legal remedy, and the pre-
judgment attachment will not be granted if the plaintiffs claim falls outside of
28. Id.




33. Id (arguing that the English Court of Chancery is the foundation of the American legal system).
34. Johansson, supra note 1, at 1100.
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the statute's scope.35 The Mareva injunction applies to claims that these two
remedies cannot.
36
Our constitution requires that notice and a hearing be given before our
property or assets may be seized by way of these procedures.37 Yet it is quite
disturbing to think that the notice given in order to comply with due process, is
what would allow a defendant to remove his assets from the jurisdiction of the
court.
IV. THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO)
There is perhaps one choice available to a plaintiff that can solve the
problem of having to give notice to the defendant that his assets are being
seized, which has the effect of giving him time and a warning that he should
remove them if he wants to make himself judgment proof.38 Rule 65 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes United States district courts to issue
a temporary restraining order to freeze assets when there is a threat of
dissipation of assets. 39 The importance of the TRO for the purposes of this
paper, is that it is sometimes granted to a plaintiff without giving notice to the
defendant.4" A TRO is issued on an ex parte basis, as is the Mareva injunction,
and it will be issued without written or oral notice to the adverse party only if:
immediate and irreparable harm is likely to result, and the attorney certifies the
efforts made to give notice or reasons supporting why notice should not be
required.4' However, the courts make every effort to give notice to the
defendant, and they also require that the plaintiff show that he will suffer
irreparable injury if the order is not issued, a requirement that is not commonly
met, as well as requiring a hearing on the issue, at which time the TRO's effect
ends. 42
It seems as if the TRO, which can be seen as the harshest and most extreme
order that can be issued against a defendant, defeats its own purpose, because
in most cases it exhausts all possible avenues in order to give notice to the
defendant, thus eliminating the element of surprise that one would hope and
imagine it was designed to accomplish. Moreover, when we look at the fact that
the plaintiff has to meet several strict requirements in order to receive the grant,
the TRO seems to be an unattainable remedy. As we will see later in this paper,
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Alexander, II, supra note 11, at 525.
38. Id. at 526.
39. Id.
40. ROHR, supra note 10, at 26.
41. Id.
42. Alexander, I, supra note 11, at 526 (explaining that a hearing is required after the TRO is
issued to determine if it should remain in effect).
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the TRO has some similarities with the Mareva injunction, but we will find that
the Mareva Injunction has a much more potent and restrictive effect on a
deceitful defendant.
.V. THE MAREVA INJUNCTION DEFINED
The Mareva Injunction is an interlocutory order generally obtained in an
ex parte hearing before a lawsuit is filed, but it may be obtained at any stage of
the proceedings and in aid of execution.43 It has been referred to by many
commentators as a creditor's legal "nuclear weapon." 44 The term ex parte
meanswithout notice to or argument from the adverse party or anyone adversely
affected.45 The reason why an ex parte application is made, is that the order
would be ineffective if the defendant knew about its existence and disposed of
his assets before the injunction could be granted. 6 This is important in the
analysis because the element of surprise and lack of notice to a dishonest
defendant, is what this paper attempts to highlight in the application of the
Mareva injunction. It restrains a defendant from disposing of his assets where
there is a real risk or danger that he may dispose of them to frustrate any
judgment that the court might award.47 So foreign defendants will not have a
chance to remove or dissipate their assets from the jurisdiction in an attempt to
avoid a judgment from the court.48 Likewise, if a foreign debtor has assets in
the United States that it is seeking to remove for the benefit of creditors in its
home country, the Mareva injunction is an invaluable weapon to prevent this
from happening.
A. Origin
In 1975, in the case of Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis, 1 W.L.R.
1093 (Eng. C.A. 1975), the English Court of Appeals reversed a High Court
judge's ruling that denied the plaintiffs application for an emergency
injunction, thus giving rise to the first grant of an injunction with the aim of
preventing a defendant from disposing of his property in lieu of a judgment in
43. David L. Zicherman, The Use of Pre-Judgment Attachments and Temporary Injunctions in
International Commercial Arbitration Proceedings: A Comparison Analysis of the British and American
Approaches, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 667, 668-669 (1989).
44. Nation, supra note 4, at 399.
45. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 597.
46. Nation, supra note 4, at 400.
47. Id. at 397.
48. Alexander, Im, supra note 11, at 505.
49. Ronald L. Cohen, Second Circuit Allows U.S. Creditors To Freeze Foreign Assets, I I INT'L.
SEC. REG. REP. 14 (1998).
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favor of the plaintiff.5" The plaintiffs in Nippon were ship owners who had
issued a writ against defendants, Greek charterers, who failed to pay a certain
amount for the use of the plaintiff's ship.5' At a later point in the proceedings,
when the plaintiffs feared that the defendants would remove their assets out of
the jurisdiction, they applied ex parte for an injunction to restrain the defendant
from transferring assets outside of the English jurisdiction, and even though the
defendant lacked an effective defense and the plaintiff had clearly shown that
the money was owed to him, the absence of case law supporting the request of
the injunction resulted in the denial of their application.52 Nevertheless, the
plaintiffs appealed and were successful when the judge, Lord Denning, held that
the High Court could grant an injunction by an interlocutory order in every case
where it appeared to be convenient and just, and that if the court failed to grant
the injunction in this case, the money owed to the plaintiffs would be transferred
out of the jurisdiction and they would encounter difficulty in retrieving any
payment whatsoever. 3 Even though the Nippon case is not the case considered
to be the origin of the Mareva Injunction, it certainly signaled the change in
practice of the English Courts in granting an emergency injunction to prevent
a defendant from dissipating his assets in view of a judgment for the plaintiff.54
The case that gives the Mareva injunction its name, Mareva Compania
Naviera S.A. v. Int'l Bulkcarriers S.A., 1975 L. Lloyd's Rep. 509 (Eng. C.A.).,
dealt with plaintiffs who had chartered their ship, the Mareva, to the defendants,
who in turn had contracted with the Indian government to deliver phosphate to
India.5 After delivery of the phosphate, the Indian government deposited its
payment to the defendant for the phosphate in a London account, but the
defendant defaulted on its last payment for the ship to the plaintiffs, and claimed
that it did not have the money to satisfy the debt. 6 The plaintiff made an ex
parte application on June 20, 1975 to freeze the account because they feared
removal of the $30,800 owed to them, and Lord Denning, again applying the
reasoning from the Nippon case and using the Supreme Court of Judicature
(Consolidated) Act 1925, granted the injunction.57
As we can see from the dates of the aforementioned decisions, the change
in English law in terms of granting the injunctions, has been a relatively recent
phenomena. 58  The two cases can be seen as the triggers for the change,




54. Alexander, In, supra note 11, at 508.
55. See generally 1975 Lloyd's Rep. 509 (Eng. C.A.).
56. Id.
57. Scope of Mareva Injunction, MAR. NEWSL. (Guardian Law Reports.), Jan. 2000, at 1.
58. James R. Theuer, Pre-Judgment Restraint ofAssets for Claims of Damages: Should the United
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although the latter is the one widely recognized as the origin of the Mareva
Injunction. 9
B. Scope of the Mareva Injunction
A Mareva Injunction may be granted against a defendant or a third party
that is holding assets for the defendant.6' The subject of a Mareva injunction is
any asset in legal or beneficial ownership of the defendant, which is potentially
available to an anticipated judgment award.6' Perhaps a feature of this
injunction that makes it even more attractive and favorable than the available
United States remedies, is the fact that it can attach to assets either tangible or
intangible, personal or realty.62 This factor weighs heavily on the Mareva
Injunction's utility and scope when we compare it to the shortcomings and
limitations of the pre-judgment attachment and preliminary injunction.
Moreover, when we consider Lord Denning's reasoning and the Mareva
injunction's broad attachment power, it is safe to say that as long as the basis for
granting the injunction is reasonable, it will be granted and applied to all types
of property regardless of the cause of action or debt owed to the plaintiff.63 We
can easily contrast this approach with that of the TRO, which seems to impose
more of a barrier on the plaintiff than an available solution.
In terms of jurisdiction, the Mareva injunction will bind a defendant even
if he is not domiciled or present within the jurisdiction, and it will specify which
assets belonging to the defendant it will cover, and it will only be valid against
those assets which are specified.64 Its jurisdiction extends to debts and
commercial transactions, as well as to any action for damages for breach of
contract or tort.65
If a plaintiff s claim is for a small sum, the injunction may be limited to
that specific amount, but if the claim is significant, the plaintiff will normally
make an application to freeze all of the defendant's assets.66 However, a
defendant will not be deprived of living expenses, so courts will normally allow
the defendant to decrease the assets below the amount indicated by the
injunction if he needs money for those basic expenses.67 It is also not
States Follow England's Lead?, 25 N.C. J. INT'L. & CoM. REG. 419, 422 (2000).
59. Id. at 425.
60. Zicherman, supra note 43, at 675.
61. Scope of Mareva Injunction, supra note 57, at 2.
62. Alexander, III, supra note 11, at 513.
63. Id. at 507.
64. Zicherman, supra note 43, at 674.
65. Scope of Mareva Injunction, supra note 57, at 2.
66. Mareva Injunctions- Uses and Abuses, NEWSL. (Myers, Fletcher & Gordon, Kingston, Jam.),
Dec. 1998, at 2.
67. Zicherman, supra note 43, at 676.
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uncommon for the defendant himself to apply to the court so that the injunction
will allow him to meet ordinary living and business expenses, but this will only
be allowed if he has disclosed all of his assets.68
The Mareva injunction's scope is far greater than that of an ordinary
injunction, but it will only be granted if there is evidence showing that the
defendant possesses assets within the court's jurisdiction, or that there is a
likelihood of their removal.69
It applies on an in rem basis, but it is an in personam order, and it takes
effect from the moment it is pronounced on every asset of the defendant in
relation to which it is granted.70 The fact that it applies in rem in some
circumstances, presents complications when it requires the court to have
jurisdiction over foreign assets.7' Nevertheless, there are disclosure orders
which require a defendant to reveal all of his assets within or outside of the
court's jurisdiction, and they allow the plaintiff to attach assets located in
foreign jurisdictions as well to seek enforcement of the judgment.72 So this is
yet another key factor in favor of the Mareva injunction, because as was
mentioned earlier, the prejudgment attachment used in the American legal
system requires in rem jurisdiction, so a foreign defendant's assets would be
untouchable.73
The Mareva injunction does not directly affect third parties, except to the
extent that they are not allowed to "aid and abet a breach of its orders."74 For
example, a bank that is holding a defendant's assets that are the target of the
injunction, is not permitted to transfer the defendant's funds or use any of the
assets to make payments that would violate the injunction. 75 A third party could
face contempt charges without even being aware that an injunction is in effect.76
Every person who has knowledge or notice of the injunction is obliged to do
whatever he reasonably can to preserve the assets affected by its terms.77 So we
see that not only is the need to give notice to the defendant bypassed, but it
would also affect others without giving them any type of notice either. I believe
that this factor serves as a perfect example of the power and value that the
Mareva injunction possesses.
68. Mareva Injunctions- Uses and Abuses, supra note 66, at 2.
69. Scope ofMareva Injunction, supra note 57, at 2.
70. Id.
71. Johansson, supra note 1, at 1096.
72. Id.
73. Nation, supra note 4, at 399.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 400.
77. Scope of Mareva Injunction, supra note 57, at 2.
Fabano
The Mareva injunction can also be issued against a trustee, ordering him
to freeze all of the assets and compelling him to provide access to his files to the
plaintiff, in order to allow him to modify his complaint if necessary.78 However,
a plaintiff will almost always apply for an order that would require a defendant
to file an affidavit disclosing his assets within a specified time, because many
times the plaintiff will not know the amount or nature of the assets held by the
defendant.7 9 If the trustee transfers the assets out of the jurisdiction himself, he
faces contempt of court charges and can be charged for fraudulent transfer.80 In
addition, the grant can affect assets that are located within the court's
jurisdiction, or they can apply to assets on a worldwide basis.8'
Many countries use the Mareva injunction, and the trend is toward giving
it more recognition and use as a tool to protect plaintiffs from insolvent or
untrustworthy defendants.82 Mareva injunctions have been granted in Australia,
New South Wales, Western Australia, the Australian Capital Territories, New
Zealand, the Canadian Federal court, the Provincial courts of Ontario, British
Columbia, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong
Kong.83 It can also be granted in a jurisdiction that is a party to the Brussels or
Lugano conventions, which relate to jurisdiction and judgments.84 These
conventions recognize the use of the Mareva throughout the European Union.85
C. Limits
The Mareva injunction, although wide and sometimes unlimited in scope,
does not give the plaintiff a security interest in the defendant's frozen assets
prior to a final judgment from the court.86 It only serves to freeze the assets
until a judgment is reached later in time. 87  As was mentioned earlier, if a
plaintiff's claim is relatively small, the injunction will only freeze as much of
the defendant's assets as is necessary to satisfy the plaintiffs claim.88 This can
78. F. Bentley Mooney Jr., The Mareva Injunction, 13 FBM REP. 4 (2000).
79. Mareva Injunctions- Uses and Abuses, supra note 66, at 2.
80. Mooney Jr., supra note 78, at 1.
81. Mareva Injunctions- Uses and Abuses, supra note 66, at 1.
82. See The Long Arm of the Law: International Fraud and Worldwide Mareva Injunctions, FRAUD.
L. UPDATE (ACFI, Can.), Dec. 2001, at 3 (discussing how the increase in international business transactions
calls for extended use of the Mareva Injunction).
83. Zicherman, supra note 43, at 676.
84. Alexander, Ill, supra note 11, at 528.
85. Id.
86. Zicherman, supra note 43, at 669.
87. Eric S. Rein, International Fraud: Freeze, Seize, and Retrieve, 116 BANKING L.J. 144, 147
(1999).
88. Mareva Injunctions- Uses and Abuses, supra note 66, at 2.
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be seen not only as a limit on the plaintiff and of the injunction's scope, but also
as a measure of protection for the defendant.
89
Another limit imposed on a plaintiff seeking a Mareva injunction, is that
if the defendant that he is targeting is either bankrupt or insolvent, he will rank
in order of priority with all of the other defendant's creditors; he will not get
preference in receiving the defendant's assets. 90 Furthermore, another one of the
limits of the Mareva injunction, which can also be viewed as both a hurdle for
the plaintiff and a safeguard for the defendant, is the burden of proof
requirement imposed on the plaintiff.9' The plaintiff must show a "good
arguable case", and the factors required of him to meet the burden of proof are
conjunctive, thus if he fails to meet just one, the injunction should not be
granted.92 The plaintiff must fully disclose all matters of which he has
knowledge that are material for the judge to know, as well as the grounds for his
claim, the amount, and any other particulars regarding his claim against the
defendant. 93 In addition, the plaintiff should give his reasons for believing that
there is a risk of the assets being removed before a final judgment, and his
grounds for believing that the defendant has assets within the jurisdiction. 94
There are several factors used by the courts to determine if there is a risk of
removal of assets.95 Real risk is present and immediate when the defendant has
in the past, removed assets out of the jurisdiction, when the defendant is a
foreign business and can easily become judgment proof, and when the
defendant's past business dealings show dishonesty.96 Finally, the plaintiff must
pay a sum of money that works as a bond or security interest in case the
injunction is erroneously granted. 97 These requirements differ from those of the
TRO because they are only asking the plaintiff to give some reasons for why the
injunction should be granted, he is not being asked to show irreparable injury
and to try everything in his power to give notice to the defendant.
Nevertheless, even if the plaintiff has met the burden of proof, there is yet
another limit on the injunction's effectiveness that arises after it has been
granted, this is the injunction's duration.98 The duration of the Mareva
injunction is normally between five days to a week, and if the plaintiff wishes
89. Id.
90. Nation, supra note 4, at 399.
91. Zicherman, supra note 43, at 673.
92. Id. at 673-74.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Johansson, supra note 1, at 1105.
96. Id.
97. Zicherman, supra note 43, at 673.
98. Id. at 675.
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to extend it beyond the expiration date, he must give notice to the defendant of
his intention to apply for an extension of the injunction.99
D. Procedure
The procedural requirements that a plaintiff must meet in order to apply for
a Mareva injunction, include all of the requirements previously mentioned to
meet the burden of proof, as well as a statement of the plaintiff's claim, an
affidavit in support of his claim, and copies of the draft of the order that the
plaintiff is requesting the court to issue.'" The draft of the order includes the
terms or parts of the injunction that the plaintiff is applying for, and it is
delivered to the court before the hearing.'' Oral arguments then take place
based on the documents that were submitted, and the order will be given and
become immediately operative upon the judge's approval of the application.'
In terms of the legal fees that accompany a Mareva injunction, the party that
receives the order for the injunction may recover legal fees and costs by filing
a motion with the court with an attached affidavit of attorneys' fees and cost. 1
03
E. The Worldwide Mareva Injunction
The origin, scope, and development of the Worldwide Mareva injunction
differ from the injunction that only affects assets within the jurisdiction."°4
When we consider the amount of business that is conducted today in the
international arena, and we take into account how many illegal and corrupt
maneuvers accompany those transactions, it would be absurd not to think of
extending an asset freeze or Mareva injunction to a defendant's assets that are
located in another country. When a court issues a worldwide Mareva
injunction, it is not attempting to exercise jurisdiction in foreign territories,
instead it is directing the defendant that is subject to its jurisdiction, not to
dissipate or transfer his assets wherever they are situated.' °5 The order will bind
him whether his acts or omissions take place within the jurisdiction or abroad.'0 6
It was not until the late 1980's that England began to issue Worldwide Mareva
injunctions.0 7 The Worldwide Mareva was established in the case of Babanaft
Int'L Co S.A. v. Bassatne, 1990 Ch. 13 (Eng. C.A.), where the court authorized
99. Id.
100. Alexander, m, supra note 11, at 509.
101. Id. at 510.
102. Id.
103.. Id. at 512.
104. Mareva Injunctions- Uses and Abuses, supra note 66, at 1.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Mooney Jr., supra note 78, at 1.
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the granting of an order against the defendant otherwise within its jurisdiction,
relating to assets that he held overseas.' °8 The issue in that case was whether a
Mareva injunction could be granted to freeze a defendant's foreign assets so that
"notice can be given by the plaintiffs to all and sundry abroad."'0 9
When foreign assets are involved in the matter, the court will apply a
proviso to the 6rder, known as the Babanaft proviso. "° This proviso states that
nobody in the foreign jurisdiction will be affected by the order of the injunction
until it is declared enforceable by a foreign court, at which point it will only be
enforceable to the extent that that they are: a person addressed by the order or,
persons subject to the court's jurisdiction who have received notice of the order
within the jurisdiction and are able to prevent acts outside the jurisdiction that
would assist in a breach of the order."' So a plaintiff that wants a Worldwide
Mareva injunction to be issued by the court, must make a further application in
the foreign jurisdiction where he believes the defendant's assets are located." 12
The requirements that a plaintiff needs to meet for the Worldwide Mareva
injunction are similar to those needed for the basic Mareva injunction.' The
plaintiff must show a good arguable case on the merits, that there are
insufficient assets in England to meet his judgment, that the defendant has
foreign assets, and that there is a real risk of disposal of the assets that would
frustrate enforcement of the plaintiff s judgment if one were to be obtained.'
It appears that a Worldwide Mareva injunction will only be appropriate where
large sums are involved and there is evidence that the defendants are used to
moving assets around the world through sophisticated means so that
enforcement of the judgment would cause great difficulty to the plaintiff.'
In the case of Republic ofHaiti v. Duvalier, 1990 Q.B. 202 (Eng. C.A.), the
Court upheld the granting of a worldwide Mareva injunction against Jean-
Claude Duvalier, his wife, and his mother, that prevented them from transferring
their assets, wherever they were located, which represented funds allegedly
embezzled from the Republic of Haiti."6 The Haitian government filed suit in
France and then sought a restraining order in England, and even though the
Duvaliers did not reside in England, the court said that there was jurisdiction to
108. Alexander, IIH, supra note 11, at 520.
109. Babanaflnt'l Co. S.A. v. Bassatne, 1990 Ch. 13 (Eng. C.A.).
110. Alexander, IU, supra note 11, at 520.
111. Id. at 521.
112. Id. at 522.
113. The Long of Arm of the Law: International Fraud and Worldwide Mareva Injunctions, supra
note 82, at 2.
114. Alexander, III, supra note 11, at 522.
115. Id. at 523.
116. See generally 1990 Q.B. 202 (Eng. C.A.).
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grant the Mareva injunction pending trial, over assets worldwide." 7 The court
came to this conclusion because it said that the determining factor was the
"plain and admitted intention of the defendants to move their assets out of the
reach of courts of law and the vast amounts of money involved," and the
resources and skill that they showed in doing so." 8
A case where the United States pursued and resorted to the use of a Mareva
injunction, was the case of FTC v. On Line Communications."9 This was a
landmark case where the United States for the first time, obtained an asset freeze
issued by a foreign court and was successful in returning those frozen assets to
United States telemarketing fraud victims.' The FTC filed suit against On
Line Communications and their hidden principal, but after learning that the
principal had transferred assets to the Bahamas, it requested that the Department
of Justice's. Office of Foreign Litigation bring an action in the Bahamian court
for the purpose of freezing the assets and returning them to the United States.'2
The Bahamian court issued a Mareva injunction that froze the principal's assets
pending inclusion of the Bahamas proceeding.'22
However, even though the United States was successful in protecting those
assets, it had to initiate suit in the Bahamas by way of its foreign litigation
office, and the Bahamian court was the one that issued the Mareva injunction.'23
Had the United States adopted the Mareva injunction as a remedy available in
its own courts, it could have been operational earlier, and they would have
resolved the problem in a more time-efficient manner. The FTC could have
applied for a Mareva in the United States when it made its initial complaint, and
then all it would have had to do to have it enforced in the Bahamian court was
to make a further application to that court. Even though the freeze was
successful, it required extra steps that would not have been necessary had the
United States already possessed the Mareva as a possible remedy in the first
place.
If the Mareva injunction's utility is valuable to a plaintiff when he is
pursuing a defendant with assets located inside the court's jurisdiction, then it
only multiplies when its reach is extended on a global basis when the
defendant's assets are located in another country. Imagine someone initiating
a lawsuit in the United States, against a company or individual who has enough
money to satisfy a judgment against him, but his money is not only likely to be
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See generally Bahamas Freezes, Confiscates and Returns Assets to Fraud Victims, 13 INT'L
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transferred so as to render it untouchable by the court, but it is located outside
of the United States. Next, consider what the United States remedies could
accomplish for the plaintiff. As we saw earlier, the pre-judgment attachment's
requirement of in rem jurisdiction, does not allow it to have power over the
money. Furthermore, the preliminary injunction would be useless because the
plaintiff is looking for monetary relief, which renders the preliminary injunction
completely ineffective. In contrast, when we apply the Worldwide Mareva
Injunction, we see that not only would the plaintiff be able to freeze the foreign
assets, but most importantly, he would be able to do so without having to give
any type of notice to the defendant himself.
After September 11 th, when examining the topic of asset freezing, it is
necessary to briefly mention the United States effort in freezing the assets of
corporations suspected of financing terrorist groups. Even these types of asset
freezes by the United States, in a time of heightened national security, have
faced some resistance and close scrutiny.'24 Lawsuits alleging violation of due
process and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment because the
government's functions were not exercised with a proper hearing and other
processes, are not uncommon. 125 However, freezing the assets of suspected
terrorist groups, while deserving mention, differs from the analysis of this paper
because they tend to have a degree of governmental immunity and are powered
by executive orders and national security concerns. 126
VI. CONCLUSION
There are numerous reasons why the United States might want to resist
adopting the Mareva injunction. Perhaps they do not want to go against a strong
precedent, or because the principles of due process would be offended by its
adoption. Nevertheless, the service and protection that they would be providing
for a plaintiff, could in some instances, justify such an effect.
When discussing the Mareva injunction, we are usually considering its use
when an American plaintiff is dealing with a foreign defendant in possession of
foreign assets, or assets that have the potential to be removed to another
country. So the person who requires the protection here is the plaintiff. If not,
what is to stop the defendant from committing the same act in the future? The
second that the court gives the defendant notice of a proceeding against him, the
plaintiff's chances of recovery will have decreased substantially. This paper
does not seek to bypass or attack the need for notice that the Constitution calls
124. See generally Bruce Zagaris, Counter-Terrorism Financial Enforcement, 18 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 5 (2002).
125. Id.
126. See generally Anti-Terrorism and Economic Sanctions: U.S. Orders Freezing of Assets of
Suspected Terrorist Groups, 11 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 3 (1995).
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for, but when we consider a situation from an international perspective, we need
to realize that the dealings between individuals and companies and the potential
for a defendant making not only himself but his assets disappear, calls for
different and more severe measures. It seems fair to say that the person being
protected here is an American plaintiff, and his own Constitution acting as the
source of the problem by requiring the very notice that gives the defendant the
chance to elude a judgment against him, is completely unjustified.
A plaintiff dealing with a defendant in the international business arena
needs to feel that there is a sure and effective remedy for him in the event that
he has to initiate a lawsuit. As we have seen from the analysis of the American
legal system, the plaintiff will face more uncertainty than peace of mind. Many
of the requirements that need to be met to obtain either the Mareva injunction
or any one of the American remedies, share some similarities as well as some
differences. Nevertheless, the fact that notice is not required, as well as the
Mareva injunction's ability to apply on a worldwide basis, thereby surpassing
the jurisdictional shortcomings of the American remedies, marks the difference
that separates a secure plaintiff from one that will be left empty-handed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In May of 2000, the FTC, under Chairman Robert Pitofsky, concluded that
industry self-regulation was not effective in protecting consumer privacy and
in a report to Congress the FTC expressed the view "that legislation [was]
necessary to ensure further implementation of consumer data protection
devices."' At the same time, the U.S. Department of Commerce ("DOC") and
the European Commission jointly developed the so-called Safe Harbor
Principles ("SHP").' The Safe Harbor Principles signify mutual agreement
regarding basic and internationally accepted principles for the protection of
consumer privacy.
On October 4, 2001, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") announced
that it has changed its course. Chairman, Timothy Muris, .shifted the FTC's
position and stated that it is still "to soon" to "fashion workable legislation"4 and
the that FTC would instead concentrate on the enforcement of existing privacy
laws. In so doing, Muris has abandoned three important steps to creating
comprehensive consumer privacy protection. These steps were: First, the
FTC's Fair Information Practice Principles ("FIPP"); Second, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development's Privacy Guidelines (the "OECD"
and the "OECD Guidelines"); and lastly, the FTC's latest move backs away
from the recent culmination of comprehensive privacy protection guidelines as
established by the SHP (as referenced above). Although there has been some
criticism about the effectiveness of comprehensive international privacy
protection standards, the SHP are a logical and rational progression in consumer
privacy protection.
In this article, I will argue that the SHP mark significant progress over the
FIPP and OECD Guidelines (despite the fact that they are currently limited to
the protection of European Union citizens). Further, I will discuss why criticism
I. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices In The Electronic
Marketplace, A Report To Congress (May 2000) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf.
2. The SHP was developed by the U.S. Department of Commerce in consultation with the
European Commission and became effective November 2000.




surrounding the SHP, in particular concerns about its enforceability, is
misplaced, or at least premature. Rather, when combined with emerging
technologies and services, the SHP help level the playing field between
consumers and data collectors and provide a safety net that will benefit both.
Lastly, because of the strengths of the SHP, they should serve as a model for
comprehensive US legislation. The 106th Congress considered numerous
privacy bills and 107th has continued with those efforts. The SHP offer a
valuable model.
The time is right for comprehensive consumer privacy protection. There
is considerable evidence that the e-marketplace recognizes the benefits of
collecting consumer data and is taking steps to maximize its unhindered use of
consumer information. Consider the brief example of Amazon.com's August
2000 privacy policy amendment. Amazon.com now "classifies customer
information as a business asset, and is transferable to third parties if Amazon or
one of its business units is sold. Previously, the company promised its
customers that it would not sell, trade or rent personally identifying consumer
data."' Although European consumers are still protected from un-consented to
transfers, 6 non-E.U. citizens are not protected. Amazon.com's rationale behind
this move is that "such restrictions on data-sharing would impede its budding
partnerships."7 Although this type of corporate discretion may allow for added
commercial conveniences, fundamental rights are at issue and the consumer
must be a willing and informed participant.
II. A BRIEF CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE
CONSUMER PRIVACY PROTECTION
There is little question that consumers need privacy protection.8 Privacy
is an important part of an effective society. It is necessary for participatory
governance 9 and is a basic right of citizens in a democratic state.'l Further,
5. Keith Perine, Privacy Centers Have Their Eyes on Amazon, THE INDUST. STAND. Dec. 4, 2000,
at http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0, 1151,20586,00.html; see also
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/468496/107-6133111-3237344.
6. The E.U. Data Directive restricts transfers that are made without the consent of the data subject.
EUA. PARL. DIR. (95/46/EC) (Oct. 24, 1995) at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1995/en 395L0046.html.
7. See Amy Borrus, Online Privacy: Congress Has No Time To Waste, Bus. WK., Sept. 18, 2000,
at 54.
8. The United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) states on the webpage for Privacy
Initiatives that "as personal information becomes more accessible, each of us - companies, associations,
government agencies, and consumers - must take precautions to protect against the misuse of that
information." http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/index.html; see also Federal Trade Commission supra note 2.
9. See Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy In An Information Society 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707 at 732
(1997).
10. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right Of Privacy 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989).
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consumers themselves are concerned with privacy. An October 1999 survey
indicated that 72% of internet users in the United States, Germany, and the
United Kingdom were "very" concerned about personal privacy, another 20%
were "somewhat" concerned." Forrester Research estimated that, in 1999
alone, 2.8 billion dollars of internet related transactions were lost due to
consumer concerns about privacy.'2
Concerns for consumer privacy have not gone ignored. Privacy has
sometimes been recognized as an individual's fundamental right or as a
constitutive value that helps form individual identities or social consensus.'
3
Although numerous legislative and private industry efforts have been
undertaken, few have been successful in adapting to changes in society, in
particular, the changes brought by the internet.
The FTC articulated its FIPP in 1998 report, Privacy Online: A Report to
Congress. The FTC was responding to a concern about "privacy" and the
effectiveness of "self-regulation."' 4 The FTC revisited the FIPP in May of
2000,'" and, perhaps attesting to the importance of fair information practices, the
FTC re-endorsed the FIPP and offered renewed support.
As the FIPP were being developed, the OECD, an international working
to "co-ordinate domestic and international policies,"' 6 began work on privacy
11. IBM Multi-National Consumer Privacy Survey (Oct. 1999) at 72. This report was prepared by
Louis Harris & Associates Inc., available at http://www.ibm.com/services/files/privacy-survey-.oct991.pdf;
see also Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC): Public Opinion on Privacy at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/survey.
12. Forrester Research, Inc., The Internet's Privacy Migraine, (May 2000) at
http://www.forrester.com/ER/Research/Report/Excerpt/0, 1338,9363,FF.html.
13. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) establishes a fundamental right of
privacy through the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. This
right to privacy is also recognized in the European Union's Data Directive, 95/46/EC which was established
to "protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy."
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Oct. 1995, Article 1, 1 1 available
at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1995/en 395L0046.html. See also Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read
Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996).
Paul Schwartz, a leading scholar in privacy law, has characterized "information privacy as a constitutive value
that helps both to form the society in which we live in and to shape our individual identities" and that the
"State has a special role in two areas: (1) creating and maintaining conditions for a functioning privacy
market, and (2) developing privacy norms that prevent access to personal information that would cause too
great a rate of preference falsification in society." Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN.
L. REV. 815, 816-17 (2000).
14. See Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A Report To Congress, Executive Summary
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/exeintro.htm#Executive Summary.
15. Federal Trade Comm'n, supra note 2.
16. "The OECD consists of Australia (1971), Austria (1961), Belgium (1961), Canada (1961), Czech
Republic (1995), Denmark (1961), Finland (1969), France, (1961), Germany (1961), Greece (1961), Hungary
(1996), Iceland (1961), Ireland (1961), Italy (1961), Japan (1964), Korea (1996), Luxembourg (1961), Mexico
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guidelines to facilitate the creation of privacy policies by governments,
businesses, individuals, and law enforcement officials. 17 The OECD Guidelines
were promulgated on September 23, 1980 in the OECD Guidelines on
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data8 and purport
to "represent an international consensus on how best to balance effective
privacy protection with the free flow of personal data."' 9
Both the FIPP and the OECD Guidelines provide guidance to legislative
efforts and the development of private sector privacy policies.20 However,
despite the fact that both the FIPP and OECD Guidelines have withstood the
tests of time, the e-marketplace is still void of effective consumer privacy
protection.
Following the development and acceptance of the FIPP and OECD
Guidelines, the European Union adopted Directive 95/46/EC Of The European
Parliament And Of The Council Of 24 October 1995 On The Protection Of
Individuals With Regard To The Processing Of Personal Data And On The Free
Movement Of Such Data.2' The E.U. Data Directive were enacted in October
1995 and went into effect in October 1998. It affirmatively established
standards for the protection consumer data and privacy in an effort to promote
the free flow of information between member nations. Not only does the E.U.
Data Directive create a standard to serve as the common law between member
nations, but it also prohibits the transfer of information from one of those
countries to any third party without adequate privacy protections in place. It
requires that those who wish to use consumers' personal data must provide "an
adequate level of protection" for that personal data.22 Thus, any party interested
(1994), The Netherlands (1961), New Zealand (1973), Norway (1961), Poland (1996), Portugal (1961), Spain
(1961), Sweden (1961), Switzerland (1961), Turkey (1961), United Kingdom (1961), and United States
(1961). The goals of the OECD are to promote "an open market economy, democratic pluralism and respect
for human rights." Interestingly, in addition to developing guidelines, the 29 member nations have also
"agreed to participate in the exercise ... called "peer review", which is based on transparency, explanation, and,
when needed, self-criticism by the countries examined." OECD Online, About: Membership at
http://www.oecd.org.
17. See http://cs3-hq.oecd.org/scripts/pwv3/pwhome.htm.
18. See O.E.C.D. Doc. C58 (final)(Oct. 1, 1980), reprinted in 20 1.L.M. 422 (1981) available at
http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/prod/PRIV-EN.HTM.
19. O.E.C.D. Doc. C58 (final)(Oct. 1, 1980), reprinted in 20 1L.M. 422 (1981) available at
http://cs3-hq.oecd.org/scripts/pwv3/pwhome.htm.
20. TRUSTe, a "leader in promoting privacy policy disclosure, informed user consent, and consumer
education", has established its privacy protection practices "based on long-standing principles of fair
information practices as interpreted by the U.S. government."
http://www.truste.com/about/about-whitepaper.html.
21. EUR. PARL. DIR., supra note 6.
22. Id.
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in collecting personal data from citizens of European Union member nations
must comply with the comprehensive standards of the E.U. Data Directive.
In this era of increasing globalization, international harmony is necessary.
Recognizing this, the U.S. Department of Commerce ("DOC") and the
European Commission jointly developed standards meant to enable U.S.
businesses to meet the requirements of the E.U. Data Directive. The so-called
Safe Harbor Principles ("SHP")3 were developed to facilitate international
commerce by creating a bridge between the E.U. Data Directive and U.S.
practices. Additionally, by creating means for compliance with the E.U. Data
Directive, the SHP attempted to ensure the fundamental right of privacy and
security of personal data. The SHP require that consumers be notified of actions
to collect data, be provided the opportunity to withhold information, be offered
the chance to review and correct collected information, and be assured of
security measures and redress in case of abuse.
This is a valuable step toward comprehensive consumer privacy protection
because consumers become active participants in the transfer of their personal
data. The SHP are flexible enough to adjust to changing times and changing
preferences, consistent with the current trend of "mass-customization." As
Professor Anita L. Allen-Castellito points out, "imposing privacy norms to
make sure everyone lives in accordance with a particular vision of privacy-
would be problematic. 24  Consistent with a liberal conception of private
choice,25 the SHP provide for choices crucial to a successful privacy regime.
Further, by providing a comprehensive approach to consumer privacy and data
protection, the SHP avoid some of setbacks other efforts have suffered.26
23. The SHP was developed by "the U.S. Department of Commerce in consultation with the
European Commission" and became effective November 2000.
24. Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM & MARY L. REV. 723, 729 (1999).
25. See generally Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM & MARY L. REV. 723. Professor Allen describes
the liberal conception of private choice as "the idea that government ought to promote interests in decisional
privacy, chiefly by allowing individuals...to make many, though not all, of the most important decisions..."
Id. Privacy and private choice are "indispensable, foundational goods." Id. Further, although Professor Allen
encourages choice, she argues that some people must be coerced into privacy. This is problematic, as pointed
out by Neal Devins in Reflections on Coercing Privacy, 40 WM & MARY L. REV. 795 (1999). The Safe
Harbor Principles strike a balance by giving subjects choice while requiring responsible use and protection
of personal information on collectors. Therefore, although one consumer may wish to give up as much data
as practical, that data will not color the use of another subject's data.
26. A recent agreement between the Federal Trade Commission and leading online advertisers
(including Doubleclick and Engage) pledged to give consumers choice "about when such companies can
snoop on their Web-surfing habits." The agreement was easily side stepped by Pharmatrak, Inc., a specialized
consulting firm, that is not an "advertiser" but helps drug companies compare and improve their websites.
The data collection is "invisible to consumers unless their browsers are specifically set up to alert them when
such "bugs" are being used." Marcia Stepanek, Surf At Your Own Risk, BUS. WK., Oct. 30, 2000, at 143.
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III. A GOOD START: THE FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES AND THE
OECD GUIDELINES
A. FIPP
As privacy legislation matured in the 1970's, the FTC compiled principles
that would serve as guidance in the protection of consumer privacy. These were
not enacted into law; rather, they were a distillation of existing legislation.27
The FIPP focuses on five issues: 1) Notice/Awareness; 2) Choice/Consent; 3)
Access/Participation; 4) Integrity/Security; and 5) Enforcement/Redress. 28
These elements encourage consumer involvement in the data collection process.
They keep consumers in the loop and keep them informed of potentially
invisible practices while facilitating consumers' ability to choose whether or not
they wish to share their personal data. As Professor Schwartz has stated, "fair
information practices are the building blocks of modem information privacy
law. 29
The First principle of the FIPP is notice. Notice is the element that makes
the other elements - choice/consent, access/participation, and
enforcement/redress - possible. While the nature of the notice may vary
depending on what is collected, the FIPP state that data subjects should be
notified of the following: 1) identification of the entity collecting the data; 2)
identification of the uses to which the data will be put; 3) identification of any
potential recipients of the data; 4) the nature of the data collected and the means
by which it is collected...; 5) whether the ... requested data is voluntary or
required; 6) the consequences of a refusal to provide the requested information;
and 7) the steps taken by the data collector to ensure the confidentiality,
integrity and quality of the data.3 ° With such information, the consumer will
have the building blocks for informed decision making.
27. The Fair Information Practice originated in the United States Department of Health, Education
and Welfare's 1973 report entitled Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens (1973). Other reports
addressing the fair information practice principles are: The Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal
Privacy in an Information Society (1977); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980); Information
Infrastructure Task Force, Information Policy Committee, Privacy Working Group, Privacy and the National
Information Infrastructure: Principles for Providing and Using Personal Information (1995); U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, Privacy and the NiH: Safeguarding Telecommunications-Related Personal Information (1995);
The European Union Directive on the Protection of Personal Data (1995); and the Canadian Standards
Association, Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information: A National Standard of Canada (1996).
See http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/endnotes.htm#N-27-.
28. Federal Trade Comm'n, Fair Information Practice Principals, at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.htm.
29. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52VAND. L.REV. 1607,1614(1999).
30. Federal Trade Comm'n, supra note 28.
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Once notice is established, it is a logical step for the consumer to have the
ability to make choices based preferences. Choice makes the consumer an
active participant of the transaction. This includes marketing, sale to third
parties or any other use. Without the informed consent of the data subject, data
collectors are prohibited from using personal information for their own gain.
Notice and choice facilitates awareness, access permits participation. For
meaningful participation, consumers should have "ability both to access data
[collected] about him or herself' and to "contest [its] accuracy and
completeness."31 Further, access must be reasonable. A data collector should
provide "simple means for contesting inaccurate or incomplete data, a
mechanism by which the data collector can verify the information, and the
means by which corrections and/or consumer objections can be added to the
data file and sent to all data recipients."3 2 Such qualifications help ensure that
consumers do not get caught behind a web of hurdles or red tape. Such
consumer involvement also facilitates data accuracy.
Providing consumers with information about what is being collected,
choices regarding collection, and the ability to check and correct inaccurate
information promotes cooperative management of consumer data. Adequate
management is also facilitated by sufficient security of collected data.
The FIPP addresses precautionary measures. 3  Data collectors are
encouraged to structure their internal organizational processes to prevent
inadvertent misuse or dissemination of sensitive data.34 Data collectors are also
encouraged to use encryption "in the transmission and storage of data. '35 And
once data is collected, it should be stored on "secure servers or computers that
are inaccessible by modem., 36
These principles, when put into practice, provide a foundation for the safe
and open collection and use of data. However, such principles may not be put
into practice. The FIPP conclude by suggesting that data collectors develop
methods of enforcement through either "industry self-regulation; legislation that
would create private remedies for consumers; and/or regulatory schemes
enforceable through civil and criminal sanctions., ' 3' This, however, is too
flexible. Although Congressional bills based on the FIPP have been





35. Federal Trade Comm'n, supra note 28.
36. Id.
37. See id 5
38. Online Privacy Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 89, 107th Cong. (2001). Social Security On-line
legislation,39 the FIPP are at risk of becoming merely suggestive by remaining
unenforceable.
Interestingly, the FTC, which has been a proponent for self-regulation in
the past, now acknowledges that legislative measures may be necessary.4" The
conclusion of the FTC's 1998 Report to Congress indicates that the FTC is
prepared to take action, where appropriate, through the authority of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.4' The FTC Act "authorizes the Commission to seek
injunctive and other equitable relief, including redress, for violations of the Act.
It therefore provides a basis for "government enforcement" of the FIPP.42 The
FTC openly warns: "failure to comply with stated information practices may
constitute a deceptive practice in certain circumstances. 43
The FIPP were developed to ensure "that the collection, use, and
dissemination of personal information are conducted fairly and in a manner
consistent with consumer privacy interests. '  They are comprehensive and
provide for the general wellbeing of consumers. Interestingly, the FIPP are not
the only attempt at comprehensive consumer privacy protection. Another
prominent development is the OECD Guidelines.
1. OECD Guidelines
The OECD Guidelines followed the FIPP and address similar concerns.
These concerns include: 1) limits on collection of information; 2) mechanisms
to promote data quality; 3) notification of the specific purpose for collection; 4)
limits on the use of data collected; 5) safeguards for the security of data
collected; 6) openness with regard to practices and policies for the collection
and use of personal data; 7) data subject's participation in maintaining the
integrity of data collected; and 8) accountability of data collectors for
compliance with the Guidelines.45
These eight elements are based on the principle of "openness."46 Openness
allows the consumer to become a meaningful participant in the e-marketplace.
Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 91, 107th Cong. (2001). Electronic Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 112, 107th
Cong. (2001). Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act, H.R. 237, 107th Cong. (2001). Spyware Control
and Privacy Protection Act, S. 197, 107th Cong. (2001).
39. Ted Bridis, Industry Studies Attack Web-Privacy Laws, WALL ST. J. (March 13, 2001) at B6.
40. See generally Federal Trade Comm'n, supra note 30.
41. 15 U.S.C.§ 41.
42. Federal Trade Comm'n, supra note 28.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See O.E.C.D., supra note 18.
46. See id. The concept of openness suggests that "there should be a general policy of openness
about developments, practices, and policies with respect to personal data."
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This is important for the creation of a democratic e-marketplace. As Paul
Schwartz states in Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, if consumers are not
given procedural and substantive rights they will be deterred "from participating
in activities that promote cyber-democracy and self-definition on the Internet.
47
Openness begins by making consumers aware of data collectors' practices.
This is achieved by providing notice of collectors' practice. The Collection
Limitation Principle, the Purpose Specification Principle, and the Openness
Principle each direct data collectors to notify data subjects of the practices they
will be subject to.
The Collection Limitation Principle of the OECD Guidelines only permits
collection of data "where appropriate [and] with the knowledge or consent of
the data subject. 48 This implies notice and provides the first parallel to the
FIPP. Further, the purpose for the collection of consumer data must be stated
either before or at the time of collection as stated by the Purpose Specification
Principle. 49  Notice also extends to changes of use, collectors must notify
consumers of "each occasion of change of purpose."5
The Openness Principle further expands the notice requirements. Data
collectors must disclose practices and policies and provide data subjects with
information regarding the "existence and nature of personal data, and the main
purposes of their use (as established by the Purpose Specification Principle), as
well as the identity and usual residence of the data controller."' This is the
foundation to transparent practices and a level playing field.
Like the FIPP, the OECD Guidelines address consumer choice. The
Collection Limitation Principle allows data subjects to choose whether or not
they want data collected and collection is restricted to consumer preferences.5"
The Use Limitation Principle also implicates consumer choice. Consumers
must consent to the data collector's use of personal information. 3 The data
47. Schwartz, supra note 29 at 1677-78. For effective community on the internet Professor
Schwartz states that data subjects must "(1) be able to allow or refuse collection of more than a minimum
amount of these data or further use for a non-compatible use; (2) be informed of the data consequences of
relevant behavior, such as signing up for service with an ISP or entering a specific Web site; and (3) be
granted a mechanism by which she can inspect and correct personal data and find out which parties have
gained access to her records." Notice how closely these elements that Professor Schwartz advocates mirror
the standards imposed by the Safe Harbor Principles. Each of these objectives are met through the Safe
Harbor Principles.
48. O.E.C.D, supra note 18 at 7.
49. See Id. at 9.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 12.
52. Id. at 7.
53. See O.E.C.D., supra note 18 at 10. This is also assuming that there is no overriding legal
authority requiring collection regardless of a data subject's consent as provided by this paragraph of the
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collector is then limited to the extent that the data subject has permitted use.
The Purpose Specification Principle further limits permitted uses to those
purposes explicitly stated by the data collector. In other words, the data
collector is restricted from using consumer data in ways not previously
disclosed.
These elements of the OECD Guidelines illustrate clear concern for
consumer notice and choice. In accordance with the FIPP, the OECD
Guidelines suggest that consumers become active participants of the data
collection process.
The Purpose Specification Principle of the OECD Guidelines address the
possibility of trade of consumer personal data. This principle limits transfer of
personal information after the initial purpose of collection is met or if any use
is incompatible with the initially specified purpose. 4 The Use Limitation
Principle further develops the concept that use must be consistent with the initial
purpose for collection and "should not be disclosed" or "made available"
without the consent of the data subject or as authorized by law.55
The OECD Guidelines also promote data integrity by preventing
inappropriate or potentially harmful altercation of a consumer data. This is
done through the Data Quality Principle. This principle requires that the data
collected be "relevant," "accurate," "complete," and "kept up-to-date. 5 6 To
achieve these ends, the OECD Guidelines, like the FIPP, encourage consumer
access to collected data.
The Individual Participation Principle of the OECD Guidelines
corresponds directly to the access element of the FIPP. Data subjects are
unambiguously afforded the opportunity to obtain confirmation whether or not
data is collected. Data subjects are also given the opportunity to challenge and
possibly erase, rectify, complete or amend any inconsistencies in the
information held by a data collector. 7 The OECD Guidelines provide for data
subjects to directly request information from data collectors and if a reasonable
request is denied, the data subject should "be able to challenge such denial. ' 58
Consumers therefore play a valuable role in maintaining the integrity of
collected data. The groundwork for data collector and data subject cooperation
is created.
In addition to allowing the data subject access to information, the concept
of making the data subject a meaningful participant in the e-marketplace reflects
Guidelines.
54. See id. at 9.
55. See id. at 10.
56. See id. at 8.
57. See id. at$ 13.
58. O.E.C.D. supra note 18.
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the OECD's concern for openness. Without the ability to access information it
would be impossible for data subjects to evaluate "the existence and nature of
personal data."'5 9
The Openness Principle, true to its title, prescribes transparency on behalf
of data collectors. Data subjects must have knowledge of the collection of their
personal data. In theory, this is good; however, without imposing accountability
on a data collector, there is no incentive for data collectors to comply. Thus, the
OECD included an Accountability Principle.
Though broad, the Accountability Principle states that a data collector
should "be accountable for complying with measures which give effect to the
principles stated above."6 This illustrates concern for enforceability. It also
recognizes that the privacy-protecting measures of the OECD Guidelines are at
risk of inadequate implementation or of not being followed at all.
2. Limitations of the FIPP and OECD Guidelines
The OECD Guidelines and the FIPP are straightforward. They both
address comprehensive protection of consumer data through the establishment
of a privacy friendly environment. One in which the consumer plays an active
and informed role in the data collection process.
Both the FIPP and the OECD Guidelines, however, are weakened by the
fact that they only "suggest" proper practices. The FIPP are the result of a
"series of reports, guidelines, and model codes that represent widely-accepted
principles concerning fair information practices."61 They were drafted as a
distillation of common beliefs on appropriate methods to protect consumer
privacy. Similarly, the OECD Guidelines were drafted to serve as a
"recommendation" to "harmoni[z]e national privacy legislation" with an eye
towards "human rights" and at the same time promote "international flows of
data., 62 Neither has been adopted into U.S. law. Further, neither the FIPP nor
the OECD Guidelines has been adopted in full by U.S. business. 63 As we stand
today, U.S. consumers lack comprehensive privacy protection. The FIPP and
the OECD Guidelines offer models, but these models have not been formally
adopted.
59. Id. at 12.
60. Id.
61. Fair Information Practice Principles, supra note 28.
62. O.E.C.D. supra note 18.
63. The Georgetown Internet Privacy Policy Survey conducted by Professor Mary Culnan "[drew
a random sample] of the most-heavily trafficked sites on the World Wide Web and [surveyed] the busiest 100
sites. The survey found that "only 10% of the sites posted disclosures that even touched on all four fair
information practice principles." Federal Trade Comm'n, supra note 28.
On the other, the European Union has adopted and enacted comprehensive
privacy protection legislation. Although the E.U. Data Directive was not simply
based on the OECD Guidelines or the FIPP, the intentions are noticeably
similar.64 Professor Marc Rotenberg has pointed out that the E.U. Data
Directive was indirectly influenced by the development of United State's
privacy law.65 The most notable difference, for the purposes of this article, is
that the E.U. Data Directive mandates privacy-friendly practices and procedures
for data collectors and data subjects.
3. The E.U. Data Directive: in harmony with the FIPP and OECD
Guidelines
The E.U. Data Directive recognizes and affirmatively establishes
transparent practices for data collectors. By enacting a pan-European
"directive" these transparent practices are binding enforceable by law.
66
Although not organized like the FIPP or the OECD Guidelines (which set out
specific principles as discussed above), the E.U. Data Directive does address the
elements of notice, choice, access, security, and enforcement.
Notice is addressed in Articles 10 and 11 of the E.U. Data Directive.
Together, these articles require disclosure of a data collector's identity, purpose
for processing data, whether the data collection is obligatory or voluntary, the
64. Graham Greenleaf, Associate Professor of Law at the University of New South Wales has
compared the E.U. Data Directive to the OECD Guidelines and has found that the E.U. Data Directive is in
"general terms similar to the information privacy principles found in the OECD Guidelines and the Council
of Europe Convention. A rough comparison of the articles in Chapter H with the titles of the OECD's eight
principles is as follows: collection limitation principles (art 10, art 11, parts of art 7); data quality principles
(art 6); purpose specification principle (art 6); use limitation principle (art 16); security safeguards principle
(art 17); openness principle (art 21); individual participation principle (art 12, art 14); and accountability
principle (definition of 'controller'). Other articles cover matters not always found in previous sets of
principles, such as purpose justification (art 7), 'sensitive' data (art 8), automated decision-making (art 15),
and notification (arts 18, 19, 20)." Graham Greenleaf, The European Privacy Directive - Completed, Privacy
Law & Policy Reporter, Art. 2, No. 5 (1995) 2 PRIv. L. & POLICY REP. 81, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/aulother/plpr/vol2[Vol2NoO5/vO2nO5a.html#fn l.
65. Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry
Doesn't Get), 2001 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2001). Professor Rotenberg states that offering privacy protection
is not just a "European approach... in contrast to a US approach." Developments in privacy law were "derived
from the Brandeis and Warren article of 1890, which was even characterized by European scholars as the
'American tort."' Other examples of influential efforts by the U.S. include the Federal Wiretap Act of 1968
and the Privacy Act of 1974.
66. The E.U. Data Directive requires that each E.U. member nation appoint a "supervisory
authority" to ensure the Directive is followed. Among other powers, the supervisory authority has "the power
to engage in legal proceedings where the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive have been
violated or to bring these violations to the attention of the judicial authorities. EUR. PARL. DIR., supra note
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consequences of failure to reply to collection questions, and whether a right of
access exists.67 Article 7 of the E.U. Data Directive then provides that personal
data may only be processed where an individual's consent has been obtained (or
in certain cases of necessity, such as the compliance with a legal obligation or
to protect the vital interests of the data subject among others68). After giving
notice, the data subject's consent must be "unambiguously given."
The E.U. Data Directive also addresses consumer consent. Article 7
explicitly states that "personal data may be processed only if: the data subject
has unambiguously given his consent; or [ ... ]processing is necessary for "the
performance of a contract" at the request of the data subject, "for compliance
with a legal obligation," "to protect the vital interests of the data subject",
processing is necessary for the public interest or official authority. '69 Article 8
offers further protection to specific types of data. Data that is especially
sensitive or unique to the consumer such as: "racial or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs or trade union membership" as well
as details of a person's health or sex life"7° requires explicit consumer consent
must before it can be processed.7' Article 13 provides another exemption to the
protection of personal data. This article provides that national security; defense;
public security; the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of
criminal offenses; important economic or financial interests; certain inspection
and regulatory functions; or the protection of the data subject or the rights and
freedoms of others will trump the individual's rights to privacy protection.72
Although the E.U. Data Directive allows freedom to collect data in
circumstances of "journalistic purposes or for the purpose of artistic or literary
expression...," Article 9 states that the collection of data is only permissible "if
necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom of
expression. 73  Given the tough stance on protecting consumer data, it is
unlikely that this exemption will be abused.
Consumers are also given the right to access information that has been
collected. The consumer's right to access includes "confirmation [that personal
data is] being processed" notice of the "categories of recipients to whom the
data are disclosed", as well as information concerning the "automatic processing
of data., 74 Article 12 of the E.U. Data Directive also grants data subjects the
67. See id. at Arts. 10- l1.
68. ld. at Art. 7.
69. Id.
70. Id. at Art. 8.
71. EUR. PARL. DIR., supra note 6, at Art. 8.
72. Id. at Art. 13.
73. Id. at Art. 9.
74. Id. at Art. 12.
Kambas
right to "rectify, erase or block data" that is collected but not used in accordance
with the Data Directive.
To promote stepped up security for consumer's personal data, the E.U.
Data Directive limits any processing of consumer data to necessity. 5 In other
words, fewer attempts at processing will help safeguard from accidental
disclosure. Article 17 of the Directive also requires that data collectors take
precautionary steps to prevent "accidental or unlawful destruction, loss,
alteration, or unauthorized disclosure or access. 76 Data collectors must take
"technical security measures" (such as employing sufficient cryptography) as
well as take "organizational measures" to prevent internal or employee
mishaps.77
The development and implementation of the E.U. Data Directive had
international consequences. It thrust a new hurdle in international consumer
data collection. Any data collector wishing to collect data from citizens of
European Union member nations had to comply with the E.U. Data Directive
or be subject to the legal ramifications of breaking E.U. law. As mentioned
above, Safe Harbor Principles are a consequence of the E.U. Data Directive.
4. A Bridge: The Safe Harbor Principles
The final version of the SHP was released on July 21, 2000.78 It consists
of seven elements: 1) Notice; 2) Choice; 3) Onward Transfer; 4) Data Security;
5) Data Integrity; 6) Access; and 7) Enforcement. 79 To ease implementing the
SHP, the DOC set up a compliance checklist for data collectors.80
It is apparent from titles alone that the SHP mirror the FIPP and the OECD
Guidelines. The reemergence of these principles can be seen as an affirmation
accepted thought on consumer privacy and data protection. The SHP are merely
an elaboration of existing U.S. principles. Because the SHP are international in
nature, they potentially create a world-wide safety net for consumers; something
necessary in our borderless e-marketplace.
75. Id. Art. 17.
76. EUR. PARL. DIR., supra note 6.
77. Id.
78. US DEPT. OF COMM., Safe Harbor Docs., Issuance of Principles and Transm'n to Eur. Comm'n.,
65 Fed. Reg. 45666 (July 24, 2000).
79. Id.
80. See Safe Harbor Privacy Principles Checklist available at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/checklist.htm.
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IV. SAFE HARBOR PRINCIPLES: A SAFETY NET FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CONSUMER PRIVACY
There have been numerous attempts to secure effective protection for
consumer privacy. The 106th Congress considered numerous privacy related
bills8 and the 107th Congress is following continues to address the protection
of consumer privacy.82 However, Congress is still only beginning to recognize
the importance of comprehensive consumer privacy legislation. For example,
Congress is not considering the Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act.83
This bill, consistent with the FIPP, would require data collectors to provide
notice to data subjects about the identity of the data collector, whether
information would be collected, the types of information collected, how the
information would be used, and how the data subject can prevent collection.84
If enacted into law, this bill would be enforced under the FTC Act because a
violation would be considered "an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or
affecting commerce. ' '85  Although this bill addresses Notice, Choice, and
Enforcement, it falls short of the comprehensive protections created by the FIPP
and the OECD Guidelines. It also falls short of the standards imposed by E.U.
Data Directive. The proposed Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act
represents an initial, yet still incomprehensive, approach to protecting consumer
privacy.
As Professor Joel R. Reidenberg argues in Restoring Americans' Privacy
in Electronic Commerce,86 The OECD Guidelines, as a reflection of the FIPP
"should be adopted in law as the American framework for information
privacy."'" All five elements of the FIPP, as reaffirmed in the OECD
Guidelines, when taken together, are necessary for an effective privacy
81. The 106th Congress considered 50 bills relating to privacy, 48 of which were specifically
concerned with "consumer privacy." See thomas.loc.gov.
82. The 107th Congress is evaluating 50 bills also, seven of which are specifically concerned with
"consumer privacy." These seven are: 1. Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act S. 288, 107th Cong. (2001);
2. Internet Tax Moratorium and Equity Act S. 512, 107th Cong. (2001); 3. Consumer Internet Privacy
Enhancement Act, H.R. 237,107th Cong. (2001). 4. Consumer Online Privacy and Disclosure Act H.R. 347,
107th Cong. (2001); 5. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 S. 420., 107th Cong. (2001); 6. Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 2001 S. 420, 107th Cong. (2001); and 7 . Comprehensive and Balanced Energy Policy Act of 2001S.
597 107th Cong. (2001).
83. H. R. 237, 107th Cong. (2001). Introduced to protect the privacy of consumers who use the
Internet.
84. H. R. 237 at § 2(b)(1).
85. H.R. 237 at § 3(a). Unfair and deceptive acts are defined in section 18(a)(l)(B) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(l)(B). See id.
86. Joel R.Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEYTECH.
L.J. 771 (1999).
87. Id. at 788.
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protection program. The SHP offer just such a combination. They reflect the
values and ideas of the FIPP and the OECD Guidelines and do so in compliance
with the E.U. Data Directive.
1. The Creation Of The SHP
As discussed above, the SHP were developed to help U.S. businesses meet
the requirements of the E.U. Data Directive. The theory behind the E.U. Data
Directive is that privacy is a fundamental human right and that collected data
should be protected.88 The SHP serve as a bridge between privacy protection
and international trade.
The SHP are necessary because Article 25 of the E.U. Data Directive
restricts the transfer of personal data outside of the European Union. The
United States and by implication, those businesses operating in the U.S., does
not meet the standards of Article 25 because, as discussed above, no
comprehensive consumer data protection legislation exists. Although data
collectors that operate exclusively in the United States are not subject to the
E.U. Data Directive, those businesses with European operations or intending to
do business with E.U. member countries must comply.
Although the U.S. has historically taken a "sectional" approach to
consumer privacy protection 89 and the European Union has now adopted a
"comprehensive" privacy protection program,90 globalization has led to
increased interaction between countries. This convergence of cultures requires
that differences be ironed out. The SHP do just that.
2. The Substance of the SHP
As discussed above, the SHP address the same topics as the FIPP and the
OECD Guidelines: Notice, Choice, Access, Security, and Enforcement.
However, the SHP also explicitly address onward transfer of consumer data and
the maintenance of data integrity.
88. EUR. PARL. DIR., supra note 6.
89. Rotenberg, supra note 65; see also, U.S. Department of Commerce website for the
implementation of the Safe Harbor Principles which states that "while the United States and the European
Union share the goal of enhancing privacy protection for their citizens, the United States takes a different
approach to privacy from that taken by the European Union. The United States uses a sectoral approach that
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a. Notice
The SHP require that consumers be provided with the identity and contact
information of the data collector. Data collectors must also provide "clear and
conspicuous" notice when personal information is collected. 9' Fine print will
probably not suffice. Additionally, the information collected must be "relevant
for the purposes for which it is to be used."92
For example, a shoe salesman would most likely not be allowed to collect
information about a consumer's race, religion, or medical conditions. Further,
"an organization may not process personal information in a way that is
incompatible with the purposes for which it has been collected or subsequently
authorized by the individual. 93  Notice must also be provided before the
organization uses such information or discloses it to a third party.94
b. Choice
Consumers must also be able to choose - choose whether or not to give
information and what information to give. Data collectors are required to
provide the option of opting-out of disclosure of personal information to third
parties. Consumers may also opt-out of disclosure if the information is to be
used for purposes other than as authorized by the data subject.95 As discussed
when addressing the FIPP and OECD Guidelines, choice and notice make
consumers informed participants in the e-marketplace.
c. Data Integrity
The SHP require the data collector to take "reasonable steps to ensure that
the data collected is reliable for its intended use, accurate, complete, and
current. 96 Although this places the data collector in the potentially precarious
position of having the responsibility to validate personal information, it also
prevents the circulation of false or misleading information. Interestingly, this
element, does target those consumers who would otherwise wish to be identified
as a "dog.
9 7
91. DEPT. OF COMM., Safe Harbor Privacy Principles Issued By The U.S. Department Of Commerce
July 21, 2000 available at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SHPRINCIPLESFINAL.htm.




95. Department of Comm., supra note 78.
96. Id.
97. As in the famous cartoon by Peter Steiner from page 61 of July 5, 1993 issue of The New
Yorker, (Vol.69 (LXIX) no. 20).
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Information has value and "data has power."98 If data is not correct, its
value is reduced and its power is illegitimate. The data integrity element helps
prevents spoliation of collected information. Allowing the consumer access to
review the data that has been collected also enhances data integrity.
d. Access
Consumers are often in the best position to verify the accuracy of their
personal information. They are also in the best position to keep it up to date.
The access principle provides that consumers be permitted to view the data
collected about them and "to correct, amend, or delete that information where
it is inaccurate."99 This right of access, however, is limited to situations where
"the burden or expense of providing access" would not be "disproportionate to
the risks to the individual's privacy in the case in question, or where the rights
of persons other than the individual would be violated."' '
Advising consumers of the data collection process, giving consumers the
opportunity to consent to collection, and providing access to review and correct
data promote transparent practices and make the consumer a meaningful
participant in the collection process. However, effective consumer privacy
protection also includes secure and responsible use of consumer data.
e. Onward Transfer
Onward transfer requires that third party transferees provide the same
protections that the data collector was required to provide. This protects
information used at point B even when it was collected at point A.
Transfer of consumer data is restricted to instances where the consumer has
consented to such transfer. However, once consent has been obtained, and there
are assurances that the third party (the new data user) complies the SHP use and
security restrictions"', consumer data can be used by that third party.
Although transfer is limited to those parties that comply with the objectives
of the SHP, effort is made to facilitate the transfer of data. As discussed above,
the SHP were developed with the understanding that consumer privacy concerns
are linked to international commerce.'0 2 The SHP bridge these two interests.
98. Lawrence Lessig, Behind the Curtain, THE INDUS. STAND., Sept. 4, 2000.
99. Department of Comm., supra note 6.
100. Id.
101. id. The notice provision restricts use to those uses specified at the time of collection. The
security provision requires that third party data users provide "adequate" security for consumer data.
102. Although further discussion of the criticisms of the SHP are discussed in following sections, the
concept of privacy as fundamental "human right" versus "commercial concern" was fundamental to the Trans
Atlantic Consumer Dialogue's (TACD) criticism of the SHP. In paragraph four of the TACD Resolution On
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Even if a third party has not completely adopted the SHP but still wants
consumer data, that party may execute a written agreement "requiring that the




Collection of consumer data will inevitably yield files of consumer data.
Once these files are created, they must be protected from misuse (both internal
and external) and from inadvertent dissemination. Measures must be taken to
ensure the security of information collected. That which is not secure cannot
be considered private.
It is clear that data controllers are responsible for the confidentiality and
security of consumer data. "Organizations creating, maintaining, using or
disseminating personal information must take reasonable precautions to protect
it from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and
destruction."'" Although not mentioned, cryptography and encryption are
likely requirements. 10
5
Recognizing that some information may require special treatment, the SHP
differentiate between types of personal information and encourage special
treatment of sensitive information. Consistent with the E.U. Data Directive,
sensitive information includes "personal information specifying medical or
health conditions, racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs, trade union membership or information specifying the sex
life of the individual."'1 6 Data subjects must give "affirmative or explicit (opt-
in)" consent if sensitive information is going be disclosed to a third party or
used outside of the immediate transaction. This provides heightened protection
Safe Harbor Principles, TACD criticizes the SHP for not recognizing that privacy is a "human right" and
placing it on the same ground as "commercial concerns." TACD Doc No. Ecom- 18-00 (February, 2000) at
4. The purpose behind the SHP is to "provide a more predictable framework for such data transfers." Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles Issued By The U.S. Department Of Commerce (July 21, 2000). This implies that
commercial concerns are to be considered the rights and concerns are intimately linked and by addressing
them together will facilitate a comprehensive solution.
103. Department of Comm., supra note 6.
104. Id.
105. "Encryption technologies" are "the locks and keys of the information age. "They" are special
programs designed to protect sensitive information on digital communications networks. Encryption
technologies work by scrambling and encoding information so that it can only be read by the proper
recipient." Center For Democracy and Technology, Introduction to "what is crypto" at
http://www.cdt.org/crypto/new2crypto/l.shtml "Strong encryption is freely available today inside the United
States."
106. Department of Comm., supra note 6.
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to a sphere of information that could be particularly harmful to a data subject if
mishandled.'17
g. Enforcement
The old adage that knowledge is power is just as true in the e-marketplace
as it is outside. 108 Information therefore becomes an easy target for abuse and
proper enforcement is needed. Further, enforcement measures add confidence.
Enforcement must be available through mechanisms that: 1) ensure
compliance, 2) acknowledge that recourse is available and affordable, and 3)
illustrate that consequences exist.'0 9 This includes independent recourse (in
accordance with applicable law or private sector initiatives)." 0 Data collectors
must follow-up on complaints of violation and work to remedy problems.
These efforts must also be backed up by self-imposed consequences that are
serious enough to ensure compliance when violations occur.'." If these
measures are not taken and recourse is not available, the data collector will be
considered to be in breach of its duties to the consumer and therefore subject to
the ramifications of unfair and deceptive practices under the FTC Act.
Although the technicalities of this element are vague, the objective is clear.
Data subjects must be made aware that recourse is available when personal data
is misused. This is achieved when data collectors publicly acknowledge that
they are in compliance, acknowledge that there are consequences of misuse of
personal data, and that they have an obligation to remedy problems. Because
the broadness of this principle may lead to varied application, SHP Frequently
Asked Question (FAQ) number 11 specifically addresses methods of
compliance" 2 and encourages data collectors to work with a third party to test
107. This element opens the door to a theoretical question regarding the right to privacy and that
different rights may extend to different kinds of information. This, although very interesting, is beyond the
scope of this paper.
108. Consider the success of online marketing firms such as Engage.com. Engage is a "leader in
audience profiling technology and maintains the world's largest database of anonymous Internet profiles."
See Engage Company information available at http://www.engage.com/company. (Fortunately, Engage
maintains the practice of keeping anonymous profile technology and thus recognizes the importance of
protecting consumer privacy.)
109. Department of Comm., supra note 6.
110. See id.
11. Id.
112. See Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) number 11 available at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/ecom/FAQ 11FINAL.htm (regarding dispute resolution and enforcement). To satisfy
the first and third elements of the enforcement principle, an organization can either (1) comply with a privacy
program developed in the private sector that incorporates the Safe Harbor Principles into its rules and that
includes effective enforcement mechanisms; (2) comply with legal or regulatory supervisory authorities that
provide for handling of complaints; or (3) commit to cooperate with European data protection authorities. To
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its practices. By bringing in a third party, such as a certifying organization (like
TRUSTe) or legal counsel, there is a greater likelihood that unbiased judgment
will be made that the data collector could serve the needs of concerned
consumers.
3. Implementation of the SHP in the U.S.
The principles of Safe Harbor allow for "controlled self-regulation." Data
collectors could implement the principles themselves and get a stamp of
approval from a government agency (currently the United States Department of
Commerce)." 3 This would appeal to U.S. interests that believe business should
decide how to manage the collection of consumer data. Further, pursuant to
Article 4 of the E.U. Data Directive, American law will still govern U.S.
businesses. 4 Despite criticism from the European Parliament," 5 the European
Council and the United States have agreed to follow the SHP.
The DOC (or its designee) will serve as a liaison for U.S. companies. It
will register organizations that are certified under the SHP"6 and maintain a
satisfy the second point, an organization must verify that the assertions it makes about its privacy program
are true either through self-assessment or outside compliance reviews.
113. See generally Official Journal of the European Communities of 23 November 1995 No. L. 281
p. 31. Art. 29. Supervisory Authority, Working Party on the Protection of Individuals. Unofficial copy
available at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/eudirective/EUDirective_.html. See also US Department of
Commerce website for the implementation of the Safe Harbor Principles which states that "to be assured of
safe harbor benefits, an organization needs to self certify annually to the Department of Commerce in writing
that it agrees to adhere to the safe harbor's requirements" available at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SafeHarborlnfo.htm.
114. This, however, is being challenged. It was recently reported that "The European Parliament
approved ... a measure that lets customers sue operators of foreign e-commerce sites in the courts of the
consumers' home countries." See Rick Perera, E. U. strengthens consumers' e-commerce rights, The Industry
Standard, September 22,2000 available at http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0, 1151,18785,00.html.
115. E.U. Parliament stated that that the Safe Harbor Principles do not offer adequate protections
because they neither provide for monetary damages for breach nor right of appeal in the United States.
116. An organization can obtain acknowledgement that it is in compliance with the SHP by self
certifying. To qualify, organizations must "provide to the Department of Commerce (or its designee) a letter,
signed by a corporate officer on behalf of the organization that is joining the safe harbor, that contains at least
the following information:
I. name of organization, mailing address, email address, telephone and fax
numbers;
2. description of the activities of the organization with respect to personal
information received from the EU; and
3. description of the organization's privacy policy for such personal information,
including:
a. where the privacy policy is available for viewing by the public,
b. its effective date of implementation,
c. a contact office for the handling of complaints, access requests, and any
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publicly available list of all organizations that are in compliance with the
SHP." '7 This will facilitate business to business transfers of information by
reducing the pre-transfer due diligence. The DOC's list currently registers
sixty-seven registered U.S. based data collectors." 8
V. PENDING QUESTIONS: CRITICISM OF THE SAFE HARBOR PRINCIPLES
1. Does the SHP offer sufficient protection?
Privacy advocates have long been skeptical of self-regulation. In February
of 2000, Marc Rotenberg, director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center,
stated that U.S. "self-regulation is inviting a 'race to the bottom."' 19 This
concern illustrates a need for a mandatory and enforceable standard-of-care for
data collectors. It also speaks to the weaknesses behind the FIPP and OECD
Guidelines. Because neither required comprehensive adoption, they were
subject to being applied incompletely and therefore only offering incomplete
protection. In essence, both were subject to abuse because data collectors could
partially adopt the recommendations and still say that they were attentive to
FIPP.
The Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue ("TACD"), a consumer advocate,
has expressed concern that international consumer privacy protection is
necessary. 2° The increasingly international e-marketplace demands an
international set of standards. Further, the TACD does "acknowledge that the
other issues arising under the safe harbor,
d. the specific statutory body that has jurisdiction to hear any claims against
the organization regarding possible unfair or deceptive practices and
violations of laws or regulations governing privacy (and that is listed in
the annex to the Principles),
e. name of any privacy programs in which the organization is a member,
f. method of verification (e.g. in-house, third party), and
g. the independent recourse mechanism that is available to investigate
unresolved complaints." http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/ecom/FAQ6Self
CertFINAL.htm.
117. See Safe Harbor Privacy Principles FAQ No. 6 para. 4 available at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/ecom/FAQ6SelfCertFINAL.htm.
118. Department of Commerce Safe Harbor List at
http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsf/webPages/safe+harbor+list. (last visited June 30, 2001).
119. Keith Perine, The Indust. Stand., How Private Is Private Enough? (Feb 28, 2000) available at
http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/O, 1151,12348,00.html.
120. See Press Release, TACD, Consumer Groups Warn That Safe Harbor Privacy Proposal Will
Undermine Consumers' Legal Rights (Mar. 30, 2000) at
http://www.tacd.org/press-releases/wam300300.html.
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current text of the safe harbor agreement represents some progress" despite the
fact that they "maintain their reservations."'
2
'
The progress that the SHP represent is significant. It is distillation of the
widely supported U.S. FIPP and OECD Guidelines. Rather that risking a race
to the bottom, the SHP represent affirmative action in favor of comprehensive
adoption of the FIPP and the OECD Guidelines.
2. Is There Protection From Discrimination?
Another concern about the SHP, as with any standard, is that data
collectors will discriminate against consumers that choose not to disclose their
personal information. Goods or services may be withheld if information is not
provided. Or worse, goods or services may not be offered based on the
information collected.
Although this is a concern, there is no provision in the SHP to address
discriminatory practices by data collectors. In the event of such discrimination,
national discrimination laws would most likely apply. Although this is beyond
the scope to this article, the desire for transparent data collection practices
would most likely reveal such discrimination and facilitate proper prosecution.
3. Does the E.U. Gets Greater Protection Than U.S.?
The TACD also criticizes the SHP because they are a watered down
version of the E.U. Data Directive and therefore "compromise the privacy
interests of European citizens. ' The compromise, however, is not substantial.
As discussed above, the SHP has adopted the elements of the E.U. Data
Directive and was developed in accordance with the E.U. Data Directive.
Although, the SHP streamline the E.U. Data Directive, they still serve to
maintain the rights provided through the E.U. Data Directive. European citizens
are not sacrificing their legal rights with the implementation of the SHP.
Further, because legislative intent is a well established technique for interpreting
legislation, courts will most likely look directly to the E.U. Data Directive to
interpret violations of the SHP. Admittedly, this will be on a case by case basis
and will not be determined until the SHP is the subject of court proceedings.
As discussed above, the SHP only apply to citizens of E.U. member
nations. This affords E.U. citizens greater protections than U.S. citizens.
Comprehensive U.S. consumer privacy legislation has been slow in the making.
Although there have been some efforts2 3 nothing has been passed. Likewise,
121. Id.
122. TACD Safe Harbor Proposal and International Convention on Privacy Protection, Doc. No
Ecom 8-99 at http://www.tacd.org/ecommercef.html#consumer.
123. See supra notes 86 and 87.
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I advocate that the SHP be used as a template for comprehensive U.S. consumer
privacy legislation. This would raise the bar in the U.S. to one closer to that of
Europe.
4. Does the SHP Lack Enforcement and Accountability?
Enforcement of the SHP has been questioned.' 24  One of the primary and
most often sited criticisms of the SHP is that the SHP will be unenforceable.' 25
This concern is based in part on the belief that consumers will not have a forum
to bring complaints, making redress difficult. Although in the past this concern
may have been well grounded, recent developments offer a promising likelihood
that redress will be available.
Recent FTC actions and statements illustrates that consumer privacy is an
area of concern.'26 The FTC' s traditionally pro-business reputation is ebbing. 27
The FTC has abandoned its support of industry self-regulation in favor of
legislative efforts to protect consumer privacy. 28  In addition to this revised,
consumer-privacy-friendly stance, the FTC has created precedent for the
enforcement of privacy policies. Consider the FTC's actions in the case against
GeoCities.' 29 The FTC brought action for deceptive practices in the collection
and use of consumers' personal information because GoeCities misrepresented
their privacy policy in violation of the FTC Act. 3°
124. See generally Julie Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 461 (2000). See also, Press Release, supra note 120. TACD maintains "reservations [... above all, on
the issue of effective enforcement; and TACD, Safe Harbor, Doc. Ecom-07/03/01 The most significant
shortfall of the Safe Harbor Principles is the lack of enforcement and accountability.
125. See Fromholz, supra note 124 at 475. In this article, Ms. Fromholz argues that safe harbor will
not be enough of a permanent protection because protection laws are still outstanding and cannot be effective
without further US policy and law enforcement. "In addition, the Directive requires so much oversight of
even individual data transfers that the transaction costs of implementing a system that fulfilled the
requirements for every transfer could be prohibitive. It would seem to make little sense for the U.S. and other
third countries to spend significant resources attempting to comply with a regulation that cannot realistically
be enforced."
126. See Federal Trade Comm'n, supra note 8. The FTC states "that self-regulatory initiatives to date
fall far short of broad-based implementation of effective self-regulatory programs" (emphasis added).
127. See Reidenberg, supra note 86.
128. Federal Trade Comm'n, supra note 8, http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf.
"Ongoing consumer concerns regarding privacy online and the limited success of self-regulatory efforts to
date make it time for government to act to protect consumers' privacy on the Internet. Accordingly, the
Commission recommends that Congress enact legislation to ensure adequate protection of consumer privacy
online."
129. In the Matter of GeoCities, 1999 WL 69858 (Feb. 5, 1999) (F.T.C.). The Decision and Order
is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/l1999/9902/9823015.do.htm.
130. See id.
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GeoCities operated a website that created a community of individual
homepages. This community consisted of about 2 million users, including
adults and children.' 3 ' Consumers were required to complete an online
application form disclosing personal information. GeoCities then created a
database that included e-mail and postal addresses, member interest areas, and
demographics including income, education, gender, marital status and
occupation.' 32 This information was then disclosed to third parties. The FTC
brought the complaint and followed up with the charge. Although GeoCities
settled the case with no admission of wrongdoing, this shows that the FTC is
concerned with consumer privacy and is willing to investigate potential
violations of consumer rights. The FTC has also probed sites such as
iVillage.com and HeathCentral.com "for possible unfair and deceptive trade
practices" resulting from "improperly shar[ing] information with third parties"
or "violat[ing] their stated privacy policies.' ' 3
Foreseeing the concern for the protection of consumer privacy, there, has
also been Congressional action and the U.S. Department of Commerce released
a memorandum addressing the issue.'34 Enforcement will be initiated in the
private sector and will move to the federal arena if the private sector does not
respond effectively. 35' Data collectors are required to have a dispute resolution
system to investigate and resolve complaints. 36 This provides for the initial
contact. If matters are not handled adequately, a data subject can seek relief
under "federal or state law prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts" or the False
Statements Act.137 The FTC would be a likely candidate to challenge violations
131. Press Release, FTC, Internet Site Agrees to Settle FTC Charges of Deceptively Collecting
Personal Information in Agency's First Internet Privacy Case (FTC File No. 982 3015) (Aug. 13, 1998)
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9808/geocitie.htm. Copies of the complaint, the proposed consent
order, the analysis of the proposed consent order to aid public comment, the brochure, "Site-Seeing on the
Internet," as well as information, including Commission reports and testimony about its privacy initiative are
available from the FTC's web site at http://www.ftc.gov and also from the FTC's Consumer Response Center,
Room 130, 6th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 25080; 202-FTC-HELP (202-382-
4357).
132. See id.
133. See Keith Perine, FTC Probes Health Site Privacy, The Indust. Stand., (Feb. 18,2000) available
at http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0, 1151,11120,00.html.
134. See Safe Harbor Enforcement Overview Federal and State "Unfair and Deceptive Practices"




137. Id. The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Transportation with respect to air
carriers and ticket agents have both stated in letters to the European Commission that they will take
enforcement action against organizations that state that they are in compliance with the safe harbor framework
but then fail to live up to their statements." Id. Further, If an organization "frequently fails to comply with
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where websites claim to adhere to the SHP but do not offer the required
protections.
The remaining criticism over the enforcement of the SHP is that they only
apply to Europeans and others living outside of the United States. They should
serve as a framework for comprehensive U.S. legislation. In fact, a bill was
introduced in the 106th Congress to adopt legislation to "protect the privacy of
American consumers."' 38 This bill, short title "Consumer Privacy Protection
Act", embraces the FIPP in full and applies not only to data collectors but also
to third parties, thus accounting for onward transfer of data.
Although the FTC is still developing its privacy protection expertise, it has
made commendable strides toward the protection of consumer privacy and is
currently the only agency overseeing compliance with privacy protection
policies. Other options include setting up a separate agency to monitor privacy
violations. Professor Paul Schwartz advocates the appointment of a privacy
commissioner.139 Professor Schwartz believes that this commissioner should do
more than just enforce privacy standards and should "assist the public, social
groups, and the legislature in understanding strengths and weaknesses in the
boundaries of existing information territories." 40 Similar suggestions have also
arisen through the TACD. 4 ' Although this is an interesting option and one that
deserves consideration, I will not discuss it further in this article. For the
purposes of this article, it is sufficient to note that some federal entity (currently
the FTC) is monitoring privacy violations.
Lastly, the element of enforcement gives the SHP teeth. These teeth,
however, must adapt to inevitable changes in technology. By not specifying
which specific mechanisms must be in place, the SHP remain flexible and
enable a system of communication between data collector and data subject
rather than rigid specifications. This communication will facilitate an
environment that will "create new markets and opportunities for the
development of privacy protecting products."' 42 Our new economy requires
the requirements to the point where its claim to comply is no longer credible" action may be taken under the
False Statements Act (18 U.S.C. § 1001). This also addresses the Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD)
concern that there are not satisfactory procedures for consumers when they have a grievance. See
http://www.epic.org/privacy/intl/TACD-SH comments_0300.html (Submission of the TACD concerning the
U.S. Department of Commerce Draft International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and FAQs, published on
March 15, 2000).
138. S. 2606, 106th Cong., (2000).
139. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1680
(1999).
140. Id.
141. See TACD, supra note 122.
142. Reidenberg, supra note 127 at 790. Reidenberg argues that adoption of the OECD Guidelines,
combined with the creation of a "data privacy commissioner", would enhance consumer privacy protections.
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adaptability. What might seem required today may become antiquated by
tomorrow. Effective regulations are adaptive regulations and enforcement is
thus strengthened by such flexibility.
VI. SHARING THE BURDEN: TECHNOLOGIES THAT ENHANCE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SAFE HARBOR PRINCIPLES
It is not hard for an individual to recognize when their home or vehicle has
been broken into; the evidence of broken windows or missing items is apparent
to the naked eye. The collection of data, on the other hand, is not so apparent.
With the aid of developments in technology, consumers will be able to help
defend themselves against abuses. The victim of theft can report that theft to the
appropriate authorities as soon as it is noticed. With the SHP in place, the
involved and educated consumer who becomes victim to privacy or data
collection abuses will be able to seek redress with haste. Consumer privacy
technology can help prevent "the tremendous risk that incomplete national
assumptions will be powerful, that multinational media giants will assert
themselves, and that imperfect enforcement schemes will allow loopholes and
cheating."' 43
1. Developments in the E-Marketplace: Giving The Consumer Tools To
Survive
There are three aspects of the e-marketplace that have considerable impact
on the consumers' ability to navigate safely. These areas are: 1) the existing
technology and architecture of the internet, 2) software upgrades, and 3) third
party service providers. They each represent avenues impacting consumers'
ability to enforce privacy rights and personal data protection. The SHP may
provide a safety net but that net must be secure. Technology will enable
consumers to become experienced and proficient in the protection of personal
data and thus serves to offer security on the frontlines of privacy abuses - with
the consumers.
2. Code: Creating The Need For Protection
Before evaluating the services and technologies available, it is important
to consider why they are helpful. The history of privacy protection in the U.S.
has been one of competing interests. Products are developed that facilitate
communication. However, in facilitating communication, these products also
Although I agree with the substance and insightful comments of the article, the Safe Harbor Principles would
be an effective replacement for the OECD Guidelines.
143. Lance Liebman, An Institutional Emphasis, 32 CONN. L. REV. 923 at 927.
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expose the user to easy intrusions to privacy. Consider the telephone, which led
to wiretapping and caller identification. These developments made it necessary
for regulations to be imposed and legal boundaries considered.'"
Privacy protection has developed part and parcel with efforts to regulate
technology (also known as "code," a term made famous by Lawrence Lessig in
his book, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace45). Regulation can be achieved
either through imposing laws (such as forbidding wiretapping without a
warrant) or by erecting walls (such as allowing the use of a caller-identification
unit that can take advantage of telecommunications code to identify callers). 146
However, despite its heavy influence, "architecture is not pre-determined" and
"can be made subject to reason, public debate, and the rule of law.' ' 147 On the
internet, code permits not only considerable collection, but also undetected
collection. There are no walls to protect the flow of personal data. Although
cookies may pop up to inform the user they are being set, many cookies never
get noticed. They sit in the consumers hard-drive until they expire. This is the
code we have. Effective enforcement of privacy standards will depend on
adapting to it.
Professor Lawrence Lessig convincingly argues that the internet can be
governed by architectural techniques ("code") to protect fundamental and
constitutional values. He also illustrates that the same architecture or code can
be used to destroy those values.'48 The truth of this is undisputed; however the
impact of this concept is widely discussed. 49  For purposes of this article,
however, the fact that code plays a predominant role in the governing of
fundamental rights is taken as a given. Further, as communication technologies
become more sophisticated, numerous devices are capable of using the internet,
all with different operating systems (and therefore different codes). Consider
Microsoft's closed source software, Linux's open source software, Palm, Inc.'s
144. Consider two widely cited U.S. Supreme Court cases, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928). Although the majority held that telephone conversations were not protected within the 4th
Amendment, Justice Brandeis dissented on the ground that time works changes and brings into existence new
conditions and purposes. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). One has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a telephone booth.
145. See infra note 154.
146. See Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace And The State Action Debate: The Cultural Value Of
Applying Constitutional Norms To Private Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263-64 (2000). Although
Professor Berman is primarily concerned with the State Action Doctrine of the 14th Amendment, he states
that "it is important to realize that both the law and the wall function as regulatory tools."
147. Rotenberg, supra note 65.
148. See Lawrence Lessig, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
149. See generally Rotenberg, supra note 65; Lawrence Lessig, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New
Legal Paradigm? 52 STAN. L. REV. 987 (2000); and David Post, What Larry Doesn't Get: Code, Law, And
Liberty In Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1439 (2000).
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hand held devices, and the variety of internet capable cellular telephones. Each
of these use the internet to communicate and each of these is capable of
collecting and transmitting data.
The code itself is secondary to the fundamental rights of consumers. The
safety net provided by the SHP does not distinguish between codes any more
that it distinguishes retail transactions from wholesale (i.e. not at all).
Increased use of the e-marketplace will create an educated consumer base
and familiar landscape. Consumers could then watch out for each other.
Consider the Neighborhood Crime Watch programs. 5° If a violation is spotted,
it is reported to the proper authorities. In the case of internet privacy, a data
collector who abuses consumer privacy and personal data can be reported by
those in the "neighborhood." Therefore, with the proper tools the consumer can
work with the code of the e-marketplace and play a valuable role in the
enforcement of standards.
3. For The Do-It-Yourself ers: Privacy And Data Protection Technology
The e-marketplace is what we make of it. It provides mass-customization
by default. The sites I visit, the products I buy, and the services I use are all a
product of my preferences. My preferences are also valued for the information
that it reveals about me.' 5' I accept this; however, I also want some control.
Development of an open source system that codes my preferences may be
above my abilities and is generally reserved to those sophisticated enough to
develop software programs. As Paul Schwartz discussed in the third section of
Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, it may be best to have a variety of
privacy protection devices and techniques.' 52 Fortunately, software developers
are creating programs to expose industry practices. Examples include: Platform
for Privacy Preferences (P3P) 5 3; Firewalls; and/or Microsoft's Beta security
150. For an example of a Neighborhood Crime Watch program see
http://www.state.ma.us/dhcd/components/crimewatch/programs.htm.
151. Professor Schwartz states that "information technology in cyberspace also affects privacy in
ways that are dramatically different from anything previously possible. By generating comprehensive records
of online behavior, information technology can broadcast an individual's secrets in ways that she can neither
anticipate nor control. Once linked to the Internet, the computer on our desk becomes a potential recorder and
betrayer of our confidences. In the absence of strong privacy rules, cyberspace's civic potential will never be
attained." Schwartz, supra note 29 at 1610-11.
152. Id. at 1681-1701 (1999). Although Professor Schwartz does not specifically advocate software
developments as a means of protecting the consumer, he recognizes that one technique alone may not be
enough.
153. P3P is a filtering technology developed by the World Wide Web Consortium. Once a consumer
downloads P3P and responds to questions, P3P reviews website's privacy policies and notifies the consumer
if the policy does not conform to the preferences indicated. Consumers can also set preferences in their brow-
sers to control data released and are notified if more information is requested. See http://www.w3.org/P3P.
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patch for Internet Explorer 5.5. 14 There are numerous other products also,
information for which is easily accessible on the internet. 
155
These software developments facilitate consumer education and
independence. If you do not want your home broken into, put locks or an alarm
on the door. Consumer technology works in a similar manner. P3P lets
consumers program their browsers to alert them of incompatible requests for
data. It then allows the consumer decide when to "open the door" and let data
go. 56 However, this alone is not enough without the SHP. It places the burden
of protection on consumers.
Although consumers need to be informed decision makers, they should not
be solely responsible. As Graham Pearce and Nicholas Platten observe in their
article Orchestrating Transatlantic Approaches To Personal Data Protection:
A European Perspective, products such as P3P "must be applied within the
context of a framework of enforceable data protection rules, which provide a
minimum and non-negotiable level of privacy protection for all individuals."' 57
Therefore, products like P3P, that shift data protection responsibility from data
collectors to data subjects, fall short of the privacy protections prescribed by the
E.U.
Microsoft's beta patch is also a good step toward educating consumers.
Many consumers are just learning about cookies and this technology not only
helps explain where they come from and what they do, but also gives consumers
an easy way to check cookies installed on their computers and be notified of
who planted them. Consumers are also given the option to refuse third party
cookies.'58 However, as Microsoft's director of corporate privacy, Richard
Purcell, has stated, cookie management "alone is not the answer to consumer
privacy" ... but it will help "facilitat[e] online privacy."'' 59
This distinction between first and third parties raises concern all its own.
When does an entity become a third party? Is a parent a third party if data is
collected by a subsidiary? What about longstanding affiliations and symbiotic
relationships, where both parties exist for mutual cooperation? Consider the
154. The beta patch is a means of "cookie-management" for Internet Explorer 5.5. "The new features
will automatically provide consumers with a clearer understanding of different types of cookies and where
they originate-as well as an easy way to manage and delete them." See
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2000/julOO/07-2Ocookies.asp.
155. A good start for many privacy enhancing technologies is available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/privacy/900workshop/demoslist3.htm.
156. See World Wide Web Consortium, PLATFORM FOR PRIVACY PREFERENCES (P3P) PROJECT at
http://www.w3.org/P3P.
157. Graham Pearce & Nicholas Platten, Orchestrating Transatlantic Approaches To Personal Data
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case of Toys 'R' Us.com and Coremetrics, data analysis services. A class action
suit was brought against Toys 'R' Us because Coremetrics was obtaining
personal information including "customer names, addresses, and other sensitive
data" from Toys 'R' Us shoppers. 6 This "sharing" of information was
discovered by "Internet security expert Matt Curtin."'' Although Toys 'R' Us
has ended this relationship, the issue illustrates why a safety net like the one
created through the SHP is an important step, yet is strengthened by
technologies and services made available to consumers.
Alone, consumer privacy technology creates a "bottom-up" method of
protection, and regulations alone create a "top-down" method. The SHP, when
viewed in light of emerging technologies and services, offer a middle of the
road approach. The establishment of adequate privacy and data protection to
consumers alone will not ensure high standards 62 , but enabling consumers to
take an active role in privacy protection facilitates the development of a
consumer-friendly e-marketplace.
Although the individual should be part of the privacy and data protection
process, "it can no longer reasonably be considered the only part.' 63 The SHP
promote consumer involvement in the data collection process. However, they
also impose responsibilities on the data collectors and government, thus
balancing the competing interests in the e-marketplace. 6
In addition to developments in technology, developments in consumer
services also protect the consumer. These services have some advantages over
the technology. As we will see, they create a system where those with
knowledge and experience assist those without.
160. Chris Oakes, Toys R Us Ends Data Practice?, Aug. 16, 2000.
161. Chris Oakes, Lack of Notice Snags E-Service, Aug. 2, 2000.
162. Professor Schwartz uses the term "autonomy trap" to illustrate that "a critical mass of
sophisticated privacy consumers is not yet emerging" and "the rest of us cannot free-ride on the efforts of
those who are more savvy about data privacy on the Internet." Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the
State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 822 (2000). However, Professor Schwartz uses this "autonomy trap" situation
as a spring board for advocating regulatory standards. These standards would establish a safety net much like
the Safe Harbor Principles which require care and responsibility of data collectors.
163. Fred H. Cate, Principles of Internet Privacy, 32 CONN. L. REV. 877 (2000).
164. Id. at 880. Professor Cate points out that "United States has historically balanced competing
interests" and "identifying the constitutional standard by which those balances are achieved has been one of
the major tasks of the Supreme Court in the latter half of the twentieth century."
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VII. THIRD PARTIES To THE RESCUE: PROVIDING KNOWLEDGE AND KNOW-
How To CONSUMERS
As discussed above, the majority of consumers may not be knowledgeable
enough to program their own operating system or develop monitoring
technology. Fortunately, we are living in a time of entrepreneurial productivity
and the internet has spurred considerable entrepreneurial activity. Where
software developments have left off, third parties have taken the initiative to
create non-governmental consumers' assistance and protection companies.
These companies are often referred to as "trusted third parties" or "info-
mediaries." The concept is not complicated. Essentially, they act as middle-
men and monitor the e-marketplace for the consumer. Because it may be
impractical for consumers to investigate privacy policies themselves, these third
parties can be hired to do the legwork and report the results.
Examples of these third parties include: TRUSTe 65, BBBOnline 66, and
The Personalization Consortium. 167 There are others which are easily accessible
through the intemet.168 Each of these organizations approach privacy and data
protection from a different perspective which are reflected in their services and
goals. However, they all educate and assist in the development of privacy
policies. Professor Schwartz has noted that these third parties can also provide
value to the e-marketplace by providing "a venue for seeking redress after
violations of privacy agreements."'' 69 Although it is clear that these services
alone provide inadequate protections to consumers, they can become effective
165. See http://www.truste.com. "TRUSTe is an independent, non-profit privacy initiative dedicated
to building users' trust and confidence on the Internet." They have developed a privacy seal program that
alerts consumers to the protections provided while also assisting data collectors in the management of
consumer personal data.
166. See http://www.bbbonline.org. BBBOnline is a subsidiary of the Council of Better Business
Bureaus that also offers services to both business and consumers. It has created a seal that identifies
"companies that stand behind their privacy policies and have met the program requirements of notice, choice,
access and security in the use of personally identifiable information." BBBOnline also provides means for
consumers to file complaints.
167. See http://www.personalization.org. Developed by and for marketing companies, including
Doubleclick, PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, and American Airlines "to promote the development and use
of responsible one-to-one marketing technology and practices on the World Wide Web ... by expanding the
scope and use of personalization technology that respects consumer privacy." Although clearly the effort of
marketing firms, this consortium provides services and a forum that seeks to develop the e-marketplace in
light of consumer concerns over privacy and data protection.
168. Examples include but are not limited to: PNI, available at http://www.privacyrights.org; the
Online Privacy Alliance, available at http://www.privacyalliance.org; the Network Advertising Initiative,
available at http://www.networkadvertising.org, and the ISA Service Provider Principles / Individual
References Industry Principles available at http://www.bna.com/e-law/docs/dbguides.html.
169. Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1681 (1999).
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catalysts for upholding the standards imposed by privacy directives such as the
SHP.
There are limits to the effectiveness of these third parties, though. A chain
is created that distances the consumer from the e-marketplace. This distance is
potentially a weakness. Without direct participation, consumer values and
conveniences to consumers might be sacrificed. The consumer's fate is also
being trusted to a third party. Although that third party would hopefully be
looking out for the best interests of the consumer, the consumer would not be
playing any role in the monitoring of privacy policies and accuracy of
information collected. This is contradicts the SHP and the spirit of openness
that they embrace. An open marketplace will benefit from diversity of input.
Third party services can play the valuable role of informing, educating and
otherwise serving consumers, thereby enhancing the sophistication of the
marketplace.
Alone, neither technology nor services will solve privacy and data
protection concerns, but taken together with the standards created through the
SHP consumer privacy concerns are greatly reduced. 7 The SHP create a safety
net that facilitates exchanges in a global e-marketplace.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Just as the E.U. Data Directive was not "a radical departure from existing
privacy laws" in European countries and was therefore easily adopted in "effort
to harmonize commerce and privacy rights,"'' the SHP are not a radical
departure from current U.S. approaches to the protection of consumer privacy
and use of personal data. The SHP were designed to "fill in [...] gaps in United
States privacy statutes"'72 and therefore do not conflict with previous U.S.
developments.
Commerce has been a tremendous avenue for growth and both consumers
and service providers have legitimate concerns in the e-marketplace' 73 The
SHP are sensitive to such concerns and benefit everyone in the e-marketplace:
170. Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Standards and the Future of the Net,
14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 759, 768 (1999). "The only enemy is in the extremes." Although Professor Lessig
was commenting on the difference between open and closed source software, the principle applies well to the
case at hand. Consumer privacy and data protection is best served through the use of complementing systems.
171. Peter P. Swire & Robert E. Litan, None Of Your Business: World Data Flows, Electronic
Commerce, and the European Privacy Directive, 12 HARV. L. J. & TECH. 683 at 683.
172. Fromholz, supra note 125, at 476.
173. The trade of personal information itself has considerable value in the marketplace. The U.S.
FTC, in a case concerning the "sale of target marketing lists, with consumer information" found that "The total
gross annual revenue of companies supplying consumer direct marketing lists and file enhancement data may
be $1.5 billion." In re Trans Union, FTC Docket No. 9255, at 53 (July 31, 1998) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9808/d9255pub.id.pdf.
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consumers, because the SHP lay the groundwork required for active consumer
involvement in the data collection process; commercial business, because the
SHP allow continued collection of consumer data with minimal practical
restraints; and governments, because the SHP provide groundwork for effective
and meaningful legislation adaptable to a globalized era.
Legislative action is a prudent step to ensure the future of the SHP.
Comprehensive consumer privacy protection legislation would "improve the
functioning of a privacy market and play a positive role in the development of
privacy norms."'174 Professor Schwartz outlined two steps that Government
could take. The first step is to "discourage a default of maximum information
disclosure" and two "encourage a market for privacy enhancing technology."'' 75
As discussed above of these is addressed by the SHP.
The purpose of this article has been to illustrate that adopting the SHP will
level the playing field on which consumers and commercial interests coexist.
A safety net is necessary, one that will require minimum standards and create
an environment of openness. The Safe Harbor Principles do just that.
174. Schwartz, supra note 162, at 816-17.
175. Id. at 854.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The concern over protection of Intellectual Property has been an issue for
over 500 years. The basis behind the issue is to promote innovation by
restricting competition, thus, guaranteeing the return of investments into
research and development. This represents a very delicate balance between the
corporations and individuals discovering these new ideas and the people that
might benefit from them. The inventor is rewarded for his innovation with an
exclusive right to sell the product and collect profits. This issue becomes
increasingly sensitive when dealing with rights to patents of medicines held by
corporations, but needed by millions of people with serious diseases. The cost
of development of the drugs is high, but the demand is even higher, although the
most needy of the people are typically not the ones that can afford them.
The United States, along with the other developed countries of the world,
stands for strict protection of intellectual property rights. With the creation of
* J.D. student at the Shepard Broad Law Center at Nova Southeastern University. Mr. Mullin has
an environmental engineering degree from the University of Florida, and for the two years prior to starting
law school, he worked as a civil engineer. He wishes to dedicate this article to his wife and parents for their
support and understanding.
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the World Trade Organization, developing countries facing health crises, such
as HIV/AIDS, were given a forum to express their concerns and needs for
cheaper alternatives to the costly drugs produced by mostly American
corporations. Although agreements were signed that provided options for these
developing nations, trade pressure and legal threats by the United States and
other developed nations prevented these options from being fully utilized.
Then came September 11 th and the anthrax outbreaks, and suddenly it
seemed as though the United States was singing a different tune. The United
States warned that it would use the same options against Cipro manufacturer,
Bayer AG, that it had prevented developing and least-developed countries from
relying on to receive cheap AIDS drugs. The rest of the world was in an uproar
over the United States' double standard and the full repercussions from this act
have yet to be fully realized.
11. THE CREATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO)
AND THE TRIPs AGREEMENT
The Paris Convention, established in 1883, was the first important
international treaty offering the protection of patents and other intellectual
property.' It was based upon a national treatment principle in which the patent
owner was only granted rights in the patent granting country.' As a result, an
inventor who wanted to protect his invention in multiple countries had to file for
patent protection in each country which he wanted protection.3 The main
weakness of the Convention was that it did not require standardized patent laws
among the participating countries and it offered no enforcement remedies in
cases of infringement.4
Although the Paris Convention did go through several revisions, laws
protecting intellectual property rights remained the same for nearly one hundred
years. With the advent of many new technologies in the later parts of the
twentieth century, public policy demanded greater intellectual property rights.5
The Uruguay Round, which represented seven and a half years of negotiations
ending in 1994, is considered the largest series of trade negotiations that have
1. John A. Harrelson, IV. Note, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIVIAIDS Crisis: Finding
the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, 7 WID. L. SYMP. J. 175, 178
(2001).
2. Id. Belgium, Brazil, France, Ecuador, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador,
Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom approved the Convention in 1884 and the United
States ratified it in 1887. See id., infra note 24.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 179.
5. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Comment, Coining of Age with TRIPS: A Comment on J.H.
Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?,
33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 179 (2001).
ever occurred.6 The first round of the negotiations occurred at a ministerial
meeting of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) members in
Punta del Este, Uruguay.7 The importance of intellectual property rights to the
United States' economy was just then being fully realized and the dominant
countries were in agreement that more protection was better and that changes
would always come in the direction of the intellectual property rights.8
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations culminated with the
signing of the Marrakesh Agreement 9 in April 1994.0 The Agreement
established the World Trade Organization (WTO) and on January 1, 1995, it
took effect." One of the agreements, signed as part of the Marrakesh
Agreement, was the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs). 2 The 1995 agreement globalized trade rules, including setting up
universal intellectual property rights. 3 The TRIPs agreement is considered the
most comprehensive and influential agreement on international intellectual
property rights and it establishes the minimum standards on copyrights and
related rights, including computer programs and databases, trademarks,
geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, integrated circuits, and
trade secrets. 14  Every WTO member or country wishing to join the
Organization was required to set up patent offices and legislate patent laws,
protect copyrights, and fight piracy. 5 Article 8(1) of TRIPs stated that members
could adopt measures necessary to public health, provided that such measures
were consistent with the other articles of the agreement. 6 The treaty allowed
that compulsory licenses be granted to countries, which then permitted the
making, using, or selling of a design against the patent owner's wishes. 7 Broad
6. Trading into the Future: The Introduction to the WTO, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/fact5 e.htm (last visited July 13, 2002). The Uruguay
Round is a title used to encompass almost eight years of negotiations that occurred in Punta del Este,
Montreal, Geneva, Brussels, Washington, Tokyo and, Marrakesh.
7. Id.
8. Dreyfuss, supra note 5.
9. WTO: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Trade Compliance
Center, available at http://199.88.185.106/tcc/data/commerce-html/TCC_2/WTOMarrakesh-Agreement
.html (last visited June 27, 2002).
10. Trading into the Future: The Introduction to the WTO, supra note 6.
11. Id.
12. GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the Uruguay Round): Agreement on the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPs].
13. Carlyn Kolker, Doing the Doha Shuffle - At a WTO Meeting, Nations Agreed to Break
Pharmaceutical Patents During Emergencies. Or did They?, THE AM. LAW., Feb. 2002.
14. Carlos M. Correa, Life after the Agreement, Bus. LINE, Mar. 11, 2002.
15. Kolker, supra note 13.
16. See TRIPs, supra note 13, at art. 8(1).
17. Kolker, supra note 13.
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discretion was permitted by the agreement for determining when compulsory
licenses would be afforded; it was up to the individual country to determine
what situation required a compulsory license. 18
The agreement created new conflicts within developing countries because
the protection of intellectual property rights was not a part of the culture of
many countries. 9 One hundred seventeen nations signed the TRIPs agreement
allowing intellectual property rights to be enforced by trade sanctions, despite
this lack of tradition.2" Although they had reservations about strengthening their
intellectual property rights, many developing countries signed the TRIPs
agreement because they were concerned about their own economic growth and
participation in the WTO was essential for them to accomplish this.2'
The TRIPs agreement took effect January 1, 1995, but under the
agreement, WTO members had a transition period in which to comply with the
obligations required by the agreement. 22 Developed countries had until January
1, 1996 to comply, whereas developing countries had until January 1, 2000, and
the least-developed countries had until January 1, 2006 to come into full
compliance. 23 The goal of the agreement was the development of a framework
for insuring the requirement of intellectual property protection was met, while
allowing those countries facing a national health crisis to be able to provide
adequate and cost effective treatments and medicines to combat the
emergency.
24
The United States was reluctant to sign the agreement as it was against
compulsory licensing, but did eventually sign.25 Many countries already had
compulsory licensing laws, but were reluctant to use them for fear of upsetting
the intellectual property community.26  The United States pharmaceutical
industry lobbied against the TRIPs agreement, relying on the "slippery slope"
argument, a legal fiction, believing that once one country was awarded a
compulsory license, then all developing or least-developed countries would
18. Id.
19. Harrelson, supra note 1, at 176.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Committee Report, Scope of the Committee: Intellectual Property as They Relate to
International Trade Agreements such as the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the World Trade Organization
(WTO), 2000 A.B.A. SEC. INTELL. PROP. L. REP. 263.
23. ld.
24. Markus Nolff, Compulsory Patent Licensing in View of the WTO Ministerial Conference
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 133, 137
(2002).
25. Kolker, supra note 13.
26. Id.
request licensing.27 There are two main responses to this argument: first, that
the HIV/AIDS crisis is at epidemic proportions with millions dying from the
disease and its complications; and second, that the pharmaceutical industry
lobbied intensely to prevent the TRIPs agreement from incorporating the rules
on compulsory licensing and lost the fight; the law was approved and actions
are legal.28
The result of the agreement is that compulsory licenses may be granted to
countries to protect public health so long as the measures adopted are necessary
to protect public health and are consistent with the provision of TRIPs.29 The
first provision, "necessary to protect public health," must be given effect before
any adopted measures can be held to be consistent with the provisions of
TRIPs.30 Consistent with the provisions of TRIPs" means consistent with all of
the other applicable provisions of the Agreement; anything that affects
availability, maintenance, and revocation or forfeiture of patents must be in
agreement with the other relevant TRIPS articles.3 Exceptions to the exclusive
rights of a patent holder without authorization by the owner must be in
agreement with TRIPs articles 30 and 31.32 A basis for a potential infringement
cannot be public health, if it merely has an incidental effect on public health, for
the concern is to prevent anti-competitive behavior and abuse of patent rights.33
There must be a balance between the measure taken, namely exclusion of
patent protection, and public health. The AIDS/HIV crisis was the perfect,
albeit most controversial, case for the restriction of patent protection, especially
the anti-retroviral AIDS drugs. 34 The concern for these drugs is that the regimen
must be followed closely, eating food and drinking water at the correct times,
and taking the drugs in the correct order and at the right times. 35 Refusing to do
so could result in the generation of more resistant strands of the virus, which
creates a serious problem in underdeveloped countries where citizens lack the
proper amounts of food and water.36 Some people even feel that it may be more
27. Frederick M. Abbott, Discontinuities in the Intellectual Property Regime: The TRIPS - Legality
of Measures Taken to Address Public Health Crises: A Synopsis, 7 WID. L. SYMP. J. 71, 72 (2001).
28. Id.
29. See TRIPs, supra note 12, at art. 8(1).
30. Nolff, supra note 24, at 136.
31. Id.
32. See TRIPs, supra note 12, at art. 30, 31. Comparison of Article 30 of the TRIPs agreement to
Article XX of the GAT1 Agreement suggest that measures taken under the TRIPs agreement using the public
health theory cannot arbitrarily or unjustly discriminate against countries that have the same conditions or are
a "disguised restriction on international trade." See Nolff, supra note 24, at 136.
33. Nolff, supra note 24, at 137.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 138.
36. Id.
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cost effective to improve sanitary conditions, basic public health care, and
raising public and government awareness.
37
One main weakness in the TRIPs agreement is an absence of adequate
enforcement remedies in developing countries.38 Most likely, the court used to
resolve a dispute will be in a developed country, but the country in which the
infringement took place would be a less developed country. 39 "Choice of law"
rules in this area are underdeveloped themselves; jurisdictional issues may result
in judgments that do not protect anyone's interests.4n Countries that only have
intellectual property laws because of their joining the WTO do not have a
history of analysis of the law to allow the developed country to understand how
its laws are intended to apply.4' Courts may even be inclined to harmonize the
law between the developed and less developed countries, leading the court to
apply precedents of the developed country to the less developed country. 2
I. PATENT BREAKING AND COMPULSORY LICENSING
According to Article 31 of the TRIPs agreement, compulsory licensing is
the "use of subject matter without the authorization of the right holder. 43
Article 31 allows WTO members to use these patents, including use by
governments or third parties authorized by a government. Subsection (b)
mentions two uses: (i) "national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency;" and (ii) "public non-commercial use."'  Public non-commercial use
has been implicitly described as use by a government contractor, by or for the
government, and is referred to as the "non-commercial use exception."45 This
exception is not one used for compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals.
Each WTO member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the
freedom to determine the grounds upon which to grant them; the country must
still meet the general and specific requirements applicable for granting of a
37. Id.; See Treatment Action Campaign and Others v. Minister of Health and Others, 2001 SACLR
LEXIS 95 (2001). The President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, concluded that HIV was not the primary
cause of AIDS and determined that the distribution of Nevirapine, a drug given to HIV infected pregnant
women to prevent the passing of the virus to their child, was not necessary. In the case, the High Court of
South Africa ordered the government to provide the drug to the HIV-positive mothers, which was being
donated to South Africa free of charge by the manufacturer.





43. See TRIPs, supra note 12, at art. 31.
44. Id.
45. Nolff, supra note 24, at 140.
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compulsory license.46 Subsection (b) of Article 31 requires that compulsory
licensing can only be granted once "efforts to obtain authorization from the right
holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions have not been successful
within a reasonable period of time."47 This requirement can be waived in times
of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. If the
measure is needed in times necessary to public health, but not in an extreme
emergency, then there must have need efforts to come to reasonable commercial
terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a
reasonable amount of time.48
Although the term "compulsory license" is not used in the TRIPs
agreement, Article 31 of the agreement, when read in conjunction with Article
2(1) and Article 5.A.2 of the Paris Convention, is understood to mean that WTO
members may grant compulsory licenses. 49 The provision created by the Paris
Convention states that such measures should be taken to "prevent abuses which
might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the
patent. .. "5 Governments, including the United States, have interpreted this
requirement liberally to allow the authorizing and granting of compulsory
licenses in a wide variety of contexts.5'
One of the arguments by developing countries against compulsory
licensing is that the proceedings to be awarded a license are very costly and
protracted, imposing substantial barriers that many countries seek to avoid.
Even under administratively streamlined procedures, compulsory licenses are
subject to pharmaceutical company opposition and can lead to trade pressure
from the United States; these serve to deter humanitarian programs, which act
merely to serve public health needs in distant countries.53 Also, imposing fees
for compulsory licenses on countries that do not even have patent laws means
that a pharmaceutical company that does not have a patent in a certain country
is going to benefit from its use.54
There are arguments for compulsory licenses that favor developing
countries. The argument says that sales of the drugs will increase, offsetting the
lower pricing of the drugs, so long as a reasonable fee is granted and
46. Id.
47. Id.; See TRIPs art. 31 (b).
48. Id. at 142.
49. Abott, supra note 27, at 74.
50. Id. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 1967, article 5(A)(2).
51. Id.
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pharmaceutical manufacturers will not be significantly harmed.55 Developing
countries only account for ten percent of pharmaceutical profits internationally,
and Africa accounts for only 1.6 percent.5 6 Therefore, compulsory licensing
could result in the promotion of additional sales without impacting the ability
of pharmaceutical companies to make profits to support research and
development.57
One alternative to compulsory licensing is parallel importing. With
parallel importing, a country can search the global market for the best deal on
a patented product, as frequently, a drug manufacturer will sell a product at a
drastically different price depending on location.58 A distributor in a higher
priced location can obtain drugs from a country with lower prices and then
compete with the manufacturer in the higher priced market.59 By parallel
importing, a country can use free market forces to obtain the best price, thus,
preventing the need for domestic manufacturing capabilities, currently a TRIPs
requirement. 60
The mere threat of the generic production of patented drugs is often all that
is needed to achieve discounted prices. Developed countries use compulsory
licensing laws, which are complex and rarely used, as bargaining power for
national governments against the drug producers. 6' Developing countries can
also use generic manufacturers as a negotiating tactic to reduce the price of
brand-name drugs.6" Also, developing countries have contracted with
pharmaceutical companies to build their own domestic production facilities to
achieve technology transfer and increase their own technical capacity. 63
IV. COUNTRIES RESPOND TO TRIPS AND COMPULSORY LICENSING
Tens of millions of Africans have HIV/AIDS, but only 10,000 to 15,000
can afford medicines at their full price, even when treatment is partially
subsidized by private medical plans.' On June 12, 2001, Kenya passed a law
making it only the second country in Africa to legalize generic versions of
patented drugs against HIV/AIDS, just after President Moi declared the disease
a national disaster.65 Parliament passed the Industrial Property Bill of 2001,
55. Harrelson, supra note 1, at 191.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id., at 192.
59. Id.
60. Harrelson, supra note 1, at 192.
61. Michael A. Gollin, Practice Focus, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001, at 31.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Pan-Africa, supra note 52.
65. Kenya; Nairobi can manufacture, import HIV/Aids drugs, AFRICA NEWS, Nov. 26, 2001.
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allowing both parallel importing and production of generic anti-retroviral drugs;
Kenya is a WTO member and this created much discord with the Organization.66
The Public Health Administer said that the anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs needed
by patients could not be imported and distributed free of charge due to the
extremely high prices.67 The purpose of the Bill was to replace a previous bill,
and to allow Kenya to comply with the TRIPs agreement.6' Kenya is a member
of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property and a member
of the WTO, and according to the Kenya government, the new bill fully
addressed the requirements under the agreement.69
South Africa passed the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act of
1997, which permitted the government power to override patents. 70 Thirty-nine
drug companies filed a lawsuit against the government claiming that the new
law was unconstitutional.7 In the litigation against the South African
government, the pharmaceutical industry argued that the legislation authorizing
the Health Minister to allow parallel importation of generic drugs was too
broadly drafted and would allow the Minister to take action beyond that of
parallel importation.72 To succeed at such a claim, the pharmaceutical industry
would have to persuade the South African courts that the TRIPs agreement
directly affects South African law, essentially saying that the industry can rely
on the terms of the TRIPs agreement as the legislation in the national courts. 7 3
The European Court of Justice previously ruled that TRIPs did not directly
affect the law of the European Union and the United States Congress expressly
precluded it from having a direct effect on the law of the United States. 74 The
South African constitution had undergone several recent revisions that have
affected the way that international treaties influence the national law.75 South
African Parliament approved the Uruguay Round Agreements of 1995 and did
not stipulate specifically that the agreements would have direct effect.76 The
lawsuit was settled when all thirty-nine drug manufacturers agreed to sell the
drugs at significantly reduced prices.77
South African and Brazilian officials met to discuss the purchase of generic





70. Kevin Gopal, Tectonic Shift, PHARM. EXEC., Apr. 1, 2001 [hereinafter Tectonic Shift].
71. Id.





77. Gollin, supra note 61.
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than the brand name equivalent. 78  The South African government
acknowledged that it might be infringing on patent rights, but it felt that the
patent holder's rights should not outweigh the people's access to life saving
medicines; the government felt that this was inline with the governmental and
international public policy.7 9 The medicines imported from Brazil have patents
in South Africa, but the government felt that there is a constitutional right to life
and dignity and that providing these drugs to its citizens falls within this right.8°
The country's concern is that since the drug companies hold monopolies on the
drugs, the prices are too high.8' In response to this, the Medicine Control
Council of South Africa immediately approved the use of these generics for the
treatment of HIV/AIDS.82
In the late 1990's, Brazil had a problem providing government subsidized
access to affordable AIDS drugs and the government responded by passing laws
authorizing the domestic production of generic versions of the American
drugs.83 United States trade representatives stated, "the United States would use
its strength and international laws to modify the situation. ' 84 The United States
approves the use of compulsory licensing in impoverished countries such as
Senegal and Uganda, but in situations such as Brazil, which is considered a
middle-income country, the United States believes that Brazil has an adequate
gross domestic product and industrial support to afford the brand-name
pharmaceuticals.85
In 1996, Brazil passed legislation that guaranteed that all AIDS patients
would receive state-of-the-art treatment, provided for by the government. 86 In
1994, the World Bank estimated that by the year 2000, there would be 1.2
million people affected with AIDS; there were only 530,000.87 Brazil's use of
generic versions of HIV/AIDS drugs, coupled with a national program of
education on the disease, directly contributed to this.88
A second law passed in 1996 in Brazil declared that any product
commercialized before May 14, 1997, would remain unpatented in the country,
78. South Africa: Cosatu Statement on the Importation of Generic Antiretrovirals From Brazil,













of which most of the first generation anti-retroviral drugs lie.89 The prices of the
brand-name drugs with Brazilian equivalents have dropped almost eighty
percent, whereas drugs without Brazilian generic equivalents have only dropped
nine percent.9° In 2000, the Brazilian government spent 444 million dollars on
AIDS drugs for its citizens, but saved 422 million dollars between 1997-1999
because of the decline of hospitalizations resulting from AIDS-related
illnesses.9'
Brazil has even announced that it would be spending considerably more
money on research into an AIDS vaccine than it has ever before and plans to
work with the nations of Africa to accomplish this.92 After receiving
international acclaim for its anti-AIDS/HIV programs, Brazil's new victories
come from its contentions that drug patents can be waived in cases of public
health emergencies.93 In Brazil, it is the government institutes that conduct all
the research into the AIDS/HIV programs.9 4 The Far-Manguinhos Institute
produces seven of the fifteen medicines now used in the anti-retroviral cocktail
offered in Brazil, which has led to many new innovations, and three other drugs
are currently being developed. 95 Brazil's stand is that if the molecules are found
to be effective against resistant viruses, the patent will be public and drug
industries of any country would be free to produce them.96 The institute's
situation puts itself in a unique bargaining position for the reduction in price of
pharmaceuticals for Brazilian law provides for the granting of compulsory
licenses of generic versions of drugs in cases of public health emergencies. 97
According to the WTO and the TRIPs agreement, compulsory licenses are only
permitted in countries that have the production ability, and the Far-Manguinhos
Institute provides Brazil with this ability.98 The Health Minister of Brazil
threatened to ignore several patents and this resulted in a forty to seventy




91. Success Story, supra note 86.
92. Mario Osava, 2001-2002: Brazil's Successful Anti-AIDS Efforts Set to Expand, INTER PRESS




96. Id. Ninety-five percent of the 16,500,800 patents granted in the United States between 1977 and
1996 were awarded to only ten different industrialized countries, while during this period, developing
countries only accounted for two percent of the patents. Correa, supra note 14.
97. Osava, supra note 92.
98. Id.
99. Id. Brazil also provides education to other countries on how to produce their own versions of
the drugs. Angola now has a production facility that was partly funded by Brazil. Brazil is also intensifying
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The government now plans on concentrating on the areas that are
especially impoverished, like the north and northeast sections of the country.'0 0
Of the nearly 600,000 Brazilians infected with HIV/AIDS, most of them are not
even aware that they have contracted the virus.'0 ' Brazil recognizes the
importance of early detection and plans on continuing to produce the cheap
generic versions of the ARV combinations of drugs free of charge to its citizens,
a cost that does not overstress the national budget.' °2
In June 2001, China completed negotiations with the United States for its
accession into the WTO, which would grant China permanent normal trade
relation status.'03 China will be expected to continually comply with its WTO
obligations and this will be monitored by United States trade representatives."
China is considered a priority foreign country, since it does not maintain proper
intellectual property protection, and could have sanctions imposed against it for
failing to meet specific standards, of specific importance is compliance with the
TRIPs agreement." 5 Before 1985, China awarded no patent protection, as the
government awarded inventors of "useful" inventions with a certificate and a
cash award; China then became the owner. 10 6 With the threat of added trade
duties on all Chinese imports, China agreed to improve its system of protecting
intellectual property, passing laws that were approved on August 25, 2000, and
effective on July 1, 2001.1°7
China still has changes that it needs to make to come into full compliance
with TRIPs. Currently, China does not permit patents on inventions that are
prohibited by its country's laws. 08 Additionally, China needs to amend its laws
to include the condition that compulsory licenses will be predominately for the
domestic market and that adequate remuneration will be provided to the patent
cooperation with China and India, two countries that do not recognize patents and produce generic medicines
and chemical substances at low costs. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Osava, supra note 92.




107. Id. In 1993, consistent with article 27(1) of the TRIPs agreement, China agreed to the protection
of patenting of chemical and pharmaceutical products, as well as food, beverages, and flavorings. The
amendments also extended the period of protection from 15 to 20 years, complying with article 33 of TRIPs.
They provided for offering for sale as an exclusive right of the patent holder, hence complying with Article
28 of the TRIPs agreement. Also amended was the section of their law that limited the situations where
compulsory licenses could be granted, bringing it into compliance with Article 31 of the TRIPs agreement.
China also amended its law to provide for injunctive relief against infringement and shifted the burden of
proof to the defendant to prove that an infringement did not occur, complying with article 34(1) of TRIPs. Id.;
See generally TRIPs, supra note 12.
108. Moga, supra note 103. This expressly violates article 27(2) of TRIPs.
holder in the case a compulsory license is issued. °9 Article 41(1) of TRIPs
requires a system of enforcement and remedies in the case of an infringement
of a patent, and to conform to these requirements, China must increase criminal
penalties and reduce the threshold for minimum damages."0 Considering that
China's patent laws are less than twenty years old, the country has shown
commitment to compliance with the TRIPs agreement and the desire to be a
responsible member of the WTO. "'
India, through its Indian Patent Act of 1970, abolished all product patents
and only recognizes process patents for pharmaceutical purposes."12 Indian
manufacturers have an advantage because their manufacturing costs are forty-
five percent lower than those in the United States, and the result is that sixty
percent of the generics sold in the United States are imports.' Additionally,
in India, the government has control over maximum pricing of the drugs."4
The United Kingdom, Canada and European Union members all have
existing well-developed national patent laws giving maximum protection to
their governments. 1 5 The TRIPs provisions are not as far reaching as the
existing laws in these developed countries." 6 British law is governed by the
Patent Act of 1977, which provides for United Kingdom government exemption
from the exclusive rights held by patent owners and thus, need not apply for
compulsory licenses. ' A patent holder could have its patent invalidated by the
Crown.'18 The United Kingdom provides tax incentives to companies
researching medicines and vaccines for diseases of poverty that could total fifty
percent relief in certain situations.'' 9 Under Canadian law, 20 the government
may impose a compulsory license on the patent holder and have generic
manufacturers produce the drug, but adequate remuneration must be paid to the
patent holder to account for the economic loss.'2 '
109. Id. This would bring China into compliance with article 31(f) and (h).
110. Id.
11l. Id.
112. Bernard D'Mello, Transnational Pharmaceutical Corporations and Neo-Liberal Business Ethics
in India, 36 J. OF Bus. ETHICS 165 (2002).
113. Id.
114. Id. Additionally, India, Egypt and Pakistan are not required to adopt the medicine provisions
of the TRIPs agreement until 2005. Medicines: Commission Seeks to Square Poor Country Circle, EUR. REP.,
June 15, 2002.





120. Patent Act, § 19(4) (1985) (Can.).
121. Shashank Upadhye, After Cipro Battle, Patent-Busting is Still Live Issue. Attempts at Generic
Versions Compulsory Licensing Issues State Infringement?, 24 NAT'L L.J. (2002).
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The United States, home to most of the research-based pharmaceutical
companies, has tried to influence countries to adopt patent laws that exceed the
minimum provisions of TRIPs and totally exclude compulsory licensing. 22
Because the United States' economy is increasingly moving away from basic
manufacturing into high-technology industries, intellectual property protection
has become much more of a concern.'23 The United States has labored to
discourage foreign governments from breaking pharmaceutical patents and
buying unauthorized generics from such countries as China and India,
recognized as the two major exporters of unauthorized generic drugs.'24 As a
deterrent, the United States has trade barriers and other various forms of
political pressure on non-compliant governments. 2 5 Critics state that the United
States argument that the TRIPs agreement allows it to prevent developing
countries from addressing national health emergencies through the use of
parallel importing and compulsory licensing by the imposition of trade
sanctions, undermines the political foundations of the WTO itself. 26 They
claim that such steps poison the environment in which negotiations are
undertaken, agreements are carried out, and disputes are settled.'27
A current House bill'28 will permit generic companies to force a
compulsory license from brand-name companies. Under the Affordable
Prescription Drug Act, the brand-name drug manufacturer would be forced to
license a generic equivalent.'29 The generic drug company would be required
to pay a reasonable royalty to the brand-name company and civil penalties
would result from failure to do so. 130
V. CHALLENGING THE CIPRO PATENT
Bayer AG, a German corporation, owns the 4,670,444 patent (the 444
patent) on the main ingredient of Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride (Cipro) until
2003, and the 5,286,754 patent (the 754 patent) covering the pharmaceutical
formulation of the main ingredient until 2011.'' In 1997, Bayer settled a patent
infringement case in which Barr Labs alleged that Bayer's patents were no
122. Harrelson, supra note 1, at 176.
123. Id.
124. Godwin, supra note 83.
125. Id.
126. Abbot, supra note 27, at 85.
127. Id.
128. House Report HR 1708.




longer valid over prior art. 32 Part of the settlement included Bayer paying Barr
fifty million dollars a year not to produce a generic equivalent to Cipro.'33
Bayer instituted a reexamination of the patent and the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) maintained the validity of the patent. 134 Other generic
companies sued under the same theory, but the District Court of New Jersey
ruled in favor of Bayer and dismissed the invalidity actions. 135 Many other
generic manufacturers have filed for certification of each patent once the
originals expire. 1
36
Cipro was the first drug approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) for treatment of anthrax infections, but the last case of anthrax infection
occurred in the 1970's. 137 Cipro's major anthrax testing occurred more than ten
years ago by the United States Army biowarfare researchers on rhesus
monkeys. 138 The Persian Gulf War proved beneficial to Bayer, as Cipro was
rushed through the FDA approval amongst fears that Saddam Hussein might use
anthrax as a biological weapon. 139 This quick approval was due to Cipro's
advantages over other antibiotics. 140 It is not a part of the same family of drugs
as penicillin or tetracycline, which means that it would remain an effective
antidote against strains of anthrax resistant to penicillin or tetracycline."" Cipro
is the best selling antibiotic in the world and has been since 1991, and in 1999
Bayer's gross sales of Cipro totaled 1.04 billion dollars.'42
132. Id. See In Re Ciprofloxacin HydroChloride Antitrust Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D.N.Y.
2001). Barr first applied for a generic version of Cipro in 1991 and received tentative approval for the generic
version in 1995. But by 1997, Barr, along with two other companies, Rugby and Hoechst-Marion Roussel,
had come to an agreement whereby Bayer would pay the companies over $200 million in exchange for the
company's promise not to produce generic versions of Cipro. Consumer Group Challenges Cipro Pact, 9 No.
6 ANDREWS ANTITRUST LITIG. REP. 9 (2001).
133. Id. It was a consumer advocacy group that sued to dislodge the agreement between Bayer and
other drug manufacturers that prohibited any generic versions of Cipro to be made. The Prescription Access
Litigation project is a group of more than sixty organizations from over twenty-nine states that challenged the
agreement. Unlike other challenges in the court at that time, the suit was only seeking injunctive relief,
whereas the others where seeking monetary damages. Nick Dutton, The Price You Pay for Their Patent
Protection, GLASS AGE, Jan. 31, 2002.
134. Upadhye, supra note 121.
135. See Bayer AG v. Schein Pharmaceutical, Inc., 129 F.Supp.2d 705 (NJ 2001); Meyers v. Bayer
AG, 143 F.Supp.2d 1044 (E.D. Wisc 2001).
136. Upadhye, supra note 121.
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The United States Code'43 holds that the government has the authority to
infringe on patents.' 44 Under this section, the government need not negotiate the
patent's use with the owner. 45 The government, or its agents, would have to
pay some compensation to the owner, and the government's use cannot be
enjoined. 46  The royalty the government has used is based on an eminent
domain theory of recovery and is measured by what the patentee has lost rather
than what the government has gained. "'
VI. UNITED STATES ANTHRAX SCARE FURTHER THREATENS BAYER AG
Tommy Thompson was the United States Secretary of Health and Human
Services at the time of the recent anthrax scare and as such, he was responsible
for the health of every American. When problems arise he has the power to
require immunizations and quarantines and order the distribution of medicine.1
48
Traditionally, the courts defer to the judgment of the Secretary."' He also
controls governmental spending in areas of scientific research, as well as having
the duty to pass on information discovered by the government to the
pharmaceutical companies. 50 Above it all, his main objective is to protect the
lives of American citizens."
Following the anthrax scares that occurred in October 2001, and in
response to concerns over an inadequate supply of Cipro doses, Thompson's
first statement was that the government lacked the statutory authority to grant
itself a compulsory license for the generic production of Cipro. 52 It was James
Love and Ralph Nader that co-authored a public letter to the Secretary declaring
that Title 28, Section 1498, of the United States Code was more than sufficient
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2002).
144. See also Crater Corp. v. Lucent Tech., 255 F.3d 1361 (Cir. 2001). Where it was held that 14
U.S.C. § 1498 provides for such authority.
145. Godwin, supra note 83.
146. Id. The government has even required compulsory licensing for the military on such things as
satellite technology and night-vision glasses, using public interest as the main argument. Harrelson, supra
note 1.
147. Id. This is refuted by the pharmaceutical industry as the correct reading of the law. The
Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers Association of America (PhRMA) believes that section refers
to "eminent domain" compensation, and that the United States has a greater obligation under the WTO and
the TRIPs agreement to work with the drug manufacturer first. Id.
148. Matt Fleischer-Black, The Cipro Dilemma --- In the Anthrax Crisis, Tommy Thompson Distorted
Patent Law to Save Public Health. Good Move?, AM. LAW., Jan. 2002.
149. See Bowen v. Mi. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986); Furlong v. Shalala, 238 F.
3d 227 (2nd Cir. 2001); Diagnostic Cardioline Monitoring of N.Y., Inc., v. Shalala, No. 99-CV-5686 (JS),
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13443, at I (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
150. Fleischer-Black, supra note 148.
151. Id.
152. Godwin, supra note 83.
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law to permit the production of generic drugs. 153 In 1918, a law was passed that
gave the government the ability to guarantee that its shipbuilding orders would
not be hindered by patent litigation. 154 This law was the authority for Senator
Charles Schumer's suggestion that Secretary Thompson allow other drug
manufacturers to produce Cipro during the anthrax crisis.' Schumer said that
the generic versions of Cipro would both reduce the reliance on a sole supplier
and could significantly reduce costs. 156 At first, Thompson was concerned about
the delicate balance between patent protection and the concern for adequate
Cipro supply. 157 He made a statement with regard to this balance, knowing that
a month later the WTO would be having a meeting to discuss whether nations
have the right to disregard patents to address public health concerns. 1
58
But there is another law that controls FDA decisions concerning generic
drugs, which would prevent the government from buying generic Cipro because
it had not first passed final FDA approval."' Under the 1984 Hatch-Waxman
Act, companies cannot produce generic versions of drugs for thirty months if
the patent is not expired and the patent holder opposes the production of generic
versions of its drug. 16  These conflicting laws created a very difficult position
for Secretary Thompson to be in.
161
It was on October 18, 2001, that the Canadian Minister of Health signed
a contract with other pharmaceutical manufacturers for the production of
Cipro. 162  His reasoning was for the sufficiency of Canada's stockpile and
Bayer's ability to provide an adequate supply.163 Canada's position was that if
Bayer could not produce, then Health Canada, the national health care system,
would be forced to use its supply of generic equivalents.' 14 The next day,
153. Id.; See also 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2002).
154. Fleischer-Black, supra note 148. See The Act ofJune 25, 1910, c. 423,36 Stat. 851, as amended
by The Act of July 1, 1918, c. 114, 40 Stat. 704. See also William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Bldg. Co.
v. Int'l Curtis Marine Turbing Co., 246 U.S. 28 (1918).
155. Id. Simply put, the law said that the federal government could take license for itself, so long
as the patent holder was provided with adequate compensation. Id.
156. Lawrence B. Ebert, Where Have You Gone, Richard K. Lyon?, INTELLPROPTODAY, Dec. 2001.
157. Fleischer-Black, supra note 148.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984).
161. Fleischer-Black, supra note 148.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Ebert, supra note 156. Canada's Health Minister commissioned a generic manufacturer to
produce a million doses of Cipro even as Bayer assured that it could supply Canada's needs. Upadhye, supra
note 121. As well, there had been no anthrax outbreaks in Canada. Id. It was questionable whether Canada's
action was "necessary to protect public health," as required under Article 8(1) of the TRIPs agreement. Id.
It seemed that the Health Canada official who ordered the generic Cipro did not get prior approval from the
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Thompson started threatening Bayer by saying that he would have laws changed
so that he could break the Cipro patent.165 Soon after, Canada brokered a deal
with Bayer to purchase Cipro at a significantly reduced price; this allowed
Thompson to do the same, effectively saving the country eighty-two million
dollars, as well as preventing certain future litigation.'66 Thompson later stated
at a Congressional hearing that the issue was price and not the supply.
67
The pharmaceutical industry believed that even if Bayer was unable to
meet the demand for Cipro at that time, the best decision was to still contract
with Bayer.'68 Bayer could then meet the new demand by licensing the Cipro
to other manufacturers, allowing Bayer to maintain its long-term value.
169
Bayer could set the prices of the private transactions and still meet the demands
of the government during a public health crisis. 70
Politicians and the media were greatly concerned over the possibility of
"busting" Bayer's patent on Cipro so that an alleged shortage of the drug could
be supplied."' In a traditional drug patent-busting lawsuit, a generic drug
company will file with the FDA an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA)
on the drug, claiming that its generic version is basically the same as the brand-
name drug. 172  This could have been a possibility for breaking the Cipro
patent. 173 Normally, if the generic version is the same, then the ANDA will be
approved and a generic equivalent will enter the market. 17' The most common
type of application is a Paragraph IV ANDA certification, which says that the
applicant seeks immediate permanent approval because either the generic will
not infringe, or the patent is invalid.'75 Under United States law, 7 6 a brand-
Patent Commissioner of the Ministry of Industry. Id. Godwin, supra note 83. Additionally, no national
emergency had been declared. Godwin, supra note 83. It was an Indian company that offered to sell the
generic Cipro at one-twentieth the cost. Gollin, supra note 77.
165. Fleischer-Black, supra note 148.
166. Id.
167. Ebert, supra note 156.
168. Godwin, supra note 83.
169. Id.
170. Id.




175. Id. There are also Paragraph I, fl, and III ANDA certifications. Paragraph I certification said
that the drug had not been patented. Paragraph 11 certification meant that the patent had expired. Paragraph
M certification meant that the date on which the generic equivalent will go on the market will be after the date
which the patent will expire. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and its Impact on
the Drug Development Process, available at http://www.oblon.com/Pub/seeker.php3?hatchwax.html (last
visited on July 15, 2002).
176. See 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(e)(2)(A)(B).
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name drug manufacturer can sue a generic drug company that files a Paragraph
IV ANDA certification.177
The Bayer chief executive stated that Bayer would not give Cipro away to
the United States because if it had done so, then it would have to give it away
to all the other countries sharing the United States ideals, because they would
be threatened as well. 17 Seven other antibiotics were offered for free from their
manufacturers, including Bristol-Meyers Squibb's Tequin and Johnson &
Johnson's Levaquin, which are in the same family as Cipro, but have yet to be
approved for use against anthrax. 7 9 The two companies stated that they each
would donate 100 million tablets to the United States if they could receive
automatic approval for use against anthrax. 180
When Secretary Thompson threatened to override the Cipro patent, he
claimed that this was in compliance with the TRIPs agreement.' 8' If the United
States government had used Article 31 of the TRIPs agreement to grant
compulsory licenses for the eighteen cases of anthrax, then poorer countries
would use that decision to extort compulsory licenses of the AIDS cocktail
drugs to treat the millions of cases of AIDS. "'82 The economy of drug licensing
would be disrupted, as research and development profits are returned to the
companies through sales in developed countries. 183 The developed countries
help to offset lower prices in poorer countries, but profits are lost when
compulsory licenses are used as a threat by developed countries seeking to
reduce the prices of drugs to generic levels. 184
VHI. DOHA DECLARATION AND THE FUTURE
On November 14, 2001, the WTO members met in Doha, Qatar for a
ministerial conference to discuss specifically international intellectual property
rights under the TRIPs agreement. The Ministerial Declaration reaffirmed that
each WTO member has the right to determine what constitutes a national
emergency or other extreme urgency, as required under the TRIPs agreement
before a compulsory license can be granted.' 85 Paragraph 1 of the Declaration
177. Upadhye, supra note 121.
178. Bayer's Reasons for not Giving Cipro Away; USA Slammed for "Double Standards,"
MARKETLETER, Nov. 12, 2001 [hereinafter Bayer's reasons]. Bayer did donate eight million Cipro tablets
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specifically lists AIDS/HIV, tuberculosis and malaria.'86 Although the
Declaration does not define a public health crisis, the examples provided help
to narrow the scope. Paragraph 4 states that the TRIPs agreement does not and
should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health. 87
Paragraph 5(b) states that each member has the right to grant compulsory
licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are
granted.'88 This provides a presumption of validity to a WTO member
determining that a national health emergency exists. 189 Additionally, this
represents a shift of "balance of rights and obligations" away from the patent
owner. 90  Under threat of compulsory licensing, a patent holder will be
persuaded easier by a WTO member to conclude a licensing agreement. 191
Both health activists and the pharmaceutical industry see the Declaration
as a victory.' 92 The Declaration drew on drafts provided by two opposite sides
of the issue: one from developed nations, and the other from sixty developing
nations.' 93 The first side recognized that intellectual property protection is
important for the development of new medicines.' 4 The second side relied
more on the TRIPs agreement's effect on drug prices, saying that it should not
prevent members from taking measures to protect public health. 95 The final
version stated that compulsory licensing need not be restricted to pandemics, as
the United States-led draft suggested.' 96 The compromise reached recognized
the problem that countries having little or no manufacturing ability would not
be able to make effective use of compulsory licensing. 97 Activists and
186. Id. at 11.
187. Id. at 4.
188. Id. at 5(b).
189. Nolff, supra note 24, at 144.
190. Id., at 145.
191. Id.
192. Kevin Gopal, New Accord: A WTO Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement Affirms Countries'
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will remain. Indian Pharma's Mixed Views on Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health,
MARKETLETTER, Dec. 10, 2001.
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developing nations said that the Declaration clarified the interpretations of the
ambivalent agreement.'98
Within the context of the Ministerial Declaration, in order to grant a
compulsory license in times of public health emergencies, it is required that the
license is necessary to protect public health and address a public health crisis,
authorization of the license must be considered on its individual merits, and the
right holder must be notified.'99 The scope and duration must be limited to the
purpose for which it was authorized, and must be liable to be terminated if and
when the circumstances, which led to it, cease to exist and are unlikely to
recur.200 Underdeveloped countries and private sector advocates see the new
declaration as a way out of the AIDS crisis and other health emergencies, but
they still realize that it is a battle of lives versus money.2'
The Ministers did oppose a proposal recommended by the developing
countries that countries without manufacturing ability could import medicines
made under compulsory licenses in another country.20 2 This creates the situation
where many developing countries cannot make use of compulsory licenses.2°3
They do not have manufacturing ability, which is a requirement for granting a
compulsory license.2 °n It is estimated that only ten of the one hundred thirty
developing members of the WTO can use compulsory licenses to manufacture
their own drugs. 2 5  Article 31(f) of the TRIPs agreement imposes the
requirement that production under compulsory licenses must be predominately
for the domestic market.206 One of the options proposed to deal with the
developing countries with little or no domestic manufacturing ability is to
remove the requirement completely from Article 3 1(f), but this was not done.20 7
Another option was to interpret Article 30 of the agreement to mean that
products made under compulsory licenses can be exported to developing
countries facing public health problems that lack the domestic production
capacity. 2°1
The World Health Organization (WHO) and the Commission of European
Communities welcomed the Doha Declaration and the pro-public health
198. New Accord, supra note 192.
199. Nolff, supra note 24, at 143.
200. Id. at 141.
201. Kolker, supra note 13.
202. New Accord, supra note 192.
203. Campaigners Urge Action on Poor Countries' Access to Cheaper Drugs, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Mar. 28, 2002.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. TRIPS Meeting Examines Drug Licensing Hitches, BUS. LINE, Mar. 14, 2002; See also TRIPs
article 31 (f).
207. Id.
208. Id.; See also TRPs article 30.
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approach it had. 2 9 The WHO and the European Commission (EU) have agreed
to work closely with the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) on technical assistance to developing countries implementing the TRIPs
agreement, believing that global cooperation is required so that generic
manufacturers can provide the lowest prices on a sustainable basis to the poorest
countries. 2 ' The European Commission is proposing an exception to the TRIPs
agreement that allows WTO members to export generic drugs produced under
compulsory licenses to developing countries without quantitative limits, so that
countries without production capability can rely on other countries for its
Supply.21' The European Union even proposed an option amending the TRIPs
agreement to include for the export of medicines to poorer countries. 2 2 The EU
is also proposing a global tiered pricing system for certain pharmaceutical
products in the poorest countries.1 3 Tiered pricing is used in some countries,
but the push is to use it for all developing countries. z 4
The TRIPs agreement was not altered or amended, but the Declaration
merely acted as a suggestion for how to interpret the agreement.2 5 Medicines
are treated as any other commodity, but the declaration says that since they save
lives, their patents should have different standards applied.2 16 Drug companies
rely on the fact that the agreement was not amended and, therefore, the
agreement still stands as it did before." 7 Drug companies do hold the upper
hand because they can stop the research into new drugs when they lose
confidence on the payoffs.2"8
The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
(IFPMA) pointed out that the Declaration was political rather than a legal or
binding instrument, but did agree that the final version reflected the balanced
interest to encourage innovation in drug therapies and vaccines, while seeking
to promote improved access to medicines. 2 9 The European Federation of
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) said that it welcomed the
Declaration's confirmation that the TRIPs agreement was flexible enough to
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take account of public health concerns and that intellectual property protection
is vital for the development of new medicines.22°
The United States position opposing an easing of TRIPs had been
undermined by Washington's threat, just before the meeting, to break Bayer's
patent on Cipro, unless the drug company lowered the price. 22' The
international community felt that this represented a double standard by the
United States.222 The United States had previously received criticism for calling
on the WTO to rule that Brazil's legal requirement that patent holders must
produce patented products in the country, rather than have them imported, was
in violation of WTO.223 Brazil was in fact, given much credit for brokering the
Declaration and this gave Brazil more assurance to confront the abusive pricing
of brand-name drugs.224
The United States is also trying to limit the countries that could benefit
from the production-for-export exception. 225 The United States wishes to limit
the applicability of the rule to small market countries for fear that small rich
countries will benefit.226 This will affect many small African countries that are
considered small market because they have small populations and have a low
number of people that can afford the drugs.227 In reference to AIDS and other
diseases of poverty, the production-for-export exception may be the only way
to get these countries affordable medicines, for they do not have their own
production capacity.228 The United States is also trying to exclude the larger
developing and middle-income countries because they are considered an area
of future growth for the patent pharmaceutical industry.229 By limiting the
conditions, which would warrant a compulsory license to only "serious" health
conditions, the other much needed medicines, such as expensive antibiotics and
diabetes medicines, are excluded.230 The main concern over the exception in the
United States is that the "production-for-export" medicines will find their way
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It is important to provide access to affordable medicines both through the
public and private sectors.232 First, existing workplace clinics of larger
employers provide considerable capacity to the private sector through benefits
to employees.233 Since ARV medicines have not been reduced in price in the
private sector, employers are refusing to supply them to employees. 4 Second,
medical aid plans that extend to both the private and public sectors have benefit
limits that make it impossible to pay for ARV medicines unless they have been
heavily discounted. 235  Third, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and
mission hospitals, which are included in the private sector, have in place the
ability to deliver high quality treatment and care, but only if the drugs are made
more affordable.236
The shift of balance of rights and obligations, created by the Declaration,
away from the patent owner has already resulted in more favorable agreement
for purchases of pharmaceuticals by governments than might have been
possible.237 Possibly the biggest impact of the Ministerial Declaration is that the
threat of a compulsory license will make it easier for a WTO member to
persuade a patent holder to concede a licensing agreement. 8
VII. CONCLUSION
The need for affordable drugs in developing countries due to the AIDS
crisis has further defined the contrast between these countries and the developed
nations such as the United States. Although the United States does have an
AIDS problem, it does not see the same high percentage of infections as do the
lower income less-developed countries. Developing countries that do have high
infectious rates may see this as a lack of compassion by the United States for the
crises affecting their countries.
The United States, through a concern for returned investments of large
corporations, may have lost sight into what the founding fathers based the
country on: the protection of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. AIDS
in America is still seen mostly as a disease among homosexuals and, therefore,
the government may be more concerned with profits rather than human lives,
but the countries in Africa and South America do not have the same ideals.
They are using whatever means they have to get free medicines to the millions
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chance at happiness. The irony found behind the anthrax attacks and the United
States' reaction to them is that Americans now have a fear that they never had
before; whereas developing countries facing the AIDS crises may have more
hope for the future than ever before.
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"We must remind ourselves that the Holocaust was not six million.
It was one, plus one, plus one..."'
I. INTRODUCTION
When Jesus was in Jerusalem carrying his Cross to Cavalry, he took a
moment to pause on a man's doorstep. The man drove him away and cried
aloud for Jesus to "Walk Faster!" As Jesus walked away bearing the Cross, he
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1990).
212 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 9:211
replied "I go, but you will walk until I come again !,,2 Accordingly, the Jews
were cast to walk eternally. However, the Jews had already begun to wander
and they would continue to. seek refuge until they were almost annihilated.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the pragmatism and possibility of
creating a state as the necessary remedy for a large group of refugees, the
Palestinians. Towards that end, the historical persecution, treatment under
modem legislation, and the genocide during the Holocaust of the Jews will be
considered as relevant to the formation of the State of Israel and used as a guide
from which the Palestinian contention might be measured. This paper will
explore the peril and plight of the Palestinians in the occupied territories of
Israel in the attempt to answer the question as to whether their struggle should
be alleviated by the creation of a state.
Accordingly, Part I of this paper will examine the historical persecution of
the Jews. Part II will focus on the effect that legislation had on the Jews. Part
III will profile the creation of the Jewish state. Finally, Part IV will explore the
requirements and possibilities for the establishment of the Palestinian state.
II. HISTORICAL PERSECUTION
A. From Nomads to Wanderers
In and around the year 3000 Before the Common Era (B.C.E.), Egypt
already had built the pyramids and Sumer and Akad were world empires.
During the 1400s, Phoenicia was colonizing while the Jews were merely a tiny
band of nomads wandering through the upper regions of the Arabian Desert.
The Jews were for a time too inconspicuous and transient to be noticed.
Reflecting on the words from the Torah, "Let them make Me a sanctuary; that
I may dwell among them," the Jews settled in Palestine.3
After the death of his father, David, Solomon issued the orders for the
building of the First Temple to commence.4 The building of the First Temple
was a monumental task. Phoenician craftsmen were employed to build the
Temple. Construction began in the fourth year of Solomon's reign and took
seven years. King Solomon dedicated the Temple in 953 B.C.E.5 Amongst a
great many other things, the Temple was also a place of refuge for the stranger:
Moreover concerning a foreigner, who is not of Your people Israel,
but has come from a far country for Your name's sake. (for they will
2. GEORGE K. ANDERSON, THE LEGEND OF THE WANDERING JEW 11 (Brown University Press
1965).
3. See Exodus 25: 8 (New Catholic Edition, hereafter NCE). See also Lambert Dolphin, Does God
Need a Temple? at http://www.templemount.org/whytemp.html (n.d.).
4. HENRY CATTAN, PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (Longman Group, Ltd. 1973).
5. Id. at 6-7.
2002]
hear of Your great name and Your strong hand and Your outstretched
arm), when he comes and prays toward this temple, hear in heaven
Your dwelling place, and do according to all for which the foreigner
calls to You, that all peoples of the earth may know Your name and
fear You, as do Your people Israel, and that they may know that this
temple which I have built is called by your name.6
For many years Solomon evidently wandered away from fellowship with
His God, returning only much later, near the end of the life, to record in his
book, Ecclesiastes, what he had learned about the emptiness of all of life apart
from God. When Solomon died, his son Rehoboam became king of Israel. The
nation, however, was on a spiritual decline and Rehoboam's policies caused the
kingdom to be divided into separate regimes of the north (Israel) and the south
(Judah). The northern kingdom remained in idolatry until it was overrun and
taken captive in 721 B.C.E. by the Assyrians. With the Jews falling from grace,
the Temple would now continue to decline in wealth, splendor, and importance
for the next 367 years. The first Temple was destroyed in 586 B.C.E. and the
Jews were exiled and sent wandering throughout Babylon.
Israel's exile for seventy years in Babylon marked a new era of
government for God's chosen people. They had entered what Jesus would later
call "the times of the gentiles."7 The majority of Jews living in Babylon were
prosperous and had assimilated. They were unwilling to undertake the hardship
and danger of moving back to their ruined homeland. For those who took it, the
journey was "530 direct miles, but about 900 miles by road and took about four
months."8 After the Jews arrived in Jerusalem, they worked toward building the
second Temple, which was then completed four years later in 516 B.C.E.
According to Jesus, not one stone would be left upon another when the Temple
was destroyed. 9 When the Temple was set on fire, the Roman soldiers tore apart
the stone to get the melted gold. The Menorah and vessels were carried to
Rome and the treasury was robbed. The destruction of the second Temple in the
year 70 of the Common Era (C.E.), for the Jews, marked the period of the
second exile. The Jewish people were soon to be scattered throughout the earth.
6. See I Kings 8: 41-43 (NCE). See also Lambert Dolphin, The Temple of Solomon at
http://www.templemount.org/solomon.html.
7. See Luke 21: 24 (NCE). See also Lambert Dolphin, Second Temple Times at
http://www.templemount.org/secondtmp.html.
8. See I Esdas 7: 8-9 (NCE). See also Dolphin, supra note 7.
9. See Luke 21: 20-22 (NCE). See also Dolphin, supra note 7.
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B. Middle History
The Jews were persecuted and displaced throughout the crusades. There
were periods during the beginning of each Crusade where Jews were killed as
they were "blamedthat the Holy Land was not in Christian hands."' While the
Jews wandered, many headed North and West into Europe. They attempted to
settle in various places in Europe prior to the Crusades, however, the Jews could
not own land because the feudal system made it impossible. They were barred
from the guilds of artisans and were left without the avenues of farming and
handicrafts. Due to the feelings of filth associated with handling money,
commerce and money lending were areas left open to the Jews." During the
Crusades, the large number of Christians that were in contact with foreign lands
increased the trade in foreign commodities. Not interested in competing with
the Jews, the Christian tradesmen secured the enactment of laws that effectively
took the Jews out of trade.'2
During the crusades, many Jews faced the ultimatum of Baptism or death.
In England, the Jews received a modicum of refuge from the cruelty beset on
their brethren in the rest of the world. Henry I had granted the Jews a charter
of rights and privileges as traders, and although their status was not to increase
beyond a modest living as ensured by the levying of special taxes for Jews,
there was not a rampant hatred of the Jews in England. 3 However, this changed
a century later in 1290 C.E. when Edward I ordered an edict to the effect that
all Jews must leave England or die. "
Many of the exiles from England found refuge in France. However, this
was a very short stop for the Jews. In 1306 C.E., Philip IV ordered not only the
Jews who recently relocated to France to leave, but he ordered the expulsion of
all Jews including those native Jews whose ancestors had lived in France for a
thousand years.' 5 Similar to the expulsion in England, the Jews were permitted
10. See G. L. Esterson, Ashkenazic, European Given Names, Judaism, And Jewish History at
http://www.jewishgen.org/databases/GivenNames/midlages.htm (n.d.).
11. RUFUS LEARSI, ISRAEL: A HISTORY OF JEWISH PEOPLE 276 The World Publishing Co. 1949).
See also D. Brecher and J. Kniesmeyer, Usury at http://historymedren.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=
http%3A%2F%2Fwww.friends-partners.org%2Fpartners%2Fbeyond-the-pale%2Fenglish%2F06.html.
12. LEARSI, supra note 11, at 276.
13. Id. at 277.
14. See D. Brecher, Expulsions and the Black Death at http://historymedren.about.com/gi/dynamic/
offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.friends-partners.org%2Fpartners%2Fbeyond-the-
pale%2Fenglish%2F06.html (n.d.).
15. See LEARSI, supra note 11, at 281-82. Compare with Speaking of Jews at
http://www.rfcnet.org/newsletter/jan2002b.htm (January 2002) where it states that there has been a rising tide
of anti-Semitism in Europe and particularly in France. Moreover, in France alone, there were 350 attacks
against Jews since the beginning of the "infitada" in Israel in October, 2000.
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to leave effectively with only the clothes that they wore, with the rest of the
Jews' accumulated wealth to replenish the royal coffers.
16
On the bitter road of exile, many Jews had stopped and settled in Spain
because in many ways, "Spain resembled Palestine."' 7 The climate of central
and southern Spain was largely subtropical, "with hot rainless summers and
mild winters."'" While in Spain, the Jews prospered despite the ill will of the
clergy. The Jews in Spain favored well during the Black Death in 1348-49 C.E.
while other Jews and non-Jews suffered throughout Europe. The Jews of Spain
owed their safety to the Kings, who softened the laws that were passed against
the Jews because of the service they had received from the Jews in their capacity
as doctors during the plague. 9 Once again, this favor was short lived and in
1371 C.E. a decree was ordered that the Jews must identify themselves by
wearing a yellow patch.2" The clergy felt that they had gained a victory in
further prohibiting the Jews to live among Christians or to employ Christians.2'
The treatment by the Church of the Jews culminated in disaster for the
Jews of Spain in 1391 C.E. It siarted in Seville, which was famous for its
beautiful synagogues and scholars, when the citizenry stormed the ghetto from
all sides to burn and loot the houses and killing more than 4,000 of the
inhabitants.22 The situation worsened in one community after another.
Settlement and ghettos throughout Spain were devastated and the number of
forced converts went well into the thousands. Only in Granada, which was
controlled by the Muslims, were the Jews safe. The flame of the Spanish Jewry
was nearly extinguished, and the persecution created a group that would soon
be ripe for more persecution. These people were the New Christians, and they
were forced by the sword to accept Jesus Christ. These New Christians were
called "Marranos," which means "the damned," and they were seemingly more
hated by the clergy than the Jews before them.23
In 1412 C.E., a law passed in Spain that prohibited Jews from trimming
their hair or beards, to own nice fabrics, to engage in handicrafts, or to carry
arms. 24 Most of the Jews that remained tended to practice in secret, as did many
of the so-called New Christians, since they did not willfully denounce their
16. Brecher, supra note 14.
17. LEARSI, supra note 11, at 243.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 302. See also Esterson, supra note 10.
20. LEARSi, supra note 11, at 306. See also D. Brecher, Patterns of Discrimination at
http://historymedren.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.friends-
partners.org%2Fpartners%2Fbeyond-the-pale%2Fenglish%2F06.html.
21. LEARSI, supra note 11, at 307.
22. See Beth Randall, The Secret Jews at http://historymedren.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.
htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mcs.drexel.edu%2F%7Egbranda%2FIllum-htm%2FSecret.htm (n.d.).
23. LEARSI, supra note 11, at 308.
24. Id. at 309.
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religion. Subsequently, the New Christians were not under the jurisdiction of
the new prescriptions against the Jews. Thus, these New Christians began to
prosper and they aroused bitter resentment. In 1440 C.E., and again in 1467
C.E., mobs unleashed their anger in Toledo and many New Christians were slain
and their homes set ablaze." In 1479 C.E., the rulers Ferdinand and Isabella
united the Castile and Aragon thrones and adopted the policy of absolutism at
home and expansionism abroad for their Catholic way. On 30 March 1492
C.E., the edict of expulsion was issued from the Alhambra in the newly
conquered Granada.26 The ultimatum given to the Jews, as well as to the
Muslims, was to surrender their faith or surrender their life or leave. Some Jews
stayed under the terms of the Crown, but most of the Jews had heard such
promises before and once again, the Jews set off to wander.
Over the next several centuries and throughout Europe, the walls of the
ghettos were strong as to separate the Jews who lived within from the world
outside and there was ostensibly no place for the Jews to go. In many cities,
Jews were altogether excluded from the daily ways of life and they were
considered to be a people without natural rights, and any freedom they paid for
came to an end at any of the many borders. The procreation of Jews was kept
in check by an elaborate system of restrictions that taxed marriages and births
and prohibited more than one son to remain with his family.27 After the
expulsion of all the Jews from Austria in 1670 C.E., Fredrick William, the
Elector of Brandenburg, permitted some of the exiles to settle in Berlin. By
1712 C.E., in spite of several restrictions including the separation of Jews in
categories of "protected" Jews and "tolerated" Jews, the Jews had built their
first synagogue in Berlin and their numbers began to grow.28
As people and their ideas were on the forefront of enlightenment, the
French Assembly proclaimed the Declaration of the Rights of Man on 26
August 1789 C.E. Eventually, these rights were even thought to extend to the
Jews, almost as an admonition that a Jew was indeed a "Man." In November
of 1799 C.E., Napoleon Bonaparte became the master of France and through his
skill and leadership, the Jews were emancipated as a matter of course
throughout France's victories.29 With the fall of Napoleon after losses in Russia
in 1812 C.E. and in Germany in 1813 C.E., the rights that the Jews had barely
realized were in the hands of the Congress of Vienna. Hope turned into
nightmare as German cities became the scene of anti-Jewish pogroms, and
25. Id. at 312-13.
26. See Beth Randall, Tomas de Toquemada at http://historymedren.about.com/gi/dynamic/
offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mcs.drexe.edu%2F%7Egbranda%2FIllum-html%2FTrorquema
da.html (n.d.).
27. LEARSI, supra note 11, at 370.
28. Id. at 372.
29. Id. at 404-5.
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citizens proclaimed the superiority of their blood while they murdered Jews who
were thought of as inferior. And there were other pogroms in Europe against
the Jews in the Common Era: three waves of pogroms occurred in Russia, each
worse and broader than the last, in 1881-1884, 1903-1906, and in 1917-1921;
and also in Poland in 1919, in Hungary in 1919, in Romania in 1926, and more
as the Nazi ideology permeated and gained acceptance. It was this patchwork
of instability in the name of hatred for the Jews that left the Jews searching for
a home and continuing to wander.
C. The Turn of the Twentieth Century
Ever since there was passage to the "New World," if for no better place to
go, the Jews have immigrated to America. Many Jews escaped not only the
Spanish Inquisition but also the pogroms by finding passage to America.
Before 1825, fewer than 10,000 immigrants entered the United States annually.
"By the early twentieth century America was receiving an annual average of
more than one million immigrants," while two-thirds arrived from Eastern and
Southern Europe.30
Those who arrived in the United States during the years after 1820 brought
with them discontent with their status at home as well as the desire to improve
their conditions and quality of life. Some entered the United States under the
pressure of great disasters in their native homeland, while others entered under
the threat of more gradual economic and social change. The unifying principle
for America's last great migratory wave, which began in the middle of the
nineteenth century, was America's need for labor combined with the widespread
belief that the United States was a land of opportunity and a refuge for the
oppressed. The Jewish community that had preceded them welcomed the Jews
who came to America during this period and they continued to grow and
prosper. The number of Jews that were new arrivals seemed to mimic the plight
of the Jews abroad and the ghettos of New York, Philadelphia, Chicago and
other large cities continued to increase. It was a time where there was a demand
for labor and an ample supply of immigrant workers. During this time, the Jews
who wanted to wander had a place to take refuge and work. However, attitudes
and market forces changed and United States immigration law changed with
them. The next section looks at the impact of this evolving legislation on the
new immigrants, the wandering Jews.
30. See Jay M. Brown, From The Shtetl To The Tenement: The East European Jews and America,
A Social History 1850-1925 at http://www.cis.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1979/2/79.02.02.x.html (n.d.).
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III. TREATMENT UNDER MODERN LEGISLATION
A. Immigration Policy: the Effect on the Jews
In the 19th century, when immigration consisted of admitting enough
immigrants to fill the capitalist needs for the proletariat, a more open
immigration policy was beneficial to meet those exploitive needs. However,
American economic policy changed at the beginning of the 20th century as the
United States was a changed nation before and after World War I.
Organizations formed and spoke out at Congressional hearings to voice their
opinions on immigration and the relative effects. 3' Although often concerned
that Jewish immigration could provoke anti- Semitism in America, Jewish
leaders fought a long and largely successful delaying action against restrictions
on immigration during the period from 1891-1924, "particularly as they affected
the ability of Jews to immigrate. 32 While other religious groups such as
Catholics and ethnic groups such as the Irish remained divided and ambivalent
on their attitudes toward immigration and were poorly organized and ineffective
in influencing immigration policy, and while labor unions opposed immigration
in their attempt to diminish the supply of cheap labor, "Jewish groups engaged
in an intensive and sustained effort against attempts to restrict immigration. 33
Despite the efforts to keep a more open immigration policy, Congress passed a
literacy test that required all immigrants to be literate in order to pass through
at Ellis Island.34 Immigration in the United States was substantially lower, but
this was also due to the interruption to life caused by the Great War.
After World War I, feelings of nationalism and protectionism ran
rampant.3" The heightened distrust of foreigners, the fear of labor unions and
the influx of cheap labor, provoked hostility from the earlier Americans toward
the newer, more-hyphenated foreign-Americans. The Ku Klux Klan revived to
antagonize the immigrants when the War ended and Henry Ford's newspaper
warned that there was a Jewish conspiracy to take over the world.36
In 1921, over 800,000 immigrants arrived with most able to pass the
literacy requirements. Rumors spread that all 3,000,000 Jews in Poland would
escape to America if there were a boat big enough to take them.37 Accordingly,
the issue of immigration policy in the United States during the 1920s was not
31. ROBERTA. DIVINE, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1924-1952 10-11 (Da Capo Press 1972).
32. See Kevin MacDonald, Jewish Involvement in Shaping American hnmigration Policy, 1881-
1965: A Historical Review at http://www.p-m-s.freeserve.co.uk/texts/USpol-2.htm (n.d.).
33. Id.
34. DAVID M. REIMERS, UNWELCOME STRANGERS 18 (Columbia University Press 1998). President
Wilson vetoed this bill but the Congress overrode the President and it became law.




whether to radically restrict the immigrants from entering but how to effectively
legislate such restrictions. In 1920, the House and Senate split on a bill to
suspend all immigration.38
The Quota Act of 1921 established the first numerical restrictions on
European immigration. The Quota set the level of immigrants permitted to enter
the United States at three percent of the number of foreign born from each
European nationality residing in the United States according to the 1910
census.3 9 The 1910 census was favored over the 1920 census because it
minimized the proportion of southern and eastern Europeans in the population.4 °
The Immigration Act of 1924 further restricted the entry of immigrants, while
in 1929 a maximum quota of 153,774 was adopted from which 83,575 of those
immigrants were designated from Great Britain and Ireland. The Jews were
finding that there was less and less room to wander.
B. The Treaty of Versailles and the Great Depression
The enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles in Germany, which called for
Germany to accept the blame for the war and pay heftily in reparations, created
hardship in Germany and fostered general and targeted feelings of resentment.
In 1921-22, the German mark fell in value from four to the United States dollar
to seventy-five. Since Germany was unable to keep up with the repayment
schedule from the Versailles Treaty and since the Treaty blocked Germany from
many export markets, the mark then plummeted to four-hundred marks to the
dollar.4 By 1923, German economic life was grinding to a standstill, and while
some reverted to the practice of bartering, many of the farmers stopped putting
their crops up for sale and people throughout Germany were going hungry.
During the rest of the 1920s in Germany, there became increasing needs for
individuals to emigrate from Germany.
The Wall Street stock-market crash of 1929 precipitated the Great
Depression, the worst economic downturn in the history of the United States.
The depression had devastating effects on this country as well as others. The
bottom fell out of the stock market, many banks could not continue to operate,
farmers went into bankruptcy, and many were unemployed. With hundreds of
thousands of Americans losing their jobs, businesses failing, and financial
institutions collapsing, the immigrants were not wanted.
In September of 1930, President Hoover addressed the plight of the nation
and instructed that immigrants "likely to become a public charge" were not to
38. ARTHUR D MORSE, WHILE SIX MILLION DIED 134 (Random House 1967).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 37-39.
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be admitted into the United States.4" There was another major obstacle for the
Jews who would try to escape tense times in Europe: the recent enforcement of
Section 7(c) of the 1924 Act. Section 7(c) required that applicants furnish
police certificates of good character for the past five years and other such
documents.43 Accordingly, the Jews were put in a position that required them
to request certificates of good character from their persecutors in order to escape
persecution. Thus, the 1920s were becoming the 1930s and after the prosperity
of the 1920s, which was enjoyed throughout much of the world, there were
many factors that made this time very difficult for the Jews. This combination
of factors included but was not limited to the Depression in the United States
and in Europe along with the manner in which the Treaty of Versailles had
affected those in Germany.44 Accordingly, power was shifting, ideologies were
changing, and darkness was approaching for the Jews.
C. The Nazis and the Holocaust
During World War I, Adolph Hitler was twice recognized for valor in his
service with the German Army. Although he only reached the rank of Corporal,
he remained in the full-time employment of the Army after the War. One
September night in 1919, Hitler received orders to attend a German's Worker
Party meeting and report back on the "well intentioned" group.45 The gathering
of fifty was the first public forum that heard Hitler speak about his ideas of
nationalism. As the party gained support and influence, the name was changed
to the National Socialist German Workers' Party (the Nazis). The Nazi
ideology was born from the belief that most of the Communist leaders were
Jews, that it was the Jews who were responsible for the Revolution in Russia
and Germany's defeat, and that the Jews "sold the nation into the slavery with
the Versailles Treaty. '4 6 In December 1920, the Nazis bought their first
newspaper and from this platform they announced to Germany that the Nazis
were present as a "weapon for Germanism. ' '47 The Nazis through the newspaper
went on to make many other statements.
As Germany suffered throughout the 1920s, the Nazis advhnced their
ideology, gained support, and became powerful by making the Jews vulnerable.
The Nazis had found in anti-Semitism a consolation and a program. The Nazi
42. Id. at 135.
43. Id. at 137.
44. See Modern World History: The Treaty of Versailles at http://www.bbc.co.uk/education/
modem/versaill/versahtm.htm#q3 (n.d.) where it describes the terms of the Treaty and the particularly costly
and devastating effect on the Germans.
45. JAMES POOL, WHO FINANCED HITLER 5-6 (Pocket Books 1978).
46. Id. at 24.
47. Id. at 32.
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program consisted on the power of hatred and a plan toward the extermination
of the Jews for the betterment of mankind and the glory of Germany. The
words of Joseph Goebbels, who served as the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, help
illustrate the contempt that was felt for the Jews. Certainly the Jew is a human
being,"[But then] the flea is a living thing too; only not a pleasant one. Since
the flea is not a pleasant thing, we are not obliged to keep it and let it
prosper.. .but our duty is rather to exterminate it. Likewise with the Jews. 48
On 30 January 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt's fifty-first birthday, Adolf
Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany. It was not long after the
appointment that Hitler was able to put his plan for the extermination of the
Jews into effect. There were more Christians than Jews among the initial
victims of the Nazi terrorism, but as they were Socialists and Communists,
Hitler thought of them as Jews.4 9 As the Nazis launched their campaign against
Jews through laws and brutal physical attacks, American diplomats and foreign
correspondents began to report of the onslaught. 50 It started with public book
burnings. Then, with much persecution in between, the Nuremberg Laws were
passed in September 1935. These laws deprived all Jews of their citizenship,
subjected the Jews to forced labor, deprived them of property and their
possessions, and horded them into ghettos.
The pre-war persecution culminated on 10 November 1938 on the Night
of Broken Glass, Kristallnacht. It was that night that the vision of hell was
unleashed on the Jews. Throughout hundreds of cities and towns, Jewish homes
and shops were systematically looted and destroyed, over five hundred
synagogues were burned, thousands of men, women, and children were beaten,
maimed and murdered. While there was a genuine feeling of uneasiness
throughout democratic governments, there was no planned intervention as this
event was a matter of German "internal policy. '52 Many Jews fled both legally
and illegally, while many Jews stayed.53 In Germany, there was no secret about
the Nazis plan, only disbelief that it could be real. The Jews would bitterly joke
that when the Nazis came to power, there were two sorts of Jews living in
Germany: the optimists and the pessimists. The pessimists went into exile; the
optimists went to the gas chambers.54
48. C.C. ARONSFELD, THE TEXT OF THE HOLOCAUST: A STUDY OF THE NAZIS' EXTERMINATION
PROPAGANDA 1919-1945 12 (Micah Publications 1985).
49. MORSE, supra note 38, at 104.
50. Id. at 105.
51. See The Nuremburg Laws at http://www.skalman.nu/third-reich/nurnberg-lagarna.htm_(n.d.).
52. LEARSI, supra note 11, at 597.
53. See the article by W. Michael Blumenthal at http://www.unhcr.org/ (n.d.) where he talks about
the "Shanghai Jews." It says: "A large part of Shanghai's Jews, estimated at 20,000, escaped from Germany,
Austria and Poland between 1938 and 1941. It was the last haven for those who had no visas."
54. RABBI JOSEPH TELUSHKIN, JEWISH WISDOM 561 (William Morrow and Co. 1994).
Klein
222 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 9:211
D. The Jews Who Went Into Exile and Those That Could Not
While the Nazis spread throughout Germany and into Europe, many Jews
and other potential refugees looked to the United States for a safe haven. The
number of refugees that fled Germany during the 1930s was about 25,000 a
year.55 These numbers were significant enough to raise the question of whether
the United States would provide refuge for these persecuted people. The
immigration laws had been erected high as a hurdle with only a little room to
crawl underneath during the 1920s. Therefore, the laws obfuscated the asylum
ideal that had made America what it had become.
The pre-war era was not a time where diversity was celebrated, merely
exploited. During that period, the refugees were not distinguished from other
immigrants in the existing legislation but for one exception.56 The one
exception was the literacy test and "it could be waived for persons fleeing
political or religious oppression."57 Thus, refugees had the same hurdles to
jump as all other immigrants and that included quotas, moral character
qualifications that required paperwork, and the public charge clause. It was not
until after World War II that for the first time the United States engaged "in the
massive resettlement of refugees."58 As a result, there were relatively few
wandering Jews because many Jews went to the camps when Hitler unveiled his
final solution to the world.
E. The Laws that Followed the War and the Definition of Refugee
The Nazi war machine required labor. Accordingly, the Nazi policy was
that of importing forced laborers from conquered territories. When the Allies
surveyed the liberated enemy territory in 1945, they ascertained that there were
about eight million people in Germany, Austria, and Italy who had been
displaced from their homes in other parts of Europe 9.5 The Jews that survived
the camps and the exterminations were a part of this group of displaced
persons.6° On 13 February 1945 at the Yalta Conference, the Allied
governments agreed on procedures for the repatriation of displaced persons.
Close to seven million people returned to their homes per this agreement while
over one million refused to return to their countries of origin because they
55. DIVINE, supra note 31, at 93.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. MICHAEL S. TEITELBAUM AND MYRON WEINER, THREATENED PEOPLE, THREATENED BORDERS
47 (W.W. Norton and Co. 1995).
59. DIVINE, supra note 31, at 110.
60. Id.
61feared persecution from the newly instituted Communist governments.
However, over three million people where gathered and forcibly resettled.62 In
the United States , the 1948 Displaced Persons Act was the first policy for
admitting persons fleeing persecution and the quota under the Act was 205,000
persons over two years.
63
The escalating refugee crisis after World War H1 prompted the world
community to develop certain norms and protections. The 1951 United Nations
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which was drafted as a result of
a recommendation by the newly established United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, was a landmark in setting standards for the treatment of
refugees. The Convention, in its article 1, provides a general definition of the
term "refugee." The term applies to any person who
... as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or
owing to such fear, is unwilling, to avail himself of the protection of
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.64
Many universally recognized human rights are directly applicable to
refugees. These include the right to life,65 protection from torture and ill-
61. Id. See also http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/yugoslav-histl.htm for allegations that many
of the repatriations were forced.
62. See Punished peoples: the mass deportations of the 1940s at http://www.unhcr.org/ (n.d.) where
it says that from ... 1936 and 1952, more than 3 million people were rounded up, for the most part along the
Soviet Union's western borders, strictly on the basis of their 'foreign' origins or culture, and dumped
thousands of kilometers away in eastern and central Siberia or in the Central Asian republics. In all, more than
20 major groups suffered in this way.... [These included] ... non-Orthodox Christian (the Volga Germans),
... Buddhist (the Kalmyks), and ... Muslim (Chechens, Ingush, Karachai, Balkars, Crimean Tatars and
Meskhetians). The Soviet Union's 2.5 million Jews were only saved from a similar fate by Stalin's death in
March 1953.
63. TEITELBAUM, supra note 58, at 47. In 1950, the quota was increased to 415,744 persons and
then complemented in 1953 by the Refugee Relief Act. In 1957, the Refugee-Escapee Act removed all quotas
and allowed for refugees to be admitted without the limits of immigration law.
64. See Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951) art. I (A)(2), 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. See also the Note on Determination of Refugee Status under
International Instruments, (EC/SCP/5) at http://www.unhcr.org/ (n.d.).
65. See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (U.D.H.R.) (G. A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810)
art. 3 (1948) [Hereinafter U.D.H.R.].
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treatment, 66 the right to a nationality,67 the right to freedom of movement as well
as the right to leave any country including one's own and to return to one's
country,6 8 and the right not to be forcibly returned to persecution.69
The most essential component of refugee status is protection against return
to a country where a person has reason to fear persecution. This protection has
found expression in the principle of non-refoulement. The principle of non-
refoulement is articulated in Art. 33(1) of the 1951 Convention which provides
that: "No Contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion." This provision constitutes one of
the basic Articles of the 1951 Convention, to which no reservations are
permitted."7 Unlike various other provisions in the Convention, its application
is not dependent on the lawful residence of a refugee in the territory of a
Contracting State.7' While non-refoulement is not an entitlement to asylum, it
does forbid forcible return.72 Moreover, the principle of non-refoulement
applies not only in respect to the country of origin but to any country where a
person has reason to fear persecution.
The logic inherent in the non-derogable norm of non-refoulement, as it
stood in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention and Article 12 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, was indicative of the logic set forth in
the creation of the State of Israel as a place for the wandering Jews to go.73
Many of these rights echoed the cries of the Jews in their treatment before,
during and after the Holocaust. While the world number of Jews was
considerably lower after World War II and the Holocaust, there were more Jews
66. See U.D.H.R., supra note 65, art 5.
67. See U.D.H.R., supra note 65, art 15.
68. See U.D.H.R., supra note 65, art 13.
69. See 1951 Convention, supra note 64, art. 33(1).
70. See Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by the High Commissioner) (EC/SCP/2) at para. 4
at http://www.unhcr.org/.(n.d.).
71. Id.
72. Guy GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 122-23 (Clarendon Press 1983),
where it states:
[f]reedom to grant or to refuse permanent asylum remains, but save in exceptional
circumstances, states do not enjoy the right to return refugees to persecution or any
situation of personal danger. Protection against the immediate eventuality is the
responsibility of the country of first refuge. In so far as a state is required to grant that
protection, the minimum content of which is non-refoulement through time, it is
required also to treat the refugee in accordance with such standards as will permit an
appropriated solution, whether voluntary repatriation, local integration, or resettlement
in another country.
73. See 1951 Convention, supra note 64, art. 33(1). See also the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (adopted 19 Dec. 1966) art. 12, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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that legitimately sought refuge than there were places for them. This was
because the Jews were not wanted in many of the places of would-be asylum,
as made obvious by the attempt to exterminate them. The right to not be
forcibly returned, or non-refoulement, while different than an affirmative right
to be resettled, left the nations of the world without the option of [forcibly]
returning the Jews to their former homes and nightmares. Consequently, the
pervasive and ongoing phenomenon of Jewish persecution cried out for the
creation of a Jewish state.
IV. THE CREATION OF A JEWISH STATE
Following World War II, escalating hostilities between Arabs and Jews
over the fate of Palestine and between the Zionist militias and the British army
compelled Britain to relinquish its mandate over Palestine.74 The Zionists
believed that all Jews constitute one nation and that the only solution for anti-
Semitism was the creation of a Jewish state.75 The British requested that the
recently established United Nations determine the future. of Palestine.76 On 29
November 1947, the UN General Assembly voted to partition Palestine into two
states, one Jewish and the other Arab. The UN partition plan divided the
country in such a way that each state would have a majority of its own
population, although some Jewish settlements would fall within the proposed
Palestinian state and many Palestinians would become part of the proposed
Jewish state. The territory designated to the Jewish state would be slightly
larger than the Palestinian state (56 percent and 43 percent of Palestine,
respectively) on the assumption that increasing numbers of Jews would
immigrate there.
According to the UN partition plan, the area of Jerusalem and Bethlehem
was to become an international zone. While this was the plan for the geographic
boundary of Israel, it was not the boundary for long as the neighboring Arab
74. See The British Mandate at http://www.arab.net/palestine/history/pebritishmandate.html.(n.d.).
75. See http://www.merip.org/palestine-israel_primer/zionism-pal-isr-primer.html (n.d.) where it
defines Zionism: Zionism, or Jewish nationalism, is a modem political movement. Its core beliefs are that all
Jews constitute one nation (not simply a religious or ethnic community) and that the only solution to anti-
Semitism is the concentration of as many Jews as possible in Palestine/Israel and the establishment of a Jewish
state there.
76. See Question of Palestine at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ngo/history.html (n.d.) where it speaks
to the years of the Palestine Mandate. From 1922 to 1947, large-scale Jewish immigration from abroad, mainly
from Eastern Europe took place, the numbers swelling in the 1930s with the notorious Nazi persecution of
Jewish populations. Palestinian demands for independence and resistance to Jewish immigration led to a
rebellion in 1937, followed by continuing terrorism and violence from both sides during and immediately after
World War HI. Great Britain tried to implement various formulas to bring independence to a land ravaged by
violence. In 1947, Great Britain in frustration turned the problem over to the United Nations.
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countries attacked the one-day old state on 15 May 1948. 77 In 1949, the war
between Israel and the Arab states ended with the signing of armistice
agreements. The country once known as Palestine was now divided into three
parts, each under separate political control. The State of Israel encompassed
over 77 percent of the territory. Jordan occupied East Jerusalem and the hill
country of central Palestine (the West Bank). Egypt took control of the coastal
plain around the city of Gaza (the Gaza Strip). The Palestinian Arab state
envisioned by the UN partition plan was never established. The creation of the
Jewish state largely alleviated the Jewish refugee problem, as it was a place that
any Jew could go. However, the creation of the Jewish state and the subsequent
attack by the Arab neighbors displaced many Palestinians and created a whole
new problem.
V. THE CRITERION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STATE AND THE
PALESTINIAN PROBLEM
A. Conflicts in the Region
There was a good deal of power brokering, political influence, and design
in relation to the establishment of Israel as the Jewish state. The historical
persecution, treatment under modem legislation, and the genocide during the
Holocaust of the Jews was certainly relevant to the formation of the State of
Israel. All of these factors contributed to the creation of a significant number
of stateless people with religion as a unifying feature. These same criterions
would seem to be an appropriate starting point from which the Palestinian claim
to the formation of a separate state should be examined. However, what follows
in this inquiry will illustrate why such a comparison is not appropriate and why
the factors that contributed to the formation of the State of Israel will not be the
same factors that have been brought out in the Palestinian struggle.
The Palestinians had lived in the country in question since the dawn of
history.78 Both Muslim and Christian people comprised the Palestinian people
and they constituted the main element of the population until the reintroduction
of the Jews displaced the majority of this population in and around 1948.79 In
the period since World War II, the Middle East has been the scene of one
77. CATrAN, supra note 4, at 23.
78. Id. at 13.
79. See Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank and Arab Jerusalem: A Survey of Living Conditions
at http://almashriq.hiof.no/general/300/320/327/fafo/reports/FAFO151/2_2.html (n.d.) where it states:
"'Palestinians' will be understood as patrilineal descendants of Moslems, Christians, Druse and other 'non-
Jewish' citizens who were residents in this area [Palestine] prior to 1947/48" [hereinafter Palestinian Society].
Compare with The History and Meaning of "Palestine" and "Palestinians" at
http://www.tzemach.org/fyi/docs/nopal.htm where it refers to the British Mandate and states: "...it was the
Jewish population that was known as 'Palestinians"' [hereinafter Meaning of "Palestinians"].
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conflict after another. Tensions both between nations and within nations have
erupted into wars, revolutions, and terrorist plots that have had widespread
diplomatic, military, and economic ramifications throughout the region and the
rest of the world. The victory for the Jews in the War of 1948 helped them to
acquire more land for settlements, but at the expense of the Palestinians who
lived there before. The United Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees (UNRWA) faced the staggering task of caring for more than 750,000
refugees from this first exodus of 1948-1949, which put a considerable burden
on the available UNRWA resources. In 1967 the Arab countries, Egypt, Syria,
and Jordan, upset at the confiscation of land that went to form Israel, increased
pressure on Israel by mobilizing their armies and threatening to attack the new
country in order to reclaim the land. Israel was overwhelmed at the prospect of
this seemingly imminent attack, and quickly launched a preemptive strike that
pierced nearly to Cairo, Egypt.80 The Six-Day War, as it came to be known, led
to an additional half-million new refugees who comprised 1967's "second
exodus" from Palestine.8' "More than one-fifth of the inhabitants had fled when
Israeli soldiers seized East Jerusalem and the West Bank during the six-days of
fighting. 82
The Jews were viewed by the Palestinians to have come into Israel as
invaders historically and once again in the Zionist movement after World War
II. The defense of Israel seemed to have the effect of expanding its territory.
As a result, many Palestinians were displaced, but unlike the Jews, they were
without religion as a unifying factor. 83 Nevertheless, does the displacement of
Palestinians or the creation of Palestinian refugees rise to the level of
persecution, or the type of persecution that the world witnessed with respect to
the Jews prior to the recognition of the State of Israel? Is this level of
persecution necessary? Does the non-derogable norm of non-refoulement entitle
the Palestinian refugees a way out of the camps and a way into either the lands
of their Arab neighbors or into their own state? Moreover, should the treatment
of the Palestinians in the camps and the consequential standard of living by the
Palestinians that resulted from their displacement be included in part of the
analysis?
This paper is now at the point where one could say that any such
comparison between the Jews and the Palestinians for the purpose of
establishing a Palestinian state is absurd. This is because pain is pain and
suffering is suffering, and it is the distinguishing of degrees that is absurd. It is
80. See The 1967 War (The Six-Day War) at http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0856668.html
(n.d.).
81. See Question of Palestine at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ngo/history.html (n.d.).
82. See Andrew I. Kilgore, Israeli Terror Tactics Drive Out Palestinians in 1948 and 1967 at
http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0390/9003017.htm (n.d.).
83. See Palestinian Society and Meaning of "Palestinians", supra note 79.
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certain and unfortunate that Palestinians have suffered. Accordingly, it is more
relevant to ask how the persecution of the Palestinians might cease and how
their suffering might be remedied. This inquiry in turn will pose the question
of whether the Jews and Palestinians can coexist.
B. Remedy for the Palestinian Problem
There seem to be three pragmatic solutions to refugee situations:
repatriation to the country of origin, integration or settlement in the country of
first asylum, and resettlement in a third country having the capacity and
willingness to absorb the refugees.84 In the case of the Palestinians, one of the
largest refugee groups, none of these options have been available." Given
Israel's refusal to comply with UN Resolution 194 of 1948, which established
the principles of repatriation and compensation, and the Arab states'
unwillingness to accept or permanently integrate and resettle the hundreds of
thousands of refugees on their soil, the Palestinian refugees have been left in
limbo for the last fifty years.86
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), formed in 1964, adopted a
new covenant in 1968 committing all Palestinians to continue the fight for their
rights, claiming that the international community had so far proved unable to
discharge the responsibility it had borne for almost half a century. The covenant
termed Israel an illegal state, which led to Israel's refusal to deal with the PLO.
In 1969, the General Assembly specifically and formally recognized the
inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, declaring that the Assembly:
Recogniz[ed] that the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees has
arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of
the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
84. See Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1992 (A/47/12) at para. 43
at http://www.unhcr.org/ (n.d.) where it states: "The three classical durable solutions are voluntary
repatriation, the preferred solution, local integration in the country of first asylum and resettlement in a third
country." See also http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/papers/UNH.html (n.d.), where it speaks to the
Palestinian Right of Return and Refugee Resettlement.
85. See Palestinian Refugees at http://www.incite-national.orglissues/refugees.htm (n.d.), where
it states that the Palestinians have the unfortunate status of being both the largest single group of refugees in
the world, and one of the oldest, having been refugees for some five decades.
86. See The Origins and Evolution of the Palestinian Problem 1917-1988 at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/qpal/dpr/DPR-pp-2.htm (n.d.) [hereinafter Origins]. See also C.W. Gusewelle,
Bungling Arab brethren share blame for plight ofPalestinians, KANSAS CITY STAR, December 2, 2001, where
it states that:
[t]hrough all those 25 years of confrontation and in the 28 troubled years since, the
Arab regimes, except for Jordan, refused to allow Palestinians to immigrate in
significant numbers, or extend to those they did admit the rights of citizenship, or even
to commit serious resources to relieving the misery in the refugee camps.
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Gravely concerned that the denial of their rights has been aggravated
by the reported acts of collective punishment, arbitrary detention,
curfews, destruction of homes and property, deportation and other
repressive acts against the refugees and other inhabitants of the
occupied territories..."
As a result of the position of the United Nations, it would seem that the
only direction to go is forward and toward the creation of a Palestinian state.
Moreover, the United Nations has been vocal in questioning Israeli measures
against Palestinian terrorist activity, but the United Nations has not once
questioned the Palestinian terrorist activities. 88 However, there lies a problem
with the creation of a Palestinian state that is bent on the destruction of the Jews
and of Israel. There are factions with power and the will to destroy all of the
Jews in the Middle East and either eliminate them systematically from the
region or provoke them into inviting on their own destruction. 89 Furthermore,
the holy book of Islam has been interpreted by these factions to justify both their
means and their ends: the use of suicide bombers to rid Palestine of the Jews. 90
Thus, there is the problem of justly dealing with the plight of the Palestinian
refugees, which may prove to be mutually exclusive with maintaining any Jews
in Israel.
Unfortunately, the goal for peace in the region was not historically
facilitated when the Palestinians embarked upon a new three-stage strategy for
Israel's destruction, embodied in the PLO's 1974 decision commonly known as
the "Phased Plan." The plan called for the "armed struggle" to establish an
"independent combatant national authority" over any territory that is "liberated"
from Israeli rule. It then called upon the Palestinians to continue the struggle
against Israel, using the territory of the national authority as a base of operations
87. See Origins, supra note 86.
88. See United Nations Demands Israeli Withdrawal at http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/
meast/03/30/un.mideast/index.html (March 30, 2002); see also Security Council Calls For 'Fact-Finding'
Mission In Jenin at http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meastl04/19/mideast/index.html (April 20, 2002).
89. See Interviews With Three Palestinian Militant Leaders at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/holy/onground/pales.html (March 27, 2002) where the Islamic Jihad leader Ali Safuri stated:
[i]f Israel were to annihilate all the Palestinian population here with atomic weapons,
Israel itself would be automatically destroyed because of the scope of the atomic
destruction. So we are proud to be martyrs and that our sons from outside come and
continue our journey and live in this land.
90. Two Views: Can the Koran Condone Terror? N.Y. TIMES, October 13, 2001 at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/fundamentalism/1013koran2.htm where it quotes the Koran as follows:
"And fight in Allah's cause against those who wage war against you, but do not commit aggression - for
verily Allah does not love aggressors" (2:190). "And slay them wherever you may come upon them, and drive
them away from wherever they drove you away - for oppression is even worse than killing" (2:191). "Hence,
fight against them until there is no more oppression and all worship is devoted to Allah alone" (2:193).
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to provoke an all-out war in which Israel's Arab neighbors would then "liberate
all Palestinian territory. '  This Palestinian attitude has produced an
oversensitive and sometimes over-reactive Israel, which then must consider the
safety of the Jews in regard to any and all aspects of a proposed peaceful
settlement.
There are two deal-breaking issues that have prohibited progress with
regard to a peaceful settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The
first issue is the Palestinian "right of return." This issue has been at the center
of the Palestinian position on the refugee issue since 1948.92 Asserted and
implied in this right to return is that all displaced Palestinians have the right to
return to Palestine. Palestinian claims in this regard are rooted in the principles
of natural justice and the historical experience of Palestinian dispossession. The
prohibition against the Palestinian right of return seems to violate both the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights as well as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by depriving the Palestinian
people the right of self-determination.93
The right of self-determination is of particular importance because its
realization is an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance
of individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those
rights.94 However, the Israelis are not entirely at fault for the Palestinian refugee
problem. While the Palestinians were encouraged to leave Israel by the
neighboring Arab invaders, even though they were invited to stay and live in
Israel, and while many Jews fled these neighboring Arab countries and were
absorbed into Israel, "Jordan was the only Arab country to welcome the
Palestinians and grant them citizenship. 95 Accordingly, those other Arab
countries that denied asylum and refuge to the Palestinians acted in violation of
the right to asylum and nationality as stated in the United Nations Declaration
of Human Rights, as well as the right to self determination as stated in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
91. See The PLO's "Phased Plan" at http://www.netaxs.com/-iris/plophase.htm (n.d.). Specifically
look at articles 2, 4, and 8.
92. See The Palestinian Diaspora at http://www.en.monde-diplomatique.fr/focus/mideast/question-3-
3-1-en.(n.d.), where it states that the right of return was recognized for the first time in UN General Assembly
Resolution 194 on II December 1948. Moreover, Resolution 3236 (22 November 1974) asserted that the right
to return became an "inalienable right."
93. See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (adopted 19 Dec. 1966)
art. 1(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. See also the ICCPR, supra note 73, art. 1(1). See also The
Right To Self-Determination of Peoples (Article 1) CCPR General Comments 12 at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/CCPR+General+comment+ 12.En?OpenDocument.
94. See The Right To Self-Determination of Peoples (Article 1), supra note 93.
95. See Mitchell Bard, The Palestinian Refugees at http://www.us-
israel.org/jsource/History/refugees.html_(n.d.).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.96 Moreover, the problem
for the Jews with allowing the Palestinians the full realization of the right of
return is that the return and replacement of such large numbers of Palestinians
would certainly make the Jews a minority population in their state and have an
effect on the Jews in Israel with regards to security.
The second deal-breaking issue is the withdrawal of Israel from territories
occupied beyond its 1967 border. Unfortunately, the attitude that Israel has
failed to return to living within its pre-1967 border does not accurately portray
the movement of the Jews on this issue. There have been numerous occasions
that "Israel has withdrawn from certain parts of these areas. 97  These
withdrawals include but are not limited to: As part of the 1974 disengagement
agreement, Israel returned territories captured in the 1967 and 1973 wars to
Syria. Under the terms of the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, Israel
withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula for the third time and Israel had already
withdrawn from large parts of the desert area it captured in its War of
Independence. After capturing the entire Sinai in the 1956 Suez conflict, Israel
relinquished the peninsula to Egypt a year later. In September 1983, Israel
withdrew from large areas of Lebanon to positions south of the Awali River.
In 1985, Israel completed its withdrawal from Lebanon, except for a narrow
security zone just north of the Israeli border. After signing peace agreements
with the Palestinians on 4 May 1994,98 and a treaty with Jordan on 26 October
1994, 99 Israel agreed to withdraw from most of the territory in the West Bank
captured from Jordan in 1967, a small area was returned to Jordan, and the rest
was ceded to the Palestinian authority. The agreement with the Palestinians also
involved Israel's withdrawal in 1994 from most of the Gaza Strip, which had
been captured from Egypt in 1973.
The possible elements of a resolution to the unfortunate Palestinian refugee
situation may call for a plan of Palestinian repatriation achieved through
Palestinian statehood, the ability of refugees to gain Palestinian citizenship and
return to national soil in the land seized from the 1967 War in the West Bank
and Gaza, as well as the return of a limited or targeted number of 1948 refugees
to their homes within Israel under the rubric of family reunification. However,
these plans must respect the national security of Israel and guarantee security in
96. See U.D.H.R., supra note 65, arts. 14 and 15. See also ICESCR, supra note 93, art. 1(I). See
also ICCPR, supra note 73, art. 1(1).
97. Mitchell Bard, Defensible Boundaries at http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Peace/Boundaries.html
(n.d.).
98. See Agreement On the Gaza strip and the Jericho Area at http://www.us-israel.orgljsource/
Peace/gazajer.html (May 4, 1994).
99. See Treaty Of Peace Between The State Of Israel and The Hashemite Kingdom Of Jordan at
http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Peace/isrjor.html (October 26, 1994).
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consideration because the Jews in Israel seem to always be on defense from the
constant aggressive activity of neighbors that harbor intrinsic hatred.
While the recent recognition of Israel as a state by Palestinian leader
Yasser Arafat helps illustrate that Palestinians and Arabs alike value Jews as
human beings, wave after wave of terrorist activity has kept Israeli land-for-
peace deal-brokers apprehensive to give away too much too soon.' 0 "The right
to life and security of the person allows for no derogation, and must be applied
with no exception in all circumstances. Israeli and Palestinian civilians are not
presently enjoying this right...,,o' Accordingly, there is a clear and present need
for action. The establishment of a viable and independent Palestinian state is
a sufficient remedy to resolve the refugee issue as far as the moderate
Palestinians are concerned. However, as the creation of the Palestinian state
would permit Palestinian repatriation and security for their own people, any
remedy must fully address the legitimate security concern of the Israelis. t"2
Although these concerns may not be the same today as they were in 1967, with
the present state of the world and the state of technology these security concerns
may be much greater.
C. The Present Conflict
Peace talks slowed after the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin by an Israeli radical in 1995.103 Following several interim agreements
and lengthy discussions about Israeli withdrawals from occupied territories,
there was a shift of control from the Israeli government to the Palestinian
authority. The United States brokered an agreement between Israeli Prime
Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to reopen
peace talks in October of 1998. The Wye River Accord set the parameters for
an Israeli withdrawal from more territory in exchange for promises that
100. All Things Considered (NPR September 9, 1993), when it was reported that the PLO has finally
recognized Israel's right to exist. See also Interviews With Three Palestinian Militant Leaders at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/holy/onground/pales.html (March 27, 2002) where the
Islamic Jihad leader Ali Safuri stated that the Jews have no right to live anywhere in Palestine and that the
Islamic Jihad will not cease terrorist activity until Israel leaves the occupied territory, i.e. the entire region.
101. See High Commissioner For Human Rights Calls On Israeli, Palestinian Leaders To Show
Political Will To End Violence at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/viewOl/554DFAA20AB48C21
C 1256B720059BAB0?opendocument.(n.d.).
102. See Bard, supra note 97, where it states that Israel cannot withdraw from all the territories it
captured. As the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded in a 29 June 1967 memorandum for the
Secretary of Defense: "From a strictly military point of view," the Joint Chiefs wrote, "Israel would require
the retention of some captured Arab territory in order to provide militarily defensible borders."
103. The assassination illustrates the fact that there exists extremism on both sides. However, there
is no Israeli mandate to destroy or kill all Palestinians.
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Palestinian officials would work to ensure the security of Israel."° The Wye
River Accord also laid the groundwork for discussions about the formal creation
of a Palestinian state and other so-called "final status" issues, such as who
controls Jerusalem.
After the election of Labour Party leader Ehud Barak in May 1999, the
peace talks moved into high gear. Barak quickly moved to expedite a new
accord, and his government accepted the idea of a Palestinian state with a
strategy generally known as "land for peace."' 5 The idea of "land for peace"
required that the Israeli government surrender more territory to the Palestinian
Authority in exchange for sustained security. Barak also opened negotiations
with Syria and finished the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.
In March of 2000, a series of negotiations opened outside Washington with
a framework for peace talks on the "final status" issues as the goal.0 6 These
"final status" issues include agreement on borders, the refugee situation, and
control over Jerusalem. The meetings culminated in another meeting at Camp
David in July 2000 between Arafat and Barak, while a self-imposed deadline of
13 September 2000 loomed over the discussions. At the talks, Barak offered the
most sweeping peace plan ever put forward by the Israeli government.
However, United States efforts to broker a deal finally failed when Arafat
refused Barak's offer and failed to make any counter-offer.
Soon after the talks failed, the visit by Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount
in Jerusalem sparked days of protests. 107 The violence spread and intensified as
Palestinians vented anger at the continued presence of Israel in the occupied
territories. As the Palestinian protests continued and daily clashes intensified,
Prime Minister Barak was defeated by conservative Ariel Sharon in February
of 2001. In May 2001, Senator George Mitchell issued his report saying the
actions of both Israel and Palestinian authorities sparked the violence that had
104. See Israelis, Palestinians Break Deadlock on Wye River Accord at
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/meast/9909/04/mideast.04/index.html (September 4, 1999).
105. See Barak Looks to Friends and Rivals to Form New Government at http://www.cnn.com/
WORLD/meast/9905/19/israel.02/index.html (May 20,1999).
106. See United States to Call for Israeli Withdrawal at http://www.cnn.com/200l/US/1l/14/
powell.mideast/index.html (November 14, 2001).
107. See http://www.templemount.org/allah.html (n.d.) where it states that the significance of the
Temple Mount for the Palestinians is that the shrine was deliberately built as a political, economic, and
religious counter attraction to Mecca because Medina and Mecca, the two cities holy to Islam, were under the
control of a rival Caliph. Moreover, the holy spot of Judaism was now to be identified with the spot where
Mohammed's horse ascended to heaven. Compare with http://ds.dial.pipex.com/ritmeyer/temple.ark.html
where it proposes that the Temple Mount is the resting place of the Ark of the Covenant, and
http://www.templemount.org/bitterend.html where it underscores the importance of the site to the Jews as the
place where it connects the Jews to God. See also Israeli Troops, Palestinians Clash After Sharon Visits
Jerusalem Sacred Site at http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/09/28/erusalem.violence.02/index.html
(September 28, 2000).
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raged for eight months, and that neither party was specifically to blame.'0 8 The
report also outlined a multi-step process for the violence to end and talks to
reopen.' 09 Both Israel and the Palestinians have been slow to endorse the report,
each side saying it does not trust the other side to uphold its part of the deal.
Nevertheless, the United States accepted Mitchell's recommendations.
After the failure of the talks, and the non-implementation of the Mitchell
proposal, the Al-Aqsa brigade launched an infitada and began to conduct
suicide bombings against the Israeli military and civilians alike.°"0 The Al-Aqsa
Martyrs brigade is the military wing of Yasser Arafat's Fatah organization,
which includes both secular and Islamic ideologies and militias."' Also, there
have been several armed incursions by the Israelis into the occupied territories.
These Israeli transgressions include but are not limited to the systematic
assassinations and arrests of individuals believed to have been involved in
terrorism, the deployment of troops, and the destruction of Palestinian property
such as the Palestinian Radio station and Arafat's own compound. Both the
radio station and Arafat's compound were thought to be used for terrorist
planning and terrorist propaganda.
Between suicide bombings and Israeli military action, it is not known
which is the chicken and which is the egg, or if they are even rationally
connected. The Palestinians refer to it as the "balance of terror," and some of
them do not differentiate Israeli or American military action from suicide
bombings." 2 In any event, the terrorist attacks by the Palestinians and the
armed incursions by the Israelis have spiraled out of control and this has invited
intellectuals to debate the "moral equivalence" of the acts.' '" It seems that
Arafat cannot stop the suicide bombings, although there are allegations that he
108. See Mitchell: No Such Thing 'As Conflict That Can't be Ended' at http://www.cnn.com/2001/
WORLD/meast/05/2 l/mitchell.cnna/index.html (May 21, 2001).
109. See Bush Said Ready to Take 'Active' Role in Mideast at http://www.cnn.com!2001/WORLD/
meast/05/27/mideast.mitchelllindex.html (May 27, 2001).
110. See The Cycle of Violence at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/holy/cron/ (n.d.)
for a chronology to the escalation of violence. See also Interviews With Three Palestinian Militant Leaders
at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showslholy/onground/pales.html (March 27, 2002) where the
leader of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Ibrahim Abayat stated that the group, which the United States
designated a terrorist. organization, was a national liberation movement that "...derives the legitimate right
to resist the occupation of the Israelis from the United Nations Geneva Convention." Moreover, he stated that:
"...the United States has proven it is not the shepherd of peace but the shepherd of the Israelis." See also
Intifada Has United All Palestinians at http://www.arabnews.com/Article.asp?ID=9601 (Apr. 5, 2002).
111. Id.
112. See Interviews With Three Palestinian Militant Leaders at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/holy/onground/pales.html (March 27, 2002) where the Islamic Jihad leader Ali Safuri stated
that the fear needs to be instilled on the Jewish people.
113. See The Peace Encyclopedia: Moral Relativism, Moral Equivalence, Ethical Relativism,
Cultural Relativism, Egalitarianism at http://www.yahoodi.com/peace/mrelativism.html (n.d.)
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does not adequately try. It is charged that he talks with two tongues, speaking
English and condemning an act while also speaking Arabic and encouraging the
same act. Others allege that he encourages the acts by financing the terrorists."
4
Moreover, neither the United Nations nor individual nations can influence Israel
to stop its offensive campaigns, because it is widely believed in Israel that these
campaigns are the only means of preventing future terrorist acts.
A United States-sponsored resolution adopted on 12 March 2002 endorsed
the creation of a Palestinian state, demanded an immediate cease-fire, and called
for renewed efforts by both parties to resume negotiations on a political
settlement. 15  Also, there has recently been a proposal from the Arab
community championed by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah for a resolution to the
conflict. What is significant about the Arab proposal is that the Arab
community offered an implied recognition of the right of Israel to exist." 6
While the Israelis would no doubt insist upon normal diplomatic relations in
light of some of the concessions they are asked to make, it is important that the
Arab community recognize that they will have an important role in resolving
this conflict.
Compounding the problem, the United States has debated military
intervention to remove the Iraqi leader Sadaam Hussein, who has allegedly
awarded the families of terrorist martyrs twenty-five thousand dollars for the
completion of each terrorist attack.' Thus, it does not appear that the entire
Arab community recognizes Israel's right to exist, which stems from ancient
problems in the region. Arab intransigence and militancy are obstacles to peace
and stability in the region, and also threaten the call for the creation of a
Palestinian state. Moreover, given the extreme hatred of some Arabs for not
only the Jews, but the United States as well, there seems little hope for a cease
fire by Palestinian militants either before or after any agreement." 8 Thus, the
cycle of violence will continue.
114. See Interviews With Three Palestinian Militant Leaders at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/holy/onground/pales.html (March 27, 2002) where the leader of Islamic Jihad said that he
would not follow any order from Arafat for a ceasefire, however, the leader of Al Aqsa would follow any
command from Arafat. See also Israelis Say Documents link Arafat to Terrorists at http://www.cnn.com/2002/
WORLD/meast/04/04/arafat.documents/index.html (April 4, 2002).
115. See Highlights of Bush News Conference at http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/03/13/
bush.hilights/index.html (March 13, 2002).
116. See Bush: 'The World Finds Itself at a Critical Moment' at http://www.cnn.com/20021US/04/04/
bush.transcript/index.html (April 4, 2002).
117. See Put the Blame On ... at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,49563,00.html (April, 4
2002).
118. See Interviews With Three Palestinian Militant Leaders at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/holy/onground/pales.html (Mar. 27, 2002) where the Islamic Jihad leader Ali Safuri stated
that the Jews and the Americans are terrorists and that by God's hand America will fall. Moreover, that "[i]n
the Palestinian lexicon, Israel has no place on the map."
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VI. CONCLUSION
The creation of the State of Israel gave the wandering Jews a place to take
refuge, but in doing so a new group of wanderers were created. It took a long
time for the Jews to have the place that they call Israel; a place where they are
permitted to be Jews; a place where the internal government is not trying to
remove them or persecute them.
First they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out-because I
was not a socialist. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did
not speak out-because I am not a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Jews, and I did not speak out-because I was not a Jew. Then
they came for me-and there was no one left to speak for me." 9
It is unfortunate that history can be cruel, as it seems that the Jews to a
certain extent have not spoken out for the Palestinians. If the Palestinians
cannot take refuge in Israel, their situation calls for an affirmative duty by the
Israelis and the Arab community to assist in their resettlement elsewhere. This
is because the Palestinian refugees, like the Jews before them, have no place to
wander. Accordingly, they are stateless, they are refugees, and they have
rights. "0
The establishment of a Palestinian state is a possible remedy for the
refugee problem, and it is arguably necessary to prevent the Palestinians from
becoming marginalized and hated as the Jews have been historically. However,
the creation of a Palestinian state seems to be as problematic as peace between
the Jews and the Palestinians, or between the Jews and the larger Arab
community. The failure to affect a meaningful and lasting solution between the
peoples of two of the most ancient cultures is disheartening in the hope for
peace in other parts of the world. Moreover, the continuation of the conflict
between the Arabs and the Jews effectively treats the three million Palestinian
refugees as nothing more than a group, rather than the one plus one plus one that
should represent each and every individual among them.
119. TELUSHKIN, supra note 54, at 536, quoting the Reverend Martin Niemoller, leader of the
Confessional Church.
120. See 1951 Convention, supra note 65.
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SUMMARY
This article explores and compares the faith-based dispute resolution
philosophies and techniques of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism and examines
their interaction with the secular legal system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether or not lawyers like to admit it, human beings with scores to settle
did not go straight from clubbing each other with rocks and bones to serving
each other with summons. Since time immemorial, third parties have peacefully
* R. Seth Shippee is a law student at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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intervened in every manner of dispute, and much of this intervention has been
rooted the world's countless religious traditions.' Before there were courts,
there were temples; before there were judges, there were elders and priests, and
before there were lawyers, there were clergymen, relatives, and neighbors.
These time-honored institutions did not whither away and die with the
founding of the American Arbitration Association. On the contrary, in the
United States, traditional, faith-based alternatives to the mainstream legal
system are alive and well, and, in many ways, busier and more influential than
ever. This article will explore the modem, faith-based dispute resolution
philosophies and techniques of the three religions with the strongest presence
in the United States: Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. In doing so, each
religion's approach will be viewed through the lens of alternate dispute
resolution (ADR) as it is commonly practiced and studied in this country. More
specifically, the ADR approaches of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism will be
compared to the four, basic forms of dispute resolution in the United States:
negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication. Since these forms of
dispute resolution are the key to this article's focus, the basic principles and
characteristics of each is discussed briefly below, in order from least to most
formal.
II. MAINSTREAM FORMS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Negotiation
Negotiation is the most basic and least formal means of resolving a
dispute.' Essentially, a negotiation is a direct, back-and-forth dialog between
the parties with the goal of trying to resolve the conflict.3  Generally,
negotiations are quick, inexpensive, private, and controlled completely by the
parties.4 Because the emphasis of a negotiation is on informality, there are no
specific procedures that must be followed.5 Each party may bring an attorney,
however negotiations do not involve the intervention of a third party facilitator
or decision maker.6 Moreover, because of the direct involvement of the parties
in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement, negotiations can often result in a
I. ADR Group, History and Theory Papers of Mediation I, available at
http://vvww.adrgroup.co.ukltraining/MedHist&Pract_vl.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
2. Oklahoma Bar Association, Methods for Resolving Conflicts and Disputes, available at
http://www.okbar.org/publicinfo/brochures/conjbroc.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
3. Id.
4. Johanne H. Gross, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) An Introduction, available at
http://wvww.duhaime.org/adrl.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
5. Methods for Resolving Conflicts and Disputes, supra note 2.
6. Goss, supra note 4.
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win-win solution.' As discussed below, negotiation is a central element of
Christian dispute resolution.
B. Mediation
Mediation is a voluntary, non-binding process in which a neutral third
party (the mediator) helps the parties communicate with each other and reach
a mutually acceptable agreement. 8 Typically, mediations are characterized by
being voluntary and informal, as well as private and confidential, and are aimed
at reducing hostility and preserving on-going relationships. 9 Likewise, the
parties in conflict generally choose their own mediator.'" The mediator does not
render a decision nor does he or she force the parties to reach an agreement."
As in a negotiation, the parties directly participate in the mediation and are
responsible for reaching their own, mutually acceptable settlement or
agreement.12 As discussed in greater detail below, mediations are most common
in Christian and Islamic ADR, but are an important part of the Jewish tradition
as well.
C. Arbitration
Arbitration is a formal, more trial-like process in which a dispute is
submitted to a neutral third party (the arbitrator) for a decision."' Typically,
arbitrations are more formal than negotiations or mediations, but may be less
formal than going to court. 14 Although more complicated than other forms of
ADR, arbitrations are usually faster and cheaper than going to court."
Generally, arbitrations take place out of a courtroom setting, but in an
environment where the arbitrator, like a judge, controls the process.'6 The
arbitrator will listen to testimony from both sides, examine exhibits, and make
a decision in which only one side will prevail.' 7 The arbitrator's decision can
be binding, if, prior to the arbitration, both parties agreed to be bound by it.'
8
As discussed below, the Jewish ADR tradition has the strongest focus on










17. Methods for Resolving Conflicts and Disputes, supra note 2.
18. Id.
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arbitration, but arbitrations are also utilized in Christian and Islamic dispute
resolution.
D. Adjudication
In a nutshell, adjudication involves parties going to court for a formal
judicial proceeding in which all the issues are examined by applying the facts
of the case to the applicable law, and a binding decision is rendered either by a
judge or jury in which only one side prevails.' 9 Adjudications are involuntary,
in that a defendant has no choice whether or not to participate, very formal,
open to the public, lengthy, and usually quite expensive.20 As discussed in
greater detail below, the Jewish dispute resolution tradition is the most
adjudicative, while in the Islamic and (especially) the Christian traditions,
adjudication of disputes should be avoided if at all possible.
III. FAITH-BASED ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHRISTIANITY,
ISLAM AND JUDAISM
A. Christianity
Historically, Christian culture has a strong, rich tradition of faith-based
dispute resolution. Since the middle ages, Christian clergymen have been called
upon to act as mediators in disputes ranging from minor family squabbles to
international diplomatic clashes between nations on the brink of war.2' As
anyone who has ever read or seen "The Hunchback of Notre Dame" knows,
Christian churches have always been respected as places of "sanctuary" from
the disputes of the secular world.22 However, most people probably do not
know that, while fugitives were protected by the sanctity of the church,
Christian clergy often acted as mediators between criminals and the
authorities.23
Today, Christianity is, by far, the most practiced religion in the United
States.24 Approximately 80% of Americans come from Christian backgrounds25,
and 154 million consider themselves practicing Christians.26  However,
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. History and Theory Papers of Mediation I, supra note 1.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Global Road Warrior, United States at a Glance, available at
http://media.maps.mcon/globalraadwarrior/cauntries/grwunitedstates/olataglancebdy.html (last visited Oct.
12, 2001).
25. Id.
26. Religious Tolerance.Org, Religious Makeup of the United States,at
http:/iww. religioustolerance.org/us-rel/htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2001).
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"Christians" are by no means a homogenous group. Roughly 60 million
American Christians are Roman Catholic (the largest single group) 27, and 94
million comprise the 220 different protestant denominations, ranging from
Mormons to Mennonites and from Presbyterians to Pentecostals.28
Within the spectrum of faith-based ADR, Christian forms of dispute
resolution are the least formal, and generally range somewhere between
negotiation and mediation. The informality of Christian dispute resolution
technique is no accident. As discussed below, it is deeply rooted in basic
Christian doctrine.
Naturally, Christians draw their traditions of faith-based dispute resolution
from the Bible, particularly the teachings of Jesus Christ. Basically, Jesus
taught that all people had to work out their differences in order to receive
salvation, saying, "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless
those who curse you, pray for those who ill treat you. If someone strikes you
on one cheek, turn to him also the other."29 Likewise, "Whatever you bind on
earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed
in heaven."3 This is a common theme not only in the teachings of Jesus
himself, but also throughout the New Testament. For example, in his letter to
the Romans, the Apostle Paul wrote, "Do not repay anyone evil for evil ... If
it is possible, as far as it depends on you, live at peace with everyone."3
Arguably, there is no stronger command for Christians to resolve their
disputes peacefully than in the Sermon on the Mount, when Jesus told his
followers, "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of
God. '32 Just as Jesus compelled his followers to forgive one another and
reconcile their differences, he also taught them how to go about accomplishing
those goals. In the Book of Matthew, Jesus taught, "If your brother sins against
you, show him his sin in private; if he listens, you have won your brother., 33
"If a dispute cannot be resolved privately between the parties, Jesus taught that
one of the grieving parties should take one or two others along with [him or her]
so that every fact may be established on the testimony of those witnesses. 34
Finally, if the parties were still unable to reach a solution after talking with the








33. Id. at 18:15.
34. Id. at 18:16.
35. Id. at 18:17.
20021
242 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 9:237
Many Christians interpret Jesus' teachings, as well as various other
passages from the New Testament, as strongly discouraging, if not outright
prohibiting, Christ's followers from taking their disputes to the secular courts.
36
This aversion to the mainstream legal system felt by some Christians has its
roots in many passages from the New Testament. For example, in the book of
Matthew, Jesus said, "Woe to you, teachers of the law... you have neglected
the more important matters of the law- justice, mercy, and faithfulness. 37
Likewise, Jesus also taught his followers that it is best to avoid litigation
altogether by going beyond the letter of the law, saying, "[I]f someone wants to
sue you and take your tunic, let him have your cloak as well."3 Moreover,
Jesus taught that even when legal disputes cannot be avoided, every Christian
should "[s]ettle matters quickly with [the] adversary who is taking [him or her]
to court," even if that means reaching a settlement on the way to the
courthouse.3 9 Similarly, in his First Letter to the Corinthians, the Apostle Paul
wrote that those who resort to taking their neighbors to court never win in the
eyes of God, regardless of the verdict, because "[t]he very fact that [Christians]
have lawsuits among [one another] means [both parties] have been completely
defeated already. 40  Thus, because the teachings of Jesus and the various
authors of the New Testament passionately urge Christians to forgive one
another, stay out of court, and personally resolve their disputes in the least
formal way possible, the Christian approach to dispute resolution has
traditionally focused on negotiation or mediation, rather than arbitration or
adjudication.4 Such is the case in the modem practice of Christian dispute
resolution in the United States.
While hundreds of Christian denominations and organizations offer some
sort of conflict resolution service, several have stood out as leaders in the
process of Christian dispute resolution. Some of these are discussed below.
1. Peacemaker Ministries
In 1982, a group of nonprofit Christian ministries offering dispute
resolution services throughout the United States joined together to form the
Christian Legal Society.42 Five years later, many of these ministries formed the
36. Alice Curtis, Should We File Lawsuits?, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, August 6, 2001, available at
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2001/OlO/27.66.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
37. Matthew 23:23.
38. Id. at 5:40.
39. Id. at 5:25.
40. 1 Corinthians 6:7.
41. Peacemaker Ministries, Our Distinctives and Statement of Faith, available at
http://www.hispeace.org/html/abt_us-distinct.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
42. Peacemaker Ministries, Our Ministry, available at http://www.hispeace.org/htmlorg.htm (last
visited Oct. 12, 2002).
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Association of Christian Conciliation Services, and by 1993, these services had
merged into Peacemaker Ministries ("Peacemakers").43 Today, over three
hundred churches, ministries, and organizations are a part of Peacemakers,
making it is the largest, multi-denominational Christian dispute resolution
service in the country."
One of the core beliefs of the Peacemakers is that Christians should not see
conflict as necessarily bad or destructive.45 Rather, the Peacemakers believes
that "[b]y God's grace, [Christians] can use conflict to glorify God, serve other
people, and grow to be like Christ."46 When conflicts do arise, the Peacemakers
follows Jesus' teaching that the parties should try to work out their differences
between themselves through negotiation.47 In doing so, the Peacemakers'
approach is for each party to first look inward and ask whether he or she has had
a "critical, negative, or overly sensitive attitude that has led to unnecessary
conflict."48 This call to introspection stems from Jesus' teaching that one must
"first take the plank out of [his or her] own eye, and then [he or she] will see
clearly to remove the speck from [his or her] brother's eye."49  Next,
Peacemakers' approach requires the parties to "negotiate in a Biblical manner,"
following the Apostle Paul's teaching that each individual should "[d]o nothing
out of selfish ambition or vain conceit, but in humility, consider others better
than [one's self]," and not merely look out for [one's] own personal interests,
but also for the interests of others.5" If negotiations fail to resolve the conflict,
the Peacemakers suggest that the parties turn to a "spiritually mature" person
within the church to "coach" them and get them back on track to resolving their
differences in private.5' Moreover, in keeping with Jesus' teachings, if the
"spiritually mature" person fails to help the parties reach a resolution, they
should then seek the advice of one or two mutually respected individuals to help
settle their differences through mediation and, if necessary, arbitration.52
If, after making every attempt to resolve a conflict either privately or
within a small, community- or church-based group, the parties are still unable









51. Peacemaker Ministries, Basic Principles, available at http://www.hispeace.org/html/bas.htm
(last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
52. Id.
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for Christian Conciliation take an active role in the process.5 3 These peace-
makers do not act as advocates or provide counseling, but rather help to
facilitate the process of resolving the dispute by serving the interests of all
parties impartially. 54  Moreover, these professional peacemakers charge a
"professional fee" (about $125-150 per hour, plus expenses), providing an
additional incentive for the parties to reach a private solution in a Christ-like
manner.
55
2. Christian Dispute Resolution Professionals, Inc.
Like the Peacemakers, Christian Dispute Resolution Professionals, Inc.
("CDRP") offers "alternative dispute resolution with a biblical twist., 56
However, CDRP is not a nonprofit organization. Rather, it is a money-making
business based in California, comprised of "retired judges, experienced business
attorneys, and other qualified professionals trained as mediators and arbitrators"
who hear cases and attempt to settle them by applying "biblical principles of
justice and reconciliation to effect a mutually beneficial solution."57 While
CDRP's mediators and arbitrators are compensated for their time, the
corporation notes that the average cost of one of its full mediations or
arbitrations averages only about $5,000, split between the parties, and, naturally,
all proceedings are private and confidential.58
CDRP offers faith-based services in virtually every practice area one might
find in a secular "big firm," including real estate, contract, marital disputes,
child custody, employer/employee disputes, insurance disputes, workplace
harassment, employment discrimination, and personal injury- all with a focus
on biblical principles. 59 Primarily, CDRP handles marriage and family
mediations. 6' As Christians, CDRP mediators and arbitrators "do not encourage
divorce, but seek to help families find agreement where possible.",61 "If a
53. Peacemaker Ministries, Introduction to Christian Conciliation, Frequently Asked Questions




56. Christian Dispute Resolution Professionals, Inc., Welcome, available at http://cdrpinc.com (last
visited Oct. 12, 2002).
57. Id.
58. Christian Dispute Resolution Professionals, Inc., Getting Started, available at
http://cdrpinc.comngetting%20started,htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
59. Christian Dispute Resolution Professionals, Inc., When to Call CDRP, available at
http://cdrpinc.coin.when%200to%20call,htn (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
60. Christian Dispute Resolution Professionals, Inc., Affordable Mediation Plans to Meet Your
Family's Needs, available at http://cdrpinc com/marriagemedition.program,htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
61. Christian Dispute Resolution Professionals, Inc., Marriage and Family Mediation, Frequently
Asked Questions, available at http://cdrpinc.com/fainily-meditionfaqhtn (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
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couple, after consulting with their support professionals and church leaders,
decide to divorce, the CDRP mediators try to reduce the damages to the
relationship that may occur. '62 Where couples can find agreement, the CDRP
encourages full family reconciliation.63
B. Islam
Islam is now the fastest growing religion in the United States.' Currently,
between 3.5 and 3.8 million Muslims call America home.65 While many
American Muslims are immigrants, the majority are now born here,66 due
mainly to the fact that the American Muslim birthrate is about 4.5 children per
couple, versus a nationwide average of 1.9.67 As the American Islamic
community has grown, it has faced the challenge of maintaining its cultural
distinctiveness and adhering to its core beliefs while many Muslims are
becoming increasingly secular and "Americanized., 68 One approach American
Muslims have used to preserve their traditions is Islam-based dispute resolution.
Within the spectrum of ADR, Islamic dispute resolution techniques and
traditions are more formal than those characteristic of Christianity. Generally,
Islamic faith-based dispute resolution falls somewhere between mediation and
arbitration. Like the Christian tradition, Islamic ARD has its foundation in the
tenants of religious doctrine.
Historically, Islamic culture has had a strong tradition of encouraging the
peaceful resolution of disputes between Muslims. In Islam's holiest book, the
Quran, Muslims are taught that "Allah guides all who seek his good pleasure to
ways of peace."69 The Quran also teaches that Muslims should always take the
initiative for peace, reconciliation, and dialog,7" describing true Muslims as
people "who hastens in every good work, and those who are foremost in
them."'" Likewise the Quran gives Muslims numerous, explicit instructions as
to how they should resolve their disputes. For example, one verse commands,
"All who believe, stand out firmly for Allah as witnesses to fair dealing, and let
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Religious Makeup of the United States, supra note 26.
65. Id.
66. Barry Seitz, Fastest-Growing Religion Often Misunderstood, at
http://wwiv.thenodernreligion.com/assault/rising.htnl (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
67. Id.
68. M.A. Muqtedar Khan, American Muslims and the Moral Dilenmas of Citizenship (May 2000),
available at http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/052000/000506 I.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
69. Quran 5:16.
70. Alaa Bayoumi, Peace: The Muslim's Initiative (October 1999), available at
http://conflictres.org/vol172/peace.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2001)
71. Quran 23:61.
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not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from
justice. Be just, for that is next to piety .... ,72 More specifically, in the context
of marital disputes, the Quran teaches that "[i]f [Muslims] fear a breach between
two people, [they should] appoint an arbitrator from his people and an arbitrator
from her people. If they both want to set things right, Allah will bring about
reconciliation between them."73 In light of this emphasis on peaceful dispute
resolution, the Islamic tradition has developed specialized intermediaries known
as quadis who interpret and apply Islamic law (shari'a), often in an attempt to
preserve social harmony by reaching a negotiated solution to a dispute.74
An interesting facet of the Islamic approach to dispute resolution is that,
arguably unlike Christianity, Islam gives its followers specific guidance as to
handle disputes between themselves and people of other faiths.75 In the Quran,
Allah teaches Muslims to "invite [non-Muslims] to the way of the Lord with
wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue with [non-Muslims] in ways that are
best. '76 Likewise, Muslims are also taught to "walk on the earth in humility,
and when [those ignorant of Islam] address [Muslims], they say peace., 77
Islam's emphasis on peaceful resolution of disputes between all persons,
including non-Muslims, has its roots in the Islamic view of the unique role of
Muslims as shahadat, an Arabic word meaning "witness over other nations. 78
Islam teaches that, for Muslims to deserve the position of shahadat, they must
first understand peace and initiate it among themselves. 79 Next, Muslims must
extend the call for peace to include their non-Muslim neighbors. 80 Finally,
Muslims must be as committed to spreading peace within other communities as
they are within their own.8' "Only then will Muslims deserve to witness over
other nations."82
1. Muslim Mediation
Both mediation and conciliation are the preferred dispute resolution
approaches of the Prophet Mohammed. 3 In disputes between American
72. Id. at 5:8.
73. Id. at 4:34.
74. History and Theory Papers of Mediation 1, supra note 1.
75. Bayoumi, supra note 70.
76. Quran 16:125.
77. Id. at 25:63.
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Muslims, mediation is most often used to address marital disputes. 84 In keeping
with the procedures discussed in the Quran, when a Muslim husband and a wife
are in conflict, each spouse will either name a different person he or she is
comfortable with, and the two will help resolve the conflict, or they both will
agree on one person to be the sole mediator.85 In most cases, if two people are
chosen, they are older family members, and if one person is chosen, he will be
the couple's local Imam (religious leader and teacher).86 As in secular
mediation, the Muslim mediator is more of a facilitator than a judge.87
According to Shahina Siddiqui, executive director of the Islamic Social Services
Association of the United States and Canada (ISSA), "The job of the [Muslim]
mediator is to listen to both sides, to help [the parties] identify what the problem
is, where the conflict is, and then allow each client to listen to each other. 88
Dr. Muzammil Siddiqi, a long time mediator to the Muslim community in
California, observes that the most common conflict between Muslim couples is
"culture clash;" the prime example being "a Muslim woman brought up in
America married to a Muslim man from India."89 Although culture clash is the
most common Muslim marital dispute, it is also among the conflicts most
amenable to mediation. 90 "Sometimes," Dr. Siddiqi notes, "couples have said,
'I wish we had come before. I wish we had gone to someone earlier; we might
have saved out marriage." 9'
Besides being more successful at resolving conflicts between Muslim
couples, mediation also tends to result more often in agreements that secular
courts will enforce. Zafar Hasan, a Chicago-based attorney, has noted that
courts view a signed, notarized contract made after couples have gone through
voluntary mediation as being more legally binding "because both the husband
and the wife have agreed to the conditions mutually., 92 In contrast, Hasan
notes, courts are more likely to ignore or not enforce arbitration agreements
because of incompatibility with local laws.9"
84. SoundVision.com, Mediation: solving marital disputes mutually, at
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2. Muslim Arbitration
Arbitration has received mixed reviews within the Muslim community.
According to Shahina Siddiqui, "In the North American [Islamic] community,
arbitration is rarely used., 94 "It is more likely to be a last resort... for couples
on the verge of divorce."95 "Arbitration," she notes, might "come into how the
property is divided, who will take the children, that kind of stuff, [but] you
cannot really arbitrate a relationship. 96 Zafar Hasan, the Chicago attorney, has
observed tha "[p]art of the problem is that the contract that results from the
arbitration is not respected." "Couples can ... draft a contract stipulating terms
and conditions that each partner will respect. They can even get it notarized.
However, it is usually either appealed or broken."97 Another Muslim attorney,
Faisal Kutty, notes that, "[a]t the end of the day, unless there is some kind of
social pressure forcing the parties to abide by [the arbitrated agreement], what
ends up happening is one of the parties will take it to court."98
However, Abdalla Idris Ali, a former Toronto Imam, supports the use of
arbitration as "a way for warring couples to avoid divorce." 99 "If they arbitrate
[their] issues and accept the arbitration .... they might back down from the
decision to divorce."' 0 Ali is not the only Muslim who believes in the value of
arbitration. Dr. M. Qadeer Baig has long campaigned for Muslims to resolve
their disputes through arbitration rather than mediation.' According to Dr.
Baig, through arbitration, Muslims will be able to decide [their] family law
matters according to Islamic law.0 2 Moreover, he says, "many [a]rbitration
decisions are final in that they do not need formal court approval in the same
way as required in mediation cases."'0 3  To accomplish this, Dr. Baig
recommends the creation of Islamic arbitration boards to deal with family
problems, marital separations, inheritance, child support, and spousal
maintenance in accordance with the shari'a. 104
94. SoundVision.com, How arbitration can help Muslim couples solve conflicts, at
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Today, approximately 3.8 million Americans practice Judaism, and another
2 million consider themselves "culturally" or "ethnically" Jewish. 0 5 Perhaps
because people of the Jewish faith represent a relatively small percentage of the
American population (approximately 2%),16 many Jewish communities
throughout the United States have generally worked to preserve Jewish culture
and religious law through Judaism-based dispute resolution. Primarily, Jewish
communities have worked to settle their disputes in accordance with their faith
through highly specialized religious courts. As will be illustrated below, the
Jewish approach to the resolution of conflicts is significantly more formal and
adjudicative than either the Christian or Islamic traditions.
Compared to the ADR traditions of Christianity and Islam, the Jewish
approach to faith-based dispute resolution is the most formal and can often be
conducted very much like a secular trial, firmly rooted in process and law.
Along the ADR spectrum, Jewish dispute resolution falls somewhere between
arbitration and full adjudication.
The long, rich history of the Jewish people, as reflected in the Bible,
Talmud, and in the writings of Jewish scholars, as well as in the practice of
halacha (Jewish law), provide the basis for the Jewish approach to conflict
resolution. '07 Central to the Jewish approach is the concept of shalom (peace).'08
The Bible commands religious and community leaders to seek and pursue peace
and accept that which is undesirable in order to avoid conflict within the
community.0 9 Shouldering the special burden of preserving peace and avoiding
conflict within the Jewish community are the rabbis. As community leaders and
religious authorities, rabbis are responsible for interpreting and enforcing the
halacha."° At the same time, rabbis also have the obligation to prevent
divisions and conflict from arising in the first place."'
In Jewish tradition, compromise, based on mediation and arbitration, is
seen as an important method of settling civil disputes (bayn adam l'ichavero)
and preventing community conflict.'2 One of Judaism's holiest books, the
Talmud (a compilation of the Jewish oral law with rabbinical commentaries),
highlights the advantages of mediation and compromise over a legal decision
105. Religious Tolerance.Org, supra note 64.
106. The World Factbook - United States, at
http./Avww.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbookgeosus.htnl (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
107. Gerald M. Steinberg, Conflict Prevention and Mediation in the Jewish Tradition, available at
http://faculty.biu.ac.ilI-steingconglictjewishconfl.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
108. Id.
109. Psalms 34:15.
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finding for one party or the other." 3 Likewise, Jewish sages have noted that
when the demands of pure justice are met, there is no peace." 14 In fact, the
Shulchan Aruch, the authoritative code of Jewish Law, states that judges of the
halacha are required to open all civil proceedings by proposing a compromise
for the litigants to consider. 5 The Shulchan Aruch also states that a judge or
an independent mediator may also offer to mediate a solution, even after the
evidence has been heard, in order to encourage a peaceful resolution to the
conflict. 16 Moreover, the Jewish scholar and philosopher Maimonides urged
judges to promote voluntary mediation, praising any judge who does not have
to make a legal ruling in his lifetime, and is able to mediate a compromise
between rival litigants."t
7
Jewish law states that civil disputes do not necessarily have to be settled
by professional judges, but rather, any three individuals accepted by the litigants
and familiar with the law can sit in judgment." 8 Nevertheless, most disputes
under Jewish law are heard by rabbis, since they are most familiar with Jewish
law. However, despite its emphasis on mediation and compromise, the Jewish
tradition does not provide much direction regarding the process of mediation. "9
Essentially, judges are simply told to seek a compromise.120 In furtherance of
this command to seek compromise, judges, rabbis and other persons presiding
over disputes between Jewish parties often employ the familiar techniques of
mediation and arbitration.
1. Jewish Mediation and Arbitration
Everyone knows the Old Testament story of King Solomon and the baby
with two mothers, but most people probably have not thought about it in terms
of alternate dispute resolution technique. In this context, it is worth repeating.
The Bible teaches that, by the grace of God, King Solomon was the wisest
man who ever lived.'21 Soon after God bestowed this great wisdom upon him,
Solomon went to the Temple in Jerusalem and threw a big party to give thanks
113. The Talmud, The Steinsaltz Edition (English translation), Volume XV, Tractate Sanhedrin, Part
1, (Random House, NY) 1996.
114. Yaakov Bazak, Conflict Resolution Through Compromise in Jewish Law, in Sinai (in Hebrew)
Vol. 71, Nisan 5732 (Spring 1972).
115. Id. at fn 13.
116. Id.
117. Id.atfn4l.
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for the gift he had received. 2 2 In the middle of this party, two women (the Bible
calls them "harlots") approached Solomon with a dispute about a baby. 123
Apparently, both women had recently given birth, but one woman had rolled
over on her baby during the night, and now the child was dead.
124
Consequently, the two women were battling over whose baby was dead and
whose was still alive. So, King Solomon, taking his newly acquired wisdom out
for a spin, said, "Get me a sword."'' 25 "Then the King said, 'Divide the living
child in two, and give half to the one and half to the other."",12 6 "Then the King
said, 'Cut the living child in two, and give half to the one and half to the
other. ' , 12 7 The first woman was horrified and said, "Oh, my lord, give her the
living child, and by no means kill him."'' 28 However, the second woman
sneered, "He shall be neither mine nor yours; divide him!"' 129 Of course, King
Solomon did not get to be revered as the wisest man who ever lived by carving
up a lot of babies. Instead, he coolly gave the baby to the first woman, the real
mother, and all the people of Israel said, "Wow! That Solomon is one heck of
an Alternate Dispute Resolution guy." (paraphrased). 3 °
Today, probably very few disputes within the Jewish community are
resolved by threatening to chop the parties' children in half, but the theme set
by King Solomon all those centuries ago still holds true: Jewish tradition
encourages creative solutions to dispute resolution. Because of this history of
creative, not necessarily "legalistic" solutions to conflict, Judaism has developed
a strong tradition of mediation and arbitration.
In the Talmud, the Hebrew terms p'sharah and bitzua are used
interchangeably to refer both to mediation and arbitration."i' Which term is
appropriate depends on the number of people presiding over the dispute. A
p'sharah may be conducted by a single individual. 32 Thus, it is less formal, and
lends itself more to the process of mediation. In contrast, a bitzua is more
formal and requires three individuals, which is also the number required for a
strict legal proceeding or din (discussed in greater detail in the next section). 33
122. Id. at 3:15.
123. Id. at 3:16.
124. Id. at 3:17-22.
125. 1 Kings 3:24.
126. Id. at 3:24.
127. 1 Kings 3:25.
128. Id. at 3:26.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 3:27-28.
131. Ira Yitzahak Kasdan, A Proposal for P'sharah: A Jewish Mediation/Arbitration Service,
available at http:lwww.jlaw.comlArticles/psharah3.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2001) [Hereinafter Proposal
for P'sharah].
132. Id. (citing Sulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 12:7).
133. Proposal for P'sharah, supra note 131.
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Three individuals are required when a potentially binding decision is sought
because, under Jewish law, the enforceability of such judgments requires kinyan
("exchange").134 Consequently, a bitzua is more likely to refer to arbitration.
As with secular mediation, Jewish mediators do not render decisions, and
any suggestions the mediator makes for resolving the dispute are not binding on
the parties. 135 A mediator may preside over a face-to-face meeting between the
parties, caucus with each side separately, or, most likely, combine the two.' 36
In practice, a Jewish mediator basically acts like any other mediator. He or she
serves as an objective "sounding board" to offer an impartial evaluation of the
merits of the case, and any information he or she receives is strictly confidential
unless the parties agree otherwise. 137
Like mediation, Jewish arbitration essentially follows the same procedures
as secular arbitration. The parties voluntarily take their disagreement to a panel
of typically three impartial dayanim ("arbitrators") from the Jewish community
who hear the evidence and arguments and render either a binding or non-
binding decision, depending on what the parties want.138  At times, the
procedures used during the arbitration are designed and agreed upon by the
parties, and, more often, Jewish arbitration panels follow the rules of an
organization like the American Arbitration Association.'39 The latter is
particularly true when the parties are seeking a binding decision. While
arbitration awards can be appealed under various state and federal statutes,
generally, courts will not vacate an arbitration panel's decision unless the
proceedings were "tainted by fraud or bias" or the arbitrators "exceeded their
powers in a manner [that] results in a manifest disregard of the law."' 140
While these less formal approaches certainly have their place in the Jewish
tradition, most Judaism-based dispute resolution is done by official, adjudicative
bodies of trained professionals. These Jewish courts and the roles they perform
are discussed in greater detail below.
2. Jewish Adjudication - The Beth Din
Din is the Hebrew word for a formal court proceeding.' 4' A Beth Din (or










law. 42 Some of its many responsibilities include the preservation of procedures
and decisions based on the Torah, Talmud, and the vast body of halachic law. 43
While there is no single "Beth Din" in the United States (virtually every state
is served by at least one), Jewish courts are typically affiliated with the
Rabbinical Council of America ("RCA") or the Union of Orthodox Jewish
Congregations of America. '4
Beth Dins serve the Jewish community by providing a forum for obtaining
Jewish divorces, confirming personal status, and adjudicating commercial
disputes stenming from divorce, business, and community issues. 141 When it
comes to financial conflicts, Beth Dins usually hear cases involving disputes
between business partners, employers and employees, congregations and rabbis,
and family members. While Beth Dins rely primarily on Jewish law in reaching
their decisions, most pride themselves on offering "erudite rabbinic judges...
capable of addressing halachic issues in areas of financial and family law
through the prism of contemporary commercial practice and secular law.' 46
When appropriate, many Beth Dins include lay professionals and experts;
including secular lawyers, businesspeople, physicians, and psychologists; on its
panel of judges.'47 Finally, most Beth Dins will hear cases regardless of the
amount of money being disputed, because their jurisdiction hinges on the
parties' desire to be governed by Jewish law, not on the amount in
controversy. 1
48
One of the most important functions of a Beth Din is the certification of
one's status within the Jewish community. When issues arise as to whether or
not a person is Jewish or whether a couple is recognized as "married" in
accordance with Jewish law, a Beth Din will hear the evidence, apply the
halacha, and issue a ruling, either denying or confirming the disputed status. 149
Likewise, a Jewish divorce is properly accomplished by a Beth Din through a
get, the official document required by Jewish law for either party to remarry. '50
The document makes no reference to responsibility or settlement details, nor
142. West Coast Rabbinical Court - Beth Din of Beverly Hills, Beth Din, available at
http://www.beth-din.org/more/default.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
143. Id.
144. Beth Din of America, Our Mission, Background & Affiliations, Principals, available at
http://www.bethdin.org/mission.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
145. Beth Din of America, Our Services and What You Can Expect from the Beth Din o America,
available at http://www.bethdin.org/services.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) [Hereinafter Our Services].
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Beth Din, FinancialArbitration, available at http://www.beth-din.org/Financial.asp (last visited
Oct. 12, 2002).
149. Our Services, supra note 145.
150. Beth Din, Divorce, available at http://www.beth-din.org/more/divorce.html (last visited Oct.
12, 2002).
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does it offer any religious blessing or prayer.'5 ' Thus, a get is strictly a legal
document that breaks the existing bond of marriage and acknowledges that the
parties are free to remarry under Jewish law.
5 2
In addition to confirming personal and marital status, Beth Dins also assist
in conversion to Judaism by providing education and counseling, along with the
actual procedure and appropriate documentation are provided to eligible,
interested parties."' Great care is taken to ensure that a convert to Judaism's
legitimacy in legal and family matters is guaranteed by strict adherence to
Jewish law (guir ke'halacha). Once properly performed, conversion by a Beth
Din is recognized by every Jewish legal authority, domestically and abroad. 
154
Likewise, once settled, certificates of personal religious or marital status
properly issued by a Beth Din are recognized by rabbinical courts in Israel and
worldwide. 15
5
3. Jewish Law and the Secular Legal System
Because Beth Dins make an effort to conduct their proceedings in a manner
consistent with secular arbitration law, their rulings are usually binding and
enforceable in the secular court system. '56 For example, in Cabinet v. Shapiro,
the Superior Court of New Jersey held that decisions of Jewish tribunals on
religious matters must be accepted by legal tribunals as final and binding.'57
Similarly, in Blitz v. Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland recognized the validity of arbitration proceedings before a Beth
Din, even when the proceedings are not in strict compliance with the Maryland
Uniform Arbitration Act, so long as the parties knowingly and voluntarily agree
to the arbitration procedures.'58  Moreover, when controversies include
substantially religious issues, courts have declined to make their own judgments
until a rabbinical court has had the opportunity to rule on the issues. For
instance, in Congregation B'nei Sholom v. Martin, the defendant reneged on a
$25,000 pledge towards building a synagogue. 59 When the congregation sued
in a Michigan court to collect on the pledge, the defendant claimed the court
lacked jurisdiction, because the enforceability of the pledge was an issue of
Jewish law, and, as such, it must be taken first to a Beth Din. 6' After hearing
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Beth Din, supra note 142.
154. Id.
155. Our Services, supra note 145.
156. Id.
157. Cabinet v. Shapiro, 86 A.2d 314, 317 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1952).
158. Blitz v. Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation, 720 A.2d 912, 913 (Md. 1998).
159. Congregation B'nei Shalom v. Martin, 173 N.W.2d 504, 504 (Mich. 1969).
160. Id. at 507.
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expert testimony from rabbinical scholars of Jewish law, the Supreme Court of
Michigan agreed, and remanded the case to the Beth Din16
IV. CONCLUSION
While the dispute resolution traditions of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism
may differ in the scope of issues they hear and the formality of the procedures
they employ, all three certainly share one unifying theme: peacefulness is next
to Godliness. In a time when faith seems to be a subject brought up more to
spur conflict than to resolve it, it is both ironic and reassuring to read the holiest
texts of these three great religions and reflect on their common commands: get
along with one another; compromise; work things out. Suffice it to say that,
when it comes to religion's true role in human conflict, blessed are the
negotiators, the mediators, and the arbitrators, for they shall be called the
children of God. And Allah. And Yahweh.
161. Id. at 510.
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Turingia and the Republic of Babbage have brought their
case before this Court by notification of the Special Agreement as provided for
by Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The Court
has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article 36(2) of the said Statute.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Turingia is a large, developed state with a highly educated and
technologically literate population. Babbage is a smaller developing state, with
little infrastructure, although the availability of Internet access for Babbagian
citizens has increased markedly in recent years. In 1994, the Babbagian
government promulgated a new Criminal Code. Section 117 of the.Code
prohibited the publication of indecent material, which was defined to include
material targeted at and designed to offend members of a particular ethnic
group, and material offensive to the public morality of Babbage. On September
25 1999, the head of Babbage's government, President Revuluri, issued a
Presidential Declaration extending the legal scope of section 117 to embrace
material published or distributed on the Internet, and ordering all Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) operating in Babbage to eliminate any user access to
material which would violate section 117. Within two weeks of the Declaration,
all but one of the ISPs operating in Babbage employed restrictive blocking
software to comply with the legal prohibition in section 117. Such software also
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prohibited users from accessing sites of historical and medical interest, and
blocked other sites which were neither pornographic nor defamatory in intent.
Babbage OnLine (BOL), the dominant ISP in the Babbagian market and
a subsidiary of a Turingian-based company, Turingia OnLine (TOL), refused
to comply with the Presidential Declaration on grounds articulated by TOL's
Chief Executive Officer, namely its inconsistency with the international right
to freedom of expression. Charges were laid and proceedings successfully
brought against BOL and TOL. In order to protect its property against
forfeiture, BOL closed down its operations in Babbage and removed its assets.
President Revuluri warned that Babbage would not permit TOL to escape
responsibility for its actions.
On December 24 1999, a computer programmer illegally hacked into
TOL's computer system, erased the data which comprised TOL's publically
available websites and deleted the system programmes that controlled TOL's
worldwide network. The effect was to deny TOL's subscribers access to the
Internet for three days, for which TOL was later required to reimburse its
customers in the amount of 50 million dollars.
On December 27, 1999, once the TOL website had been restored, a hidden
computer virus was activated. The virus disrupted normal computer operations,
resulting in the loss of unsaved data. Certain files containing words commonly
used in hate speech were deleted. In addition, an e-mail indicating the political
motivations of the group was sent to all subscribers. The International
Babbagian Cyber-Patrol (IBCP) later claimed responsibility for the attack.
On December 29 1999, President Revuluri issued a proclamation in which
he conferred orders of merit on the members of the IBCP, thanked and praised
the group, and also promised them a full amnesty from prosecution in the
Babbagian courts.
Following the IBCP attack, Josephine Shidle, the Minister of Justice of
Turingia, confirmed that no action was planned by the Turingian government
by way of response. She did, however, publicly state her opinion that should
a Turingian citizen inconvenience the government of Babbage through non-
violent means, Turingia would have no jurisdiction to prosecute. Subsequently,
David Gabrius, a Turingian citizen, hacked into the Babbage Rail Transit
Authority (BRTA) and deleted its operating system. The effect of this was to
eliminate all automated rail traffic control functions for two days, reducing
traffic control to radio contact. In the immediate confusion following in the
wake of the hacking, two trains traveling in opposite directions on a heavily-
used mountain pass crashed into each other, causing fatalities. Turingia
reiterated its decision not to prosecute Gabrius.
Following a joint request by the BRTA Administrator and the Minister of
Justice of Babbage, Tara Elis, that Gabrius come to Babbage to assist with the
repair of the BRTA, and on the express assurance that he would not face
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prosecution if he did so, Gabrius agreed to go to Babbage. A plane was
chartered by the Government of Babbage to transport Gabrius from Turingia.
However, the request for help was in fact a deliberate ruse constructed for the
purpose of luring Gabrius to Babbage, and on arrival at Babbage International
Airport, the Babbagian national police were waiting to arrest Gabrius. Despite
objections by Turingia as to the manner of the arrest and to the absence of any
right of Babbage to assert jurisdiction over Gabrius, Gabrius was charged, put
on trial and convicted for the murder of the 200 victims of the train collision and
sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.
Under mounting international pressure, Babbage and Turingia have agreed
to submit this dispute to the International Court of Justice.
II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether Babbage's legislation exceeds itsjurisdiction at international law?
2. Whether Babbage' s legislation violates the right to freedom of expression
at international law?
3. Whether Babbage is responsible for an internationally wrongful act in
respect of the IBCP's hacking?
4. Whether Babbage is obliged to provide compensation for the IBCP's
interference with TOL' s contractual rights under the law of expropriation?
5. Whether the luring of Gabrius to Babbage violates Turingia's sovereignty?
6. Whether the luring of Gabrius to Babbage violates his human rights?
IV. SUMMARY OF THE PLEADINGS
1. Babbage's legislation is inconsistent with the right to freedom of
expression found in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), which Babbage has signed but not yet ratified.
Babbage is bound by Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties not to act so as to defeat the purpose and object of the ICCPR,
which it has done by imposing broad restrictive provisions on the
publication of indecent materials, thereby impinging on a fundamental
human right. Alternatively, Babbage's legislation has breached a right to
free speech that exists independently at customary international law.
Whilst the right, whether founded in treaty or custom, is not absolute and
may be subject to reasonable limitations assessed on the criteria of
necessity and proportionality, the Babbagian legislation fails on these
criteria, principally because it is overly broad in its reach and is not the
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least intrusive means of achieving the legitimate objective. Hence, it
exceeds what is an acceptable restriction of the right at international law.
2. Babbage is responsible for the loss suffered by TOL because the IBCP's
"cyberactivities" are both attributable to Babbage and in breach of
international obligations owed by Babbage. A state may become
responsible for acts ex post facto where the conduct of the state is such that
it may be seen to have adopted and acknowledged the acts as its own. The
contents of the Presidential proclamation constituted an adoption and
acknowledgement of the activities of the IBCP for the purposes of
attribution. The IBCP attack on TOL, specifically the actions of hacking
into TOL and destroying data, violated the customary prohibition on
cybercrimes. The same actions can also be conceptualized as an
expropriation of TOL's capacity to fulfill its contractual obligations,
necessitating TOL's US$50 million reimbursement of subscribers.
Babbage must make reparations for the loss accordingly.
3. Turingia is not responsible for the damage sustained by the BRTA, as it is
not responsible for the private actions of Gabrius against the BRTA.
While a state may be held responsible for the acts of individuals in various
circumstances, none is applicable to the present case. The statement of the
Minister cannot amount to prior authorization for the purposes of
attribution, as it does not evidence the requisite degree of association. Nor
can the failure to prosecute Gabrius constitute an implicit acknowledgment
or adoption so as to make Turingia subsequently liable for his acts.
Moreover, the actions of Gabrius do not violate any relevant legal
obligation. There is no international prohibition on terrorism, and Gabrius'
acts cannot fall within established prohibitions on the use of force or
unlawful intervention. In any event, the actions may be viewed as legiti-
mate countermeasures. Furthermore, even if Turingia were responsible for
the actions against the BRTA, this would not extend to liability for the
damage sustained in the train collision, such an injury being insufficiently
causally related to the initial act.
4. The subsequent luring of Gabrius to Babbage was in clear breach of the
territorial sovereignty of Turingia and as such was contrary to international
customary law. Additionally, the luring contravened the customary
prohibition on non-intervention in that it constituted a direct interference
with Turingia's regulation of its sovereign legal and political affairs.
Moreover, the luring was an arbitrary arrest which was in clear violation
of Gabrius' human rights. The manner of the arrest qualified as arbitrary
because of the unpredictable, coercive nature of the arrest and its
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equivalence to forcible abduction. Babbage is also estopped from
prosecuting Gabrius because it is bound by its prior assurance that it would
refrain from doing so, that assurance having the requisite characteristics of
a legally binding undertaking. In view of Babbage's wrongful conduct,
Babbage is obliged to return Gabrius to Turingia.
A. Babbage's Broad Restrictions on the Internet Violate International Law
1. Turingia Has Jus Standi Before the International Court of Justice to
Challenge Babbage's Breach of an Internationally Recognized Right to
Freedom of Speech
a. TOL has a right to impart information
Turingia can claim standing on the grounds that TOL, which we must infer
is a national of Turingia, has a right to impart the types of information that have
been restricted.' The TOL server in Turingia provides original content as well
as transmitting non-original information.
b. The principles and rules regarding basic human rights are
obligations erga omnes, thereby giving Turingia standing to
intervene
This Court has held principles and rules concerning basic human rights to
be obligations erga omnes, binding on all states and opposable against any
state.2 The entire international community is obliged to observe and protect
human rights and all states have "a legal interest in their protection." Turingia
thus has standing to intervene on behalf of a non-national to preserve human
rights.
B. Babbage's Extension of its Legislation to the Internet Exceeds its
Jurisdication
1. The Internet is a common space that is not amenable to jurisdiction
Babbage's exercise of jurisdiction over the medium of the Internet is
unreasonable given that it is undefined territory at international law. It is similar
to outer space prior to its regulation.' Until a specific regime is formulated,
I. G.A. Res. 1997/26, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.41I998/40 (1998), available
at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huidocda/Huridocda.nsf/TestFrame/7599319fO2ece82dcl256608004 (last visited
Oct. 4, 2002).
2. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (BeIg. v Spain) (1970) ICJ 3, 42 (Feb. 1970).
3. M. Balsano, An International Legal Instrument for Cyberspace? A Comparative Analysis with
the Law of Outer Space in Padirac (ed), The International Dimensions of Cyberspace Law, UNESCO (2000)
at 128-130 (2000).
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Babbage should not act contrary to accepted jurisdictional principles. If this
Court were to extend prescriptive jurisdiction into cyberspace, it would be
formulating rather than declaring law, contrary to its Statute.4
2.. In any case, Babbage cannot fulfill any conventional jurisdictional
requirements
Any enforcement of Babbage's legislation entails a necessary breach of
law, because it is inconsistent with all five conventional principles of
prescriptive jurisdiction.5
Neither the nationality principle nor the subjective territoriality principles
applies to publishers in foreign countries. While some effects of the proscribed
acts occurred within Babbage, any territorial connection is too oblique for the
purposes of the objective territoriality principle. The passive nationality
principle is far from accepted at international law and, even if established, the
exercise of jurisdiction on this basis would be disproportionate to the gravity of
the crime. Such acceptance as it has gained has been largely confined to
terrorism and other internationally condemned crimes.6 The security principle
could not be extended to protect "public morals" without broadening the
principle so as to assert jurisdiction over an indeterminate range of offences,
especially in the context of the Internet. This would undermine state
sovereignty.
C. Babbage's Legislation is in Violation ofArticle 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties
1. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties binds
Babbage
Article 19 of the ICCPR protects freedom of expression. Babbage has
signed but not ratified the ICCPR. Pursuant to Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention, which Babbage has ratified, it may not curtail free expression so
as to defeat the object and purpose of the ICCPR.
Violating a seminal right, such as freedom of expression, strikes at the
object and purpose of any international human rights instrument. The
fundamental character of this right has been affirmed in domestic constitutions
and by various institutions in the international community, including the United
4. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Ch. Il, art. 59, available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/Statute/contents.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
5. C. Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in Bassiouni (ed), International Criminal Law
(1999).
6. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v Turk.), 1927 PCIJ (ser A) No. 10, at 82 (Sept. 1927); United States v. Yunis,
681 F Supp 896 (D.D.C. 1988).
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Nations General Assembly (UNGA) which declared it to be "the touchstone of
all freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated."'7 It has been further
recognized as underpinning democracy itself.8
Here, the breach of Article 19 is so broad as to breach several other rights,
including the rights to cultural participation, scientific advancement, and
arbitrary interference with correspondence. Such a wide-ranging breach
threatens the object and purpose of the ICCPR.
Further, the obligations at customary law corresponding to Article 18
require parties to do nothing which may diminish the significance of a treaty's
provisions before its entry into force.9 In restricting Article 19 in such a broad
manner, Babbage has done this.
D. Freedom of Expression is a Recognized Human Right
Customary international law requires the co-existence of settled state
practice and opinio juris. " The right to freedom of expression, including the
rights to receive and impart information "regardless of frontiers," is embodied
in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR. "
The willingness of states to submit to reports by the United Nations Special
Rapporteur and the fact that a diverse majority of states provide constitutional
protection for freedom of expression evidences strong opiniojuris. 12 In addition
to its recognition in international human rights instruments, a formidable corpus
of regional instruments evidences broad state acceptance of the right to freedom
of expression. 3
7. G.A. Res., UN GAOR, Ist Sess, at 2, UN Doc A/64 (1947); available at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2002); Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
Constitution Act, 1982, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2002); Report of
the Experts' Meeting on Cyberspace Law, G.A. Res. 36, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc.
CHIUSP/ECY/99/01 (1998).
8. Compulsory Membership, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory opinion OC-C5/85
(Nov. 13 1965).
9. Megalidis v Turk., 8 Recueil des Decisions des Tribunaux Mixtes 386 (1928).
10. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v U.S.), 1986 ICJ 14 (June
1986) [hereinafter Nicaragua]; N. Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. V. Den., W. Ger. V. Neth.) 1969 ICJ 3 (Feb.
1969).
11. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), available at
http://un.org/Overview.rights.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXII), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1976) available at
http://wwwI.umn.edu/humanarts/instree/b3ccpr.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002) [hereinafter ICCPR].
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1, art. 1; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 7, at
art.29; EST. Const. ch. VI, art. 100.
13. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. I, 1998, art.
10 [hereinafter Convention]; American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," art. 13,
available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-32.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002); Inter-American
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E. Babbage's Legislation Falls Outside the Reasonable Limits Imposed by
Customary International Law
The right to freedom of expression is not absolute, as recognized by the
international instruments which restrict it. Both national and transnational
judicial bodies recognize that it is subject to the requirements of necessity and
proportionality. 4
1. A restriction must be necessary in order to achieve a legitimate purpose
Babbage restricts material it deems "offensive" and "contrary to public
morals." The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has included
information that may "offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of its
population" within the category of protected free speech. 5 In dealing with
protected speech, Babbage cannot meet the necessity test unless the restrictions
are proportionate to some compelling interest. Notwithstanding Babbage' s local
conditions, the ECtHR has preferred objective judicial assessment of necessity
over subjective state assessment.6
2. A restriction must be proportionate to its legitimate objective
To be proportionate, the objective must be achieved by the least intrusive
means possible. Babbage's code is unacceptably broad. First, the legislation
and the ISPs' "provider-end" filtering software remove user choice, and in
doing so fail to distinguish between adults and children, which they must do.'7
Secondly, they do not make exceptions for material of scientific or artistic
value, access to which is a right. 8
Less intrusive means of restricting hate-speech and pornography were open
to Babbage, such as providing a defense of reasonable compliance. As there can
be no justification for avoidably restricting scientific material, literature and
other non-defamatory material, Babbage must fail the proportionality test.
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, http://www.cidh.oas.org/declaration.htm (last visited Oct.
4, 2002); African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 7, available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/zlafchar.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
14. ICCPR, supra note 11; Human Rights Committee Decisions; Convention, supra note 13;
Supreme Court of the United States; Faurisson v. Fr., Communication No. 550/1993, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (1996), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/VWS55058.htm
(last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
15. Handyside v. U.K., I Eur. Ct. H.R. 737, at proc. 50 (1976); Lingens v. Aus., 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407,
at proc. 41 (1986).
16. Sunday Times v. U.K. (no. 2), 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 229 (1992).
17. ACLU v. Reno 929 F Supp 824 at 854 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
18. ICCPR, supra note 11.
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The vagueness of "offensive in nature to the public morals" leads to
potentially indeterminate liability. In Babbage, this criminal prohibition has had
a chilling effect,' 9 resulting in private ISPs imposing overly broad filtering
restrictions.2 ° Both parties agree that sites that are neither pornographic nor
defamatory in intent have been blocked. The measures taken by the ISPs are
thus a direct consequence of the legislation, and are hence open to this Court's
scrutiny.
The restrictions must also be effective in achieving the desired purpose in
order to be justified. The very nature of the Internet means that blocking
software can be circumvented, and the information accessed and then
disseminated by alternative means. Babbage's law is insufficiently effective to
justify the restrictions on valuable material.
For Babbage' s limitations to be "prescribed by law," the law must be clear
enough for citizens to know with reasonable certainty the likely consequences
of a particular action.2' The vagueness of "offensive in nature to the public
morals" prevents this.22 This law's vagueness chills free expression.
3. The Internet's impact justifies minimal restrictions
The ECtHR has recognized that what is an acceptable restriction on free
expression varies with different media, and that the medium's "potential
impact" is an important factor.23 The Internet is a new and unique medium
deserving of special protection. 24 Its interactive and pro-democratic character
means that it should be subject to fewer restrictions than other media.25
Further, state practice favors minimal state regulation of the Internet. This
is appropriate as users largely elect the material they view. With the exception
of child pornography, many states do not prohibit adult access to pornography
in their Internet and media legislation. Babbage has acted paternalistically in
failing to give its citizens choice where the medium allows it.
19. Babbage Criminal Code, § 117(a).
20. Regardless of Frontiers, Global Internet Liberty Campaign Report, 2002, at 27, available at
http://www.cdt.org/gilclreport.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
21. Sunday Times v. U.K., 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245 (1979); Autronic AG v. Switz., available at
http://www.hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewHtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
22. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 854.
23. Jersild v. Den., 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. I (ser. A) No. 298 (1995).
24. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 854.
25. Id. at 873, 883.
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V. BABBAGE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LOSS SUFFERED BY TOL
Babbage is responsible for an internationally wrongful act, and has a duty
to make reparations because the IBCP's hacking is (a) attributable to Babbage
and (b) a breach of an international obligation owed by Babbage.26
A. The Claim Brought by Turingia for the Damage to TOL is Admissible
1. Turingia may exercise its right of diplomatic protection of TOL because
at the time of the hacking TOL was (and still is) a national of Turingia
Companies may be nationals for the purpose of diplomatic protection.27
There is a genuine and substantial connection between TOL and Turingia.28 As
a private company based in Turingia, it is likely that its place of incorporation
and residency for taxation purposes, its head office and administrative organs
are in Turingia.29 This close and permanent connection is not weakened by
TOL's commercial activities overseas.3°
2. There are no available and effective remedies open to TOL in Babbage
The requirement that local remedies must be exhausted may come within
the jurisdictional waiver. Alternatively, as litigants need only exhaust such
remedies as are available and effective, 31 TOL has discharged its duty under the
rule. There are no laws in force in Babbage dealing specifically with
cybercrime. Although a remedy may exist in the general law, the transnational
nature of the hacking and harm make any such remedy inappropriate.
Further, the Babbagian proclamation on the IBCP and the readiness of
President Revuluri to use his law-making powers regarding the Internet are
evidence that the Babbagian courts are, in effect, subordinate to the Babbagian
executive on this issue. When the prevailing conditions make the courts
26. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, International Law
Commission, 53rd Sess., G.A. Supp. No. 10 (A/56/10) (2001); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, at 29 (May 1980).
27. LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 425 (5th ed. 1998).
28. Nottebohm (Second Phase) (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, at 23 (Apr.1955); Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd., 1970 I.C.J. at 42.
29. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd., 1970 I.C.J at 42.
30. Id.; Special Agreement between the Republic of Turingia (Applicant) and the Republic of
Babbage (Respondent) on the differences between them concerning regulation of access to the internet
(Compromis), 5.
31. Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, at 38-39 (July 1957); Finnish Shipowners
Arbitration (Fin. v. U.K.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1479, at 1504 (1934).
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subordinate to the executive, any domestic remedies are considered to be
ineffective.3
2
B. The Actions of the IBCP Are Attributable to Babbage
The IBCP's hacking into TOL should be attributed to Babbage as Babbage
acknowledged, exploited and adopted the IBCP's acts.
1. The cumulative effect of Babbage's conduct amounts to an adoption of
the hacking for which Babbage is responsible
States may become responsible at customary international law for acts ex
post facto.33 Article 11 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles
on State Responsibility (Draft Articles) recognizes that acts of private persons
shall be attributed to the state "to the extent that the State acknowledges and
adopts the conduct in question as its own." In this respect there must be more
than a mere endorsement or acknowledgement.34 Babbage expressed its support
for the hacking in several ways. After the ICBP had publicly acknowledged
responsibility for the hacking, President Revuluri granted them "full amnesty,"
and expressed Babbage's gratitude to the IBCP. In another unqualified and
unequivocal act, the IBCP members were rewarded with Babbagian national
honors. These acts, taken in sum, constituted an acknowledgement and
adoption of the acts of the IBCP, if not a policy of adoption. The President's
statement on December 19, 1999 may have encouraged the commission of acts
against TOL. While states may publicly endorse acts without attracting
responsibility for them, Babbage went beyond mere support by capitalizing on
and exploiting the hacking for its national benefit. Exploitation, if not a
necessary condition, is certainly sufficient. 35
2. An act may be adopted after it has been executed
As recognized in Article 11 of the Draft Articles, a state is deemed
responsible for an act adopted ex post facto as if it was involved from the act's
32. See Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law (1990) 196-7 and 242-4; Browns Claim
(1923) RIAA, vi, 120.
33. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26;
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3; Lighthouses Arbitration (1956)
R.I.A.A., xii, 155.
34. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3; Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
35. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3. See also United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, supra note 26
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inception.36 Article 11 is not qualified expressly or implicitly by any reference
to a "continuous act."
The adoption doctrine must be both legally and logically distinct from
authorization. 3 Article 11 would be rendered redundant if only continuing acts
could be adopted, as the rules of authorization cover such acts from the point of
state involvement. It is therefore consistent with the law on state responsibility
to find that Babbage has adopted the hacking of the IBCP notwithstanding that
the hacking had ended before its adoption.
3. If a continuing act is required, Babbage's amnesty will apply to IBCP
hacking in the future, thereby facilitating such conduct. Thus Babbage has
effectively adopted this hacking ex ante
On its face, the grant of full amnesty applied not only to the 1999 hacking
but also to any future hacking committed by the ICBP. In effect, Babbage has
thus adopted any such acts ex ante.
C. The IBCP's Attack on TOL was an Internationally Wrongful Act
1. Babbage has breached the customary international
law prohibition against cybercrime
a. There is a prohibition against cybercrime at customary
international law
Since the early 1990s, rapidly evolving state practice has established a
customary prohibition on cybercrime. Prohibitions on unlawful access to and/or
interference with computer data have now been enacted in at least thirty-eight
states.38 The most recent multilateral development is the Convention on
Cybercrime 2001 39 which has already attracted the signatures of thirty-two
states since being opened for signature in November 2001.40 The evident
willingness of states to rapidly assume international legal obligations in this
field is compelling evidence of both the momentum and extent of state practice
36. See J.G. STARKE& I.A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 275 (11 th ed. 1994).
37. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
38. Stein Schjolberg, The Legal Framework-Unauthorized Access to Computer Systems: Penal
Legislation in 44 Countries, at www.mossbyrett.of.no/info/legallhtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
39. Convention on Cybercrime-Budapest, ETS No. 185, at
http://book.coe.int/GB/CATILlVIHTM/I 1860.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
40. See Convention on Cybercrime, at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/searching.asp?NT= 185&CM=&DF= (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
20021
272 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 9:257
and convergent opinio juris. Such opinio juris is also expressed by those
transnational institutions that emphasise the need to fight cybercrime." 1
Although state practice regarding cybercrime is less noticeable outside of
developed Western states, the comparative technological ascendancy of the
West has simply generated a greater incidence of cybercrime warranting
regulation. In this regard, evidence of customary law is properly to be
ascertained by reference to those states "specially affected" by cybercrime. 42
b. Babbage breached the prohibition against cybercrime
The two activities consistently proscribed in both domestic and
international legal provisions on cybercrime are unlawful access to, and
interference with, data. These prohibitions therefore represent the irreducible
core of customary law.43 The IBCP breached international law twice by both
illegally accessing and deleting TOL's data.44
2. The hacking attributed to Babbage was an act of expropriation
Subject to limitations, states have the right to expropriate foreign-owned
property at international law.45 Expropriation encompasses acts that fall short
of transferred ownership or possession. 46 Babbage has deprived TOL of its
capacity to fulfill its subscription contracts by interfering with its informational
assets.
a. The concept of property for expropriation purposes
includes contractual rights
Expropriation has been recognized as extending to "any right which can
be the object of a commercial transaction, ie, freely bought and sold, and thus
has a monetary value., 4 7 This definition from Amoco, the culmination of the
Iran-US Claims Tribunal's jurisprudence on contractual expropriation, is widely
41. OECD Expert Committee Recommendation, 1973; Resolution No. 3 on the Fight Against
Cyber-Crime, available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal-affairs/LegaLco-operation/Conferences-andhigh-
level (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
42. N. Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 42-43.
43. See Convention on Cybercrime-Budapest, supra note 39; Art. 3211-3321 of the French Penal
Code; German Penal Code §§ 203, 303(a), (b); Electronic Commerce Act, ch. 426 (2002) (Malta); Republic
Act No. 8792, sec. 33 (2000) (Phil.).
44. Compromis, supra 30, at 14.
45. G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/c-natres.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002); BROWNLIE, supra note 27 at
535.
46. M. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 575 (4th ed. 1997).
47. Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. CTR 189, at 108 (1987).
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supported.48 Babbage has expropriated TOL's contractual rights by interfering
With its capacity to fulfill these contracts.
Alternatively, if the Court considers that contractual expropriation must be
contingent on some physical interference, Babbage's deletion of TOL's data
was such an interference. TOL was thereby deprived of the ability to honor its
contractual obligations.49
b. Measures falling short of direct divestiture qualify as
"expropriations"50
"Constructive expropriation" is widely recognized in case law and state
practice." This occurs when the "events demonstrate that the owner was
deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that deprivation was
not merely ephemeral. 52 Here TOL was deprived of its informational assets,
an interference constituting a taking for the purposes of expropriation because
TOL was prevented from enjoying its property. 53 TOL's ability to rebuild its
assets from backed-up data does not diminish the interference in any way. The
"reality of [the] impact" of the interference and its "effects" on TOL are more
important than the government's intent and the form of the interference. "
While Babbage expropriated TOL' s property in Turingia, the territorial location
of expropriation is not determinative. Although expropriation is typically
associated with the nationalization context," the same principles must apply to
other interferences causing a deprivation of property. By its nature cyberspace
knows no territorial limitations and international law must adapt to this new
medium.
48. Mobile Oil Iran Inc. v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. CTR 3, at 25 (1987); Anglo-Iranian Oil (U.K. v. Iran),
1951 I.C.J. 89 (July 1951), as per the United Kingdom's government pleadings; Starrett Housing Corp. v.
Iran, 23 I.L.M. 1090, 1115 (Sept. 1984); Shufeldt Claim (U.S. v. Guat.) 2 R.I.A.A. 1083, at 1097 (1930).
49. Starrett Housing Corp., 23 I.L.M. at 1115.
50. For example, Sedco Inc., v. NIOC, 9 Iran-U.S. CTR 248 (1985); Kalamazoo Spice Extraction
Co., v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Eth., 86 I.L.R. 45 (1984).
51. 1964 BPIL 200.
52. Tippetts v. TAMS-ATTA (1985) 6 Iran-US CTR 219, at 225 (1985).
53. Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens, 55 A.J.I.L. 548, 553 (1961); Starrett Housing Corp., 23 I.L.M. at 1115; Third U.S.
Restatement on Foreign Relations Law, vol. U1, 712.
54. Tippetts, 6 Iran-U.S. CTR at 226.
55. For example, Starrett Housing Corp., 23 I.L.M. at 1116-117; Tippetts, 6 Iran-U.S. CTR at 226;
Amoco, 15 Iran-U.S. CTR at$ 108.
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c. Babbage must compensate Turingia for the full market value of TOL's
failure to provide consumer services
Expropriation has always required full market value compensation. 6
Although several UNGA resolutions in the 1960s and 1970s refer to a more
flexible standard of "appropriate compensation,"57 consideration of the "content
and conditions of [their] adoption"58 reveal their inadequacy as evidence of new
customary international law. These resolutions received insufficiently
widespread support, especially amongst capital-exporting states, to indicate the
emergence of a new standard.59 Moreover, the act of expropriation in the
present case falls outside the ambit of these resolutions, which were intended to
apply to the nationalization of natural resources.6° On this basis, Babbage must
compensate Turingia fifty million dollars, the full market value of the lost
subscription services.
D. Turingia is Entitled to $50M Damages to Compensate it for the TOL Loss
Having breached an international obligation, Babbage has a duty to make
reparations which "wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act" and restore
the status quo ante." But for the hacking, TOL would not have been required
to pay out fifty million dollars to its customers.
VI. TURINGIA Is NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DAMAGE CAUSED TO BABBAGE
RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY (BRTA), NOR FOR ANY HARM RESULTING FROM
SUCH DAMAGE
A. The Acts of David Gabrius are Not Attributable to Babbage
Gabrius is not formally affiliated with the Turingian government. Prima
facie, the acts of a private individual are not attributable to the state under
international law.62 Further, Gabrius' conduct cannot be imputed to Turingia.
56. Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 46-48 (Sept. 1928); Sedco Inc.,
9 Iran-U.S. CTR at 248; Amoco, 15 Iran-U.S. CTR at 108.
57. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962) available at
http://wwwI.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/c2pnsr.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002), G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. GAOR,
28th Sess., at 239, U.N. Doc. A/9400 (1974), G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., at 255, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3281 (1975).
58. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 809, 826
(July 1996).
59. See Texaco v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 389, at 488-89 (1977); Sedco Inc., 9 Iran-U.S. CTR at 248.
60. Sedco Inc., 9 Iran-U.S. CTR at 634.
61. Chorzow Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 46-48; Spanish Zone in Morocco Claims 2
R.I.A.A., ii, 615, at 641 (1925); SHAW, supra note 46, at 641.
62. Commentary to Draft Articles, supra note 26, at 103.
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1. Turingia did not authorize Gabrius' acts
Authorization requires acts to be done under the instruction, direction or
control of the state.63 The Turingian Minister of Justice's statement on
December 29, 1999 did not authorize Gabrius' hacking. It was simply an
expression of opinion as to a lack of jurisdiction to prosecute, a point reiterated
after the attack.' A high degree of association between the state and a private
action is required to engage state responsibility.65 If the heavy US involvement
in Nicaragua was insufficient in this regard, the general and ambiguous
statement of the Minister surely cannot qualify as an authorization.66 Where a
variable degree of control has been recognized, "overall control going beyond
the mere financing and equipping of.. .forces" is still required.67
Even if the statement is construed as a promise of amnesty, this was limited
to acts causing an inconvenience to the government of Babbage of a kind
similar to that caused by the IBCP. The deletion of an entire railroad network's
operating system fell outside the scope of any authorization.
2. Turingia did not adopt Gabrius' conduct
Turingia's failure to prosecute Gabrius does not amount to
acknowledgement and adoption of his conduct as its own. 68 Even if this could
be seen as endorsing Gabrius' conduct, it is insufficient to constitute an
adoption. 69 Accordingly, Turingia cannot be held responsible for the actions of
Gabrius.
B. Gabrius' Conduct did not Constitute a Breach of a Relevant International
Obligation
1. There is no customary international prohibition on terrorism
While certain categories of terrorist activities are the subject of specific
conventions, 70 there is neither a comprehensive convention on terrorism per se
63. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
64. Compromis, supra note 30, at 22.
65. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 97-98.
66. Id. at 60-62.
67. Id.
68. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
69. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, supra note 26.
70. International Convention , Against the Taking of Hostages (1979), available at
http://www.undcp.org/odccp/terrorism-convention-hostages.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2002); International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (1998), available at
http://www.undcp.org/odccp/terrorism-convention-terrorist bombing.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
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nor even an agreed definition of the term." Significantly, the Statute of the
International Criminal Court, which purports to be declaratory of customary
international law, does not include terrorism as a discrete international crime.72
2. The actions of Gabrius were not an unlawful intervention
According to the principle of non-intervention, no state has the right "to
intervene.. .in the internal or external affairs of any other state. ' 73 States are
prohibited from intervening in matters in which states are deemed to have free
choice by virtue of their sovereignty.
74
The acts directed against the BRTA were aimed neither at "the
subordination of the exercise of [Babbage's] sovereign rights" nor the
"undermining of its socio-political system." 7 5 Gabrius' acts do not fall within
this prohibition.
3. The actions of Gabrius were not a use of force
Hacking into the BRTA computer network and deleting the operating
system cannot be considered a use of force contrary to the prohibition in Article
2(4) of the UN Charter. That prohibition only embraces the use of armed force
against another state. 76 Non-armed acts, such as those of Gabrius, are outside
the scope of the rule. The international community equates the use of armed
force with acts of aggression, which is hardly the situation here.77
4. However, if the Court were to find the existence of an internationally
wrongful act, the wrongfulness is precluded in the circumstances
a. Gabrius' acts constituted a lawful countermeasure
In certain circumstances, a state may take countermeasures against a state
that would be unlawful were they not in response to a prior violation by that
71. Libyan Arab Republic 726 F2d 774, 785 (DC Cir 1984).
72. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
73. U.N. Declaration on Intervention, 5 I.L.M. 374, 375-76 (Mar. 1966); United Nations Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, 9 I.L.M.
1292, at 1296 (Nov. 1970); Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 107.
74. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 107.
75. Inadmissibility of the Policy of State Terrorism and any Actions by States Aimed at
Undermining the Socio-political System in Other Sovereign States, available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39/a39rl59.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
76. GOODRICH, HAMBRO, & SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 49 (3rd ed. 1969).
77. See G.A. Res. 3314, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/3314.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
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state.78 While the Draft Articles recognize only non-forcible measures,79 the ICJ
in Nicaragua "suggested" that proportionate forcible countermeasures would
be available in response to acts involving the use of force.80 Thus, even if
Gabrius' hacking is deemed a "use of force," it is consistent with international
law. Alternatively, if lawful countermeasures must be non-forcible, Gabrius'
acts do not involve the use of force, in that they fall well short of the terms of
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.8'
Since Babbage has breached several international obligations owed to
Turingia, including the obligation to make reparations for a wrong, the
preconditions for a lawful countermeasure are satisfied.82
To be justified, countermeasures must meet the requirement of
proportionality.83 It has been recognized that countermeasures taken in a similar
field to the original act meet the proportionality requirement, even if these have
a severe impact. 84 Similar reasoning may be applied to Gabrius' "hacking"
which mirrored that of the IBCP. Importantly, the scope of the countermeasure
extends only to the loss of automated rail traffic control. As the train collision
and casualties were not "caused" by the acts against the BRTA,85 they are
excluded from any assessment of proportionality.
C. Injuries Not Caused By Unlawful Act
Even if it has committed an international wrong, Turingia is only
responsible for the injuries caused by that violation. Causation may be satisfied
in respect of damage to the BRTA computer system. In relation to the train
collision and loss of life, however, there is no sufficiently direct, foreseeable or
proximate relationship between Gabrius' acts and the injury to satisfy the
requirements of causation at international law. 86 The crash was the culmination
of a number of improbable circumstances.87 The route was a mountain pass,88
reducing visual contact between trains and emergency stopping time. Being a
78. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 55-56 (Sept. 1997); Nauililaa (Port.
v. Ger.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1011, at 1025-26 (1928); Air Serv. Agreement (Fr. v. U.S.), 18 R.I.A.A. 416, at 443-46
(Mar. 1979); Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
79. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
80. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 109-110.
81. Id. at 19.
82. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.CJ. at 107, Part B; Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
83. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
84. Air Serv. Agreement, 18 R.I.A.A. at 443-46.
85. Infra p. 17, point I11 C.
86. Venable Claim, 4 R.I.A.A. 219, at 225 (1927); Naulilaa, 2 R.I.A.A. at 1031.
87. Naulilaa, 2 R.I.A.A. at 1031.
88. Compromis, supra note 30, at 1 21.
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heavily used route there was less time to put into proper effect the default radio
control system. 89 The absence of any effective fallback mechanism was itself
improbable.
The damage and fatalities are sufficiently divorced from the initial
"hacking" into the BRTA network so as to be categorized as "too indirect,
remote and uncertain" 9° for Turingia to be held causally responsible.
VII. THE LURING OF GABRIUS VIOLATED THE SOVEREIGNTY OF TURINGIA
A. The Luring of Gabrius to Babbage Violated the Territorial Sovereignty of
Turingia
1. Extraterritorial criminal enforcement
The exercise of sovereign powers by one state in the territory of another is
prohibited at customary international law.9' In the absence of consent by the
asylum state, pursuing criminal enforcement measures such as the abduction of
a suspect from within the territory of that state clearly contravenes this
prohibition.92
2. Male captus bene detentus does not undermine the prohibition
While some states' domestic courts have continued to assert jurisdiction
over suspects seized in breach of international law, states must "justify their
conduct by reference to a new right" at international law in orer to modify or
create exceptions to established customary law.93 Domestic courts employing
the male captus bene detentus doctrine have, however, tended to do so on the
basis of domestic precedent rather than international law94 and have even
acknowledged that conduct excused by the doctrine may be contrary to
international law.95 Thus, the opinio juris underpinning the customary
89. Id. at$ 20.
90. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. 1095, at 1931 (1938, 1941).
91. S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 34-35; OPPENHEIM;S INTERNATIONAL LAW 295 (H
Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
92. Paul Michell, Article, English-Speaking Justice: Evolving Responses to Transnational Forcible
Abduction After Alvarez-Machain, 29 CORNELL INT' L L.J. 383, 410 (1996); Legal Opinion on the Decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Alvarez-Machain Case, Inter-American Judicial Committee 13 H.R.L.J. 395
(1992); Virginia Morris and M. -Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, Current Development: The Work of the
Sixth Committee at the Forty-Eighth Session of the UN General Assembly, 88 A.J.I.L. 343, 357-78 (1994).
93. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C. J. at 108-09.
94. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 505 U.S. 655 (1992); Levinge v. Dir. Of Custodial Serv.,
9 N.S.W.L.R. 546 (Ca. 1987).
95. Alvarez-Machain, 505 U.S. at 667; In re Hartnett I O.R. 2d 206, 209 (1973).
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prohibition on extraterritorial criminal enforcement remains undisturbed by this
practice.
3. Breach of Turingian territorial sovereignty - aeroplane and aircrew
The Ministerial signing of the assurance to Gabrius, the presence of the
Babbagian law enforcement officers at the airport, and the hiring of the aircraft
and crew by the government implicate senior Babbagian officials in the luring
of Gabrius, thus engaging state responsibility for the luring itself. From the
moment of the deceptive assurance, the criminal enforcement operation against
Gabrius was effectively a continuous act. The participation of the Babbagian-
funded aircrew in this continuous operation ensured that a key element of
Babbage's sovereign act was performed both in Turingian airspace96 and on
Turingian soil, thus violating Turingian territorial sovereignty.97
4. Turingia did not consent to the transborder criminal enforcement
There is no breach of territorial sovereignty if the asylum state consents to
the relevant transborder criminal enforcement action.98 However, Turingian
officials were unaware of the purpose of the Babbagian chartered flight and
immediately protested on discovering the deception. As such, Turingia cannot
be said to have waived its sovereign rights.
5. Babbage's unilateral execution of criminal enforcement measures violates
the principle of non-intervention
a. Babbage has interfered with. Turingia' s prosecutorial and
political integrity
The principle of non-intervention protects the authority of states to make
free choices about matters within their sovereign jurisdiction.99 The pursuit of
criminal enforcement measures is a sovereign act. °° Political integrity is also
to be respected at international law."'0 Turingia decided at the highest level of
government that it had neither the jurisdiction nor the inclination to prosecute
Gabrius. 10 2 Babbage's luring of Gabrius thus constituted a direct interference
with Turingia' s regulation of its sovereign legal and political affairs.
96. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 127-28.
97. See Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic, Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused
Slavko Dokmanovic, No. IT-95-13a-PT, T Ch. 11, 22 (Oct. 1997).
98. Michell, supra note 92, at 420.
99. Id. at 15.
100. Id. at 18.
101. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 106.
102. Compromis, supra note 30, at 19, 22.
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b. The equivalence of deception and coercion
Although the ICJ in Nicaragua referred to an element of coercion within
the prohibition against non-intervention, it confined its exposition of principle
to those elements necessary to the case before it.' °3 The sovereign freedom of
state decision-making, the core principle protected by the prohibition, 04 may be
imperiled equally by the use of force or fraud. Moreover, unlike consensual
extradition processes, unilateral extraterritorial criminal enforcement measures
such as abduction or luring inherently interfere in the internal affairs of other
states. In fraudulently undermining high-level Turingian legal and political
decisions, Babbage subordinated Turingia's sovereign will in a manner
inconsistent with the sovereign equality of states.' 5
B. The Luring of Gabrius Violated His Human Rights
1. Babbage was prohibited from arbitrarily arresting
Gabrius at international law
Like freedom of expression, the prohibition against arbitrary arrest has
crystallized into customary international law, 0 6 as evidenced by an equally
formidable body of domestic and transnational human rights instruments.0 7
Alternatively, even if the prohibition is not a part of international custom, it is
sufficiently fundamental to the ICCPR that its breach will necessarily entail a
violation of Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 8
Without such a prohibition, freedom of expression, the rule of law and other
incidents of a democracy are substantially undermined.
a. Babbage's arrest of Gabrius was "arbitrary"
Babbage's arrest of Gabrius was arbitrary, and hence contrary to
international law, on four separate grounds. First, the arbitrariness criterion
103. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 108.
104. Id.
105. United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States, supra note 73.
106. See Id. at 3-4.
107. See UDHR, art. 9, supra note 10, ICCPR, supra note 11, at art. 9(1); African [Banjul] Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 13; Convention, supra note 13, at art. 5(l); American Convention
on Human Rights "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," supra note 13, at art. 7; Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, supra note 12, at art. 9 See N.Z. Bill of Rights, art. 9, available at
http://www.uniwuerzburg.de/law/nzOlOOO_.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).
108. See supra at 2 and 3.
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encompasses any legal deprivation that is unjust, unpredictable, manifestly
disproportionate, discriminatory, or inappropriate to the circumstances of the
case. 9  It is difficult to imagine an arrest more unpredictable than one
following an explicit governmental assurance of immunity.
Secondly, forcible abduction has been deemed manifestly arbitrary in the
case law. °"0 Nothing in principle distinguishes luring, as fraudulent inducement
"robs the victim of the power of autonomous decision and action as surely as
does physical coercion."''. If viewed in the positive terms of the right to liberty,
both luring and abduction deprive an arrested fugitive of the power to exercise
that right in autonomous fashion. Thus luring is "arbitrary."
Thirdly, a continuum of coercion has been recognized as informing the
prohibition on arbitrary arrest." 2 Unlike situations where police have been
given leeway to exploit a criminal's own greed," 3 the Babbagian assurance was
coercive in preying on Gabrius' goodwill and feeling of responsibility for the
unfortunate events in Babbage. If the use of such "moral" coercion is deemed
consistent with international human rights norms, in the future hackers will only
be deterred from providing potentially valuable assistance to governments The
deterrence of international co-operation is particularly unfortunate in the case
of developing nations with simplistic technological infrastructures, like
Babbage, which could well benefit from assistance provided by those
responsible for any such damage.
Fourthly, arrests circumventing established procedures for obtaining
custody, such as extradition treaties, have also been deemed manifestly
arbitrary." 4 Extradition processes contain significant due process safeguards for
the accused, and hence have an important human rights dimension." 5 By
contrast, unilateral measures such as abduction or luring are completely
unconstrained, the very definition of "arbitrary.""' 6  The absence of an
extradition treaty between Babbage and Turingia cannot excuse the
employment of unilateral, arbitrary measures.
2. The high court of Babbage breached a further aspect of the right
A necessary corollary of the right to liberty, recognized in Article 9(4) of the
ICCPR, is the right of an accused to obtain an order for release in the event of
109. Prosecutor, No. 1T-95-13A-PT, T Ch. II at 484; M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: CCPR Commentary, at 173 (1993).
110. Prosecutor, No. IT-95-13A-PT, T Ch. II at 487.
Ill. In re Schmidt I AC at 359 per Sedley J (1995).
112. Prosecutor, No. IT-95-13A-PT, T Ch. II at 483; Michell, supra note 92, at 490-91.
113. Liangsiriprasert v. United States, I AC 225, at 243 (PC) (1991).
114. Prosecutor, No. IT-95-13A-PT, T Ch. II at 487; Nowak, supra note 109, at 173.
115. Michell, supra note 92, at 437-38.
116. Miriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, available at www.n-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary.
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an arbitrary arrest. The refusal of the Babbagian high court on appeal to make
such an order, despite the prior conduct of the criminal enforcement authorities,
thus constitutes an independent breach of customary international law.
C. Babbage Was Estopped From Prosecuting Gabrius
1. Babbage may not resile from its legal undertaking
The ICJ has recognized that states may bind themselves to a course of
conduct via unilateral undertakings." 7 To be legally effective, the undertaking
must be given publicly, with an intention to be bound." 8 The intent behind an
alleged undertaking must be assessed in the context of the principle of good
faith, with the trust and confidence inherent in international co-operation
implying that interested states may place confidence in unilateral declarations." 9
Ultimately, the substance and context of such statements determines their legal
effect. '20
a. Babbage was bound by its undertaking not to prosecute or harm
Gabrius
The statement was publicly made by a Minister competent to speak for the
Babbagian government on prosecutorial matters.'2 ' Even if Babbage never
intended to be bound by its assurance, the unambiguous content of the statement
is determinative. There was no reason for Gabrius to doubt the sincerity of the
plea for assistance. In accordance with the principle of good faith, Babbage
must be held to its public undertaking.
Although deemed unnecessary in the Nuclear Tests case, 22 any
requirement of a valid offer and acceptance 123 would be satisfied on the facts.
Gabrius clearly offered his services by way of consideration for the promise of
immunity.
117. Nuclear Tests (Aust. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 332-33 (Dec. 1974); Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J at 130-
31.
118. Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. at 332-33.
119. Id. at 334.
120. Id. at 336.
121. Compromis, supra note 30, at 23; See also Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. at 332-33.
122. Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. at 332-33.
123. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 131-32.
Distinguished Brief
D. Babbage is Obliged to Restore Gabrius to Turingia
1. Babbage is obliged at international law to return Gabrius to Turingia
International law stipulates that the injured state should be returned to the
status quo ante following a breach so as to "re-establish the situation which
would ...have existed if that act had not been committed."'24 An application of
the preference expressed in Chorzow Factory for "[r]estitution in kind"' 25
requires that Babbage return Gabrius, who was arrested in breach of Turingian
sovereignty and Gabrius' human rights, to Turingia. The return of Gabrius
would also be consistent with state practice in cases of illegal rendition.
26
Turingia's immediate protest also rebuts any question of waiver of a claim to
restitution.1
27
VIII. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Turingia respectfully asks this Court to declare and adjudge that:
1. Babbage's broad restrictions on access to Internet-available resources, its
extension of its criminal code to the Internet, and its application of the
code to Turingia OnLine and Babbage Online, violate international law.
2. Babbage is responsible for the loss suffered by Turingia Online and is
liable to pay damages in the sum of fifty million dollars.
3. Turingia is not responsible for the damage caused to the Babbage Rail
Transit Authority or for any harm resulting from such damage, in particular
the train crash resulting in loss of life.
4. Babbage's luring, arrest, trial and conviction of a Turingian citizen, David
Garbrius, violated international law.
5. David Gabrius must immediately be released and repatriated.
Respectfully submitted,
Agents for Turingia.
124. Chorzow Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 46-48. See also Texaco, 53 I.L.R. 389;
Michell, supra note 92, at 419.
125. Chorzow Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 46-48.
126. Michell, supra note 92, at 424-27 and accompanying footnotes.
127. See BROWNLIE, supra note 27, at 31; Michell, supra note 92, at 420-27; Compromis, supra note
30, at 25.
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Turingia and the Republic of Babbage have brought their
case before this Court by notification of the Special Agreement as provided for
by Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The Court
has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article 36(2) of the said Statute.
1H. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Turingia is a large, developed state with a highly educated and
technologically literate population. Babbage is a smaller developing state, with
little infrastructure, although the availability of Internet access for Babbagian
citizens has increased markedly in recent years. In 1994, the Babbagian
government promulgated a new Criminal Code. Section 117 of the Code
prohibited the publication of indecent material, which was defined to include
material targeted at and designed to offend members of a particular ethnic
group, and material offensive to the public morality of Babbage. On September
25 1999, the head of Babbage's government, President Revuluri, issued a
Presidential Declaration extending the legal scope of section 117 to embrace
material published or distributed on the Internet, and ordering all Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) operating in Babbage to eliminate any user access to
material which would violate section 117. Within two weeks of the Declaration,
all but one of the ISPs operating in Babbage employed restrictive blocking
software to comply with the legal prohibition in section 117. Such software also
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prohibited users from accessing sites of historical and medical interest, and
blocked other sites which were neither pornographic nor defamatory in intent.
Babbage OnLine (BOL), the dominant ISP in the Babbagian market and a
subsidiary of a Turingian-based company, Turingia OnLine (TOL), refused to
comply with the Presidential Declaration on grounds articulated by TOL's Chief
Executive Officer, namely its inconsistency with the international right to
freedom of expression. Charges were laid and proceedings successfully brought
against BOL and TOL. In order to protect its property against forfeiture, BOL
closed down its operations in Babbage and removed its assets. President
Revuluri warned that Babbage would not permit TOL to escape responsibility
for its actions.
On December 24 1999, a computer programmer illegally hacked into
TOL's computer system, erased the data which comprised TOL's pubiically
available websites and deleted the system programmes that controlled TOL's
worldwide network. The effect was to deny TOL's subscribers access to the
Internet for three days, for which TOL was later required to reimburse its
customers in the amount of 50 million dollars.
On December 27, 1999, once the TOL website had been restored, a hidden
computer virus was activated. The virus disrupted normal computer operations,
resulting in the loss of unsaved data. Certain files containing words commonly
used in hate speech were deleted. In addition, an e-mail indicating the political
motivations of the group was sent to all subscribers. The International
Babbagian Cyber-Patrol (IBCP) later claimed responsibility for the attack.
On December 29 1999, President Revuluri issued a proclamation in which
he conferred orders .of merit on the members of the IBCP, thanked and praised
the group, and also promised them a full amnesty from prosecution in the
Babbagian courts.
Following the IBCP attack, Josephine Shidle, the Minister of Justice of
Turingia, confirmed that no action was planned by the Turingian government
by way of response. She did, however, publicly state her opinion that should
a Turingian citizen inconvenience the government of Babbage through non-
violent means, Turingia would have no jurisdiction to prosecute. Subsequently,
David Gabrius, a Turingian citizen, hacked into the Babbage Rail Transit
Authority (BRTA) and deleted its operating system. The effect of this was to
eliminate all automated rail traffic control functions for two days, reducing
traffic control to radio contact. In the immediate confusion following in the
wake of the hacking, two trains traveling in opposite directions on a heavily-
used mountain pass crashed into each other, causing fatalities. Turingia
reiterated its decision not to prosecute Gabrius.
Following a joint request by the BRTA Administrator and the Minister of
Justice of Babbage, Tara Elis, that Gabrius come to Babbage to assist with the
repair of the BRTA, and on the express assurance that he would not face
20021
294 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 9:289
prosecution if he did so, Gabrius agreed to go to Babbage. A plane was
chartered by the Government of Babbage to transport Gabrius from Turingia.
However, the request for help was in fact a deliberate ruse constructed for the
purpose of luring Gabrius to Babbage, and on arrival at Babbage International
Airport, the Babbagian national police were waiting to arrest Gabrius. Despite
objections by Turingia as to the manner of the arrest and to the absence of any
right of Babbage to assert jurisdiction over Gabrius, Gabrius was charged, put
on trial and convicted for the murder of the 200 victims of the train collision and
sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.
Under mounting international pressure, Babbage and Turingia have agreed
to submit this dispute to the International Court of Justice.
III. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether Babbage's legislation exceeds its jurisdiction at international law?
2. Whether Babbage's legislation violates the right to freedom of expression
at international law?
3. Whether Babbage is responsible for an internationally wrongful act in
respect of the IBCP's hacking?
4. Whether Babbage is obliged to provide compensation for the IBCP's
interference with TOL' s contractual rights under the law of expropriation?
5. Whether the luring of Gabrius to Babbage violates Turingia's sovereignty?
6. Whether the luring of Gabrius to Babbage violates his human rights?
IV. SUMMARY OF THE PLEADINGS
1. Babbage's legislation is inconsistent with the right to freedom of
expression found in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), which Babbage has signed but not yet ratified.
Babbage is bound by Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties not to act so as to defeat the purpose and object of the ICCPR,
which it has done by imposing broad restrictive provisions on the
publication of indecent materials, thereby impinging on a fundamental
human right. Alternatively, Babbage's legislation has breached a right to
free speech that exists independently at customary international law.
Whilst the right, whether founded in treaty or custom, is not absolute and
may be subject to reasonable limitations assessed on the criteria of
necessity and proportionality, the Babbagian legislation fails on these
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criteria, principally because it is overly broad in its reach and is not the
least intrusive means of achieving the legitimate objective. Hence, it
exceeds what is an acceptable restriction of the right at international law.
2. Babbage is responsible for the loss suffered by TOL because the IBCP's
"cyberactivities" are both attributable to Babbage and in breach of
international obligations owed by Babbage. A state may become
responsible for acts ex post facto where the conduct of the state is such that
it may be seen to have adopted and acknowledged the acts as its own., The
contents of the Presidential proclamation constituted an adoption and
acknowledgement of the activities of the IBCP for the purposes of
attribution. The IBCP attack on TOL, specifically the actions of hacking
into TOL and destroying data, violated the customary prohibition on
cybercrimes. The same actions can also be conceptualized as an
expropriation of TOL's capacity to fulfill its contractual obligations,
necessitating TOL's US$50 million reimbursement of subscribers.
Babbage must make reparations for the loss accordingly.
3. Turingia is not responsible for the damage sustained by the BRTA, as it is
not responsible for the private actions of Gabrius against the BRTA.
While a state may be held responsible for the acts of individuals in various
circumstances, none is applicable to the present case. The statement of the
Minister cannot amount to prior authorization for the purposes of
attribution, as it does not evidence the requisite degree of association. Nor
can the failure to prosecute Gabrius constitute an implicit acknowledgment
or adoption so as to make Turingia subsequently liable for his acts.
Moreover, the actions of Gabrius do not violate any relevant legal
obligation. There is no international prohibition on terrorism, and Gabrius'
acts cannot fall within established prohibitions on the use of force or
unlawful intervention. In any event, the actions may be viewed as
legitimate countermeasures. Furthermore, even if Turingia were
responsible for the actions against the BRTA, this would not extend to
liability for the damage sustained in the train collision, such an injury
being insufficiently causally related to the initial act.
4. The subsequent luring of Gabrius to Babbage was in clear breach of the
territorial sovereignty of Turingia and as such was contrary to international
customary law. Additionally, the luring contravened the customary
prohibition on non-intervention in that it constituted a direct interference
with Turingia's regulation of its sovereign legal and political affairs.
Moreover, the luring was an arbitrary arrest which was in clear violation
of Gabrius' human rights. The manner of the arrest qualified as arbitrary
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because of the unpredictable, coercive nature of the arrest and its
equivalence to forcible abduction. Babbage is also estopped from
prosecuting Gabrius because it is bound by its prior assurance that it would
refrain from doing so, that assurance having the requisite characteristics of
a legally binding undertaking. In view of Babbage's wrongful conduct,
Babbage is obliged to return Gabrius to Turingia.
A. Babbage's Broad Restrictions on the Internet Violate International Law
1. Turingia Has Jus Standi Before the International Court of Justice to
Challenge Babbage's Breach of an Internationally Recognized Right to
Freedom of Speech
a. TOL has a right to impart information
Turingia can claim standing on the grounds that TOL, which we must infer
is a national of Turingia, has a right to impart the types of information that have
been restricted.' The TOL server in Turingia provides original content as well
as transmitting non-original information.
b. The principles and rules regarding basic human rights are
obligations erga omnes, thereby giving Turingia standing to intervene
This Court has held principles and rules concerning basic human rights to
be obligations erga omnes, binding on all states and opposable against any
state.2 The entire international community is obliged to observe and protect
human rights and all states have "a legal interest in their protection." Turingia
thus has standing to intervene on behalf of a non-national to preserve human
rights.
B. Babbage's Extension of its Legislation to the Internet Exceeds its
Jurisdication
1. The Internet is a common space that is not amenable to jurisdiction
Babbage's exercise of jurisdiction over the medium of the Internet is
unreasonable given that it is undefined territory at international law. It is similar
I. G.A. Res. 1997/26, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/40 (1998), available
at http://www.unhchr.chIHuidocdaIHuridocda.nsf/TestFrame/7599319fO2ece82dcl256608004 (last visited
Oct. 4, 2002).
2. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain) (1970) ICJ 3, 42 (Feb. 1970).
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to outer space prior to its regulation.' Until a specific regime is formulated,
Babbage should not act contrary to accepted jurisdictional principles. If this
Court were to extend prescriptive jurisdiction into cyberspace, it would be
formulating rather than declaring law, contrary to its Statute.4
2. In any case, Babbage cannot fulfill any conventional jurisdictional
requirements •
Any enforcement of Babbage's legislation entails a necessary breach of
law, because it is inconsistent with all five conventional principles of
prescriptive jurisdiction.5
Neither the nationality principle nor the subjective territoriality principles
applies to publishers in foreign countries. While some effects of the proscribed
acts occurred within Babbage, any territorial connection is too oblique for the
purposes of the objective territoriality principle. The passive nationality
principle is far from accepted at international law and, even if established, the
exercise of jurisdiction on this basis would be disproportionate to the gravity of
the crime. Such acceptance as it has gained has been largely confined to
terrorism and other internationally condemned crimes.6 The security principle
could not be extended to protect "public morals" without broadening the
principle so as to assert jurisdiction over an indeterminate range of offences,
especially in the context of the Internet. This would undermine state
sovereignty.
C. Babbage's Legislation is in Violation ofArticle 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties
1. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties binds
Babbage
Article 19 of the ICCPR protects freedom of expression. Babbage has
signed but not ratified the ICCPR. Pursuant to Article 18 of the Vienna
3. M. Balsano, An International Legal Instrument for Cyberspace? A Comparative Analysis with
the Law of Outer Space in Padirac (ed.), The International Dimensions of Cyberspace Law, UNESCO (2000)
at 128-130 (2000).
4. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Ch. M, art. 59, available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/Statute/contents.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
5. C. Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law
(1999).
6. S. S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 PCIJ (ser A) No. 10, at 82 (Sept. 1927); United States v. Yunis,
681 F Supp 896 (D.D.C. 1988).
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Convention, which Babbage has ratified, it may not curtail free expression so
as to defeat the object and purpose of the ICCPR.
Violating a seminal right, such as freedom of expression, strikes at the
object and purpose of any international human rights instrument. The
fundamental character of this right has been affirmed in domestic constitutions
and by various institutions in the international community, including the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) which declared it to be "the touchstone of
all freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated." 7 It has been further
recognized as underpinning democracy itself.8
Here, the breach of Article 19 is so broad as to breach several other rights,
including the rights to cultural participation, scientific advancement, and
arbitrary interference with correspondence. Such a wide-ranging breach
threatens the object and purpose of the ICCPR.
Further, the obligations at customary law corresponding to Article 18
require parties to do nothing which may diminish the significance of a treaty's
provisions before its entry into force.9 In restricting Article 19 in such a broad
manner, Babbage has done this.
D. Freedom of Expression is a Recognized Human Right
Customary international law requires the co-existence of settled state
practice and opinio juris.'° The right to freedom of expression, including the
rights to receive and impart information "regardless of frontiers," is embodied
in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR. "
The willingness of states to submit to reports by the United Nations Special
Rapporteur and the fact that a diverse majority of states provide constitutional
protection for freedom of expression evidences strong opiniojuris. 12 In addition
7. G.A. Res., UN GAOR, Ist Sess, at 2, UN Doc A/64 (1947); available at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2002); Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
Constitution Act, 1982, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2002); Report of
the Experts' Meeting on Cyberspace Law, G.A. Res. 36, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc.
CII/USP/ECY/99/01 (1998).
8. Compulsory Membership, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory opinion OC-C5/85
(Nov. 13,1965).
9. Megalidis v. Turk., 8 Recueil des Decisions des Tribunaux Mixtes 386 (1928).
10. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ 14 (June
1986) [hereinafter Nicaragua]; N. Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den., W. Ger. v. Neth.) 1969 ICJ 3 (Feb.
1969).
11. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), available at
http://un.org/Overview.rights.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXII), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1976) available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanarts/instree/b3ccpr.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002) [hereinafter ICCPR].
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, art. 1; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 7, at
art.29; EST. Const. ch. VI, art. 100.
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to its recognition in international human rights instruments, a formidable corpus
of regional instruments evidences broad state acceptance of the right to freedom
of expression.13
E. Babbage's Legislation Falls Outside the Reasonable Limits Imposed by
Customary International Law
The right to freedom of expression is not absolute, as recognized by the
international instruments which restrict it. Both national and transnational
judicial bodies recognize that it is subject to the requirements of necessity and
proportionality. 14
1. A restriction must be necessary in order to achieve a legitimate purpose
Babbage restricts material it deems "offensive" and "contrary to public
morals." The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has included
information that may "offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of its
population" within the category of protected free speech. "5 In dealing with
protected speech, Babbage cannot meet the necessity test unless the restrictions
are proportionate to some compelling interest. Notwithstanding Babbage' s local
conditions, the ECtHR has preferred objective judicial assessment of necessity
over subjective state assessment.6
2. A restriction must be proportionate to its legitimate objective
To be proportionate, the objective must be achieved by the least intrusive
means possible. Babbage's code is unacceptably broad. First, the legislation
and the ISPs' "provider-end" filtering software remove user choice, and in
doing so fail to distinguish between adults and children, which they must do.
17
13. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 1, 1998, art.
10 [hereinafter Convention]; American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," art. 13,
available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-32.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002); Inter-American
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, http://www.cidh.oas.org/declaration.htm (last visited Oct.
4, 2002); African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 7, available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z I afchar.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
14. ICCPR, supra note 11; Human Rights Committee Decisions; Convention, supra note 13;
Supreme Court of the United States; Faurisson v. Fr., Communication No. 550/1993, U.N. Doe.
CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (1996), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/VWS55058.htm
(last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
15. Handyside v. U.K., 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 737, at proc. 50(1976); Lingens v. Aus., 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407,
at proc. 41 (1986).
16. Sunday Times v. U.K. (no. 2), 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 229 (1992).
17. ACLU v. Reno 929 F Supp 824 at 854 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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Secondly, they do not make exceptions for material of scientific or artistic
value, access to which is a right. 8
Less intrusive means of restricting hate-speech and pornography were open
to Babbage, such as providing a defense of reasonable compliance. As there can
be no justification for avoidably restricting scientific material, literature and
other non-defamatory material, Babbage must fail the proportionality test.
The vagueness of "offensive in nature to the public morals" leads to
potentially indeterminate liability. In Babbage, this criminal prohibition has had
a chilling effect,'9 resulting in private ISPs imposing overly broad filtering
restrictions.2" Both parties agree that sites that are neither pornographic nor
defamatory in intent have been blocked. The measures taken by the ISPs are
thus a direct consequence of the legislation, and are hence open to this Court's
scrutiny.
The restrictions must also be effective in achieving the desired purpose in
order to be justified. The very nature of the Internet means that blocking
software can be circumvented, and the information accessed and then
disseminated by alternative means. Babbage's law is insufficiently effective to
justify the restrictions on valuable material.
For Babbage's limitations to be "prescribed by law," the law must be clear
enough for citizens to know with reasonable certainty the likely consequences
of a particular action.2' The vagueness of "offensive in nature to the public
morals" prevents this.22 This law's vagueness chills free expression.
3. The Internet's impact justifies minimal restrictions
The ECtHR has recognized that what is an acceptable restriction on free
expression varies with different media, and that the medium's "potential
impact" is an important factor.23 The Internet is a new and unique medium
deserving of special protection. 24 Its interactive and pro-democratic character
means that it should be subject to fewer restrictions than other media.25Further, state practice favors minimal state regulation of the Internet. This
is appropriate as users largely elect the material they view. With the exception
of child pornography, many states do not prohibit adult access to pornography
18. ICCPR, supra note 11.
19. Babbage Criminal Code, § 117(a).
20. Regardless of Frontiers, Global Internet Liberty Campaign Report, 2002, at 27, available at
http://www.cdt.org/gilc/report.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
21. Sunday Times v. U.K., 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245 (1979); Autronic AG v. Switz., available at
http://www.hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudocNiewHtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
22. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 854.
23. Jersild v. Den., 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. I (ser. A) No. 298 (1995).
24. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 854.
25. Id. at 873, 883.
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in their Internet and media legislation. Babbage has acted paternalistically in
failing to give its citizens choice where the medium allows it.
V. BABBAGE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE Loss SUFFERED BY TOL
Babbage is responsible for an internationally wrongful act, and has a duty
to make reparations because the IBCP's hacking is (a) attributable to Babbage
and (b) a breach of an international obligation owed by Babbage.26
A. The Claim Brought by Turingia for the Damage to TOL is Admissible
1. Turingia may exercise its right of diplomatic protection of TOL because
at the time of the hacking TOL was (and still is) a national of Turingia
Companies may be nationals for the purpose of diplomatic protection.27
There is a genuine and substantial connection between TOL and Turingia.28 As
a private company based in Turingia, it is likely that its place of incorporation
and residency for taxation purposes, its head office and administrative organs
are in Turingia 9 This close and permanent connection is not weakened by
TOL's commercial activities overseas.3 °
2. There are no available and effective remedies open to TOL in Babbage
The requirement that local remedies must be exhausted may come within
the jurisdictional waiver. Alternatively, as litigants need only exhaust such
remedies as are available and effective,3 TOL has discharged its duty under the
rule. There are no laws in force in Babbage dealing specifically with
cybercrime. Although a remedy may exist in the general law, the transnational
nature of the hacking and harm make any such remedy inappropriate.
Further, the Babbagian proclamation on the IBCP and the readiness of
President Revuluri to use his law-making powers regarding the Internet are
26. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, International Law
Commission, 53rd Sess., G.A. Supp. No. 10 (A/56/10) (2001); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, at 29 (May 1980).
27. LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 425 (5th ed. 1998).
28. Nottebohm (Second Phase) (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, at 23 (Apr.1955); Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd., 1970 I.C.J. at 42.
29. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd., 1970 I.C.J at 42.
30. Id.; Special Agreement between the Republic of Turingia (Applicant) and the Republic of
Babbage (Respondent) on the differences between them concerning regulation of access to the internet
(Compromis), [ 5.
31. Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, at 38-39 (July 1957); Finnish Shipowners
Arbitration (Fin. v. U.K.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1479, at 1504 (1934).
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evidence that the Babbagian courts are, in effect, subordinate to the Babbagian
executive on this issue. When the prevailing conditions make the courts
subordinate to the executive, any domestic remedies are considered to be
ineffective.3
2
B. The Actions of the IBCP Are Attributable to Babbage
The IBCP's hacking into TOL should be attributed to Babbage as Babbage
acknowledged, exploited and adopted the IBCP's acts.
1. The cumulative effect of Babbage's conduct amounts to an adoption of
the hacking for which Babbage is responsible
States may become responsible at customary international law for acts ex
post facto.33 Article 11 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles
on State Responsibility (Draft Articles) recognizes that acts of private persons
shall be attributed to the state "to the extent that the State acknowledges and
adopts the conduct in question as its own." In this respect there must be more
than a mere endorsement or acknowledgement. 34 Babbage expressed its support
for the hacking in several ways. After the ICBP had publicly acknowledged
responsibility for the hacking, President Revuluri granted them "full amnesty,"
and expressed Babbage's gratitude to the IBCP. In another unqualified and
unequivocal act, the IBCP members were rewarded with Babbagian national
honors. These acts, taken in sum, constituted an acknowledgement and
adoption of the acts of the IBCP, if not a policy of adoption. The President's
statement on December 19, 1999 may haVe encouraged the commission of acts
against TOL. While states may publicly endorse acts without attracting
responsibility for them, Babbage went beyond mere support by capitalizing on
and exploiting the hacking for its national benefit. Exploitation, if not a
necessary condition, is certainly sufficient.35
32. See Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law (1990) 196-7 and 242-4; Browns Claim
(1923) RIAA, vi, 120.
33. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26;
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3; Lighthouses Arbitration (1956)
R.I.A.A., xii, 155.
34. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3; Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
35. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3. See also United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, supra note 26
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2. An act may be adopted after it has been executed
As recognized in Article 11 of the Draft Articles, a state is deemed
responsible for an act adopted ex post facto as if it was involved from the act's
inception.36 Article 11 is not qualified expressly or implicitly by any reference
to a "continuous act."
The adoption doctrine must be both legally and logically distinct from
authorization. 37 Article 11 would be rendered redundant if only continuing acts
could be adopted, as the rules of authorization cover such acts from the point of
state involvement. It is therefore consistent with the law on state responsibility
to find that Babbage has adopted the hacking of the IBCP notwithstanding that
the hacking had ended before its adoption.
3. If a continuing act is required, Babbage's amnesty will apply to IBCP
hacking in the future, thereby facilitating such conduct. Thus Babbage has
effectively adopted this hacking ex ante
On its face, the grant of full amnesty applied not only to the 1999 hacking
but also to any future hacking committed by the ICBP. In effect, Babbage has
thus adopted any such acts ex ante.
C. The IBCP's Attack on TOL was an Internationally Wrongful Act
1. Babbage has breached the customary international law prohibition against
cybercrime
a. There is a prohibition against cybercrime at customary
international law
Since the early 1990s, rapidly evolving state practice has established a
customary prohibition on cybercrime. Prohibitions on unlawful access to and/or
interference with computer data have now been enacted in at least thirty-eight
states.38 The most recent multilateral development is the Convention on
Cybercrime 2001 39 which has already attracted the signatures of thirty-two
states since being opened for signature in November 2001 .40 The evident
willingness of states to rapidly assume international legal obligations in this
36. See J.G. STARKE & I.A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 275 (11 th ed. 1994).
37. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
38. Stein Schjolberg, The Legal Framework-Unauthorized Access to Computer Systems: Penal
Legislation in 44 Countries, at www.mossbyrett.of.no/info/legal/html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
39. Convention on Cybercrime-Budapest, ETS No. 185, at
http://book.coe.int/GB/CAT/LIV/HTM/1 1860.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
40. See Convention on Cybercrime, at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/searching.asp?NT= I 85&CM=&DF= (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
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field is compelling evidence of both the momentum and extent of state practice
and convergent opinio juris. Such opinio juris is also expressed by those
transnational institutions that emphasise the need to fight cybercrime.41
Although state practice regarding cybercrime is less noticeable outside of
developed Western states, the comparative technological ascendancy of the
West has simply generated a greater incidence of cybercrime warranting
regulation. In this regard, evidence of customary law is properly to be
ascertained by reference to those states "specially affected" by cybercrime. 42
b. Babbage breached the prohibition against cybercrime
The two activities consistently proscribed in both domestic and
international legal provisions on cybercrime are unlawful access to, and
interference with, data. These prohibitions therefore represent the irreducible
core of customary law.43 The IBCP breached international law twice by both
illegally accessing and deleting TOL's data.'
2. The hacking attributed to Babbage was an act of expropriation
Subject to limitations, states have the right to expropriate foreign-owned
property at international law.45 Expropriation encompasses acts that fall short
of transferred ownership or possession.46 Babbage has deprived TOL of its
capacity to fulfill its subscription contracts by interfering with its informational
assets.
a. The concept of property for expropriation purposes
includes contractual rights
Expropriation has been recognized as extending to "any right which can
be the object of a commercial transaction, ie, freely bought and sold, and thus
has a monetary value. '47 This definition from Amoco, the culmination of the
41. OECD Expert Committee Recommendation, 1973; Resolution No. 3 on the Fight Against
Cyber-Crime, available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/LegaLaffairs/Legalco-operation/Conferences and-high-
level (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
42. N. Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 42-43.
43. See Convention on Cybercrime-Budapest, supra note 39; Art. 3211-3321 of the French Penal
Code; German Penal Code §§ 203, 303(a), (b); Electronic Commerce Act, ch. 426 (2002) (Malta); Republic
Act No. 8792, sec. 33 (2000) (Phil.).
44. Compromis, supra 30, at 14.
45. G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/cnatres.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002); BROWNLIE, supra note 27 at
535.
46. M. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 575 (4th ed. 1997).
47. Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. CTR 189, at 108 (1987).
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Iran-US Claims Tribunal' s jurisprudence on contractual expropriation, is widely
supported. 48 Babbage has expropriated TOL's contractual rights by interfering
with its capacity to fulfill these contracts.
Alternatively, if the Court considers that contractual expropriation must be
contingent on some physical interference, Babbage's deletion of TOL's data
was such an interference. TOL was thereby deprived of the ability to honor its
contractual obligations.49
b. Measures falling short of direct divestiture qualify as
"expropriations"'5
"Constructive expropriation" is widely recognized in case law and state
practice.5  This occurs when the "events demonstrate that the owner was
deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that deprivation was
not merely ephemeral."52 Here TOL was deprived of its informational assets,
an interference constituting a taking for the purposes of expropriation because
TOL was prevented from enjoying its property.53 TOL's ability to rebuild its
assets from backed-up data does not diminish the interference in any way. The
"reality of [the] impact" of the interference and its "effects" on TOL are more
important than the government's intent and the form of the interference. "
While Babbage expropriated TOL's property in Turingia, the territorial
location of expropriation is not determinative. Although expropriation is
typically associated with the nationalization context, 55 the same principles must
apply to other interferences causing a deprivation of property. By its nature
cyberspace knows no territorial limitations and international law must adapt to
this new medium.
48. Mobile Oil Iran Inc. v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. CTR 3, at 25 (1987); Anglo-Iranian Oil (U.K. v. Iran),
1951 I.C.J. 89 (July 1951), as per the United Kingdom's government pleadings; Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran,
23 I.L.M. 1090, 1115 (Sept. 1984); Shufeldt Claim (U.S. v. Guat.) 2 R.I.A.A. 1083, at 1097 (1930).
49. Starrett Housing Corp., 23 I.L.M. at 1115.
50. For example, Sedco Inc., v. NIOC, 9 Iran-U.S. CTR 248 (1985); Kalamazoo Spice Extraction
Co., v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Eth., 86 I.L.R. 45 (1984).
51. 1964 BP1L 200.
52. Tippetts v. TAMS-ATTA (1985) 6 Iran-US CTR 219, at 225 (1985).
53. Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens, 55 A.J.I.L. 548, 553 (1961); Starrett Housing Corp., 23 I.L.M. at 1115; Third U.S.
Restatement on Foreign Relations Law, vol. H, 1 712.
54. Tippetts, 6 Iran-U.S. CTR at 226.
55. For example, Starrett Housing Corp., 23 I.L.M. at 1116-117; Tippetts, 6 Iran-U.S. CTR at 226;
Amoco, 15 Iran-U.S. CTR at 108.
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c. Babbage must compensate Turingia for the full market value of TOL's
failure to provide consumer services
Expropriation has always required full market value compensation. 6
Although several UNGA resolutions in the 1960s and 1970s refer to a more
flexible standard of "appropriate compensation, 57 consideration of the "content
and conditions of [their] adoption"58 reveal their inadequacy as evidence of new
customary international law. These resolutions received insufficiently
widespread support, especially amongst capital-exporting states, to indicate the
emergence of a new standard.59 Moreover, the act of expropriation in the
present case falls outside the ambit of these resolutions, which were intended to
apply to the nationalization of natural resources.6° On this basis, Babbage must
compensate Turingia fifty million dollars, the full market value of the lost
subscription services.
D. Turingia is Entitled to $50M Damages to Compensate it for the TOL Loss
Having breached an international obligation, Babbage has a duty to make
reparations which "wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act" and restore
the status quo ante.61 But for the hacking, TOL would not have been required
to pay out fifty million dollars to its customers.
VI. TURINGIA Is NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DAMAGE CAUSED TO BABBAGE
RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY (BRTA), NOR FOR ANY HARM RESULTING FROM
SUCH DAMAGE
A. The Acts of David Gabrius are Not Attributable to Babbage
Gabrius is not formally affiliated with the Turingian government. Prima
facie, the acts of a private individual are not attributable to the state under
international law.62 Further, Gabrius' conduct cannot be imputed to Turingia.
56. Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 46-48 (Sept. 1928); Sedco Inc.,
9 fran-U.S. CTR at 248; Amoco, 15 Iran-U.S. CTR at 108.
57. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962) available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/c2pnsr.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002), G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. GAOR,
28th Sess., at 239, U.N. Doc. A/9400 (1974), G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., at 255, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3281 (1975).
58. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 809, 826
(July 1996).
59. See Texaco v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 389, at 488-89 (1977); Sedco Inc., 9 Iran-U.S. CTR at 248.
60. Sedco Inc., 9 Iran-U.S. CTR at 634.
61. Chorzow Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 46-48; Spanish Zone in Morocco Claims 2
R.I.A.A., ii, 615, at 641 (1925); SHAW, supra note 46, at 641.
62. Commentary to Draft Articles, supra note 26, at 103.
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1. Turingia did not authorize Gabrius' acts
Authorization requires acts to be done under the instruction, direction or
control of the state.63 The Turingian Minister of Justice's statement on
December 29, 1999 did not authorize Gabrius' hacking. It was simply an
expression of opinion as to a lack of jurisdiction to prosecute, a point reiterated
after the attack.6 A high degree of association between the state and a private
action is required to engage state responsibility.65 If the heavy US involvement
in Nicaragua was insufficient in this regard, the general and ambiguous
statement of the Minister surely cannot qualify as an authorization.66 Where a
variable degree of control has been recognized, "overall control going beyond
the mere financing and equipping of.. .forces" is still required.67
Even if the statement is construed as a promise of amnesty, this was limited
to acts causing an inconvenience to the government of Babbage of a kind
similar to that caused by the IBCP. The deletion of an entire railroad network's
operating system fell outside the scope of any authorization.
2. Turingia did not adopt Gabrius' conduct
Turingia's failure to prosecute Gabrius does not amount to
acknowledgement and adoption of his conduct as its own.68 Even if this could
be seen as endorsing Gabrius' conduct, it is insufficient to constitute an
adoption. 69 Accordingly, Turingia cannot be held responsible for the actions of
Gabrius.
B. Gabrius' Conduct did not Constitute a Breach of a Relevant International
Obligation
1. There is no customary international prohibition on terrorism
While certain categories of terrorist activities are the subject of specific
conventions,7° there is neither a comprehensive convention on terrorism per se
63. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
64. Compromis, supra note 30, at 22.
65. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 97-98.
66. Id. at 60-62.
67. Id.
68. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
69. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, supra note 26.
70. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979), available at
http://www.undcp.org/odccp/terrorismconventionjhostages.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2002); International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (1998), available at
http://www.undcp.org/odccp/terrorism-conventionterroristbombing.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
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nor even an agreed definition of the term.7 Significantly, the Statute of the
International Criminal Court, which purports to be declaratory of customary
international law, does not include terrorism as a discrete international crime.72
2. The actions of Gabrius were not an unlawful intervention
According to the principle of non-intervention, no state has the right "to
intervene.. .in the internal or external affairs of any other state."73 States are
prohibited from intervening in matters in which states are deemed to have free
choice by virtue of their sovereignty.74
The acts directed against the BRTA were aimed neither at "the
subordination of the exercise of [Babbage's] sovereign rights" nor the
"undermining of its socio-political system." 5. Gabrius' acts do not fall within
this prohibition.
3. The actions of Gabrius were not a use of force
Hacking into the BRTA computer network and deleting the operating
system cannot be considered a use of force contrary to the prohibition in Article
2(4) of the UN Charter. That prohibition only embraces the use of armed force
against another state.76 Non-armed acts, such as those of Gabrius, are outside
the scope of the rule. The international community equates the use of armed
force with acts of aggression, which is hardly the situation here.77
4. However, if the Court were to find the existence of an internationally
wrongful act, the wrongfulness is precluded in the circumstances
a. Gabrius' acts constituted a lawful countermeasure
In certain circumstances, a state may take countermeasures against a state
that would be unlawful were they not in response to a prior violation by that
71. Libyan Arab Republic 726 F2d 774, 785 (DC Cir 1984).
72. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
73. U.N. Declaration on Intervention, 5 I.L.M. 374,375-76 (Mar. 1966); United Nations Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, 9 I.L.M.
1292, at 1296 (Nov. 1970); Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 107.
74. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 107.
75. Inadmissibility of the Policy of State Terrorism and any Actions by States Aimed at
Undermining the Socio-political System in Other Sovereign States, available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39/a39rl59.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
76. GOODRICH, HAMBRO, & SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 49 (3rd ed. 1969).
77. See G.A. Res. 3314, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/3314.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
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state.78 While the Draft Articles recognize only non-forcible measures,7 9 the ICJ
in Nicaragua "suggested" that proportionate forcible countermeasures would
be available in response to acts involving the use of force. 80 Thus, even if
Gabrius' hacking is deemed a "use of force," it is consistent with international
law. Alternatively, if lawful countermeasures must be non-forcible, Gabrius'
acts do not involve the use of force, in that they fall well short of the terms of
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.8
Since Babbage has breached several international obligations owed to
Turingia, including the obligation to make reparations for a wrong, the
preconditions for a lawful countermeasure are satisfied.82
To be justified, countermeasures must meet the requirement of
proportionality.83 It has been recognized that countermeasures taken in a similar
field to the original act meet the proportionality requirement, even if these have
a severe impact.84 Similar reasoning may be applied to Gabrius' "hacking"
which mirrored that of the IBCP. Importantly, the scope of the countermeasure
extends only to the loss of automated rail traffic control. As the train collision
and casualties were not "caused" by the acts against the BRTA,85 they are
excluded from any assessment of proportionality.
C. Injuries Not Caused By Unlawful Act
Even if it has committed an international wrong, Turingia is only
responsible for the injuries caused by that violation. Causation may be satisfied
in respect of damage to the BRTA computer system. In relation to the train
collision and loss of life, however, there is no sufficiently direct, foreseeable or
proximate relationship between Gabrius' acts and the injury to satisfy the
requirements of causation at international law.86 The crash was the culmination
of a number of improbable circumstances.87 The route was a mountain pass,88
reducing visual contact between trains and emergency stopping time. Being a
78. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 55-56 (Sept. 1997); Nauililaa (Port.
v. Ger.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1011, at 1025-26 (1928); Air Serv. Agreement (Fr. v. U.S.), 18 R.I.A.A. 416, at 443-46
(Mar. 1979); Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
79. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
80. Nicaragua, 1986 1.C.J. at 109-110.
81. Id. at 19.
82. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.CJ. at 107, Part B; Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
83. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
84. Air Serv. Agreement, 18 R.I.A.A. at 443-46.
85. Infra p. 17, point IIl C.
86. Venable Claim, 4 R.I.A.A. 219, at 225 (1927); Naulilaa, 2 R.I.A.A. at 1031.
87. Naulilaa, 2 R.I.A.A. at 1031.
88. Compromis, supra note 30, at 1 21.
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heavily used route there was less time to put into proper effect the default radio
control system.89 The absence of any.effective fallback mechanism was itself
improbable.
The damage and fatalities are sufficiently divorced from the initial
"hacking" into the BRTA network so as to be categorized as "too indirect,
remote and uncertain" 90 for Turingia to be held causally responsible.
VH. THE LURING OF GABRIUS VIOLATED THE SOVEREIGNTY OF TURINGIA
A. The Luring of Gabrius to Babbage Violated the Territorial Sovereignty of
Turingia
1. Extraterritorial criminal enforcement
The exercise of sovereign powers by one state in the territory of another is
prohibited at customary international law.9' In the absence of consent by the
asylum state, pursuing criminal enforcement measures such as the abduction of
a suspect from within the territory of that state clearly contravenes this
prohibition.92
2. Male captus bene detentus does not undermine the prohibition
While some states' domestic courts have continued to assert jurisdiction
over suspects seized in breach of international law, states must "justify their
conduct by reference to a new right" at international law in orer to modify or
create exceptions to established customary law.93 Domestic courts employing
the male captus bene detentus doctrine have, however, tended to do so on the
basis of domestic precedent rather than international law94 and have even
acknowledged that conduct excused by the doctrine may be contrary to
international law.95 Thus, the opinio juris underpinning the customary
89. Id. at 20.
90. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. 1095, at 1931 (1938, 1941).
91. S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 34-35; OPPENHEIM;S INTERNATIONAL LAW 295 (H
Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
92. Paul Michell, Article, English-Speaking Justice: Evolving Responses to Transnational Forcible
Abduction After Alvarez-Machain, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 383, 410 (1996); Legal Opinion on the Decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Alvarez-Machain Case, Inter-American Judicial Committee 13 H.R.L.J. 395
(1992); Virginia Morris and M. -Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, Current Development: The Work of the
Sixth Committee at the Forty-Eighth Session of the UN General Assembly, 88 A.J.I.L. 343, 357-78 (1994).
93. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C. J. at 108-09.
94. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 505 U.S. 655 (1992); Levinge v. Dir. Of Custodial Serv.,
9 N.S.W.L.R. 546 (Ca. 1987).
95. Alvarez-Machain. 505 U.S. at 667; In re Hartnett I O.R. 2d 206, 209 (1973).
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prohibition on extraterritorial criminal enforcement remains undisturbed by this
practice.
3. Breach of Turingian territorial sovereignty - aeroplane and aircrew
The Ministerial signing of the assurance to Gabrius, the presence of the
Babbagian law enforcement officers at the airport, and the hiring of the aircraft
and crew by the government implicate senior Babbagian officials in the luring
of Gabrius, thus engaging state responsibility for the luring itself. From the
moment of the deceptive assurance, the criminal enforcement operation against
Gabrius was effectively a continuous act. The participation of the Babbagian-
funded aircrew in this continuous operation ensured that a key element of
Babbage's sovereign act was performed both in Turingian airspace 96 and on
Turingian soil, thus violating Turingian territorial sovereignty. 97
4. Turingia did not consent to the transborder criminal enforcement
There is no breach of territorial sovereignty if the asylum state consents to
the relevant transborder criminal enforcement action.98 However, Turingian
officials were unaware of the purpose of the Babbagian chartered flight and
immediately protested on discovering the deception. As such, Turingia cannot
be said to have waived its sovereign rights.
5. Babbage's unilateral execution of criminal enforcement measures violates
the principle of non-intervention
a. Babbage has interfered with Turingia' s prosecutorial and political
integrity
The principle of non-intervention protects the authority of states to make
free choices about matters within their sovereign jurisdiction.99 The pursuit of
criminal enforcement measures is a sovereign act."° Political integrity is also
to be respected at international law.'0 ' Turingia decided at the highest level of
government that it had neither the jurisdiction nor the inclination to prosecute
96. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 127-28.
97. See Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic, Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused
Slavko Dokmanovic, No. IT-95-13a-PT, T Ch. 11, 22 (Oct. 1997).
98. Michell, supra note 92, at 420.
99. Id. at 15.
100. Id. at 18.
101. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 106.
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Gabrius. 10 2 Babbage's luring of Gabrius thus constituted a direct interference
with Turingia' s regulation of its sovereign legal and political affairs.
b. The equivalence of deception and coercion
Although the ICJ in Nicaragua referred to an element of coercion within
the prohibition against non-intervention, it confined its exposition of principle
to those elements necessary to the case before it. °3 The sovereign freedom of
state decision-making, the core principle protected by the prohibition," may be
imperiled equally by the use of force or fraud. Moreover, unlike consensual
extradition processes, unilateral extraterritorial criminal enforcement measures
such as abduction or luring inherently interfere in the internal affairs of other
states. In fraudulently undermining high-level Turingian legal and political
decisions, Babbage subordinated Turingia's sovereign will in a manner
inconsistent with the sovereign equality of states. 1
05
B. The Luring of Gabrius Violated His Human Rights
1. Babbage was prohibited from arbitrarily arresting
Gabrius at international law
Like freedom of expression, the prohibition against arbitrary arrest has
crystallized into customary international law, 10 6 as evidenced by an equally
formidable body of domestic and transnational human rights instruments. 10
7
Alternatively, even if the prohibition is not a part of international custom, it is
sufficiently fundamental to the ICCPR that its breach will necessarily entail a
violation of Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.'
Without such a prohibition, freedom of expression, the rule of law and other
incidents of a democracy are substantially undermined.
102. Compromis, supra note 30, at9[ 19, 22.
103. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 108.
104. Id.
105. United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States, supra note 73.
106. See Id. at 3-4.
107. See UDHR, art. 9, supra note 10, ICCPR, supra note 11, at art. 9(1); African [Banjul] Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 13; Convention, supra note 13, at art. 5(1); American Convention
on Human Rights "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," supra note 13, at art. 7; Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, supra note 12, at art. 9 See N.Z. Bill of Rights, art. 9, available at
http://www.uniwuerzburg.de/law/nz0l000_.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).
108. See supra at 2 and 3.
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a. Babbage's arrest of Gabrius was "arbitrary"
Babbage's arrest of Gabrius was arbitrary, and hence contrary to
international law, on four separate grounds. First, the arbitrariness criterion
encompasses any legal deprivation that is unjust, unpredictable, manifestly
disproportionate, discriminatory, or inappropriate to the circumstances of the
case.'0 9 It is difficult to imagine an arrest more unpredictable than one
following an explicit governmental assurance of immunity.
Secondly, forcible abduction has been deemed manifestly arbitrary in the
case law. "' Nothing in principle distinguishes luring, as fraudulent inducement
"robs the victim of the power of autonomous decision and action as surely as
does physical coercion."''. If viewed in the positive terms of the right to liberty,
both luring and abduction deprive an arrested fugitive of the power to exercise
that right in autonomous fashion. Thus luring is "arbitrary."
Thirdly, a continuum of coercion has been recognized as informing the
prohibition on arbitrary arrest.' 12 Unlike situations where police have been
given leeway to exploit a criminal's own greed," 3 the Babbagian assurance was
coercive in preying on Gabrius' goodwill and feeling of responsibility for the
unfortunate events in Babbage. If the use of such "moral" coercion is deemed
consistent with international human rights norms, in the future hackers will only
be deterred from providing potentially valuable assistance to governments. The
deterrence of international co-operation is particularly unfortunate in the case
of developing nations with simplistic technological infrastructures, like
Babbage, which could well benefit from assistance provided by those
responsible for any such damage.
Fourthly, arrests circumventing established procedures for obtaining
custody, such as extradition treaties, have also been deemed manifestly
arbitrary." 4 Extradition processes contain significant due process safeguards for
the accused, and hence have an important human rights dimension." 5 By
contrast, unilateral measures such as abduction or luring are completely
unconstrained, the very definition of "arbitrary." '"1 6  The absence of an
extradition treaty between Babbage and Turingia cannot excuse the
employment of unilateral, arbitrary measures.
109. Prosecutor, No. IT-95-13A-PT, TCh. II at 484; M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: CCPR Commentary, at 173 (1993).
110. Prosecutor, No. IT-95-13A-PT, T Ch. 11 at 487.
Ill. In re Schmidt I AC at 359 per Sedley J (1995).
112. Prosecutor, No. IT-95-13A-PT, T Ch. II at 483; Michell, supra note 92, at 490-91.
113. Liangsiriprasert v. United States, I AC 225, at 243 (PC) (1991).
114. Prosecutor, No. IT-95-13A-PT, T Ch. II at 487; Nowak, supra note 109, at 173.
115. Michell, supra note 92, at 437-38.
116. Miriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, available at www.n-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary.
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2. The high court of Babbage breached a further aspect of the right
A necessary corollary of the right to liberty, recognized in Article 9(4) of
the ICCPR, is the right of an accused to obtain an order for release in the event
of an arbitrary arrest. The refusal of the Babbagian high court on appeal to
make such an order, despite the prior conduct of the criminal enforcement
authorities, thus constitutes an independent breach of customary international
law.
C. Babbage Was Estopped From Prosecuting Gabrius
1. Babbage may not resile from its legal undertaking
The ICJ has recognized that states may bind themselves to a course of
conduct via unilateral undertakings." 7 To be legally effective, the undertaking
must be given publicly, with an intention to be bound." 8 The intent behind an
alleged undertaking must be assessed in the context of the principle of good
faith, with the trust and confidence inherent in international co-operation
implying that interested states may place confidence in unilateral declarations. "9
Ultimately, the substance and context of such statements determines their legal
effect. 0
a. Babbage was bound by its undertaking not to prosecute or harm
Gabrius
The statement was publicly made by a Minister competent to speak for the
Babbagian government on prosecutorial matters.' 2 ' Even if Babbage never
intended to be bound by its assurance, the unambiguous content of the statement
is determinative. There was no reason for Gabrius to doubt the sincerity of the
plea for assistance. In accordance with the principle of good faith, Babbage
must be held to its public undertaking.
Although deemed unnecessary in the Nuclear Tests case, 122 any
requirement of a valid offer and acceptance 2 1 would be satisfied on the facts.
Gabrius clearly offered his services by way of consideration for the promise of
immunity.
117. Nuclear Tests (Aust. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 332-33 (Dec. 1974); Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J at 130-
31.
118. Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. at 332-33.
119. Id. at 334.
120. Id. at 336.
121. Compromis, supra note 30, at T 23; See also Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. at 332-33.
122. Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. at 332-33.
123. Nicaragua, 1986 L.C.J. at 131-32.
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D. Babbage is Obliged to Restore Gabrius to Turingia
1. Babbage is obliged at international law to return Gabrius to Turingia
International law stipulates that the injured state should be returned to the
status quo ante following a breach so as to "re-establish the situation which
would.. .have existed if that act had not been committed.' ' 24 An application of
the preference expressed in Chorzow Factory for "[r]estitution in kind"'' 25
requires that Babbage return Gabrius, who was arrested in breach of Turingian
sovereignty and Gabrius' human rights, to Turingia. The return of Gabrius
would also be consistent with state practice in cases of illegal rendition. 126
Turingia's immediate protest also rebuts any question of waiver of a claim to
restitution. 127
VIII. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Turingia respectfully asks this Court to declare and adjudge that:
1. Babbage's broad restrictions on access to Internet-available resources, its
extension of its criminal code to the Internet, and its application of the
code to Turingia OnLine and Babbage Online, violate international law.
2. Babbage is responsible for the loss suffered by Turingia Online and is
liable to pay damages in the sum of fifty million dollars.
3. Turingia is not responsible for the damage caused to the Babbage Rail
Transit Authority or for any harm resulting from such damage, in particular
the train crash resulting in loss of life.
4. Babbage's luring, arrest, trial and conviction of a Turingian citizen, David
Garbrius, violated international law.
5. David Gabrius must immediately be released and repatriated.
Respectfully submitted,
Agents for Turingia.
124. Chorzow Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 46-48. See also Texaco, 53 I.L.R. 389;
Michell, supra note 92, at 419.
125. Chorzow Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 46-48.
126. Michell, supra note 92, at 424-27 and accompanying footnotes.
127. See BROWNLIE, supra note 27, at 31; Michell, supra note 92, at 420-27; Compromis, supra note
30, at 125.
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